What is the relationship between contemporary digital media and contemporary society? Is it possible to affirm that digital media are without sin and exist purely in a complex socio-political and economic context within which the users bring with them their ethical and cultural complexities? This issue, through a range of scholarly writings, analyzes the problems of ethics and sin within contemporary digital media frameworks.
Without Sin: Freedom and Taboo in Digital Media

Editorial Address
Leonardo Electronic Almanac
Sabanci University, Orhanli – Tuzla, 34956
Istanbul, Turkey

Email
info@leoalmanac.org

Web
» www.leoalmanac.org
» www.twitter.com/LEA_twitts
» www.flickr.com/photos/lea_gallery
» www.facebook.com/pages/Leonardo-Electronic-Almanac/209156896252

Copyright © 2013
Leonardo, the International Society for the Arts, Sciences and Technology

Leonardo Electronic Almanac is published by:
Leonardo/ISAST
211 Sutter Street, suite 501
San Francisco, CA 94108
USA

Leonardo Electronic Almanac (LEA) is a project of Leonardo/ISAST. For more information about Leonardo/ISAST’s publications and programs, see http://www.leonardo.info or contact isast@leonardo.info.

Leonardo Electronic Almanac is produced by Passero Productions.

Reposting of this journal is prohibited without permission of Leonardo/ISAST, except for the posting of news and events listings which have been independently received.

The individual articles included in the issue are © 2013 ISAST.
The Leonardo Electronic Almanac acknowledges the kind support for this issue of

Music Technology
B.M., M.M., Ph.D.
Including a new 3-Summer M.M.
Immersive Audio, Computer Music, Informatics, Cognition, Recording and Production
• Study with a premier faculty who are active in the local and international music field, including Juan Pablo Bello, Morwaread Farbood, Phil E. Galdston, Paul Geluso, Tae Hong Park, Kenneth Peacock, Agnieszka Roginska, Robert Rowe, S. Alex Ruthmann, Ronald Sadoff, David Schroeder, Mark Suozzo, and Julia Wolfe
• Work within a large and enriching university environment in the heart of New York City
• Have access to state-of-the-art facilities including the James L. Dolan Music Recording Studio, one of the most technologically advanced audio teaching facilities in the United States
• Collaborate with an outstanding variety of department performance groups, along with choreographers, visual artists, writers, filmmakers, and scholars in other fields
• Take advantage of special courses offered abroad and during the summer

Music Composition
B.M., M.M., Ph.D.
Concert Music, Jazz, Film Scoring, Electro-Acoustic, Songwriting

Visit www.steinhardt.nyu.edu/music or call 212 998 5424 to learn more.
Leonardo Electronic Almanac
Volume 19 Issue 4

10 POST-SOCIETY: DATA CAPTURE AND ERASURE ONE CLICK AT A TIME
Lanfranco Aceti

16 WITHOUT SIN: FREEDOM AND TABOO IN DIGITAL MEDIA
Donna Leishman

26 LIKE REALITY
Birgit Bachler

MEDIA, MEMORY, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
David R. Burns

52 DIFFERENTIAL SURVEILLANCE OF STUDENTS
Deborah Burns

66 ANA-MATERIALISM & THE PINEAL EYE: BECOMING MOUTH-BREAST
Johnny Golding

DANCING ON THE HEAD OF A SIN: TOUCH, DANCE AND TABOO
Sue Hawksley

100 “THERE MUST BE SOMETHING WRONG WITH THIS, SALLY...”
Ken Hollings

114 COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL ART PRACTICE
Smita Kheria

CURATING, PIRACY AND THE INTERNET EFFECT
Alana Kushnir

148 PRECARIOUS DESIGN
Donna Leishman

162 SEDUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND INADVERTENT VOYEURS EFFECT
Simone O’Callaghan

198 ANONYMOUS SOCIAL AS POLITICAL
Kriss Ravettti-Biagioli

CONTENT OSMOSIS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Don Ritter

220 RE-PROGRAM MY MIND
Debra Swack

236 THE PREMEDIATION OF IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN ART & DESIGN
Sandra Wilson & Lilia Gomez Flores

256 PORNOGRAPHY, ALTERITY, DIVINITY
Charlie Gere

268 DO WE NEED MORALITY ANYMORE?
Mikhail Puzalik

280 THE ECONOMIES OF LANGUAGE IN DIGITAL SPACE/S
Sheena Calvert
One Click at a Time

Data Capture and Erasure

Post-Society:

They must have felt like gods at the NSA when they discovered that they were able to spy on anyone. What feels ridiculous to someone that works one else knows or can know about ‘you.’ If only they discovered that they were able to spy on any- to.These deals, if not outright illegal, are character- selves, they would discover a range of services that have started to commercialize collective data: them- ically looking somewhere else, tooblissfullybusy counting the losses that will be spread iniquitously through ‘every- one else.’

As omnipotent and omniscient gods the NSA should allow the state to ‘see.’ The reality is that the ‘hands’ of the state are no longer functional and have been sub- stituted with prostheses wirelessly controlled by the sociopaths of globalized corporations. Theamputation of the hands happenedwhile the state itself was mer- rely looking somewhere else, toolishly busy counting the money that was flowing through neo-capitalistic financial dreams of renewed prosperity and Napole- onic grandeur.

The madness is also in the discourse about data, de- prived of ethical concerns and rooted within percep- tions of both post-democracy and post-state. So much so that we could speak of a post-data society, within which the current post-societal existence is the con- sequence of profound changes and alterations to an ideal way of living that technology – as its greatest sin – still presents as participatory and horizontal but not as plutocratic and hierarchical.

In order to discuss the present post-societal condition, one would need first to analyze the cultural disregard that people have, or perhaps have acquired, for their personal data and the increasing lack of participation in the alteration of the frameworks set for post-data.

This disregard for personal data is part of cultural forms of concession and contracting that are deter- mined and shaped not by rights but through the mass loss of a few rights in exchange for a) participation in a product as early adopters (Google), b) for design status and appearance (Apple), c) social conventions and entertainment (Facebook) and (Twitter). Big data offers an insight into the problem of big loss- es if a catastrophe, accidental or intentional, should ever strike big databases. The right of ownership of the ‘real object’ that existed in the data-cloudwill become the new arena of post-data conflict. In this context of loss, if the crisis of the big banks has demon- strated anything, citizens will bear the brunt of the losses that will be spread iniquitously through ‘every- one else.’

