British Journal for Military History

Volume 8, Issue 3, November 2022

Cover picture: Battle of Brignais (1362). The French army is defeated by the Free Companies, Jean Froissart, Chronicles. 

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Volume 8, Issue 3 November 2022

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British Journal for Military History – ISSN: 2057-0422
DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3

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EDITORIAL*

This issue features a new contributor format. In addition to our usual articles and research notes, the journal now welcomes the submission of keynote talks or public lectures on topics of interest to our readership. In this issue, for the first of our new format, we feature a keynote address given by Dr Jenny MacLeod at the Second World War Research Group's Annual Conference in June 2019 reflecting on the lessons we might learn from the centenaries of both the First World War and Ireland's Decade of Centenaries. It is no spoiler that Dr MacLeod urges those thinking about the planning for the centenary of the Second World War to begin their planning early!

We are also pleased to see an increasing number of submissions of research notes. As well as allowing authors to focus on a single, narrow topic in a way not suitable for a full article, this format provides a space for researchers to discuss new themes or methodologies. It is our hope that these notes will prompt further consideration of the topics they explore and generate ongoing conversations between scholars.

The number of high quality articles submitted also continues to grow. The eight articles, together with the two research notes featured in this issue allow us to fulfil our aim of publishing research on 'military history in the broadest sense, and without restriction as to period or region'. From strategy in fourteenth century France to defence planning in late-twentieth century Singapore, via parliamentary attitudes to homosexuality in the British army and the post-war history of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, we are glad to see the journal continue to reflect the breadth of the modern discipline of military history.

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* DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1640

Looking Forward to the Centenary of the Second World War: Lessons from 2014-2018

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ABSTRACT
This is the text of a keynote presentation to the Second World War Research Group's Annual Conference in 2019. It reflects on the centenary commemorations for 1914-1918 from the perspective of a First World War historian to suggest some lessons for the forthcoming centenary of the Second World War. As such it discusses the relationship between history, memory and national identity, the role of historians in shaping that relationship, and the actions that need to be taken in anticipation of the centenary. Taking inspiration from Ireland's Decade of Centenaries 1912-1923 it explores the potential of a similar approach for Britain's commemoration of the Second World War.

Opening Remarks[1]

I am grateful to Professor Gary Sheffield both for his invitation to speak on this topic and his subsequent advice on publication.

Context is everything in history

In 2019, Britain is in the midst of the worst political crisis since the 1920s when the United Kingdom broke apart. The post-war settlement is unravelling – the norms of behaviour and party political alignments are coming undone. A culture war has been unleashed. Two very different world views and value systems, two very different ideas of Britishness have hardened into opposing camps.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1641
[1]This is a lightly edited version of a keynote presentation to the Second World War Research Group's Annual Conference, 'Armageddon: The Second World War in Comparative Perspective' held at the University of Wolverhampton on 13 & 14 June 2019.

LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CENTENARY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The causes, course and consequences of Brexit will launch a thousand theses and examination questions for years to come. Amongst the many factors that have influenced Brexit, the way in which the discourse has been shaped by the Second World War is particularly noticeable. The cartoon 'Very Well Alone' featuring a British soldier standing on the white cliffs, shaking his fist in defiance at the gathering clouds encapsulates the mind set for me.[2]

There's a good case to be made for 1940 as the most consequential year in Britain's twentieth century. The New Zealander, David Low, drew this image just as the Dunkirk evacuation had been completed. Britain was preparing to fight on alone, and the Battle of Britain was looming. Those few months were pivotal in the war and in the defeat of Germany. A magnificent, heroic effort.

One of the legacies of 1940 is that a virtuous self-image lives on in the national imagination wherein Britain saved the world from Nazi tyranny. From that proposition, we step easily to the idea that Europe more generally has brought us nothing but trouble. And that we can stand up to it alone. Here's Norman Tebbit speaking a year after the referendum to that effect:

> Henry VIII rescued the church in England from Rome. Elizabeth I rescued Europe from Philip of Spain. The Duke of Wellington rescued Europe from Bonaparte. Lloyd George and co rescued us and Europe from the Kaiser. Churchill and Attlee rescued us from Hitler. When did they [the EU] ever rescue us?[3]

Nigel Farage tapped into similar sentiments. According to the *Financial Times*

> Mr Farage turned UKIP – whose ageing members could, he said, be recognised by their Bomber Command ties – into populists. After a late night dinner, one friend asked what was his biggest regret. 'Nigel said it was not taking part in D-Day.'[4]

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[2]University of Kent, British Cartoon Archive, LSE2791, David Low, 'Very Well Alone', *Evening Standard* (London), 18 June 1940.

[3]Tim Bale, 'Tory humiliation down to campaign length and cult of May – Norman Tebbit interview' [Blog post] *Queen Mary University of London, News*, 29 June 2017. Available online: https://www.qmul.ac.uk/media/news/2017/hss/tory-humiliation-down-to-campaign-length-and-cult-of-may--norman-tebbit-interview.html. Accessed 4 July 2022.

[4]Sebastian Payne and George Parker, 'Nigel Farage, changing British history from the margins', *Financial Times*, 10 May 2019.

What I think has been apparent in recent years in public discourse has been a marked nostalgia for the Second World War and an 'us and them' mentality: an idea of Europe as the enemy lives on. That everything will be better if we can withdraw from European entanglements and be alone and free once more.

But, but! Britain was not alone, men and women from 50 different nationalities joined the British armed forces during the war. It had the support of the Empire and its people and resources. The Few encompassed personnel from the Empire, from occupied Europe and beyond.

There are endless other possible examples of the gap between specialist knowledge and what the public 'knows' or the converse, the gaps in knowledge, the events of the past that have been forgotten or ignored. Much of Britain's role in its Empire probably falls into this category. Then we have the rise in allegations of Antisemitism – understood by its recipients within the most vivid context of the Holocaust, whilst those who stand accused ignore or deny any parallels.

The important question for us, as historians, is – does this matter? If it does, what should we do about it? I think historians should push back against ignorance and oversimplification. We should offer alternative readings of the past to shift the basis upon which Britain's place in the world is characterised in the public realm. And whilst historians of all periods and genres can probably find grounds to criticise the way in which their subject is popularly characterised, my contention is that it is the era of the Second World War which offers the most pressing case for action.

But how?

Once upon a time, the main way in which academic historians would shape that debate was twofold – firstly, we would train a legion of history students to go out into the world as better-informed citizens. Secondly, we would research the past and write densely constructed arguments to be hidden away in journal articles and in weighty tomes. I'll admit right now that those are the elements within the role of academic historian where I feel most comfortable. And, of course, they remain important.

But are they sufficient?

At least since impact case studies were incorporated into the Research Excellence Framework (REF), there has been a formalised expectation that some of us would seek to influence opinion, policy, social change.[5] I guess today I'm trying to persuade

[5]REF 2014, 'REF 2014 impact case studies' https://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies/. Accessed 15 June 2022.

you, and myself, that we need to do more collectively to shape the way in which history is understood by the general public. Not just by conducting research and somehow letting it seep through to the public in some kind of slow, sedimentary process, but by getting involved more directly. In short, we cannot just leave it up to Dan Snow.

What I'd like to do then is to offer some observations based on how the centenary of the First World War unfolded. A key theme in my research is how nations make use of their past: which moments in history are selected and polished up for the purposes of national myth-making. That is one of my themes today: which parts of our past wars are we to highlight in our commemorations?

These observations are incomplete, you'll no doubt be able to add to them, but I offer them along with a proposal in order to start a conversation.

Lesson 1: Plan ahead

Andrew Murrison MP was appointed as the Prime Minister's special representative for the First World War centenary commemorations in November 2011.[6] Do you want to know the reason why that happened? It was because whilst our EU counterparts were pressing ahead with their plans, the UK was completely distracted by preparations for the London 2012 Olympics. The appointment was made so that the UK could be seen to be doing something. Let's rather plan ahead next time.

One of the most ambitious academic efforts has been the International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Funded by the German Research Foundation, but with numerous international partners, it originated in 2011. It launched in October 2014.

One thousand academics from fifty-four different countries had been involved at that point,[7] and as of June 2019 it has 1,370 articles.[8] It has a rigorous process of

[6]"PM's "catch-up" on WW1 Events', *Nottingham Evening Post*, 3 November 2011. Accessed 24 June 2022.

[7]Richard Moss, 'A wiki for the First World War? International Encyclopedia of the Great War to launch online', 24 September 2014, *Culture 24* [website] https://www.culture24.org.uk/history-and-heritage/military-history/first-world-war/art500229-a-wiki-for-the-first-world-war-international-encyclopedia-of-the-great-war-to-launch-online. Accessed 7 June 2019.

[8]1914-1918-online, 'The project started in 2011, and was launched in October 2014. Since then we've progressively added articles (now 1,370). Oliver Janz has published about the encyclopedia, if not specifically about the process, see https://geschkult.fu-

commissioning, editing and reviewing, which ensures that it provides the best possible scholarly summaries of a range of themes which cover military, political, social, cultural history and more. Designed to be global in its reach, and transnational in conception, one of the motivating factors behind it has been described as a way to "discuss the roots of and possibilities for European integration".[9] What would it take to build a Second World War equivalent?

If you want to coordinate scholarship in the form of a series of monographs, then of course the lead time is even longer. Jeff Grey edited a series for Oxford University Press, *The Centenary History of Australia and the Great War.* He started planning it in at least 2008. Six years ahead of time.

But really, if you want to effect a deep and wide change in our understanding of the Second World War, you had better check the state of your field. Who is studying the war and where are they? Is the Second World War taught in universities mostly in War Studies pockets or by German historians? Who is researching the war? In First World War Studies, I like to think that a series of generations of PhD students since the 1990s have brought more gender balance to the field, whilst also being part of the enrichment and diversification of the topics encompassed by the broad field. As such, historians of the war are to be found in all sorts of academic departments. Has the same thing been happening regarding the study of the Second World War?

Since this is not my field, I tried to find a way to gain a snapshot of it. The Bibliography of British and Irish History has the facility to compare the numbers of books and articles published on a particular subject, and gives a list of the top fifty most prolific authors on a subject. Yours is a vast and prolific subject area – between 1992 and 2019, 9,700 books or articles have been published on the Second World War. The figure for First World War books and articles is only 70% of that. It's interesting to note, however, that in the period of the centenary the rate of publishing on the First World War surpassed the Second World War rate. It seems fair to assume that when 2039 rolls around, publications about the Second World War will go stratospheric. The top fifty most prolific authors on both wars were overwhelmingly men (although there were slightly more women on the First World War), and there was only one identifiably non-European name on each list. When I tried other search terms that

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berlin.de/en/e/fmi/institut/mitglieder/Professorinnen_und_Professoren/janz.html. Also see https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/Introduction/.' [Twitter] 7 June 2019.
Available online: https://twitter.com/19141918online/status/1136979959560515585?s=20&t=0Z8Nn3mpTQlYH-C80RzGUQ. Accessed 24 June 2022.

