Are you looking at me?
The reciprocal gaze and art psychotherapy

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Abstract
This article explores and presents the reciprocal nature of looking between two objects, making the link between the reciprocity of the maternal gaze and the relationship between art object and spectator. I argue that the work of Lacan, in particular the theorising of the gaze as an objet petit a presses for the continued and further exploration into the possibilities of gaze transactions. As visual imagery is central to art psychotherapy, so is the interwoven act of looking that is caught in art making and viewing. I argue that gaze transactions brought about by the making and viewing of art can offer the opportunity for creating, re-establishing and working with lost, broken, and unavailable gazes in which the reciprocal gaze can occur.

Keywords
Maternal gaze, objet petit a, art therapy, reciprocity, aesthetics
Fig 1: Still from: *Le Voyage Dans La Lune* (1902) Directed by Georges Milies. France: Star Film.
From my work with children I have seen the use of external play and art materials used in what I have felt to be the visual creating, testing and a physical acting out of the reciprocal gaze. Through this paper I hope to explore the gaze from the early year’s maternal gaze of mother and baby to the relationship between looking at art and to see how these two acts of looking relate to one another and the practice of art therapy, with particular emphasis on the reciprocal nature of looking.

The gaze has been widely and importantly theorized by many including, Mulvey (2009), Rose (1986), Pollock (1988), Berger (1972, 1980) and O’Dwyer (2004). In art therapy there is an array of opportunities for the reciprocal gaze in any combination between client, artworks and therapist and the three ways relationship within art therapy has been well explored by Schaverien (2000). However it is the reciprocity or exchange of these interactions that I would like to explore further.

Winnicott’s (2005) chapter Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development, offers us the idea of the mother’s face as mirror for the infant with sight. Winnicott begins this paper by noting and defining the difference between Lacan’s Mirror Stage (1977) and Lacan’s work and his influence will be returned to later. For Winnicott the looking between mother and baby is part of the necessary Maternal Preoccupation required for the child. During this time the child is able to believe in its own omnipotence before the again necessary disillusionment can occur, and a sense of me and not-me can develop. For Winnicott “In individual emotional development the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face” (p.149) and what the baby is able to see in the face is dependent upon the mother’s ability to mirror and process the baby’s experience. If the mother is unable to mirror and process the baby’s experience for prolonged periods of time, the baby has several options, including trying to predict what the mirror may show, or working to avoid the mirror as it offers no form of regulation. Bick (1967) offers the infant observation of the baby who found some
containment in fixating on external objects when the presence of the caregiver was not a safe or manageable option.

In Adrian Stokes’ essay *Face and Anti-Face: A Fable* (1973) the narrator describes a generation of humans including himself who have grown sharp quills from their faces as a side effect of an injection. The quills cover the face and, if cut grow back with force. Because of this the face as the focal point has been replaced or, to quote Stokes, “dethroned” (p.99) – the stomach being fashionable as a substitute. As with Bick’s (1967) infant, in Stokes’s Fable we see the necessity to find an alternative face or imagined responsive object: in this story, the stomach.

From a Jungian perspective, Pinkola Eates (1992) responds to and retells Hans Christian Andersen’s tale of the Ugly Duckling. Using her own “eccentric version” (p.165) she tells of the duckling born into the wrong family, rejected and scorned by those around him. Not until he sees his reflection in the water and compares it to a beautiful family of swans does he find his true identity and home. The ugly duckling was a beautiful swan all along. In both the work of Bick (1967) and Stokes (1973) the infant and the narrator have had to use insufficient objects to relate to, but the story of the ugly duckling offers hope that there is often more than one opportunity or one person or group able to mirror the experiences of the individual, offering growth.

Before looking more closely at the work of Stern in *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (1985), Schore’s – *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self The Neurobiology of Emotional Development* (1994) and noting the work of Wright’s – *Vision and Separation Between Mother and Baby* (1991), it is worth noting that all book covers show images of the maternal gaze. Stern uses Mary Cassatt’s painting *Baby’s first Caress* (1890), Schore an unnamed pastel drawing and Wright a black and white photograph of the maternal gaze. Although all three texts encompass and describe much more than the maternal gaze, I would argue
that it is this image of mother and child that is able to illustrate and signal the first relationship. In a therapeutic sense all of these covers show embodied images of the maternal gaze.