The problem is therefore characterized by multiple levels of complexity that can overall be referred to as a general problem of ethics of data, interpreted as the ethical collection and usage of massive amounts of data. Also the ethical issues of post-data and their technologies has to be linked to a psychological un- derstanding of the role that individuals play within so- ciety, both singularly and collectively through the use of media that engender new behavioral social systems through the access and usage of big data as sources of information.

Both Prof. Johnny Golden and Prof. Richard Gere present in this collection of essays two perspectives that, by looking at taboos and the sinful nature of technology, demand from the reader a reflection on

“Oh, in the name of God! Now I know what it feels like to be God!”

Frankenstein (1931)

They must have felt like gods at the NSA when they discovered that they were able to spy on any-
the role that ethics plays or no longer plays within contemporary mediated societies.

Concepts of technological neutrality as well as economic neutrality have become enforced taboos when the experiential understanding is that tools that possess a degree of danger should be handled with a modicum of self-control and restraint.

The merging of economic and technological neutrality has generated corporate giants that have acquired a global stronghold on people’s digital data. In the construction of arguments in favor or against a modicum of control for these economic and technological giants, the state and its political representatives have thus far considered it convenient not to side with the libertarian argument, since the control was being exercised on the citizen; a category to which politicians and corporate tycoons and other plutocrats and higher managers believe they do not belong to or want to be reduced to.

The problem is then not so much that the German citizens, or the rest of the world, were spied on. The taboo that has been infringed is that Angela Merkel, a head of state, was spied on. This implies an unwillingly democratic reduction from the NSA of all heads of state to ‘normal citizens.’ The disruption and the violated taboo is that all people are data in a horizontal structure that does not admit hierarchical distinctions and discriminations. In this sense perhaps digital data are violating the last taboo: anyone can be spied upon, creating a truly democratic society of surveillance.

The construction of digital data is such that there is not a normal, a superior, a better or a worse, but everything and everyone is reduced to data. That includes Angela Merkel and any other head of state. Suddenly the process of spying represents a welcome reduction to a basic common denominator: there is no difference between a German head of state or a blue collar worker; the NSA can spy on both and digital data are collected on both.

If anything was achieved by the NSA it was an egalitarian treatment of all of those who can be spied upon: a horizontal democratic system of spying that does not fear class, political status or money. This is perhaps the best enactment of American egalitarianism; we spy upon all equally and fully with no discrimination based on race, religion, social status, political affiliation or sexual orientation.

But the term spying does not quite manifest the profound level of Panopticon within which we happen to have chosen to live, by giving up and squandering inherited democratic liberties one right at a time, through one agreement at a time, with one click at a time.

These are some of the contemporary issues that this new LEA volume addresses, presenting a series of writings and perspectives from a variety of scholarly fields.

This LEA volume is the result of a collaboration with Dr. Donna Leishman and presents a varied number of perspectives on the infringement of taboos within contemporary digital media.

This issue features a new logo on its cover, that of New York University, Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development.

My thanks to Prof. Robert Rowe, Professor of Music and Music Education; Associate Dean of Research and Doctoral Studies at NYU, for his work in establishing this collaboration with LEA.

My gratitude to Dr. Donna Leishman whose time and effort has made this LEA volume possible.

I also have to thank the authors for their patience in complying with the LEA guidelines.

My special thanks go to Deniz Cem Öndüygu who has shown commitment to the LEA project beyond what could be expected.

Özden Şahin has, as always, continued to provide valuable editorial support.

Lanfranco Aceti
Editor in Chief, Leonardo Electronic Almanac
Director, Kasa Gallery

3. Ibid., 101.
**Without Sin: Freedom and Taboo in Digital Media**

**INTRODUCTION**

“Without Sin: Freedom and Taboo in Digital Media” is both the title of this special edition and the title of a panel that was held at ISEA 2011. The goal of the panel was to explore the disinhibited mind’s ability to exercise freedom, act on desires and explore the taboo whilst also surveying the broader question of the moral economy of human activity and how this is translated (or not) within digital media. The original panelists (some of whom have contributed to the this edition) helped to further delineate additional issues surrounding identity, ethics, human socialization and the need to better capture/understand/perceive how we are being affected by our technologies (for good or bad).

In the call for participation, I offered the view that contemporary social technologies are continuously changing our practical reality, a reality where human experience and technical artifacts have become beyond intertwined, but for many interwoven, inseparable – if this were to be true then type of cognition (legal and personal) do we need to develop? Implied in this call is the need for both a better awareness and jurisdiction of these emergent issues. Whilst this edition is not (and could not be) a unified survey of human activity and digital media; the final edition contains 17 multidisciplinary papers spanning Law, Curation, Pedagogy, Choreography, Art History, Political Science, Creative Practice and Critical Theory – the volume attempts to illustrate the complexity of the situation and if possible the kinship between pertinent disciplines.

Human relationships are rich and they’re messy and they’re demanding. And we clean them up with technology. Texting, email, posting, all of these things let us present the self, as we want to be. We get to edit, and that means we get to delete, and that means we get to retouch, the face, the voice, the flesh, the body – not too little, not too much, just right.

Sherry Turkle’s current hypothesis is that technology has introduced mechanisms that bypass traditional concepts of both community and identity indeed that we are facing (and some of us are struggling with) an array of reconceptualizations. Zygmunt Bauman in his essay “From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity” suggests that:

One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure if where one belongs; that is, one is not sure how to place oneself among the evident variety if behavioral styles and patterns, and how to make sure that people would accept this placement as right and proper, so that both sides would know how to go on in each other’s presence. ‘Identity’ is the name given to the escape sought from that uncertainty.

Our ‘post-social’ context where increased communication, travel and migration bought about by technologically advanced has only multiplied Bauman’s conditions of uncertainty. Whilst there may be aesthetic tropes within social media, there is no universally accepted authority within contemporary culture nor is there an easy mutual acceptance of what is ‘right and proper’ after all we could be engaging in different iterations of ‘backward presence’ or ‘forward presence’ whilst interacting with human and non-human alike (see Simone O’Callagh’s contribution: “Seductive Technologies and Inadvertent Voyeurs” for a further exploration of presence and intimacy).

Editing such a broad set of responses required an editorial approach that both allowed full expansion of each paper’s discourse whilst looking for interconnections (and oppositions) in attempt to distil some commonalities. This was achieved by mentally placing citation, speculation and proposition between one another. Spilling the ‘meaning’ of the individual contributions into proximate conceptual spaces inhabited by other papers and looking for issues that overlapped or resonated allowed me formulate a sense of what might become future pertinent themes, and what now follows below are the notes from this process.