[9]Moss, 'A wiki for the First World War?'

were nonetheless specific to the Second World War – the Beveridge Report, the Blitz, Dunkirk Evacuation, and the Holocaust – in all but the case of Dunkirk, the list of authors contained a better proportion of women. What is it about a close focus on a military operation that deters women? Is it the subject matter or something structural?

The picture gets even more exaggerated for the list of top authors on Churchill – around forty books and articles are published about him steadily every year – among the top fifty authors on Churchill, there were only two women and both were related to him (Mary Soames and Celia Sandys). Why don't women authors seem to get involved in writing Great Man history? Can we extrapolate from authorship to readership?

This is a rough and ready metric. But I suggest that if historians of the Second World War consider their subject to be of national importance, perhaps the historians of the subject should look a bit more like the nation, and frame the subject in a variety of ways so that there is a better chance of speaking to a wider cross section of the nation.

Lesson 2: Change is possible

At the start of the lecture, I offered a caricature of how the Second World War has been represented – and the D-Day commemorations of course had a quite different tone – but even with an event like Dunkirk where the myth seems to be hard baked into the national psyche, I'd argue that the memory of the First World War offers a clear example that change is possible.

From the 1960s to the 1990s, the dominant perception of the First World War in Britain was that it was futile. This is not how it was perceived at the time: the germ of the idea emerged during the war books boom of the 1930s, but it was one among a range of ideas. It only became the mainstream opinion in the 1960s. Faring badly in the shadow of the morally and politically unambiguous Second World War, fuelled by anti-militarist sentiment of CND supporters and Vietnam critics, not to mention generational change and some powerful representations in popular culture, the idea that the soldiers of the Western Front were 'lions led by donkeys' took centre stage and remained there for decades.

If there was a moment where futility was likely to be the dominant trope once more during the centenary, it was likely to be 1 July 2016, the anniversary of the first day of the Battle of the Somme. The worst single day in the history of the British Army, with 60,000 casualties and 20,000 dead. But as it turns out, there was more variety than one might have expected – that's true of the interpretations and of the interpreters themselves. Helen McCartney argues that during the centenary of this event 'a greater

number of actors with divergent preoccupations were interpreting the themes in a public forum, diversifying the meaning of the Battle of the Somme for the British public'.[10] One of the things her research shows, as a consequence of this, is that the needle had shifted – subtly but to an appreciable extent – from an emphasis on futility to a narrative of terrible sacrifice. One of the interesting elements in this was the focus upon *connections* to individuals rather than just the whole.

Jeremy Deller's artistic project, 'We're here because we're here' used 1400 volunteers representing a soldier killed in battle. They handed out cards with their personal details and date of death. It was deeply moving. Its presence in multiple, non-traditional places made for an arresting experience, and one that was designed to be amplified via social media so that the public became participants in the event.[11] Helen McCartney also studied an event and installation at Heaton Park, Manchester, 'Path of the Remembered' – and this is particularly interesting because of the evidence it provides of ordinary people's perceptions. The idea was that individual members of the public could make a tile which then became part of a temporary path. Some people were motivated by a family connection, and this is an important driver of the more diverse sentiments attached to the commemoration – those making the tile wanted to convey sorrow and tragedy, but also pride. Another emergent theme was that 'soldiers deserved to be remembered as individual personalities, with admirable characters'.[12]

The simplistic futility myth had been overwritten by something more subtle.

What factors had driven these changing perceptions? Our nation's changing relationship to the Armed Forces and warfare in the era of Iraq and Afghanistan, greater sensitivity to the ensuing losses through Royal Wootten Bassett, Armed Forces Day, and the Military Wives Choir may all be factors. The rise and rise of family history has also been an incredibly important driver of a greater sense of a personal connection with the past. Particularly interesting for our profession is the question as to whether the work of historians has had any impact. Starting with John Terraine's work to defend, or at least contextualise, Haig, and gathering pace from Gary

[10]Helen B. McCartney, 'Commemorating the Centenary of the Battle of the Somme in Britain', *War & Society* 36, 4 (2017), p. 290.
[11]14-18 Now, '*we're here because we're here*' (1 July 2016). Available online: https://becausewearehere.co.uk/. Accessed 24 June 2022. For an example of a tweet about the event, see, Greater Anglia, '1st day of the #Somme British Army suffered 57470 casualties & 19240 killed. Let us all remember & pay our respects', [Twitter] 1 July 2016. Available online: https://twitter.com/greateranglia/status/748813576794583041. Accessed 24 June 2022.
[12]McCartney, p. 299.

Sheffield's *Forgotten Victory* in 2001, operational military historians have been arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the experience of fighting on the Western Front. For a long time, however, there seemed to be an unbridgeable gap between academic views and public views. With the centenary, that gap appears to have narrowed. Does it just take a long time for new ideas to percolate through?

If it is the case that academic history has had any influence in this area, but with considerable time lags – getting on for fifteen years post publication – and then you factor in the time it takes to write and publish a book; if you want to change perceptions of the Second World War by this means, then the dark joke from academic twitter applies: You Should Be Writing.

Lesson 3: It is hard to avoid a national focus

The most arresting moment of the commemorations of the Somme in the UK had a British focus. Those with a transnational bent had less impact in Britain. Alongside the aforementioned commemorations of the Somme, was a commemorative ceremony at Thiepval in France. For the first time, it was a joint Anglo-French ceremony and the French President, François Hollande attended alongside Prime Minister David Cameron, Prince Charles, the President of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins and the former German President Horst Köhler. Coming just a week after the Brexit referendum, 'the solemn expressions of international harmony' seemed particularly poignant.[13]

At the beginning of the centenary, we had seen the extraordinary installation of ceramic poppies at the Tower of London, *Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red* by Paul Cummins and Tom Piper. It is estimated that five million people visited during its five months in situ.[14] It comprised over 800,000 individual poppies, each representing a British or colonial serviceman who had died in the war. Afterwards, a portion of the poppies were sold to the general public. I have one in my office. When the *Guardian's* art critic Jonathan Jones criticised the display as 'trite and inward looking', essentially

[13]Esther Addley and Helen Pidd, 'Silence the Most Fitting Memorial at Somme Commemorations', *The Guardian*, 1 July 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/somme-centenary-commemorations-silence-fitting-memorial-uk-france. Accessed 13 July 2022.

[14]Jenny Kidd and Joanne Sayner, 'Unthinking Remembrance? Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red and the Significance of Centenaries', *Cultural Trends* 27, 2 (15 March 2018), p. 68.

a bit UKIP-py, there was an uproar, but from this side of the referendum he seems to have had a point.,[15]

As far as I can tell, there were only two occasions when a German politician was included in commemorations on British soil. The most widely noted was at the final Remembrance Sunday of the centenary. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier was the first German leader ever to lay a wreath during the annual ceremony.[16] The other occasion saw the inclusion of the Steinmeier's predecessor Joachim Gauck at the ceremony in Orkney for the Battle of Jutland. As Heads of State, such occasions are part of their duties. It is a step forward that they were invited, but such gestures remain a far cry from a thoroughgoing effort at reconciliation.

There's a different way of doing things.

As David Reynolds' work shows us, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the loss of the Soviet Union as an 'other' against which Europe could define itself, the European Union set about commemorating the world wars as a shared European tragedy that profoundly shaped the 20th Century and beyond.[17] Here are two powerful examples of EU commemorations of the First World War.

The first is the Notre Dame de Lorette international memorial.[18] It was opened in France in 2014 and it lists 580,000 names of those who died in the war in the region. It makes no distinction by nationality, gender, rank, or religion. The sheer quantity of names almost overwhelms. Each one etched in letters a couple of centimetres high on endless bronze plaques taller than you or I. Sheet after sheet of Smiths, is followed by sheet after sheet of Schmidts. On just one plaque chosen at random you find Victor Hall and Wilfred Hall and endless William Halls not far from Pierre Hallas and Alice Hallam and Wilhelm Halle.

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[15]Jonathan Jones, 'The Tower of London Poppies Are Fake, Trite and Inward-Looking – a Ukip-Style Memorial', *The Guardian*, 28 October 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2014/oct/28/tower-of-london-poppies-ukip-remembrance-day. Accessed 13 July 2022.

[16]UK Government, 'German President to lay Wreath at Cenotaph Service, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/german-president-to-lay-wreath-at-cenotaph-service. Accessed 13 July 2022.

[17]David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: the Great War and the twentieth century,* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2013)

[18]Jonathan Glancey, 'The Ring of Remembrance, Notre Dame de Lorette; Architect Philippe Prost's New International Memorial of Notre DamedeLorette Is as Beautiful as It Is Moving, Says Jonathan Glancey', *Telegraph.Co.Uk*, 10 November 2014.

The second example goes to show the longevity of Franco-German political leadership in reconciliation through commemoration. On 22 September 1984, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany and President François Mitterand held hands at Verdun, the site of the terrible battle of 1916.[19] The ossuary there holds the remains of more than 130,000 French and German dead. The image recalled Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Charles De Gaulle at Reims Cathedral in 1962.[20] It was repeated by Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron who engaged in a symbolic embrace at the commemoration of the armistice in France on 10 November 2018.[21] It was the first time a German leader had visited the site of the signing of the Armistice since the Second World War. There was no such symbolism from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, and her German counterpart.

How would you say the habits of commemoration for the Second World War compare? If a visible and recognisable German political presence on British soil is a yardstick of the absence or presence of an inward-looking nationalism, then the recent D-Day commemorations seem to be a positive indicator of reconciliation. Chancellor Merkel attended the commemorations in Portsmouth. Not everyone approved. The former Arkansas Governor, Mike Huckabee's tweeted in response, 'Must have been an "awkward" moment for Angela Merkel to sit in ceremony as the Allies commemorated D-Day that broke the back of Nazi Germany'.[22] His tweet attracted thousands of critical comments.

This is a step forward from the official arrangements for the First World War commemorations, but there's still plenty of work to be done. I'd be interested to know how you consider this point relates to how the history of the Second World War is written? I suspect that Nazi Germany and its armed forces are far more

[19]New York Times, 'Mitterand and Kohl Honor Dead of Verdun', *New York Times*, 23 September 1984.
[20]Cvc.eu by uni.lu, 'Mass for Peace: Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle at Reims Cathedral (8 July 1962)', https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/mass_for_peace_konrad_adenauer_and_charles_de_gaulle_at_reims_cathedral_8_july_1962-en-93162a4b-7c22-4d61-a27a-8f053554c92e.html. Accessed 24 June 2022.
[21]Kim Willsher, 'Trump Misses Cemetery Visit as Macron and Merkel Vow Unity', *The Observer*, 10 November 2018.
[22]Gov. Mike Huckabee, 'Must have been an "awkward" moment for Angela Merkel to sit in ceremony as the Allies commemorated D-Day that broke the back of Nazi Germany' [Twitter] 5 June 2019. Available online: https://twitter.com/GovMikeHuckabee/status/1136393050916347906?s=20&t=0Z8Nn3mpTQlYH-C80RzGUQ. Accessed 4 July 2022.

extensively studied and known than their First World War-era equivalents. How does that influence diplomacy and commemoration, if at all?