Schore (1994) brings together and gives evidence from the research of neurobiology, development psychology including Stern (1985) and psychoanalysis. Heavily backed with research, in support of Winnicott (2005), Schore (1994) makes the case for the relationship between the visual experience of both the infant and caregiver and the resulting socioemotional development of the infant. He writes that the gaze behaviours and capabilities of the caregiver show the state of the part of the brain which is necessary to an individual's emotional processing - this being the right cortical hemisphere, the part of the brain connected to the reading of emotion as shown in the face of another. In the reciprocal gazing and mirroring activity the caregiver, if able, offers arousal and a merged state and then regulation of the infant's experience so that the infant is able to process and make socioemotional developmental use of the contact. Schore (1994) describes this thus: “In this way she provides optimal “chunking” of bits of socioemotional stimulation the child’s developing right hemispheric socioaffective information processing system can efficiently process" (p87).

Stern’s (1985) work brings together and welcomes the increase in knowledge brought about by infant observation and developmental psychology. In opposition to the psychoanalytic thinking seen clearly in the work of Mahler et al.’s (1975) infant in the symbiotic stage and Winnicott’s (1971) merged infant full of healthy omnipotence and illusion, Stern (1985) argues, with evidence from developmental psychology, that the infant has a much earlier sense of emerging and core self developing from birth. He states that “First comes the formation of self and other, and only then is the sense of merger-like experience possible” (p.70). Rather than passing through stages that have been grown out of, Stern’s infant builds layer upon layer, beginning with the emergent self. Eye contact and reciprocal gazing are woven into the early experience of the infant and part of
“The Caregivers repertoire” (Stern 1977, p.23). Stern writes how gaze behaviours of the infant enable an element of equality in this first relationship. It is between three to five months that the infant relies upon gazing behaviour as an important part of social communication, able to initiate, maintain, terminate and avoid social contact. Again, as with Winnicott’s (2005) mother/mirror, the infant’s ability to develop is dependent upon the caregiver, in this case the caregiver’s receptivity to the nuances of gaze behaviours and the reciprocity of the gaze.

We have seen, through this significant number of texts and level of research, the need, value and importance placed on an early reciprocal experience in this instance the act of reciprocal gazing. For me the work of Lacan (1977; 1981) bridges the maternal gaze and the reciprocal gaze when looking at art objects. Lacan’s (1977) Mirror Stage, theorised in *ECRITS A Selection*, tells us that as the clumsy toddler discovers his reflection in the mirror he constructs a sense of I based on the lie of the reflection. The mirror offers the child a sense and image of the body as a whole but this is at odds with fragmented experience of the uncoordinated body. To overcome this tension the infant identifies with the image the mirror offers and so begins the formation of the ego and move into the *imaginary order* based on a misunderstood sense of self. The child looks to the mother/big Other, *the symbolic* for confirmation of this image. And so the mirror stage continues to form the sense of I based on images from outside the child. This may include the projections of others - for example, ‘You’re a very angry boy’ as well as a mirror reflection or identification with another child.

For Lacan (1981) the gaze is an *objet petit a*. The work of others will be used to explore and unpick what this means including Zezek, (1992), Leader et al. (2010), Bowie (1991) and Evans (1996) as well as returning to the original text in *The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis*, Lacan (1981). In the algebraic language of Lacan, the *a* of the *objet petit a* stands for *autre* and so we are to understand the gaze in this case as a small object of the other. For Lacan the gaze is the object of the act of looking, the object of the scopic drive. So the gaze
as an *objet petit a* is a partial object of desire, which we search for from the Other.

In considering the gaze, I am separating out only one aspect of the early years experience and placing value on reciprocal gazing. In Bronfen’s (1996) Lacanian analysis of Michael Powell’s film *Peeping Tom* (1960) we are reminded of the danger of the gaze in the form of scopophilia. Bronfen writes: “For the scopophile or the exhibitionist, the eye responds to the erogenous zone, emerging as a surrogate for the genitals. Gazing takes the place of touching, indeed becomes an independent process, acting on its own, leading to a twisted form of penetrating the other...” (p.60). Through the film we are shown the intrusive gaze the protagonist Mark was subjected to by his father and the absence of his dead mother’s gaze that could have offered Mark the opportunity for ‘healthy’ primary narcissism or ‘good enough’ nurturing.