**What Social Contract?**

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man. (Thomas Hobbes in chapter XIII of the Leviathan)

Deborah Swack’s “FEELTRACE and the Emotions” (after Charles Darwin), “Johnny Golding’s “Ana-Materialism & The Pineal Eye: Becoming Mouth-Breast” and Kriis Ravett’s “Anonymous Social As Political” argue that our perception of political authority is somewhere between shaky towards becoming erased altogether. Whilst the original 17th century rational for sublimating to a political authority – i.e. we’d default back to a war like state in the absence of a binding social contract – seems like a overwrought fear, the capacity for repugnant anti-social behavior as a consequence of no longer being in awe of any common power is real and increasingly impactful. Problematically the notion of a government that has been created by individuals to protect themselves from one another sadly seems hopelessly incongruent in today’s increasingly skeptical context. Co-joined to the dissipation of perceptible political entities – the power dynamics of being ‘good’ rather than ‘bad’ and or ‘sinful’ appears to be one of most fulfilment of our prior social borders.

The new reality that allows us to transgress and explore our tastes and predictions from a remote and often depersonalized position feels safer (i.e. with less personal accountability) a scenario that is a further exacerbated space vacated by the historic role of the church as a civic authority. Mikhail Pushkin in his paper “Do we need morality anymore?” explores the online moral value system and how this ties into the deleterious effect of the sensationalism in traditional mass media. He suggests that the absence of restrictive online social structure means the very consciousness of sin and guilt has now changed and potentially so has our capability of experiencing the emotions tied to guilt.

Sandra Wilson and Lila Gomez in their paper “The Premediation of Identity Management in Art & Design – New Model Cyborgs – Organic & Digital” concur stating that “the line dividing taboos from desires is often blurred, and a taboo can quickly flip into a desire, if the conditions under which that interaction take place change.”

**The Free?**

The issue of freedom seems to be where much of the debate continues – between what constitutes false liberty and real freedoms. Unique in our own approach Golding’s and Pushkin’s papers challenge the premise that is implied in this edition’s title – that ‘Freedom and Taboo’ even have a place at all in our contemporary existence as our established codes of morality (and ethics) have been radically reconfigured. This stance made me recall Hobbes’s first treaty where he argued that “commodious living” (i.e. moral, political, society), are purely conventional and that morality (and ethics) have been radically reconfigured. This stance made me recall Hobbes’s first treaty where he argued that “commodious living” (i.e. moral, political, society), are purely conventional and that morality (and ethics) have been radically reconfigured.
Traditionally good cognition of identity/society/relations is key – as we move towards naturalization of surveillance and the Divine" and cites Martin Jay’s essay “Scopic Regimes of Modernity” which in turn explores a variety of significant core concepts of modernity where vision and knowledge meet and influence one another. Gere/Jay’s line of references resurfaces for the reader Michel Foucault’s notion of the “Panopticon” (where surveillance is diffused as a principle of social organization). Guy DeDard’s “The Society of the Spectacle” i.e. “All that once was directly lived has become mere representation” and Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (published in 1979): The latter gave form to an endurably relevant question: are we overly reliant on a representational theory of perception? And how does this intersect with the risks associated with solipsistic introjection within non-face-to-face online interactions? The ethics of ‘looking’ and data collection is also a feature of Deborah Burn's paper “Differential Surveillance of Students: Surveillance/Sousveillance Art as Opportunities for Reform” in which Burns asks questions of the higher education system and its complicity in the further erosion of student privacy. Burn’s interest in accountability bridges us back to Foucault’s idea of panoptic diffusion: He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.

In panoptic diffusion the knowingness of the subject is key – as we move towards naturalization of surveillance and data capture through mass digitization such power relationships change. This is a concern mirrored by Eric Schmidt Google’s Executive Chairman when considering the reach of our digital footprints: “I don’t believe society understands what happens when everything is available, knowable and recorded by everyone all the time.” Smita Kheria’s “Copyright and Digital Art Practice: The ‘Schizophrenic’ Position of the Digital Artist” and Alana Kehrmann’s “What Curating Meets Piracy: Rehashing the History of Unauthorized Exhibition-Making” explore accountability and power relationships in different loci whilst looking at the mitigation of creative appropriation and reuse. It is clear that in this area serious reconfigurations have occurred and that new paradigms of acceptability (often counter to the legal reality) are at play.

Bauman’s belief that “One thinks of identity whenever one is not sure if where one belongs” maybe a clue into why social media have become such an integral part of modern society. It is after all an activity that privileges ‘looking’ and objectifying without the recipient’s direct engagement – a new power relationship quite displaced from traditional (identity affirming) social interactions. In this context of social media over dependency it may be timely to reconsider Guy-Ernest Debord’s ‘thesis 30’:

The externality of the spectacle in relation to the active man appears in the fact that his own gestures are no longer his but those of another who represents them to him. This is why the spectator feels at home nowhere, because the spectacle is everywhere.

Underneath these issues of perception / presence / identity / is a change or at least a blurring in our political (and personal) agency. Don Ritter’s paper “Content Osmosis and the Political Economy of Social Media” functions as a reminder of the historical precedents and continued subterfuges that occur in mediated feelings of empowerment. Whist Brigitt Bacher in her paper “Like Reality” presents to the reader that “besides reality television formats, social networking sites such as Facebook have successfully delivered a new form of watching each other, in a seemingly safe setting, on a screen at home” and that “the appeal of the real becomes the promise of access to the reality of manipulation.” The notion of better access to the ‘untruth’ of things also appears in Ravetto’s paper “Anonymous: Social as Political” where she argues that “secrecy and openness are in fact aprons.” What is unclear is that, as society maintains its voyeuristic bent and the spectacle is being conflated into the bigness of social media, are we becoming occluded from meaningful developmental human interactions? If so, we are to re-create a sense of agency in a process challenged (or already transformed) by clever implicit back-end data gathering and an unknown/undeclared use our data’s mined self. Then, and only then, dissociative anonymity may become one strategy that allows us to be more independent; to be willed enough to see the world from our own distinctive needs whilst devising our own extensions to the long genealogy of moral concepts.