Lesson 4: How you frame it is important

I'd like to talk about Australia and Ireland now, as examples of two different ways to conceptualise a centenary.

The 75th anniversaries of D-Day have strong parallels with Australia's efforts in 1990. Bob Hawke's government chose to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Anzac landings at Gallipoli in style. Almost $10m was spent flying 58 veterans, plus politicians, diplomats and military representatives from around the world, doctors, nurses, journalists and school children to Turkey for three days. For the first time ever, the Dawn Service at Gallipoli was televised and for the first time the prime minister was in attendance. Since then, Australia's commitment to remember the Anzacs has grown and grown.[23] Attendance at commemorations has steadily risen, as has political commitment to the cause – particularly under John Howard's leadership, who valued war commemoration in and of itself, but also as a means to sidestep questions of Aboriginal reconciliation.

By the time 2014 rolled around, the Australian government was committed to spending twice as much as the United Kingdom.[24] Such was the deep commitment to defining Australia in terms of a military identity, that the centenary was framed, not as the centenary of the First World War, but as the centenary of Anzac. During the 2014-18 cycle, not only the landmark moments of one hundred years earlier were marked, but so were the landmarks from all subsequent wars. Surely this led to overload, fatigue and confusion? I don't think this is a model to emulate.

Even though I do not think the British have done enough to remember the post-1945 wars and violence inherent in the process of decolonisation, and in particular we need to do far more to remember and educate ourselves about Operation Banner and the Troubles, I do not think it would be the right thing to do to try and expand the commemoration of the Second World War to include events from decades later as Australia has done.

Australia's celebration of its Anzacs places the Anglo-Celtic origins of the nation at the heart of its identity. That it does so with gusto at a time of increasing ethnic

[23]Jenny Macleod, *Gallipoli*, Great Battles Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 89–102.
[24]Macleod, p. 101.

diversity is not a coincidence. One solution to this has been what Frank Bongiorno has called 'contribution history' wherein different ethnic groups can seek inclusion in the national story by identifying some of its members within the first AIF.[25] But they do so as a bolt-on to something pre-existing, rather than as an integral part of the nation's story. I think a version of this is almost inevitable in the commemoration of the Second World War, and it will be a welcome complication of the myth if the public were to learn more about, say, who really comprised The Few at the Battle of Britain.

But given that the history of the Second World War and its impact on the UK is a far broader canvas than Australia has in Gallipoli, it does not need to be the entire story.

Nonetheless it does bear noting that Australia has chosen to use the experience of war to define itself, and more precisely, the actions of a relatively small group of young men to define what it means to be Australian. This necessarily places women in minor supporting roles. Where they are commemorated – say as nurses risking their lives near the front line – they are primarily being celebrated for the typically masculine achievement of being brave.

Nations use their past to define themselves. What I'm suggesting is that we should be thoughtful about the past we choose to emphasise.

Shall we turn now to Ireland?

Ireland's experience during the First World War was particularly complex and divisive. In establishing its own separate identity, what eventually became the Republic of Ireland made heroes of those involved in the Easter Rising and suppressed its memories of its involvement in the First World War. The national memorial to service in the British Army during 1914-18 literally became overgrown by the 1980s. However, a series of developments gradually served to detoxify that facet of its history. These were diplomatic, political, economic, and historiographical. A series of commemorative events developed which moved the reconciliation forward. The first event where the heads of state of both Ireland and the UK took part, significantly, was overseas when in 1998 President Mary McAleese and Queen Elizabeth took part in the official unveiling of the Messines Peace Tower in Belgium. The process culminated in 2011 with the first visit by a British monarch to the Republic. In doing so, she visited both the memorial to the Easter Rising and the memorial to the First World War.

[25]Frank Bongiorno, 'Anzac and the Politics of Inclusion' in Shanti Sumarto and Ben Wellings (eds) *Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration*, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), p. 96.

This detoxification process laid the basis of how Ireland approached the centenary years.[26]

The wider point I want to make here is about how Ireland framed its commemorations of the First World War. They were folded into what was termed a 'decade of centenaries' which covered the tumultuous years of 1912-1923, from the signing of the Ulster Covenant through to the establishment of the Irish Free State. Rather than seeking to erase or ignore some elements of its past, Ireland has embraced and recognised all of the waymarkers in that period.[27]

This is the model I would like to propose for the commemoration of the Second World War. Instead of the familiar 1939-45, punctuated by the outbreak, the Battle of Britain, Blitz, D-Day and VE Day, what would it mean if we framed the war as being part of a long 1940s that shaped our world for decades? So, we could have a decade of centenaries, with a little poetic license as per the Irish, that ran from 1938 and Munich through to 1949 and the founding of NATO. We make our canvas broad enough to encompass all of the momentous events, and all of the people who shaped it and contributed. We pay deep honour to our soldiers, but we do justice to the society from which they were drawn and the changes that inspired them. This could draw upon important developments in the recent historiography, Jonathan Fennell's book, *Fighting the People's War* chief among them.[28]

I started my pitch with the suggestion that historians of the Second World War are the most important for our nation. I had a qualm or two in saying that, mostly because I think the British have not properly reckoned with their imperial past. But during our decade of centenaries we could direct our nation's attention to the workings of empire, to our 'Great Betrayal' of our Dominion soldiers at Singapore, to the Bengal Famine, to the Quit India campaign, and to the bloody partition of British India.

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[26]Catriona Pennell, "'Choreographed by the Angels"? Ireland and the Centenary of the First World War', *War & Society* 36, no. 4 (2 October 2017): 256–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/07292473.2017.1384140; Edward Madigan, 'Centenary (Ireland) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)', in *1914-1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. Available online, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/centenary_ireland. Accessed 24 June 2022.

[27]For examples of the scope of activities, see https://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/. Accessed 15 June 2022.

[28]Jonathan Fennell, *Fighting the People's War : The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

The same framework would enable us to trace the progression from Kristallnacht through to the Final Solution, beyond to the liberation of the camps, and ultimately to the founding of Israel.

We could properly weave the experiences of civilian men, women and children into our nation's story. They've been a little short-changed by the way we've commemorated the war, I think. From 1945, the commemoration of the Second World War was folded into the modes of the First World War, with Armistice Day becoming Remembrance Sunday. It is proper that soldiers and their sacrifices are commemorated, but this decision erased the citizens who died in the Blitz from the main stage of their nation's story. Yet they died because their membership of the nation put them at risk: in this total war, they were an integral part of the war machine.

This was a People's War. But we did not get a People's Commemoration. What might that look like a century later?

We could make much more of the process by which the Welfare State was built, the deprivation which inspired the Beveridge Report, the decisive change in our expectations of the state and of fairness that ensued. The shining symbol of this is the National Health Service. I'd like to see its founding day become a new bank holiday. Instead of war as the means to characterise the nation, I'd like the NHS to become the holy grail. We already have a deep commitment to it. Here's why I think it could work as a vehicle for national identity. What are the reasons why nations define themselves through war, and particularly the world wars? They are momentous events, matters of life and death, and ones that touch every ordinary person in the country, linking them to the bigger story of the nation. The NHS is about a million momentous events for those it touches, certainly they are matters of life and death, and everyone is affected by it. But if we were to celebrate it, rather than war, we would not be elevating violence and a small cohort of men, we would be elevating science and caring, doctors and nurses, cleaners and porters, men and women, many of them immigrants. It would place a set of admirable values at the heart of our nation. It would make free health care at the point of use politically untouchable.

Finally, if we frame the long 1940s as a decade of centenaries, we do not just leave the story in 1945 as if peace makes itself, but we build in an education in international cooperation. We make the founding of the United Nations and the establishment of NATO part and parcel of the story. We build a bulwark against petty nationalism.
By the time we reach the decade of centenaries, it is possible that these institutions that I personally hold dear will have been submerged by the rising tide of populism.

I hope not.

Given that commemoration is always present-minded, perhaps a different set of political priorities will appear to be pressing when the moment comes nearer. But I hope that as historians we will be able to work together, to reach beyond the academy, and prepare to help to shape events for the better.

The Importance of River Valleys in the Overall Strategy of the Mercenary Companies 1357-1366

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ABSTRACT
In the middle of the fourteenth century the Great Companies of the Hundred Years' War achieved their goals by occupying bridge-towns and strategically important castles in the river valleys. In this paper, the importance of river valleys will be shown from the point of view of the mercenary companies in the border regions of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire, based on examples gathered in archives from Lyon to Lille. The cases presented show this process from the first appearance of the mercenaries until they reached the total domination of their targeted region.

Introduction

After the Battle of Poitiers, the border region of the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire was ravaged by Breton, Gascon, English and Navarrese companies and even Polish mercenaries, either serving local lords or acting in their own interest.[1] A Breton company, led by a mercenary captain called Gaultier, occupied the valley of the River Nièvre around the city of Nevers in the county of Nevers and the Barony of Donzy. The Breton captain and his company ravaged Nivernais, and gathered all the existing livestock - pigs, cattle, and sheep - and then brought them in front of one of the city gates of Nevers, close enough for their owners to be able to recognise them. Louis de Mâle, the count of Flanders and Nevers, who also bore the title of the Baron of Donzy, sent his half-brother Ryffard of Flanders to defend the Barony of Donzy. Contrary to his assignment, Ryffard disappeared with the money he had collected to

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DOI : 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1642
[1]They were on the payroll of Yolande of Flandre, Dame of Cassel in the Duchy of Bar. Archives de départementales de la Meuse B.1418. 34r

pay off the Bretons. When the Bretons received news about Ryffard left Nevers, they ravaged and destroyed the land in both the county and in the barony by setting several towns (Montenoison, Noison, and Lurcy-le-Bourg) on fire.[2] This is but one example of what happened when the companies occupied and dominated a river valley in the middle of the fourteenth century.

There are several reasons for the success of the mercenary companies in the eastern part of France and the western principalities of the Holy Roman Empire in the second half of the fourteenth century. These include the disintegration of the French central administration after the Battle of Poitiers, the sudden and unexpected death of Philip of Rouvre – the last Capet duke of Burgundy who fell off his horse and died on 21 November 1361, the ongoing private wars among the local nobilities, the last campaign of Edward III before the Treaty of Brétigny, and the active foreign and military policy of Charles the Bad, the King of Navarre.[3] However, these external factors alone would not have been enough to enable the soldiers of fortune to dominate the countryside in the border region to such an extent. The key to the success of the companies were their innovative strategies and tactics, tight control, strong leadership, outstanding fighting skills, and the immensely successful strategies and tactics of the companies were the key to their success.[4] Once they took hold of a region 'thanks to this ingenious and lucrative system of relay in oppression, the victims had no respite in their suffering'.[5] This article endeavours to highlight some of the features of the strategies and tactics that brought about the dominance of the companies over the entire region, from Champagne to Auvergne in the period 1357-1366.