Recalling Lacan’s (1981) lecture on the gaze in order to understand the films of Alfred Hitchcock and pornography, the philosopher and analyst Zizek writes:

> ..the eye viewing the object is on the side of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object. When I look at an object, the object is already gazing at me and from a point at which I cannot see it. (1992, p.109)

I find remembering and understanding Lacan’s (1981) statement, “You never look at me from the place from which I see you” (p.103) as part of an intersubjective framework both of clinical and personal worth. In this exchange reciprocity is not automatic, instant or possibly ever possible and the subjective nature of looking and gazing is understood in the division of the subject and object.

Mavor (1998) begins her evocative article, *ODOR DI FEMINA: THOUGH YOU MAY NOT SEE HER, YOU CAN CERTAINLY SMELL HER*, exploring the
hierarchy within the senses that separates vision as the superior masculine sense against the senses which are gendered as feminine. Mavor looks to psychoanalytic theory, beginning with Freud and the work of his teacher Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpetriere Clinic to show the hierarchy placed upon the senses. Elkins (1996) has also looked at images from La Salpetriere and I will return to his work later. Mavor writes: “But the bottom line for Freud was that no matter who smelled what, it had something to do with the mother/feminine. Smell was to the feminine what the visual was to the masculine: odour, indeed, separated the girls from the boys” (p.65). Mavor (1998) then moves on to the work of Lacan, finding that the gaze no longer holds court amongst the senses when we consider the gaze as objet petit a.

The objet petit a is found in the relationship between the body and loss and included in the desire to recover this loss. In this we can consider Lacanian castration, in which the infant, in order to join the world of language, has to renounce the fantasy that the infant can fulfil the mother’s every need. This is the phallus, the name given to the object the male or female infant imagines the mother lacks, and the role the infant works to fill. The child then has to believe that filling this lack is not possible and the phallus has been lost. It is therefore the idea that a fragmentation of the phallus is contained within the objet petit a, within a gaze or voice or other manifestation, alongside the fantasy of once again being joined with mother and able to fulfil her every need/lack. The contradiction of the objet petit a is that desire contained within the objet petit a can never be reached as it has never really existed in the first place.

Mavor (1989) describes the objet petit a as holes, holes which we wish to fill in the other, as we originally tried with our mother and holes made within ourselves made by working to fill the hole of another, which we desire in turn to be filled by other. Mavor writes: “Lacan’s story of the objet petit a is a never-ending story: desire only creates more desire” (p67).
I now want to consider the gaze as *objet petit a* in relation to art making and viewing.

The work of Ettinger (2006a; 2006b), a painter, theorist and post Freudian/Lacanian Psychoanalyst, offers a feminist perspective and development in psychoanalytical thinking. Developing the language of Lacan, Ettinger offers the “Matrixial” as a pre-oedipal *encounter* and in critique of phallocentric theory. Ettinger’s *Matrixial Borderspace* begins and offers a pre-natal concept in which the I and non-I are not merged but neither are they fully separate. Ettinger’s *Matrixial Gaze* is of interest here, confirming in her writing the reciprocity of looking at art and relating it to an experience of maternal holding. In *Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Differerence* (2006a), Ettinger uses Freud’s case study of Dora (Richards 1972) to illustrate or interpret the *Matrixial gaze*. In clinical consultation Dora told Freud that she had stood for two hours in silence in front Raphael’s painting Sistine Madonna (1513) and was only able to describe her reason for looking at the painting for such a period of time because of “The Madonna”. From this, Freud interpreted that what Dora wanted was her father, Mr K., and, in the transference relationship, Freud himself. Ettinger says that it was at around this point that Dora stopped the therapeutic contract, and refers back to Lacan before going on to develop the *Matrixial gaze*, offering another option for the quality of the gaze within the *matrixial sphere*;

> In *What is a picture?* Jacques Lacan presents the gaze as *fascinum*. *Fascinum* is the unconscious element in the image that stops and freezes life. The gaze inside an image has such an arresting power because, as an unconscious *objet a*, it is a product of castration. (Ettinger 2006a, p.60)

*Fascinance* with an object can only take place when the object is receptive to “.....a real, traumatic or phantasmatic encounter event...” (Ettinger 2006a, p.61). For Ettinger the infant girl seeks *fascinance* within and from the relationship with the m/Other. When Dora stared at the painting, gazing at the Madonna for hours,
fascinance was able to occur. Within the Matrixial sphere Ettinger (2006a, p.63) interprets that “Gazing at the Madonna completed a mental move that the earlier, missed encounters had not accomplished”. Here Ettinger describes these possibilities:

More than looking at the Madonna, Dora was caught in the illusion that art images “know” how to create, namely, that the gaze is reciprocal. Therefore it was the Madonna that was looking at Dora and was fascinated by her. Such was this moment of matrixial fascinance where a few feminine figures met: a mother and a virgin, a woman and a girl. (Ettinger 2006a, p.62)

Although in theorising the matrixial sphere Ettinger (2006a; 2006b) offers a critique of Freud’s infamous case study, I wonder if the matrixial sphere containing the matrixial gaze could be seen in Freud’s psychosexual biography of Leonardo da Vinci (2001). In Chapter 4 of the text, Freud reviews both Leonardo’s most iconic painting, the Mona Lisa, painted circa 1503-1519 and Madonna and Child with St Anne, painted circa 1508. Freud (2001) interprets from these paintings Leonardo’s preoccupation with the smile of his mother from whom he was separated in his early childhood, arguing that it is the remembered smile of his mother that is repeated in both these paintings. In this second painting we see St Anne the mother of Mary and grandmother of the infant Jesus, gazing upon the second gaze in the painting, that between Mary and the infant Jesus. The initial psychosexual interpretation is that it depicts Leonardo’s infant life in his father’s home in showing his relationship to both his stepmother and grandmother but what Freud investigates, is the apparent similarity in age of St Anne and Mary. For Freud this painting shows Leonardo’s experience of having two mothers, St Anne representing the first maternal gaze of his mother, and the gaze of Mary representing that of his stepmother. Freud uses these paintings alongside a wrongly translated interpretation of a note left by Leonardo (this 2001 Routledge Classic edition includes the editor’s note showing that Freud translated the word ‘kite’ as ‘vulture’) to show the origins of Leonardo’s
homosexually in his relationship with his mother. Freud writes; “So, like all unsatisfied mothers, she took her little son in place of her husband, and by the too early maturing of his eroticism robbed him of part of his masculinity” (2001 p.73) but using the work of Ettinger (2006a; 2006b), we could understand Madonna and Child with St Anne as Leonardo's opportunity to create the matrixial sphere in which he recreates and negotiates the gazes of his two mothers. Although this interpretation is as presumptive as Freud's and could be criticised as such it also offers the opportunity to consider the possibilities for creating, re-establishing and working with lost, broken, and unavailable gazes within image making in which an illusion of the reciprocal gaze can manifest.

Staying with the work of Ettinger (2006b), in *The Matrixial Boarderspace* Ettinger explores the gaze as a phallic *objet petit a* and a matrixial *objet petit a*, contained within painting. Ettinger argues that the gaze part of the painting is what separates painting from other visual media and objects in the world. She writes:

“The viewer gets caught in the double twist of a passionate plane, joining the artist’s search for the gaze and the painting's denoting of the gaze-on condition that the viewer’s own desire has been aroused by looking at the painting, in response to the gaze.” (2006b, p.136)

In *Desire and the Female Therapist Engendered Gazes in Psychotherapy and Art Therapy*, Schaverien (1995) uses gaze theory to explore and extend the transference relationship with particular attention paid to erotic transference. Schaverien describes often seeing the quality of engagement described by Ettinger (2006b) within her clinical practice. Also using the work of Lacan (1981) and his description of the painter’s invitation to the viewer “...to lay down his gaze...” (p.101), Schaverien recalls observing members of art psychotherapy groups; “He/she merely gazes at his/her picture. The engagement with the image is still alive. This is more than just looking with the eye. There is a deep connection which holds the artist/viewer in thrall” (1995, p.202). It is possible to
connect this enthrallment to the infant observation and theory of Winnicott (2005) and Stern (1985). Schaverien continues; “It is often said of this stage that the picture is feeding back; it is also said that, in this stage of the process, the picture is mirroring or reflecting the inner world.” (1995, p.202) This again confirms this link between the early reciprocal maternal gaze and that of the art object and viewer. Schaverien asserts and calls for the importance of working with and considering the gaze, as does Wright (1991). In the case of Art Psychotherapy these gazes are an important and valuable part of the transference/countertranference relationship including art images made within the therapeutic contract.