Somewhere / Somewhere
Perpetual evolution and sustained emergence is one of the other interconnecting threads flowing within the edition. Many of the authors recognize a requirement for fluidity as a reaction to the pace of change. Geographer David Harvey uses the term “space-time compression” to refer to “processes that... revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time.” Indeed there seems to be consensus in the edition that we are “in an accelerated existence and a concomitant dissolution of traditional spatial co-ordinates – Swack cites Joanna Zylinska’s ‘human being’ to a perpetual ‘human becoming’” whilst Golding in her paper reminds us that Hobbes also asserted that “[f]or seeing life is but a motion of Limbs” and that motion, comes from motion and is inextricably linked to the development and right of the individual. But Golding expands this changing of state further and argues where repetition (and loop) exist so does a different experience:
The usual culprits of time and space (or time as distinct from space and vice versa), along with identity, meaning, Existenz, Being, reconfigure via a relational morphogenesis of velocity, mass, and intensity. This is an immanent surface cohesions, the compelling into a 'this' or a 'here' or a 'now', a space-time terrain, a collapse and rearticulation of the tick-tick-ticking of distance, movement, speed, born through the repetitive but relative enfolding of otherness, symmetry and diversion.

Golding's is a bewildering proposition requiring a frame of mind traditionally fostered by theoretical physicists but one that may aptly summarize the nature of the quandary. The authors contributing to this edition all exist in their own ways in a post-digital environment, anthropologist Lucy Suchman describes this environment as being “the view from nowhere, detached intimacy, and located accountability.”

Wilson and Gomez further offer a possible coping strategy by exploring the usefulness of Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s "pre-mediation" as a means to externalize a host of fears and reduce negative emotions and what it means now to be ‘human’ as we veer away from biological truth and associated moral values towards something else. Sue Hawksley’s “Dancing on the Head of a Sin: touch, dance and taboo” reminds us of our sensorial basis in which:

Touch is generally the least shared, or acknowledged, and the most taboo of the senses. Haptic and touch-screen technologies are becoming ubiquitous, but although this makes touch more commonly experienced or shared, it is often reframed through the virtual, while inter-personal touch still tends to remain sexualized, militarized or medicalized (in most Western cultures at least).

Within her paper Hawksley provides an argument (and example) on how the mediation of one taboo – dance – through another – touch – could mitigate the perceived moral dangers and usual frames of social responsibility. Swack raises a plethora of ethical questions about the future nature of life for humans and “the embodiment and containment of the self and its symbiotic integration and enhancement with technology and machines.” Whilst Wilson and Gomez’s go on to discuss Bioprecence by Shiho Fukuhara and Georg Tremmel – a project that provocatively “creates Human DNA trees by transcoding the essence of a human being within the DNA of a tree in order to create ‘Living Memorials’ or ‘Transgenic Tombstones’” as an example of a manifest situation that still yields a (rare) feeling of transgression into the taboo.

CONCLUSION

In the interstices of this edition there are some questions/observations that remain somewhat unanswered and others that are nascent in their formation. They are listed below as a last comment and as a gateway to further considerations.

Does freedom from traditional hierarchy equate to empowerment when structures and social boundaries are also massively variable and dispersed and are pervasive to the point of incomprenhension/invalidation? Or is there some salve to be found in Foucault’s line that “Power is everywhere” and ‘comes from everywhere’ so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure? Thus nothing is actually being ‘lost’ in our current context? And is it possible that power has always resided within the individual and we only need to readjust to this autonomy?

Conventional political power (and their panoptic strategies) seem to be stalling, as efforts to resist and subvert deep-seated and long-held governmental secrecy over military/intelligence activities have gained increased momentum while their once privileged data joins in the leaky soft membrane that is the ethics of sharing digitally stored information.

Through dissipative strategies like online anonymity comes power re-balance, potentially giving the individual better recourse to contest unjust actions/laws but what happens when we have no meaningful social contract to direct our civility? Its seems pertinent to explore if we may be in need of a new social contract that reconnects or reconfigures the idea of accountability – indeed it was interesting to see the contrast between Suchman’s observed ‘lack of accountability’ and the Anonymous collective agenda of holding (often political or corporate) hypocrites ‘accountable’ through punitive measures such as Denial-of-Service attacks.

Regarding de-contextualization of the image / identity – there seems to be something worth bracing oneself against in the free-fall of taxonomies, how we see, how we relate, how we perceive, how we understand that even the surface of things has changed and could still be changing. There is no longer a floating signifier but potentially an abandoned sign in a cloud of dissipating (or endlessly shifting) signification. Where once:

The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements.

There now is no culturally specific normal in the diffuse digital-physical continuum, which makes the materiality and durability of truth very tenuous indeed; a scenario that judges-teaches-social workers are having some difficulty in addressing and responding to in a timely manner, an activity that the theoretically speculative and methodologically informed research as contained within this edition can hopefully help them with.

Donna Leishman
Duncan of Jordanstone College of Art & Design
University of Dundee, UK
d.leishman@dundee.ac.uk
http://www.6amhoover.com
Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*


As perhaps Friedrich Nietzsche would argue... He has recognized himself in the dominant images of need, the flames, and raptures to such an extent that it is liberated from all petty displeasure, gloom, and depression as by a flash of lightning! Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Horace Samuel (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 139.


Consequential subsets within a disinhibited mind are disassociative anonymity (you don't know me) and disassociative imagination (It's just a game), which can lead to benign actions such as random acts of kindness or being more affectionate or potentially toxic (exploring more violent assertive sides of ones nature) and 'other' behaviors.


Bauman, "From Pilgrim to Tourist, or a Short History of Identity." 19

15. The alienation of the spectator to the profit of the contemplated object (which is the result of his own unconscious activity) is expressed in the following way: the more he contemplates the less he lives, the more he accepts recognizing himself in the dominant images of need, the less he understands his own existence and his own desires. The externality of the spectacle in relation to the active man appears in the fact that his own gestures are no longer his but those of another who represents them to him. This is why the spectator feels at home nowhere, because the spectacle is everywhere." Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, Thesis 30.


17. Mirko Schäfer highlights the role of implicit participation in the success of the Web 2.0: a situation where user activities are implemental unknowingly in interfaces and back-end design.


THE ECONOMIES OF LANGUAGE IN DIGITAL SPACE/S

by
Sheena Calvert
Senior Lecturer
Critical Theory of Visual Communication
The University of Westminster
Department of Media Arts and Design
calvers@westminster.ac.uk

ABSTRACT

As language (both writing/speech) rapidly changes due to on-going developments in speech recognition systems, text-to-speech and chat bots, this paper focuses on the various attempts to synthesize, and mechanize language over time: to submit it to the logical, rational, and mechanical: to atomize and/or render it as pure code. This involves looking afresh at the kinds of philosophical questions these developments raise with respect to language – as a ‘human’ phenomenon – which is increasingly being mediated by technology. The question – what is language when it is made by a machine? – touches upon ethical concerns; the notion of linguistic agency, and the shifting relationship between language and thought. While attempts at synthesising speech can be traced back as far as Roger Bacon (1200s) and Christian Kratzenstein, (1770s) more recent attempts to mechanize speech include early 20th c. mechanisms for encoding speech, such as the 1939 World’s Fair ‘Parallel Bandpass Vocoder’ and ‘Voder,’ (1940). Alan Turing’s work with ‘Universal’ computing languages, and their implications for AI, as well as the recent Siri application for the iPhone are more recent examples of the move towards forms of language which are removed from the body and rendered through code. The claim is that such mechanical interventions into language, both foregrounds and problematizes our relationship with language as a primary human technology. This paper proposes that we might want to pay particular attention to the changing forms of language as they are experienced/mediated through such technologies, and to the implications for identity, human agency and the larger ‘moral economies’ they imply.