Phillippe Contamine 'referred to the style of warfare [of the companies] as one where the objective was not to prevail over the adversary or to restore peace through victory, but to enrich themselves by all possible means, where elementary economic motives eclipsed political intentions'.[6] The companies did not want to conquer the

[2]Archives départementales du Nord, B.758 n.14451.

[3]Charles the Bad was the King of Navarre and a prince of the Fleur-de-Lys. As a direct descendant of King Louis X, he was a candidate for the throne of France after the House of Capet became extinct. His many other territorial claims in France, including the Duchy of Burgundy, were at the centre of competing French and English politics during the first part of the Hundred Years War.

[4]Norman Housley, 'The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy, and the Crusades, 1356–1378', *Traditio*, 38 (1982), pp. 253-280 (p. 253).

[5]Siméon Luce, *Histoire de la Jacquerie,* (Paris: Honoré Champion, Libraire, 1895), p. 23.

[6]Philippe Contamine, 'Les Compagnies d Aventure en France pendant La Guerre de Cent Ans', *Mélanges de l'école francaise de Rome. Moyen-Age, modernes*, (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 1975) p. 367.

land, instead they wanted to maximise their profits.[7] This fact was well reflected in their strategy: they used river valleys to infiltrate into a province by focusing on taking strategically important castles or towns. They endeavoured to control trade routes by land and river; hence, crossing points were of a high value to them.[8] A town with a bridge made it possible for the mercenaries to advance along both banks of a specific river.



Figure 1: The Strategic Situation of the Companies – Bridges & Cities.[9]

[7]One of the means of their earning income was a special corporate tax: the *patis*, which was paid by the locals to ensure their survival in company-controlled territories.

[8]An example of the importance of the fluvial trade routes in the middle of the fourteenth century can be found in the accounts of Champtoceaux where it is indicated that in 1397 ships had used the River Loire between 1355-56. Philippe Contamine, '*Au temps de la guerre de cent ans en France et Angleterre*', (Paris: Hachette, 1994) p. 65.

[9]All maps in this study were designed by Ölbei Tamás and drawn by Nagy Béla

The size of the towns was also important: they were successful in taking towns like Brioude, Anse, Châtillon-sur-Loire, Pont-Saint-Esprit, and Nogent-sur-Seine. These towns were significant enough for the companies to be able to control large areas, sometimes even ones with a territory of up to a two hundred kilometres in diameter. They used these areas as a base for their *chevauchées*, but these were also the starting points for isolating big cities like Metz, Strasbourg, Lyon, Avignon, Orléans, or Reims in proximity to their operations. The companies tried to, but never succeeded in taking a significant city of more than 15,000 inhabitants. Their goal instead was the collection of tolls for use of the commercial routes leading into and out of the large cities. Very often, the companies destroyed the land and the 'faubourgs' of the cities, right up to the gates in front of the incredulous eyes of the hapless citizens. This explains why they very carefully chose the castles, or towns that they intended to conquer.

The Preparation of Attacks

Spying was always an integral part of the tactics of the companies. It was always much more dangerous and costly in human life to risk a frontal assault on a walled city or castle than take it by deception. Nicolas Savy states in his fundamental article on the tactics of the Gascon companies that one of the main elements of the preparation of the companies was related to intelligence.[10] Sending spies and requesting information about the targeted area or settlement ensured the appropriate 'surprise effect,' and the safe return of the companies to their bases. Companies used locals from the area to be conquered to gain relevant information. Sometimes these local 'assets' served the companies voluntarily or the companies paid them, as in the case of a certain Erterem, in the bailiwick of Auxois in 1362, who was 'condemned because he had given the English a lot of information about the land when they were there and [the English] took the town of Jully and he was condemned for what the [English] had done with the women of Jully'.[11]

On other occasions, the companies forced people to lead the way to their targeted destination. This was the case of 'Ligier Brouhart of Arnaul who was condemned … because he brought the enemy to the castle of Villers les Aula and then robbed several places with them. He was taken to the prison of Rougemont and then it was proven

[10]Nicolas Savy, 'Les procédés tactiques des compagnies anglo-gasconnes entre Garonne et Loire (1350-1400)', in Guilhem Pepin, Françoise Lainé & Frédéric Boutouille, eds, *Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent and, Hommage à Jonathan Sumption,* (Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2016), p.116.

[11]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or 1.F. 365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois. F. 18., B. 2748 f. 2v

that he had been forced [by the routiers]' in the bailiwick of Auxois in 1365.[12] The companies were also eager to send spies of their own to explore a targeted area or town. However, this often proved to be fatal for the spies of the companies: just before the Battle of Brignais, the Dame of Chauceris caught a spy of the companies named Gieffroy, accompanied by four female companions, who had been sent to the vicinity of Lyon to gain information concerning the region. He appeared to be suspicious and therefore they interrogated him. Under torture, he confessed that he had worked for the companies. Gieffroy Charpi was beheaded and his headless body was hung on a tree.[13] Before the Battle of Brignais, yet another spy of the companies was sent to St Paul-en-Jarez in the valley of the Loire, where the citizens caught him while he was measuring the height of the town walls with a rope.[14] Thanks to their precise reconnaissance, the companies were able to capture bridge-towns where they appeared unexpectedly and surprised the guards. This is what happened to all of the bridge-towns mentioned above.

The Invasion of the Companies

Once the companies had gathered the appropriate information, they organised the attacking parties. This would mean a coalition of different smaller companies or an operation of a single Great Company.[15]

One of the two factors that determined the success of the resistance against the companies was the size of the companies. Nobody could resist the Great Companies of Robert Knolles, Seguin de Badefol, or Arnaud de Cervole. In the 1360s, when the presence of the companies became permanent in the border regions of France and the Holy Roman Empire, there was no real possibility of regaining control of a territory that the companies had once invaded.

The second decisive factor was timing. If it was possible to stop the mercenaries early enough to avoid their devastation of the countryside and its economy the depopulation of the land could be prevented. The local authorities or the lords organising the resistance were then in a position to finance the forces needed to fight

[12]Archives départementales de la Côte-d'Or 1. F.365 Compte de Baillage de Auxois f. 55., B 2752 f. 6r

[13]Lettre de rémission pour la dame de Chauceris, May 1362. Georges Guigue, *Recits de la guerre de Cent Ans, Les Tard-Venus en Lyonnais, Forez, et Beaujolais 1355-1369*, (Lyon: Imprimerie Vitte et Perrusel, 1884), Pièces Justificatives XXXVIII, pp. 291-293.

[14]Archives départementales du Rhône, Fonds du chapitre métropolitain, arm. Laban vol.1 n.5, Bernard Descroix, 'Seguin de Badefol', p. 33., Guigue, p. 68, Pièces Justificatives XXXVII, pp. 289-291.

[15]On the origin of the Great Companies see: Germain Butaud, *Les compagnies de routiers en France 1357-1393,* (Clermont-Ferrand: Lemmeedit, 2012), pp. 5-10.

against the companies. This is what happened in Champagne when the first invasion of the companies was successfully halted in 1359.



Figure 2: Invasion of Champagne by the Alliance of Mercenary Companies

The invasion of Champagne in 1358/9 was led by the following independent who decided to share the costs and profits of this adventure captains: the English Rabigot Dury and Robert Scott,[16] and the German Frank Hennequin.[17] Rabigot Dury and

[16]Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War II: Trial by Fire,* (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), e-book (location) l. 9076.

[17]Auguste Molinier, ed., 'Fragments inédits de la Chronique de Jean de Noyal, abbé de Saint-Vincent de Laon (XIV siècle)' in, *Annuaire-Bulletin de la société de l'Histoire de France Seconde Partie*, (Paris, 1883), p. 258.

Robert Scott arrived from Picardy, where they had occupied several castles.[18] The companies used the political crisis caused by the rivalry between Charles the Bad and the Regent over the control of what remained of the kingdom, to invade Champagne. In Champagne, they first took the castle of Vailly on the River Soissons and at some point, they joined their forces with Frank Hennequin.[19] Together, the three captains occupied the castle of Roucy situated on the bank of the River Aisne.[20] They swiftly took five more castles in the region between Vailly and Roucy, and were able then to control the major commercial routes north of the coronation city of Reims.[21] At Easter, Frank Hennequin, with the troops of Roucy and Vailly, surprised the castle of Sissonne, 30 kilometres from Aisne. The occupation of Sissonne shows how the companies widened their field of action by using the fortresses of the Aisne Valley and how they supported each other. The new garrison was busy ransoming the surroundings and "inflicted great misery upon the country".[22] The Count of Roucy - who had already been ransomed - attacked Sissonne with his household troops; in total, there were about forty mounted knights with their pages, but after a fierce battle, he was defeated and handed over to Rabigot Dury.[23] Once again, this local attack was repelled thanks to the cooperation of the garrisons of the castles occupied by the companies, which were located close enough to each other so that, in the event

[18]Both English captains were in Navarrese service. '*Chronique, ou Miroir historian, rédigé pour Jean de Noyal, abbé de Saint Vincent de Leon: (1388)*' Bibliothèque National p.168. Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France.

[19]Molinier, ed., p. 259. His origin is not sure. He might have originated from Cologne or he was a Hainauter as Sumption suggests. Sumption, 'Trial by Fire' l. 9088.

[20]"At the feast of Christmas this Robert led savage attacks on the castle of Roucy and took captive the rightful count and his gentle wife and daughter". See, Matthieu Lambert Polain, ed., *The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel 1290-1360,* translated by Nigel Bryant, (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2011, p. 243. 'cil finast bien de deux mille bone florins au mouton', Matthieu Lambert Polain, ed., *Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel,* (Brussels: F. Heussner Libraire-Éditeur, 1863), Vol. II, p. 238.

[21]The political situation in France was turbulent at the time of the invasion of the Champagne region. John II, King of France, had been in English captivity since the Battle of Poitiers. He was desperate to win back his liberty, but all his attempts ended in failure, as did Etienne Marcel's struggle for power. A few months before the companies' adventure in Champagne, the Jacquerie had scorched the region. Later the Jacquerie was largely crushed by the Navarrese troops. This was when the mercenaries acquired the necessary information about the situation in Champagne.

[22]*True Chronicles of Jean le Bel,* p. 244. 'Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel', pp. 238-239.