In The Object Stares Back, Elkins (1996) writes with an accessibility not found in many of works by or referring to, Lacan. Elkins (1996) explores the possibility of objects being ready to receive our gaze, in fact asking to receive our gaze. Elkins looks around his study desk to describe his relationship to the objects waiting for his gaze; he questions why an old box is pushed to the side of desk. What does it mean for him to see the box and indeed for the box to see him? The box reminds him “…very, very gently and unconsciously, but also quite firmly…” (p.72) of certain aspects of himself. The box acts as a mirror, just as Winnicott (2005) describes the face of a mother doing. For Elkins to work at his desk he needs to keep this particular object at some distance: “I see myself being seen – seen again, without the thought ever crossing my mind – and I turn away, or I put some other object between my eyes and the box.” (p. 72) I am reminded here of a review session with a client who I will call C,

C looked through his folder of work made during the six week contract and came to a painting that he said he had never seen before and defiantly didn't belong to him....

For C this was very telling, as the image contained material he didn’t want to or was unable to consider. We can, like Elkins(1996), work to consider the objects
we choose to look at, glance over, avoid or stare at, not so that we can no longer look without questioning each gaze transaction, this would be exhausting if not debilitating, but instead to use the mirrors that are offered up to us if we so wish.

Elkins (1996) goes on to describe the transaction of seeing and being seen as being like a “cats cradle” (p.72) or threads from a spiders web. Seeing and being seen is two way reciprocal transaction, but this is something we can work hard to avoid in order to tell ourselves that we are in control of our own vision. I am thinking here of the lie of Lacan’s (1977; 1981) Mirror Stage and the contradiction of the objet petit a, and as Elkins describes here, what is avoided by understanding looking as a one way transaction:

I may not be coming to terms with the thought that I need these reciprocal gazes in order to go on being myself. Lacan was extreme about this, and he sometimes said that the idea we are unified selves is entirely fictional, a lie that we tell ourselves in order to keep going. (Elkins 1996, p.74)

Continuing the analogy of the web, for this Lacanian perspective, Elkins (1996) places us not as the spider making the web or the fly caught in the web, but as the web, moving in all directions with no part of sense of self that one can call our own. For here the observer and the object make one another. But this we can never really see for the protection of our own wellbeing, in fact in writing and thinking in this way I begin to feel both excited by the possibilities it offers but nervous and unsettled by its instability. From this perspective our world is full of gaze transactions and we manage this by believing that we are able to decide what we look at. Though for many involved in infant observation including Stern’s (1985) infant, we saw earlier that this is a very real experience; the infant partly makes sense of the world by actively making decisions about engagement and disengagement through the use of eye contact.

In *What the Spectator Sees*, Wollheim (1991) investigates the relationship
between the painter, the painting and the spectator. Taking particular interest in
the posture of the painter, he argues that the painter who “…paints with – that is,
partly with – his eyes” (p.101) works and stands in front of the painting, is able to
be both artist and spectator. In turn the spectator can experience himself as the
protagonist in the picture as well as painter and spectator. This “psychological
account” (p.103) suggests that the spectator can experience the pictorial
meaning of the painting through the intention and manner in which the painting
was made. In Painting after Art? Comments on Wollheim, Schier (1991)
examines the reciprocity found in Wollheim’s relationship between painter and
spectator. As a part of a response to the painting the spectator or audience
works to imagine the artist’s meaning, as the artist working and standing at the
same viewpoint as the audience works to think of and image her audience;
therefore, “A reciprocal bond of intimacy is established, between work and
viewer, when each side acknowledges fully the importance of the other’s
viewpoint” (Schier 1991, p53).

In Psychological Aesthetics by Maclagan (2001) we find reference to Wollheim’s
(1991) perspective. Whilst agreeing that the spectator creates the art work,
Maclagan calls for a more open and embodied exploration of the aesthetics of
painting as opposed to the classic psychosexual understanding of art of which
Freud’s (2001) Leonardo da Vinci is a classic example. For Maclagan (2001)
these perspectives limit the opportunity for exploration or “wandering about”
(p.36), in a painting.

Both Maclagan (2001) and Skaife (2001) promote the work of Merleau-Ponty
(1962, 1969) in relation to current art therapy practice, Skaife argues for the
suitability of intersubjectivity and an intersubjective framework for art therapy
groups and art making, she writes, “As in a conversation between people, what is
made has come from between, rather than just from ‘inside’ of the artist, or a
representation of the world out there…” (p.48). I am thinking here again of Elkins
(1996) “cats cradle” (p.72) of seeing and being seen, as relating to meaning
negotiated *between* two objects. Lacan (1981) also noted the influence of Merleau-Ponty in his writing on the gaze.