In a time when the ontologies and ecologies of language are being radically challenged by the unstable modes of representation posed by the digital, networked environment; and whose very relationship to temporality has, according to Johanna Drucker, in her essay “Digital Ontologies,” been altered, it seems timely, if not essential, to reconsider the question of where ‘sense’ or meaning lies in mechanized and digitized language, if it lies at all. The word ‘lies’ possesses a dual meaning in this context, and in the debates over truth in language, the static image of thought via language, as a conduit for veracity has been discredited; increasingly subject to the infinite material fluctuations of digital surface[s].

Drucker suggests that the most pressing question of the digital amounts to: “[T]he basic issue of whether an idea can exist outside of instantiation in material form with respect to the digital environment.” Her remark poses a question about the [im]materiality of the digital, and its ephemeral, paradoxical nature: both existing and not at the same time; thus unsettling our ideas about the identity of both images and language, and their status as meaning-full. In turn, it leads to us question whether our conception of language (whether writing or speech), is profoundly...
The consequent dematerialisation of language can be seen to extend all the way to Artificial Language, with its reduction to units of code, removing it further and further from the body and from the human agent. This collapsing of the space between the mechanical and the linguistic, the entwining, raises important ethical questions about the continued role of language as a phenomenon which shapes what it is to ‘be’ human, and to possess an identity through language, or indeed to ‘think.’ Language and the subject are differently configured in the world of AI and synthetic speech, requiring a different philosophy of language to account for these changes. The ethical status of language is in question when machine-made, and while all language could be argued to be a technology, the increasing mediation of advanced technologies shifts the ethical and ontological framework of language further than ever before. This is partly due to the increasing ubiquity of such languages, which have moved out of the world of relatively arcane scientific experimentation, and into the everyday.

The trajectory of both Drucker and Hollings’ questions accelerates to a remark about the identity and status of language(s) in general (whether visual or linguistic) when they move to the material/immaterial space of the digital. The ways in which we store, access, and distribute photographs is, by analogy, of real importance here. Rarely printed, and frequently residing in the ‘cloud,’ personal photography in particular, would suggest that the status of photographs has so radically changed in the current context as to be indescribable within any prior system of sign/signified, true/false, or traditional indexicality. The ‘sickness’ from which both photography and language suffer is perhaps rooted in their inability to accommodate or bend to any alternative systems of meaning required by new digital contexts. An alternative system of meaning would need to take into account both photography and language’s altered circumstances, caused by their proliferation within digital environments and ephemeral social spaces, and the accompanying challenges to their ontologies. These new modes of production and distribution require different philosophical ‘moves’ to accommodate the nebulous, networked, dematerialized contexts we find both images and language operating in. Ken Hollings offers the insight that:

[T]hanks to the digital camera, we don’t take photographs anymore but generate social networks instead – [what] we call photography is a pathological condition and has suffered greatly from being regarded as an ‘art form’ for so long, and might never recover.

The Origins of Language-as-Code

The desire to mechanize language and render it coterminous with both the ideas and practical realities of machines, has a long history, reaching all the way back to the Enlightenment, and earlier. Language, as the primary interface between us, and the ‘out there,’ was and continues to be, a source of mistrust; the locus of a frequently troubling level of subjectivity, wherein human agents are the carriers of meaning, and disruptive potential, constituting an anarchy of articulation, which is seen as needing to be managed and contained. We can see the roots of such anxieties in the practice of philosophy itself, as explained by Ian Hacking:

One reason why language matters to philosophy and not to Zoology is that philosophers are often concerned with domains where our common ways of thinking and arguing lead us not to clarity and a satisfactory technical language, but rather to ambiguity, equivocation, contradiction, and paradox.

The problem for philosophers is that the same word can have many meanings (Thomas Hobbes called this the ‘inconstancy’ of language and such ambiguity is seen to lead to confusion between concepts, whereby a perversion of judgement takes place. To counter this (and as a precursor to later work by Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz), Baruch Spinoza, John Wilkins, along with Francis Bacon proposed that a ‘mathematical’ approach to language be adopted; one in which clear and unambiguous definitions of terms were agreed:

Although we think we govern our words... certain it is that words, as a Tater’s bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definition of our terms...

The notion of language as instrumental, as something which should be removed from the human body and its propensity for the kind of sensual subjectivity which creates ambiguity, is a precursor to symbolic logic and analytic philosophy. Philosophers such as Wilkins and Leibniz have historically attempted to treat language as highly mechanised instruments of thought, through the construction of a ‘mathesis’ or, in Leibniz’s term, a ‘Charactistica Universalis,’ which attempts to suppress languages’ expressive dimensions in favour of hard logic. John Wilkins (1668), in An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, is one of the first to attempt to outline a new ‘universal’ language. He says:

If to every thing and notion there were assigned a distinct Mark, together with some provision to express Grammatical Derivations and Inflexions, this might suffice as to one great end of a Real Character, namely, the expression of our Conceptions by Marks which should signify things, and not words. And so likewise if several distinct words were assigned for the names of such things, with certain invariable Rules for all such Grammatical Derivations and Inflexions, and such only as are natural and necessary; this would make a much more easy and convenient Language than is yet in being.

Wilkins goes on to say:

By now if these Marks or Notes could be so contrived, as to have such a dependence upon, and relation to, one another, as might be suitable to the nature of things and notions which they represent, and so likewise, of the Names of things could be so ordered, as to contain such a kind of affinity or opposition in their letters and sounds, as might be some way answerable to the nature of the things which they signified. This would be a farther ad-

Figure 2. Faber and the Euphonia is a Victorian Illustration of Joseph Faber’s “Speech Organ” from 1846. Image posted by Erin at the Dead Media Archive, 2010. Used with permission via the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
within Leibniz’s advocated form of rationality and criticized such linguistic systems for their concerns.

However, as Louis Couturat has pointed out, Leibniz criticized such linguistic systems for their concerns with:

[P]ractical uses rather than scientific utility, that is, for being chiefly artificial languages intended for international communication and not philosophical languages that would express the logical relations of concepts.