[23]*True Chronicles of Jean le Bel*, p. 244. *Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel*, pp. 238-239.

of an external threat, they could concentrate their forces.[24] In the beginning of 1359, Champagne was about to face yet another threat, this time from the south.[25] The German Albert Sterz,[26] the English Peter Audley[27] and the Hainauter Eustache d'Auberchicourt,[28] three independent captains, invaded Champagne from the direction of Beaufort, the southeastern corner of Champagne altogether with 1000 men-at-arms.[29] They took two towns at the confluence of the Aube and the Seine, notably Pont-sur-Seine and the bridge-town Nogent-sur-Seine, without much effort. [30] With these crossing points on the River Seine at their disposal, they were able to extend their sphere of influence toward the north. After conquering Lucy, they raided Vertus and Epernay in the heart of Champagne. Their next target was Troissy, a few kilometres to the north, on the bank of the River Marne. Troissy made it possible for the mercenaries to control one of the major fluvial commercial routes leading to Paris. From Troissy, Auberchicourt and the two other captains could continue their advance toward the troops of Scott, Dury and Hennequin. Finally, they joined their forces after the occupation of Saponay, 48 kilometres to the west of Reims.[31] Altogether the troops of the six captains accounted for approximately 2000 mercenaries.[32] They established a chain of fortresses that controlled all the major river valleys of Champagne, from the northern marches to the southern borders of the province. In this way, the mercenary captains could assure each other of mutual assistance in the event of a siege or organise a sizeable army in the event of a battle. They were also able to control the immediate surroundings of great cities such as Reims or Troyes.

[24]Henri Denifle, *La Désolation des Églises, Monastères et Hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans,* (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1899), Vol. I, p. 240.

[25]These captains stayed in the region for some time see: Sumption, 'Trial by Fire' l. 9097.

[26]The Champagne adventure was at the beginning of his impressive career, before he was contracted by the Italian cities and led his own international company consisting of German, English and Hungarian mercenaries. See: Karl Heinrich Schäffer, Deutche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während des 14 Jahrhunderts Erstes Buch im Päpstlichen Dienste, Darstellung, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1906), pp. 81, p. 94, p. 119 & p. 130.

[27]Maurice Poinsignon, *Histoire Générale de la Champagne et de la Brie,* (Châlons-Sur-Marne: Martin Frères, Imrimeurs-Éditeurs, 1896), p. 328.

[28]Maurice Crubellier, *Histoire de la Champagne,* (Paris: Privat-Didier, 1975), p. 181.

[29]*Chronique de messire Jehan le Bel*, p. 237.

[30]Poinsignon, p. 328.

[31]Eustache d'Auberchicourt occupied Saponay. Poinsignon, p. 328.

[32]Paul Doleine, 'La Bataille de Nogent-sur-Seine' 1359, in *Extraits des Causeries sur l'Histoire de Nogent-sur-Seine et des Environs par L'Écho Nogentais* (Nogent-sur-Seine: G. Maitre, 1935), p. 2.

Nevertheless, in the beginning of June, the local authorities, with external help, managed to reverse the Rota Fortunae in Champagne. The Duke of Normandy hired Brocard de Fénetrange, a mercenary captain from Lorraine, with five hundred horsemen, as well as the troops of the Count of Vaudemont, to take part in a campaign to cleanse the Champagne region of mercenaries. At the same time, the troops of the larger cities of Champagne either accompanied the Lorraine troops, or operated in tandem with the great counter-attack from the south. Thus, an army from Reims laid siege to the castle of Sissonne the same week that the great army led by Brocard de Fénetrange, and the Count of Vaudemont laid siege to Pont-sur-Seine. Henri de Poitiers, Bishop of Troyes, also joined this campaign with 3,000 foot soldiers, including nobles from Artois, Burgundy, Champagne and Brie.[33]

Because of this multiple response to the mercenaries' operations, the mercenary defenders of Sissonne were not reinforced and were subsequently massacred.[34] However, the most important campaign was that of the south. When Eustache d'Auberchicourt, Sir Peter Audley and Albert Sterz heard of 'the gathering of the troops (they) sent word to their fellow brigand garrisons at Saponay and Crécy-sur-Serre and had soon raised a good six or seven hundred mounted lances'.[35] Jean le Bel gives an overview of the companies' strategy, they used the same method before the Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine as the one they had used a few months earlier in Sissonne. The mercenaries cooperated with each other in order to put a large army into the field against the army of Champagne-Lorraine. The decisive battle took place on the banks of the Seine on 23 June 1359. Eustache d'Auberchicourt wanted to repeat the Battle of Poitiers on a smaller scale with his 700 soldiers. He took a defensive position at the top of a hill near Bray-Sur-Seine.[36] He planned to rely on his archers. The French army, including the mercenaries from Lorraine, was divided into three usual *battles*, each consisting of 300 lances. However, Vaudemont's army encircled the mercenaries, and ended up crushing them. Eustache d'Auberchicourt was captured and brought to Reims, where the enraged citizens wanted to lynch him.[37] The Battle of Nogent-sur-Seine effectively put an end to the first attempt by the mercenary companies to occupy Champagne.[38]

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[33]Ibid.

[34]*True Chronicles of Jean le Bel*, p. 245; *Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel*, p. 239.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Siméon Luce, ed., *Chroniques de J. Froissart*, Vol. V. (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1874), p. 159.

[37]R. Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V,* (Paris: Imprimerie Valentinoise, 1909), II, p. 41.

[38]To commemorate the victory, Henri de Poitiers, Bishop of Troyes, erected a chapel on the site of the battle at Nogent-sur-Seine. Archives départementales de l'Aube G. 2678 Testament of Henri de Poitiers



Figure 3: Robert Knolles in the Loire Valley

Pope Innocent VI used the expression "magna societas armigerorum," that is to say "Great Company" for the first time for Arnaud de Cervole's Great Company in Provence in 1358. The term `Great Company' was not applied to all mercenary companies at the turn of the 1350s/60s. Froissart and Matteo Villani distinguished the Anglo-Navarrese companies from the Great Companies. Robert Knolles was one of the captains who organised his own Great Company. They were a "new formation bringing together various elements of different units" where their size was a decisive characteristic, it sometimes meant several thousand experienced combatants.[39] Several examples can be provided for the type of invasion strategies used by a given Great Company. Several examples can be provided for the type of invasion strategies used by a given Great Company. This is illustrated in the case of Robert Knolles, who invaded the Loire Valley at the time of the invasion of Champagne.[40] Robert Knolles

[39]See: Kenneth Fowler, '*Medieval Mercenaries, volume 1. The Great Companies*' (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) pp.1-14. Henri Denifle, 'La Désolation des Églises' p. 188-209, Aimé Chérest, '*L'archiprètre épisode de la guerre de cent ans au XIV*e *siècle*' (Paris: Imprimerie Paul Bouserez, 1879) p.31-40.

[40]October-December of 1358

left Bretagne, where there was nothing left to pillage.[41] Again, the governing economic principle was to sustain his Great Company and this forced him to leave behind the approximately 40 castles that he had occupied in Normandy and Bretagne.[42] Having depleted the north he crossed Berry to arrive at the Loire Valley.[43] He was not able to occupy Orléans, but destroyed its 'faubourgs' and the land in the proximity of the city. with his Great Company, which was composed of around three thousand combatants.[44] Then, he followed the course of the River Loire and at the end of October 1358, he seized Châteauneuf-sur-Loire.[45] He established a garrison in the town and his great company pillaged the region from Châteauneuf-sur-Loire. They did not remain there for long and soon moved further east, and on 31 October 1358, Knolles' company took the castle of Chantecoq (Loiret) and from there, set fire to and subdued the entire region. He continued his way toward the marches of Burgundy, and a part of his company took Châtillon-sur-Loing further down, in the valley of the Loire. At the same time, he went to the castle of Malicorne along with the majority of his great company. Malicorne served as a centre from where he could extend his sphere of influence. His lieutenants reached the valley of the Yonne and took a castle in Regennes which belonged to the Bishop of Auxerre on 8 December 1358.[46] Arnaude de Cervole, another iconic figure of the mercenary captains, was entrusted with the defence of Nivernois and Donzy.[47] He laid siege to Malicorne to drive Knolles and his English company out of the region, but after a short unsuccessful siege, had to withdraw. By the end of 1358, the town of Auxerre was surrounded by the fortresses that had been occupied by the English.[48] It was the largest town on the River Yonne,

[41]Denifle, p. 228. R. Delachenal, ed., *Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Chronique des Règnes de Jean II et de Charles V*, (Paris: La société de l'histoire de France,1910), Vol. 1., p. 218., 'Knighton's chronicle', ed. G.H. Martin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.), p. 164.

[42]Luce, ed., Vol. V. p. XLI.

[43]A. Challe, *Histoire de l'Auxerrois son territories, son dioèse, son comté, ses baronnies, son bailliage,*' (Paris: Libraire du Collége de France, de l'École normal supérieure, des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 1878), p. 290.

[44]Tony Bostock, *Dogs of War, Sir Hugh Calveley and Sir Robert Knolles* e-book edition (Bostock Books, 2017), p. 57.

[45]'Les Grandes Chroniques de France', Vol. I. p.142.

[46]The Yonne was the principal river on the left side of the Seine and played an important role in providing Paris with the necessary supplies.

[47]Thomas Grey, '*Scalacronica*' ed. Joseph Stevenson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Printing Company, 1836) p.182. p. 228.

[48]However, during the invasion of the Loire Valley and Auxerre, Robert Knolles fought under the banner of Charles the Bad, the claim that he served Edward III as well is rather dubious. Froissart may be right that this time it was his private adventure. Luce, ed.,Vol.VI. p. 351.

guarding the important fluvial commercial route toward Paris on the navigable section of the river. Exactly two months after an unsuccessful attempt on 10 January, Knolles succeeded in occupying Auxerre on 10 March 1359.[49] All the surviving inhabitants were ransomed and the surrounding region paid the *patis*.[50] Having demolished the walls, he left Auxerre on 30 April 1359.[51] The invasion of Robert Knolles shows the tactical and strategic use of river valleys during the invasion of the Great Companies. Strategically, Knolles was able to secure the long-term financing of his company thanks to the rich booty and ransom he had accumulated during the invasion, and in particular to the occupation of Auxerre. At a tactical level, by establishing a connection between the Loire and the Yonne valleys, he was able to maintain continuous communication between the different elements of his company that guarded important castles such as Malcorne in the Loire Valley or Régennes in the Yonne Valley. Knolles' method of isolating Auxerre can also be considered a typical tactical method applied by companies in the mid-14th century. First, he blocked the roads linking Auxerre to its immediate hinterland, then a series of castles were occupied around Auxerre: Champlay, Régennes to the northeast, Ligny-le-Châtel, Champost to the north-west, Molesme to the south, Malicorne to the west. Once this phase had been completed, it was only a matter of time before the town fell. Once he had succeeded, as is shown in Figure 3 above, Knolles used Auxerre as the centre of his *chevauchées* in Burgundy. In the companies' strategy, this phase served a double purpose: on the one hand, it maximised the profit during his stay in Burgundy by ravaging the terrain, and on the other hand, he used terror systematically during the *chevauchées* in Burgundy to prepare the ground for the inevitable negotiations. In this undertaking, he was very successful, because as Jean le Bel says so eloquently: 'He finished up with around two hundred thousand high-quality florins'.[52]

[49]"Exinde perrexit uersus Amisi et per cautelam muros ascendit, portas aperit, omnes Angli intrant et in medio strate se ad bellum parant" 'Knighton's chronicle' p. 164.