Isserow’s article *Looking together: Joint attention in art therapy* (2008) is another article from the International Journal of Art Therapy and makes reference to many of the texts which have come to understand and reflect upon the importance of the gaze in the early years of the child’s life, including Stern (1985) and Winnicott (2005). This article builds on the premise that, before we can look together, we need to be able to look at one another. This, he argues, is the move from a shared experience, the infant and caregiver’s reciprocal gaze, Winnicott’s (2005) Maternal Preoccupation, to that of knowing that other people have separate minds. Isserow (2008) uses two cases to explore this and calls for an integration of some of this research to the understanding of joint looking in art therapy, highlighting that when the joint looking is not possible the use of art materials may be used in creating a shared experience.

Isserow (2008) gives thanks to Damarell (1996) in his article and it is clear to see the influence of Damarell in Isserow’s thinking. Damarell’s (1996) article, *Just forging, or seeking love and approval? An investigation into the phenomenon of the forged art object and the copied picture in the art therapy involving people with learning disabilities* weaves together the practicality and physicality of the work of developmental psychologists in understanding and describing joint attention behaviours, including joint looking and “proto-declarative pointing” and the act of art making, with the theories of Winnicott (2005), Lacan (1981) and Ehrenzweig (1972). He writes:

> The initial use of the index finger (as in proto-declarative pointing) to say ‘I have noticed that, do you see it too?’ is later replaced by the particular image that say’s I have experienced this, I want you to see and know too (Damarell 1996, p45)
Exploring the copied or forged art work in relation to Winnicott’s (2005) false self Damarell describes feelings of disappointment as experienced in the transference relationship when copies of art works are made. This is related to the gaze of a mother who is unable to hide her disappointment in the child. Caught in this gaze of disappointment the child works to find a way of satisfying the other and begins an act of *self forgery*. Damarell warns against colluding with the presenting false self that is supported by a wider pressure for compliancy and calls instead to *see* or look together at the experience of the client.

O’Brien (2004) shows art making to be an activity connecting to, and coming from, the right hemisphere of the brain. This article connects the work of Shore (1994) and neurobiology to mess making in art therapy:

> The very messy products of abused children might come about because they are tapping into an undeveloped neurological structure where connections were not made. That emotion has not been regulated by the face-to-face interaction so essential to the earliest years of life would seem to have serious consequences. (O’Brien 2004, p11)

Reflecting on the reciprocal gaze I am reminded of the following song, a version of The Stargazers (1954) hit *I see the Moon* which was sung to me often enough that I still remember and think of the song today.

> I see the moon and the moon sees me
> High up above near the apple tree
> Please let the light that shines on me shine on the ones I love

> Over the mountains over the sea
> That’s where my true loves longing to be
> Please let the light that shines on me shine on the one I love
In this song I am told that when I look at an object the object looks back, or is already looking at me and that the light or gaze of the moon relates to the love of others. In *What the Moon Saw* (1866) Hans Christian Andersen also makes use of the reciprocal gaze of the Moon. When a struggling and lonely artist, living at the top of his new house, is greeted by the light and face of the Moon, the Moon offers inspiration for the painter as he retells what he has seen as the gaze of the Moon travels around the world. It is possible to interpret the reciprocal gaze between the Moon and the artist as bringing back or enabling the artist to make art, live a creative life and therefore play. This interpretation connects to Winnicott’s (2005) statement on playing and connects the reciprocal gaze to the work of the therapeutic relationship; “....The corollary of this is that where playing is not possible then the work done by the therapist is directed towards bringing the patient from a state of not being able to play into a state of being able to play” (p51).

I will end with the work of Winnicott (2005) who in theorising the mirror-role of the mother and family in child development gave credit to the level of nuance at work in gaze transactions. Winnicott writes, “All this is too easily taken for granted. I am asking that this which is naturally done well by mothers who are caring for their babies shall not be taken for granted” (p.151). I have explored some of the ways in which I feel the maternal gaze, and the gaze with which we look at art objects to be linked. I have found the work of those that do not underestimate or take for granted the complexity of the intersubjective reciprocal gaze, but theorise it in such a way that informs its continued importance and exploration, within art therapy.

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Biography
Heather Tuffery graduated with an MSc in Art Psychotherapy from Queen Margaret University this year having been on placement within a social work family centre. Heather previously gained a BA (Hons) in Fine Art and is an artist whose work relates to women’s craft, feminism, decoration and family history. Heather is currently working as an art therapist with children and the elderly in community and care settings.
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