Within Leibniz’s advocated form of rationality and abstract thinking, promoted by the creation of an entirely artificial symbolic language such as his “Characteristica Universalis,” ideas are assigned a single symbol, and rules are established for their combinations and use, such that “all abstract reasoning would be reduced to mere algebraic calculations” with the result that the errors and uncertainty associated with the figurative, shifting, imaginative language of ordinary discourse are eliminated, in favour of an emergent form of artificial language which suppresses the sensual. Words, which are assigned a precise technical meaning, stand not for themselves, but for concepts. As Stuart Hampshire explains: “Words or symbols within mathematics do not derive their meaning from the images which may be used to illustrate them, but stand for clearly defined concepts.” The system emulates pure, mathematical reasoning: clear, unambiguous, abstract, error-free, and for Leibniz: “Words are logical counters which have a purely intellectual significance, [they] stand in this sense for clear and distinct ideas,” that offer an alternative to a language shot through with error and uncertainty; one wholly unsuited to the rationalist doctrine. Leibniz continues:

If one could find the characters or symbols to express all our thoughts as clearly and exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers, or as analytic geometry expresses lines, one could do the same as one can do with arithmetics and geometry, as much as they are subject to reasoning. This is because all investigations that depend on reasoning would take place through the transposition of these characters, and by a kind of calculus.

In these historical examples, it’s clear that language is to be progressively removed from the sensual arena; one which is subjectively conditioned by the human being who utters and/or writes, and is instead to be rendered code-like and mechanical “tamed” by reason and logic.

Georg W. Hegel said: “That the subject matter of logic is thought, with that everyone agrees,” Richard Schusterman more recently counters with: “The philosopher cannot award the sole birthright by mere logical analysis for there seem to be rival logics governed by different aims.” Schusterman suggests that logic per se is not the only form in which thinking takes place, but this notion is persistent throughout the history of philosophy. The projects of Wilkins and Leibniz, can be broadly contextualised within the traditions of logical analysis, as a specific aspect of philosophy, and be seen as both a precursor to, and extension of it. We might see logic as the prototype form of artificial language, wherein its functionality is so detached from the human and the sensual as to be mechanized and reduced to small units akin to code. Language in this context is instrumental, dehumanised, decontextualized: a set of abstract placeholders for any real world events. Logic is the science and practice of rational thinking. It determines something, and asserts (predicates) about that something, in the pursuit of truth or validity. It does this purely through language as an instrumental phenomenon. Martin Heidegger remarks:

Of its own accord, a determining so understood tries to measure up to that about which the statement is made. The measuring up to that about which the determination and statement are made, the adequacy, characterises what we generally mean by the truth of statements. Aoyos, can be adequate or inadequate, true or false.

Aristotle locates truth in correspondence, or in other words, in the identity between objects and concepts (in their quality of ‘matching’). This concept of truth as a set of correspondences grounded in language, and requiring a perceiving subject, is repeated in Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and later in Immanuel Kant, who inherits the traditional concept of truth, while introducing new concepts of “subject,” “knowing,” and “judgment.” Ludwig Wittgenstein stated: “The correspondence or non-correspondence of a proposition with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.” In all versions, truth and correspondence, subject (mind) and object, and the search for identity, not difference (which would invite contradiction) are assumed, actively pursued, and considered intrinsic to method, whose ‘ground’ is this very search for correspondence or identity.

Traditional (formal) logic is grounded in, and requires, a belief in the physical determinism (positivity) of language, aligned with fixed notions of time and space. It demonstrates and infers ‘valid/invalid’ outcomes, based on the formal deployment of language within rule-bound systems of subject-predicate (sylogistic), or symbolic form (or/and, right/wrong, yes/no: all rooted in binary thinking). In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein takes logic to be the principal ‘ground’ of both language and the world “Logic pervades both reality and how we apprehend reality. To pass beyond its limits, the limits alike of language and world, is to speak non-sense.” In his essay “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” Wittgenstein outlines the principles of Logical Positivism, which Bertrand Russell had earlier proposed. He explains how every proposition has both a content and a form, but that the ‘pure’ form is only available to us if we abstract from the meanings of individual words. What counts is not solely word-level semantics; logic must account for variables, which are subject to the same syntactical constraints as the constants. Logic must also avoid the trap which ordinary [natural] language falls into, of being able to construct seemingly sensible statements that, on closer inspection, are revealed to be “pseudopropositions.” These might involve phrases such as “the Real, though it is an in itself, must also be able to become a for myself,” effectively rendering large portions of philosophical discourse meaningless.
Propositions can be reduced to what Wittgenstein terms 'atomic' elements, where more or less complex arrangements of words and sentences containing embedded propositions, 'logical sums' or truth functions are progressively stripped away to reveal the most reductive, bare, minimal form, underlying the various material instances of language:

We must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which cannot be broken, without destroying the propositional form as such. They, then, are the kernels of every proposition, they contain the material, and all the rest is only a development of this material.

The proper task of a theory of knowledge, according to Wittgenstein, is to find these extra-linguistic, 'atomic' facts (which can be thought of broadly as spatio-temporal events) and to make clear how they are constructed out of, or made possible by, the words or symbols of material language. Wittgenstein seeks to establish a hierarchy of linguistic significance, in which the material event of language is subordinate to the formal structures of language. His difficulty is in finding a method for excluding what he feels are the endless misunderstandings which plague ordinary language (its stubborn indeterminacy), while allowing for 'pure' form to reveal itself – abstracted from language (its stubborn indeterminacy), while allowing for endless misunderstandings which plague ordinary language.

The conclusion he comes to is that ordinary language is to be replaced in logical formations by numbers (rational or irrational), since numbers alone have the ability to represent "atomic propositions" while entering into their very structure, becoming an integral part of the architecture of the expression in a way unavailable to ordinary language.

In other examples, for Noam Chomsky, the symbols of a formal language are meaningless in themselves. In such formal languages, meaning is based solely on position and relation within a system. Logical language is understood as a series of axioms and variables, whose application within the system can be applied universally and confer meaning by virtue of their position alone. This 'formal' system of language and philosophy held that the ambiguities of ordinary language were unsuitable for doing precise conceptual analysis and so language had to first be translated into a formal language to which mathematical logic could apply. This language would be logically clear and precise or 'pure.' Similarly, Willard V. Quine offered the following thought: "To be is to be the value of a variable." Apart from the ontological commitment this statement involves, it also demonstrates how Quine's philosophy of language holds that the objects of language (words, utterances) are to be understood as a series of axioms and variables, which are meaningless in themselves, but whose application within the system can be applied universally, attaining meaning with respect to position alone.