[50]The companies used the system of *patis* to collect a ransom from the inhabitants of the occupied land. Georges Minois, *La Guerre de Cent Ans, Naissance de deux nations* (Paris: Perrin, Syntheses Historiques, 2008), p. 160.

[51]Ernest Petit, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne,* (Dijon: Impremerie Darantiere, 1905), Vol. 9. p.150.

[52]*True Chronicles of Jean le Bel*, p. 243; 'Les Vrayes Chroniques de Messire Jehan le Bel', Vol.II. p. 237.



Figure 4: Seguin de Badefol's *Chevauchées* from Anse in 1364/65.

Seguin de Badefol was one the most successful captains in the era of the Great Companies.[53] He was born in the castle of Badefol, originating from a noble Perigordian family, and by 1356 had fought in the Battle of Poitiers on the French side, probably under the banner of his father.[54] He took part in all major enterprises in the 1360s. He also participated in the treasure hunt of Pont-Saint-Esprit in 1360 and menaced Pope Innocent VI along with the entire papal court in Avignon for several months.[55] He was there at the Battle of Brignais, and played a decisive role in it.[56] A year later, he took the town of Brioude in Auvergne by escalade and then occupied it for ten months [57]. Having departed from Brioude, he surprised Anse on the night of 1 November 1364, and stayed there for almost a year.

[53]"Li plus grans mestres entre yaus estoit un chevaliers de Gascogne, qui s'appelloit messires Segins de Batefol" Luce, ed.,VI. p. 62.

[54]Descroix, p. 29. However, Kenneth Fowler thinks that he fought on the English side under the Black Prince. see. Fowler, 'Medieval Mercenaries' p. 75.

[55]Denifle, p. 390.

[56]Jean Devoisse, *Jean le Bon, (*Paris: Fayard, 1970), p. 463.

[57]Prise de la ville de Brioude par Séguin de Badefol et les routiers 13 Septembre 1363 in, Augustin Chassaing, *Spicilegium brivatense: recueil de documents historiques relatifs au Brivadois et à l'Auvergne,* (Paris: Libraire Droz, 1886), p. 359.

Seguin de Badefol applied the same strategy in the case of two bridge-towns that had important strategic positions; one of them Brioude was the interface between northern Auvergne, Toulouse and the Languedoc region. Generally speaking, the border between the Kingdom and the Empire was the eastern border of Auvergne, with the diocese of Le Puy.[58] The occupation of Anse established a direct threat from the north, towards Lyon, the great city of the border region, and control over the land and river trade routes leading to the heart of France. These two towns allowed Seguin de Badefol to take control of the surrounding areas on both banks of the Allier and Saône rivers. What gave Brioude such an important strategic position is that until the construction of the Pont des Moulins and the Pont-du-Château bridges in the eighteenth century there was no stone bridge between the Vieille-Brioude and the confluence with the Loire River.[59] This is why he was able to launch a series of *chevauchées* in the Auvergne, Velay, Forez, Lyonnais, Bourbonnais and Dombes regions. The raids threatened Clermont and Montferrand, Riom in the north and Le Puy in the south.[60]

After occupying Anse, Badefol quickly extended his sphere of influence to both banks of the Saône. One of his lieutenants, Chathelin la Ville, occupied the castle of Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or on the right bank, 14 km from Lyon.[61] At the same time another group invaded the castle of the Gleteins on the river's left bank, almost opposite Anse.[62] His company also acquired the two main ports of Saint-Bernard and Frans on the river's navigable sections, thus he was in control of the most important fluvial and land routes north of Lyon.

Froissart gives a list of places that were targeted by the *chevauchées* of Seguin de Badefol's company called the Margot: St. Clément-Sous-Valsonne, Arbesle, Rochefort,

[58]Marie Saudan, 'L'Auvergne médiévale en cartes : entre orient et occident, entre nord et sud', *Siècles*, 15 (2002), pp. 1-5.

[59]Emmanuel Gréloi, 'Les usages concurrents de la rivière : l'Allier en Basse-Auvergne (xiii^{e}-xviii^{e} siècle)', *Eaux et conflits : Dans l'Europe médiévale et moderne* [en ligne]. (Toulouse, 2012) (généré le 02 mars 2021). https://books.openedition.org/pumi/9469. Accessed 17 November 2021. http://books.openedition.org/pumi/9469. ISBN : 9782810709045. DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pumi.9469. https://books.openedition.org/pumi/37823. Accessed 17 November 2021.

[60]Fowler, 'Medieval Mercenaries', p. 75.

[61]Archives départementales du Rhône et de la métropole de Lyon Actes cap. vol,1 f.40, Guigue, 'Recits de la guerre de Cent Ans' pp. 109 & p.115 n. 1.

[62]Descroix, Seguin de Badefol', p. 36.

Terasse, St. Dennis-sur-Coise and 60 other strongholds in Mâconnais, Beaujolais, Forez,[63] Velay, Dombes, and Burgundy.[64]

Based on Figure 4, it is obvious that Badefol used Anse's strategic advantage to control both banks of the Saône and launch his *chevauchées* from Anse towards the four quarters. By building up his sphere of influence, he approached Lyon systematically, thus keeping the inhabitants of the city under constant pressure. The *chevauchées* he launched served the same dual purpose, as in the case of Robert Knolles. He managed to gather abundant spoils in both cities and, in both cases, he negotiated a large sum for the transfer of Brioude[65] and Anse.[66]

The Margot's *Chevauchées*	
Targeted settlements	Distance from Anse (km)
Saint-Germain-au-Mont-d'Or	11
Gletteins	19
Saint Bernard	2
Frans	10
Atbresle	23
Saint-Clément de Valsonne	24
Hopital de Rochefort La Terasse	81
Saint-Victor-sur-Loire	89
Saint-Denis-lès-Bourg.	56
Saint-Symphorien-le Chatel	55

[63]Chroniques de Froissart, ed. Luce,VI..p. 265.
[64]Ölbei Tamás, Seguin de Badefol: '"A Gonoszság fia" Anse-ban, 1364-1365', in Lengvári István, ed., *A Hely embere, az ember helye. Helytörténeti kutatás, Emberközpontú Történetírás* (Pécs, 2019) p. 154.
[65]Chassaing, p. 361.
[66]Archives départementales du Rhône et de la métropole de Lyon 10G1931 f. 4

Saint-Galmier-en Forez	62
Saint-Germain	11
Le Velay	79
Châlon	108
Dombes	35
Saint-Christophe	49
Saint-Trivier-sur-Moignans	24
Bois-d'oingt	13
Saint-Laurient d'Agny	40
Saint-Jean-de-Chaussan	24
Sain-Bel	29
Amplepuis	48
Saint-Rambert-sur-Loire	122
Vienne	56
Bourg-Argental	106
Monistrol-sur-Loire	145
Montfaucon	158

Figure 5: List of towns targeted by Seguin de Badefol's *Chevauchées* from Anse in 1364/65

Out of the 40 targets of the Margot, eight (Saint-Germain-au-Mont-d'Or, Gletteins, Saint Bernard, Frans, Châlon-sur-Saône, Pont-de-Veyle, Pont-de Vaux, Neuville-sur-Saône) located in the Saône Valley, two (L'Arbresle, Saint-Christophe-en-Bresse) in the Brévenne Valley, one (La Terasse) in the Furan Valley, three (Saint-Victor-sur-Loire, Saint-Rambert-sur-Loire, Monistrol-sur-Loire) in the Loire Valley, five (Saint-Symphorien-le Chatel, Le Velay, Vienne, Batterie de Sathonay, Saint-Genis-Laval) in the Rhône Valley, one (Bourg-Argental) in the Drôme Valley and one (Châtillon) in

the L'Azergues Valley.[67] This means that 62% of Badefol's targets were located in a river valley, which means that because of the rapidity of the chevauchées, which was an essential feature of these raids, Badefol chose targets that were not only easily accessible from Anse but made these mounted raids as safe as possible.

The Role of River Valleys in Defence against *Chevauchées* of the Margot 1364/1365

As we have seen, the companies' offensive tactics relied heavily on the use of river valleys, but this is also true for the defensive measures of towns, lords and other local authorities that organised the defence of a region against the companies. When Lyon received news of the occupation of Anse, it was already too late and they could not intervene. Hastily, they sent troops toward Anse to prevent a surprise attack coming through the valley of the Saône; Janiard Provana, bailiff of Valborne, guarded the left bank of the River Saône with 33 horsemen 'during one day and one night, when Messire Badefol took Anse'.[68]

The council of Lyon prepared 28 different chains to be stretched over the roads leading to the city and at major junctions within the city as well.[69] Each chain weighed 30 quintaux that is to say, 1468 kg.[70] Palisades protected the roads situated next to the river. Lyon was also afraid of a fluvial attack of the Margot and to prevent this, they stretched two huge chains across the river. The first chain was placed at the fortress of Pierre-Scieze, which was, approximately 100 metres long, weighing 3.6 tons.[71] The second chain was approximately 136 metres long and weighed 3.9 tons. It was protected by a tower that was connected to the ramparts of the city by a wall and was guarded day and night.[72] One of the Margot's mounted raids exemplifies both the defensive and the offensive aspects of the importance of river valleys.

Seguin de Badefol´s *Chevauchée* – mid-June 1365

In mid-summer 1365, the invasion of the Dombes and Bresse regions was prepared entirely by Seguin de Badefol. He sent spies to explore the ports and the main towns on the left bank of the Saône. Some of them were captured and forced to confess. After having been tortured, one spy confessed everything, and thus the lord of Châtillon alerted the local settlements and castles. In addition, messengers 'were sent by the order of the Lord Bailiff to Saint Bernard to the vicinity of Vimy, Tournus,

[67]Of the 60 targets mentioned by Froissart, the author has been able to identify 40 of Badefol's chevauchées.
[68]Guigue, p. 105. n.3.
[69]Archives municipales de Lyon CC 373 Inventaire-Sommaire
[70]Descroix, p. 53.
[71]Ibid., p. 51.
[72]Archives municipal de Lyon CC 373. f. 75r.

Riottier, Montmerle and other ports of the River Saône concerning the war on Anse, because someone was captured at Burgem and he confessed that he had been sent by Lord Seguin to spy on the village of Breyss'.[73] All this menacing news was confirmed by a female spy called Antelise, who was sent to Anse to bring news on Badefol's intentions, as Badefol had cut off all communication between Anse and its surroundings. She warned the local authorities about the 'utterly terrible threats' in June 1365, and that Seguin was especially tempted to lay waste the high Bresse, the territories of St-Trivier-du Courtes, Pont-Veyle, and Pont-de-Vaux in the valley of the Saône. [74] Two soldiers were sent to meet Antelise, 'who was in the proximity of Anse so that she could gain information and listen to the words of Anse's residents'.[75] It seemed that the port of Vimy was chosen as a point for crossing the River Saône, so a soldier was immediately sent to investigate the ports.[76] One of the bands of the Margot tried to cross the Saône, but because of Antelise s warning, they found the river to be guarded at Montmerle, so they searched for another, less defended crossing point to enter Bresse between Mâcon and Tournus on 20-22 June. In one of the sources, we are informed that the raiding party finally crossed the Saône and entered the region of Bresse: 'The Lord Bailiff of Saint-Amour says that the enemy have made their way to enter the area of Bresse'.[77]

Having failed to prevent the Margot from crossing the river the local lords then set up a trap at the crossing points of the Saône. The aim was to capture the returning mercenaries of the Margot so they sent additional troops to guard the Saône: once 60 glavires[78] were sent to defend Vimy, a few days later another 120 glavires joined the

[73]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or, B.7590, Guigue, Pièces Justificatives LX, p. 332-334.
[74]Claude Perroud, *Les grandes compagnies en Bresse et en Dombres*, (Bourg: Imrimerie Adolphe Dufour, 1874) p. 14.
[75]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or, B 7590 Guigue, Pièces Justificatives LX, p. 332-334.
[76]Ibid.
[77]Ibid.
[78]In the second half of the fourteenth century, the term 'glavier' or 'lance' was used to refer to not one, but two or three individuals. First, there was the fighter fully armed with chain mail and iron (flat) plates, a bascinet, a sword, a lance, a dagger and often an axe. He had a page who looked after his master's weaponry, but did not fight. Often there was a third page, who was also under his command, paid out of his master's pay. His typical armament was a brace, chain mail, sword and spear. The lance as a unit was at the heart of the companies' organisation, but there were also other types of soldiers, archers, more rarely crossbowmen, and other types of foot soldiers. These non-lance fighters were less numerous than in regular armies and were often less well equipped. In the chronicles, they are mentioned as walking on foot, and

troops in Vimy.[79] The attack of the companies might not have succeeded as planned, because in the account of Bourg, there is mention of the salary of the Carnacier of Macôn, who came to Bourg for the captured soldiers of the Margot.[80] In addition, in the account of Pont-de-Veyle of 1365 we learn that the bailiff of Bresse received news about the capture of the routiers of Anse in Pont-de-Veyle.[81] Again, the crossing points of the Saône played a crucial part in organising the successful defence against Badefol's chevauchée.

Conclusion

It has been shown that there was a pattern to the way the various mercenary captains used river valleys to their advantage: firstly, the companies used the river valleys to facilitate their entrance into a targeted region; secondly, they occupied a castle or a series of castles as a base to extend the radius of their operations.

The most efficient way for companies to occupy a region was to conquer a town with a bridge. This meant that they could increase their sphere of influence on both sides of the river valley by taking further castles and fortified settlements and at the same time, they were able to organise *chevauchées* on both sides of the river. This is what happened when Pont-Saint-Esprit was occupied.[82] On the night of 28 December 1358, the company of Batillier, Petit Meschin, Lamit and Guiot de Pin from Lyon took the town by surprise.[83] In addition, based on the sources of their spies, they learned of a gold consignment that had been collected in the province of Languedoc to ransom John I (who had been captured at the Battle of Poitiers) and was going to be transported to Paris. Contrary to what the spies had been told, the 46.5 kg gold shipment was delayed, so the mercenaries arrived in Pont-Saint-Esprit too early.[84] Although they were not able to seize the gold, by raiding both sides of the Rhône from

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sometimes described as being even naked. See details: Germain Butaud, *Les compagnies de routiers en France 1357-1393,* (Clermont-Ferrand: Lemme edit, 2012), p. 57-59. Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or, B.7590, Guigue, p. 117, Pièces Justificatives LX, p. 332-334.

[79]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or, B.7590. Guigue, Pièces Justificatives LX, p. 332-334.

[80]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or B 7116 Inventaire, Peroud, p. 15.

[81]Archives départementales de la Côte-d Or B 9921 Inventaire, Peroud, p. 15.

[82]Delachenal, p. 317.

[83]'Luce, ed., V. p. 72.

[84]Fowler, p. 134. The entire story is described in detail in Kenneth Fowler's book on the Great Companies. The captains of the companies were aware of the timing of the gold transport. The transport should have arrived in Pont-Saint-Esprit on the same day. This does not make any sense – what are you trying to say?

Pont-Saint-Esprit to the gates of the papal seat of Avignon, they accumulated a significant war booty.[85]

Mercenaries were able to take advantage of river valleys, especially when they were located on the borders of countries. In the fourteenth century, the River Saône was one of the border rivers between the Kingdom of France and the Holy Roman Empire. On 15 September 1358, Jean de Palais, in the service of Count Amadeus VI of Savoy, robbed a merchant and attempted to cross the river with his cloth-laden animals from the Kingdom of France to the Empire, partly to sell the animals there and partly to avoid French justice.[86]

Once the companies were established in a region and had control over the movements of goods and men, they used every means to gain profit. An example is Anse where Seguin de Badefol provided safe-conduct for those who wanted to cross his region. In return for a fee his clerk would issue the documents providing the name of the bearer, the duration of the safe conduct, limiting how many escorts could accompany the person. To make it even more official Seguin de Badefol used the title of 'Captain of Anse for the King of Navarre'.[87]

Champagne provides an example of how the invasion of the companies could be reversed following the decisive battle won by the locals at Nogent-Sur-Seine. Brignais meant the very opposite: the castle of Brignais was situated south of Lyon, on a plain, at the entrance to the Garon Valley, a tributary of the Rhône. It guarded the route to Lyon from the south-west.

The companies marched directly toward Lyon and 'robbed the land, kidnapped and held people for ransom and plundered cities.'[88] They arrived at the same time at the castles of Rive-de-Gier and Brignais.[89] None of the castles was strongly defended, there were only a few soldiers present, so the companies took both castles effortlessly.[90] This news caused great panic among the citizens of Lyon. The French royal army took a great risk in an all-out confrontation against the unprecedentedly large mercenary army. After the lost battle, the east of France, along the border of the Holy Roman

[85]'Si ravalèrent et rassamblèrent là tout li compagnon, et couroient tous les jours jusques ens ès portes d'Avignon' 'Chroniques de Froissart' ed. Luce V. p. 72.
[86]Descroix, p.16.
[87]Ibid., p. 51.
[88] gastant le pays, ranchonnant gens et villes" Luce, ed.,VI. 260.
[89]Frantz Funk-Bertrano, *Les Brigands,* (Paris, Librairie Hachette et C[fe], 1913), p. 50.
[90]Guigue, p. 61.

Empire, was defenceless as has been illustrated by an example based on rare unpublished findings from the Archives of Lille. [91]



Figure 6: Movement of the armies before the Battle of Brignais 1362

To allow for their greater study in depth, the examples used in this article are taken from a single decade of the fourteenth century and from the geographically limited border region of the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France. Numerous further cases of the companies using the river valleys to their strategic and tactical advantage could be found but those discussed show the companies to have been highly effective, and that their ability to take advantage of the geography of the border region played an important role in their success in the decade of the first bellicose peace of the Hundred Years War.

[91]The battle was fought on 6 April 1362. It ended with the third biggest defeat of a French royal army in the fourteenth century after the battles of Crecy and Poitiers & See footnote 2. Archives départementales du Nord, B.758 n.14451.

Ties of Service and Military Identity in Sixteenth Century England: The Example of the Blount Family

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ABSTRACT
The sixteenth century is usually considered to be a time of considerable change in the military in England. Through a case study of the Blount family, this article considers the ways in which the landed gentry of the sixteenth century defined themselves through military service, as well as looking at the ways in which they were mustered, with both the retinue system and the militia providing troops for the major conflicts in which the Blounts were involved. It will be demonstrated that personal ties of loyalty remained important to military service in the late sixteenth century.

Introduction

When Rowland Lacon decided to honour his deceased uncle, Sir George Blount (d.1581), he ordered that a great alabaster tomb be erected in the church at Kinlet in Shropshire. Lacon depicted his uncle wearing armour, in spite of George's limited military experience. Fifty years before, George had erected a tomb for his own parents in the same church, depicting Sir John Blount (d.1531) dressed for battle. Further back still, George's great-grandfather, Sir Humphrey Blount (d.1477), was shown as a knight in his tomb effigy, while the family's fourteenth century ancestor, Edmund Cornwall, still stares down from stained glass in Kinlet Church depicting him in full armour.

The military identity of Sir George Blount and other members of his family remained central to their self-image, in spite of the fact that the sixteenth century is, with good reason, characterised as a period of change in relation to the military in England, with

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1643

the use of the militia usually characterised as superseding the retinue system by the end of the century.[1] Neither were innovations, with retinue service commonly owed to lords through land occupation or indenture in the medieval period, while the county militia, which encompassed all able-bodied men aged between sixteen and sixty, had its roots in the Statute of Winchester of 1285, which required troops to be raised for domestic purposes.[2] Unsurprisingly, a considerable amount of historical research has been carried out into musters in the sixteenth century. John Jeremy Goring, for example, identified a shift from a feudal to a 'quasi-feudal' system, by which the leaders of society were summoned to provide retinues of their tenants and servants to serve in an army.[3] The crucial difference here is that such troops were summoned by the king rather than by the nobility, and that the troops raised were usually not bound to give their lord military service. Goring's work has been hugely influential, with Steven Gunn recently suggesting that the subsequent shift from quasi-feudal to a national basis of raising troops led to retinues being superseded in the 1540s by county forces raised by commissioners.[4]

This accords with the prevailing historiography, with the militia viewed as a national system of recruitment that filled the gap left by the retinue system by Charles Cruickshank in a still influential study of the Elizabethan army dating from 1946.[5] More recent historians agree, with nuance added in recent years, with it acknowledged that retinues remained to some extent and that there could be overlaps with the militia.[6] This is unsurprising, since the ways in which troops were mustered for the militia in the period were, in any event, complex, with general musters – which were intended for domestic conflict – distinct from musters for specific levies which, in the period, could necessitate serving outside England. Lindsay Boynton, for example, noted the

[1]Steven Gunn, *The English People at War in the Age of Henry VIII,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p.2.
[2]William Huse Dunham, 'Lord Hastings' Indentured Retainers 1461-1483', *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences,* 39 (1955), p. 9; Steven Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools (eds.), *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands 1477-1559,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 6, p. 21; Penry Williams, *Tudor Regime,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 2; Mark Charles Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511-1642,* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 8. Two Acts of Parliament from 1558 further updated the militia's role, although it was very much based on earlier legislation.
[3]John Jeremy Goring, 'The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558', (Queen Mary's, University of London, PhD thesis, 1955), p. 17.
[4]Gunn, *The English People at War,* p. 14.
[5]Charles Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 7.
[6]Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia 1558-1638,* (London: Routledge, 1967), p. 11; Goring, *Military Obligations,* p. 7.