All 'formal/symbolic' systems of logic hold that the ambiguities (and 'intensities') of ordinary language are unsuitable for doing precise conceptual analysis, and so language first has to be translated into a formal language to which a rigorous 'mathematical' logic could apply. Language would be rendered logically clear and precise or 'pure' as a result of this operation. – George Lakoff and Mark Johnston state:

Scientific (or philosophical) theories are systems of axioms in mathematical logic, where the symbols are meaningless and need to be interpreted in terms of set-theoretical models... Technically, a logical form in itself is meaningless just a group of symbols... A formal language needs to be interpreted to be meaningful.

Such 'mathematical' languages are distinct from natural languages ('formal' versus 'everyday' language) and the underlying assumption (shared by Chomsky and others) is that for language to be precise and scientifically rigorous, it is essential to theorize from within such a formal system. In other words, within logic, it is not possible to see meaning in the symbols themselves, but only in the relations between those symbols. In them, syntax is independent of semantics, and these are a consequence of a-priori philosophical assumptions about the relation between language and thought, language and self, and language to itself: its identity. It follows automatically that to engage with such languages, and the theories that encircle them, is to accept the world-view they partake of, and that they in turn reinforce. Logic represents the ultimate move to make language mechanical and subservient to the requirements of function. It detaches language from the human and suggests that its formal architecture is its predominant feature. In making language 'artificial' and unbound from the subject who speaks and writes, it further participates in the removal of language from the body, and lays the ground for the on-going elimination of intimacy and nuance in language as a phenomenon, which is created by, and for, human beings.

Language now becomes a technical instrument, part of the technologization of the world, which Heidegger warned against the dangers of. This kind of logical analysis most properly belongs to science, and marks the moment when philosophy becomes a form of reductionistic formal thinking.

Subjectivity and Universal Language

Michel Foucault, in The Thought from Outside, argued that language is empty form, in much the way that logic is suggested. We fill it with subjectivity, but it pre-exists us, as a series of generic, non-particular entities. The 'I' becomes our identity, but one born of an empty pronoun which lies in wait for a subject to utter it. “Fated to speak, then, and to have power over speech. But only by taking over and animating the empty forms of language. Forms, concepts, that pre-exist the subject and will outlive it.” Only a determinate subject can animate the 'I,' we speak, we blog, we confess, we
On September the 9th 2011, an article appeared in the Telegraph outlining an experiment in which two science students had set up a randomized conversation between a pair of Chatterbots (online avatars/robots). These entities usually converse with a human being, but the experiment involved them speaking with one another (the discussion quickly turned to the existence of God). These synthetic voices lack the timbre and richness of the human voice: their timbre, ascribed to the attributes of a language, which emanates from the body. Language is much more than simple point-to-point communication, while as Friedrich Nietzsche in The Will to Power pointed out, thinking itself is an infinitely more complicated affair, happening at, or beyond limits of apprehension: Causality eludes us; to suppose a direct causal link between thoughts, as logic does — that is the consequence of the crudest and clumsiest observation. Between two thoughts, all kinds of affects play their game: but their motions are too fast, therefore we fail to recognize them, we deny them.

Emulated speech, sampled from the various tonalities of voice, never manages to feel unshackled from its mechanical, coded foundations, and in turn its roots in pre and post enlightenment attempts to render language mechanical and abstract are exposed.

While the Situationist International, in 1963, wrote: “Under the control of power, language always designates something other than authentic experience,” Bell Labs were automating the human voice, forcing a new space to open up between writing and speech, in the poetry of code; one as fundamentally detached from authentic experience as it is possible to be. This new relation between language and experience, between the subject and language, has only just begun to be understood. Meanwhile, most of us instinctively flee from the automated voice, rejecting the cold, dispassionate, pseudo-communication of coded speech. Maurice Blanchot offers the following insight: When When two people speak together, they speak not together, but each in turn: one says something, then stops, the other something else (or the same thing), then stops. The coherent discourse they carry on is composed of sequences that are interrupted when the conversation moves from partner to partner...The power of speaking interrupts itself, and this interruption plays a role which appears to be minor — precisely the role of subordinated alternation. This role, nonetheless, is so enigmatic that it can be interpreted as bearing the very enigma of language: pause between sentences, pause from one interlocutor to another, and pause of attention, the hearing that doubles the force of location.

Tone, timing, emphasis, modulation — these are all tiny, intramundane, but essential pointers to the ‘human’ in language, where tone of voice, pacing, and emphasis is everything. We can tell an entire story with the nuances and inflections of our speech, and with the spaces between elements. Space and time are essential components of language, and conversation is where we experience the full force of this dynamic. In conversation, a pause designates the distinction between two statements. Someone starts to speak, and is interrupted by another or, pauses voluntarily to allow the other to speak. By virtue of the voluntary or enforced interruption of the stream of words, the silence of the one becomes the ground of the other. Differently put: a space is created whereby another voice can enter the language stream and be heard: “Interruption happens for the sake of understanding,” which amounts to saying that the void is as important, if not more so, than speech itself. But where, in this temporal structure, does true listening happen? Is conversation, conceived of as an equitable proposition really possible or simply an illusion? In the space which allows another voice to be heard, is there listening/hearing/understanding or just waiting? Given the shortness of time between the ‘something said’ of the one and the response of the other, how much thought can we realistically give to what others say? Before we respond, have we really heard? It’s not just about the structure of time and space in language, but a matter of intention, and intention is a human attribute.

Artificial voice recognition systems are ubiquitous in the technological world of late, the Siri application, automated phone systems and robots, come close to human speech, but they never replicate conversation as we understand it. Despite a somewhat uncanny-inducing near proximity to conversation, complete with carefully intonated responses, the absence of a human subject is ultimately unsettling, and unfulfilling. You know that the disembodied series of synthesized sounds, or recorded and processed ‘voice’ on the other end of the phone is ‘listening’ but not hearing. There is no comprehension, only a series of pre-programmed responses: an absence, which brings the nature of ‘conversation’ sharply into focus. As Wittgenstein said: “In a conversation: one person throws a ball; the other does not know whether he is supposed to throw it back, or throw it to a third person, or leave it on the ground, or pick it up and put it in his pocket, etc.”

We can convey disinterest, annoyance, empathy and control through such conversational nuances. How can coded language simulate these types of intramundane details of our interactions? They require a sensitive and attuned human agent, to be constantly reading for signals, and a feedback system to be in place, which allows for the subtle interplay between signs and responses, space for error and adjustment, and the ability to inhabit multiple timings. Understanding is found in the far-from-seamless flow of such interactions, it’s not a question of communication, but of ‘listening’ and ‘hearing’ differently, and of a heightened sensitivity to the most miniscule deviations from the basic structure of the message being conveyed.
CONCLUSION

Having reviewed some of the many attempts to mechanize language over time, and considered how this endeavour has removed language from the human subject and the body that produces it, the question finally becomes: which philosophical questions about language remain the same, and which change, once we enter these new linguistic contexts? Of course, the politics of information as it is expressed through language as its agent, is never far from these questions.

In 1963 and 1966 respectively, the Situationist International and Mustapha Khayati published two articles on language and power within the magazine International Situationniste. The first, entitled “All the King’s Men,” offers a stark reminder of the ways in which language, in the grasp of authoritarian forces, does damage to the authenticity of human experience, by always designating something ‘other,’ in the servicing of capitalist ideology. The second essay: “Captive Words: Preface to a Situationist Dictionary” goes further, in claiming that, as with Rene Descartes’ proposal for a “Mathesis Universalis,” thought is in danger of becoming subordinate to mathematical rigor, stripped of its insubordinate, poetic potential. Both texts reiterate the Situationist theme of resistance to becoming subordinate to mathematical rigor, always designating something ‘other,’ in the service of capitalist ideology.

In these fluid, mobile, immaterial contexts, grounded in coded speech and human-to-machine and machine-to-human translations, we need new ways of thinking through questions of what language is. We need to philosophize about it differently, in a digital space and time, to take account of the on-going removal of language from the human, and the increasingly blurred lines between ourselves and the machines that produce it. These are ethical questions as well as philosophical ones, and they are in turn deeply rooted in the politics of language:

“When I use a word, ‘Humphry Dumptly said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humphry Dumpy, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’"

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. “At the 1933 World’s Fair a machine called a Voder was shown. A girl stroked its keys and it emitted recognisable speech. No human vocal cords entered into the procedure at any point; the keys simply combined some electronically produced vibrations and passed these on to a loud-speaker.” Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” in The Atlantic Monthly, 1945, 94. For photographic documentation also see: http://www.davidsony.com/future/robot/voder.htm (assessed October 20th 2013)


3. For details see Haskin’s Laboratories, science of the spoken word page: http://www.haskins.yale.edu/featured/heads/SMU/LACRA/Kratzenstein.html (assessed October 20th 2013)


5. Ibid., 141.


8. Hacking shows, a number of contemporary philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida will claim that the opposite is true, and that ambiguity, equivocation, contradiction, and paradox, are precisely where meaning is located; not in clarity and technical precision. See: Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 5.


10. The “Mathesis Universalis” is a proposal to create a universal science (and associated language based on the same principles), which would eliminate errors of reasoning. The original conception can be attributed to Rene Descartes. Cf. Frederick P. Van de Pitte, “Descartes’ Matheus Universalis,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Volume 61, Issue 2 (2009):154-174. The idea is later associated with Leibniz and John Wilkins in the works cited elsewhere in this section of the paper.


12. We might further attempt to tease out the details of the relationships between such mathematical languages and Enlightenment reasoning through a review of the work of those philosophers such as Leibniz, who attempted to create a “Charactenistica Universalis,” in 1677; a universal language, which would eliminate the errors associated with natural languages. This consisted of what he called “... a kind of general alphabet in which all truths of reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus. At the same time, this would be a kind of universal language or writing, though infinitely different from all such languages which have thus far been proposed; for the characters and the words themselves would direct the mind, and the errors – excepting those of fact – would only be calculation mistakes. It would be very difficult to form or invent this language or characteristic, but very easy to learn it without any dictionaries.” Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, On The Art of Combination (reprinted from the edition of 1666, translated in Parkinson 1966: 10–11, and Leibniz, letter to Nicolas Remond, 10 January 1734, in Loenker 1965: 654. Translation revised.


14. Ibid. Note: original talics and capitalization retained, language modernized as necessary i.e. ease to ‘easy,’ onely to ‘only.’


17. Ibid., 20.

18. Ibid.

19. Leibniz further states: “I should still hope to create a kind of universal symbolic [spécieuse générale] in which all truths of reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus. At...”

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* Wittgenstein makes the claim that each and every proposition can be reduced down to its most elementary facts, which in turn can be referred to states of affairs in the world. In this way, he claims that the truth as a consequence of the irreducibility of those primary elements, and as a result of their combination. This is called the theory of ‘logical atomism,’ wherein each of these ‘atomic’ elements is true or false, independently of the others, and can be seen as units in a system that reveals the truth. “There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition,” 3.25. “The simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact,” 4.21.

Wittgenstein, op. cit, 1.

Ibid.

Ibid.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

The same time this could be a kind of universal language or writing, though infinitely different from all such languages which have thus far been proposed, for the characters and the words themselves would give directions to reason, and the errors – except those of fact – would be only mistakes in calculation.” — Leibniz.

From a letter to Nicholas Raymond, 1654.


27. Martin Heidegger will later inquire into the nature and meaning of this reliance on correspondence or identity, by re-posing it as a relation (mediation/translation) between meaning of this reliance on correspondence or identity, by


30. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* Wittgenstein makes the claim that each and every proposition can be reduced down to its most elementary facts, which in turn can be referred to states of affairs in the world. In this way, he claims that the truth as a consequence of the irreducibility of those primary elements, and as a result of their combination. This is called the theory of ‘logical atomism,’ wherein each of these ‘atomic’ elements is true or false, independently of the others, and can be seen as units in a system that reveals the truth. “There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition,” 3.25. “The simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact,” 4.21.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


44. Alex, Charles, Audrey, Claire, Arjik, Arnaud and other ‘voices’ synthesized by Bell and AT&T labs recite fragments of Shakespeare, sing, repeat phrases, speak in dialect, and use street-smart colloquialisms, in attempts to replicate those dimensions of language which go beyond their representational functions, but strikingly fail to achieve the intricacies and nuances of the human version. For a list of synthesized speech samples, from the 1963 onwards see: DECTalk 3, Synth, MIT Lab, (1992) http://www.soundboard.com/sb/Synthesized_Speech_Voices.aspx (accessed October 19th, 2013).


46. Ibid.

47. “Siri is an intelligent personal assistant and knowledge navigator which works as an application for Apple Inc.’s iOS. The application uses a natural language user interface to answer questions, make recommendations, and perform actions by delegating requests to a set of Web services.” See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siri (accessed October 11th, 2013).