continuing responsibility of an Elizabethan militia captain towards his men, with local connections and personal ties of considerable importance in the relationship.[7] That there is overlap between the two systems can also be seen in the fact that, while the decision to raise the militia would be taken by the central government, the administration of the musters and the appointment of the captains themselves was usually highly localised, something that was codified in the legislation, which envisaged local dignitaries, including the gentry, mayors and other civic officers playing a substantial role.[8] Indeed, this was a feature of the Statute of Winchester of 1285, which required local constables, under the oversight of the sheriffs and local bailiffs to survey the arms held by the counties, with this local focus repeated in the Marian legislation.[9] In spite of the deliberate focus on the localities in the statutory authority for the militia, the localised nature of the militia organisation has traditionally been viewed as a weakness and a cause of conflict between the shires and the central government.[10] However, the de-centralised nature of the militia's administration has more recently been characterised as a point in its favour, allowing for interaction between the localities and the centre in mustering troops, with the Elizabethan military's achievements at times impressive.[11]

This article will use the Blount family as a case study to evaluate their role in the military in the period. This gentry family, who were particularly large, had divided into several branches by the end of the fifteenth century, with seats focussed on the West Midlands in Shropshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Oxfordshire. Given their size and a reasonable amount of surviving source material, the family make a good subject for a case study, with this article looking at the extent of their military involvement, as well as the importance of the social relationships engendered and negotiated through this. This article will consider whether the Blounts' own military activities can be seen as undergoing significant change in the period. It will be illustrated here that the military remained of particular importance to the Blounts' lives and identities, with personal ties of loyalty, rather than the requirements of the militia

[7]Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia,* p. 104.

[8]Neil Younger, *War and Politics in the Elizabethan Countie,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 3.

[9]*Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First,* ninth edition, William Stubbs, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), pp. 463-469

[10]Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army;* A. Hassell Smith, *County and Court: Government and Politics in Norfolk, 1558-1603* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); John McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The 1590s Crisis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

[11]Younger, *War and Politics,* p.8; Paul E.J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544-1604,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p. 253.

statutes or direct royal command, still arguably the most important driving force in their service both in the late medieval period and throughout the sixteenth century. While the conclusions drawn will be necessarily specific to this one family, it is hoped that this article will add to the growing body of scholarship recognising both change and continuity in the way in which troops were mustered and the military culture of the gentry of the period.

Retaining in the Medieval Period

Blounts frequently served in warfare throughout the later medieval period, usually in noblemen's retinues.[12] Humphrey Blount of Kinlet (1422-1477) has been placed in the retinue of John Sutton, Lord Dudley, who had held his wardship, and he probably served with Dudley on the Lancastrian side at the Battle of St Albans on 22 May 1455 and, possibly, at Blore Heath on 23 September 1459.[13] By the middle of October 1459, however, Humphrey had joined his kinsman, Walter Blount (the future first Lord Mountjoy) in support of the Duke of York at the abortive battle of Ludford Bridge.[14] Humphrey then returned his allegiance to the Lancastrian king, Henry VI, but was an early supporter of the Yorkist Edward IV, fighting for him at Towton on 29 March 1461, alongside Walter Blount.[15] Humphrey also fought at Tewkesbury on 4 May 1471,

[12]'An account of the military service performed by Staffordshire tenants in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', ed. George Wrottesley, *Collections for a History of Staffordshire,* 8 (1887), p. 112; George Wrottesley (ed.), 'Military service performed by Staffordshire tenants during the reign of Richard II, from the original rolls in the Public Record Office', ed. George Wrottesley, *Collections for a History of Staffordshire,* XIV (1893), p. 230. The most prominent Blount from this period was undoubtedly Sir Walter Blount of Sodington (d.1403), who served in the retinue of the Black Prince and then John of Gaunt, before serving as Henry IV's standard bearer. Walter Blount is a prominent character in William Shakespeare's *Henry IV, part 1,* with Shakespeare, writing in the late sixteenth century, emphasising Blount's service as that owed directly to the king, rather than his retinue service due to Henry as the heir of Blount's previous patron, John of Gaunt (see Vimala C. Pasupathi, 'Coats And conduct: the materials of military obligation in Shakespeare's Henry IV and Henry V' in *Modern Philology, 109* (2012), pp. 326-351).

[13]*Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, vol 17: Henry VI 1437-1445,* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), p. 283.

[14]Ian Rowney, 'The Staffordshire Political Community' (Keele University, PhD thesis, 1981), p.88; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Vol 6: Henry VI 1452-61,* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1910), p. 532, p. 539.

[15]*Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, vol 19: Henry VI 1452-1461,* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), p. 289; *Calendar of the Fine Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, vol 20: Edward IV and Henry VI 1461-1471,* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 9.

where he was knighted by Edward IV. His home of Kinlet in Shropshire was within the sphere of influence of the earldom of March, which was held by Edward IV, with the neighbouring manors of Earnwood and Highley actually held by the Yorkist king from before his accession, who also leased land to Humphrey. As such, Humphrey's ties both of local loyalty and kinship were to the Yorkist side and it is therefore remarkable that he was ever a member of a Lancastrian retinue. Pertinently, on his tomb Humphrey was portrayed wearing a Yorkist sun and rose collar as a tangible demonstration of his loyalties: his career demonstrates that local concerns and loyalties could potentially override loyalty to a lord's retinue. This can also be seen in the career of his cousin, James Blount, who entered into an indenture with Lord Hastings on 12 December 1474, promising to be retained for the duration of his life. This included military service, since he vowed to be 'at all times be ready to go and ride with the said lord whensoever he shall thereto be required with the land with all such men as he may make at the cost and charge of the said lord'. However, as with Humphrey, family and personal ties could impact on retaining. In his indenture, James promised Hastings that he would 'be his true and faithful servant and to do him true service during his life, and his part take against all earthly creatures, his ligeance to the Lord Mountjoy, his nephew, when he cometh of full age, except'.[16] His loyalty to the head of his family was still paramount.

While Humphrey Blount's military service made up a comparatively small proportion of his adult life, it was central to his self-image: he owed his knighthood to his service in battle, he was depicted on his tomb in Kinlet Church in armour, while his most significant personal bequests in his will of 1477 were his two best swords.[17] In this, he was far from unusual, with a high proportion of surviving late medieval tomb effigies depicting men in armour. Indeed, Humphrey's neighbour, Sir Richard Croft, whose daughter married Humphrey's heir in the 1470s, was similarly depicted in the chapel at Croft Castle in Hereford. He, too, was primarily a holder of local office, including serving as Edward IV's general receiver for the earldom of March in Hereford and Shropshire and as treasurer of Richard III and Henry VII's households.[18] His time in the field was limited, although the early sixteenth century Hall's Chronicle claimed he was responsible for the capture of the Lancastrian Prince of Wales on the field at Tewkesbury.[19] He also served, along with his son-in-law, Sir Thomas Blount, in the Battle of Stoke in 1487, with Croft created a knight banneret on the field and Thomas Blount knighted. For Sir Humphrey Blount and Sir Richard Croft, their military service,

[16]Dunham, 'Lord Hastings', pp. 126-127.
[17]Bodleian Library MS Blakeway 22, f. 25.
[18]H. Southern and N.H. Nicolas, 'Biographical Memoirs of Sir James Croft, Privy Counsellor and Comptroller of the Household of Queen Elizabeth', *The Retrospective Review*, second series, 1 (1827), p. 472.
[19]Edward Hall, *Hall's Chronicle,* (London: J. Johnson *et al*, 1809), p. 301.

although only of very limited duration, was highly important to the ways in which they viewed themselves, as well as an important route to local and national office.

That service in a late medieval retinue was not always primarily military in character can be seen with Sir Hugh Peshall, father of Katherine Blount (Sir Thomas Blount of Kinlet's daughter-in-law), and his brother-in-law, Sir Humphrey Stanley. Hugh entered into an indenture with Lord Hastings on 28 April 1479, promising to be retained for life, as well as to do service 'at all times when he shall be required with as many persons defensibly arrayed as he can or may make or assemble, at the cost and expense of the foresaid lord'.[20] The retainer system in which these men were involved can be viewed in terms of a patron-client relationship, rather than one strictly connected with the need to raise and maintain troops. This can be seen from the fact that when a retainer relationship ended, such as with the execution of Lord Hastings in 1483, the retainers often sought other patrons. Hugh Peshall and Humphrey Stanley moved first to serve the Duke of Buckingham following their lord's execution in 1483.[21] Hugh's father, Humphrey Peshall, was already in Buckingham's service, being the Duke's 'trusty servant' who rode to York to meet secretly with the future Richard III following Edward IV's death, and assured him of his support.[22] Hugh Peshall and Humphrey Stanley later joined the retinue of their kinsman, Lord Stanley. Clearly, it was desirable to be in a nobleman's retinue in the period and such relationships can also be characterised as those of patrons and clients, with service required both in peace and war. The relationship was, however, mostly characterised and conceived of in military terms.

Although the Tudor monarchs viewed retaining unfavourably at times, it is acknowledged by historians that retainership continued – to some extent – into the late Elizabethan period, albeit that retinues declined in importance as a means by which troops were raised.[23] The Blounts support this, with clear evidence that they continued to be retained during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII. Humphrey Blount of Sodington, for example, served the third Duke of Buckingham. There were many facets to his role in Buckingham's service, including display and to provide military service if required.[24] A similar retainer relationship can be observed between

[20]Dunham, 'Lord Hastings', p. 131.
[21]C.L. Kingsford, *The Stonor Letters and Papers,* vol 2, (London: Royal Historical Society, 1919), p. 161.
[22]John Stow, *Annals or General Chronicle of England* (London, 1615), p. 460.
[23] J. P. Cooper, 'Retainers in Tudor England', in J.P. Cooper (ed.), *Land, Men, and Beliefs: Studies in Early-Modern History,* (London: Hambledon Press, 1983), pp. 78-96; Gunn, *The English People at War,* p. 56.
[24]'Extracts from the Household Book of Edward Stafford, Duke of Buckingham', *Archaeologia,* 25 (1834), p. 319, p. 322, p. 339.

Robert Blount of Eckington (the fifth son of Sir Thomas Blount of Kinlet), who entered the service of the fourth of Earl of Shrewsbury before 1536.[25] He later transferred his loyalties to the fifth and sixth earls respectively.[26] While primarily an administrative official, he was also called upon to provide military service, for example serving in the earl's army in Scotland in 1548.[27] In this, the role appears similar to the late medieval retainers of Lord Hastings, for example, with retainers serving both in peace and war.[28]

Blount Family Retinues

Blounts and their wider kin also maintained their own retinues. In 1477, Hugh Peshall (father of Katherine Blount) was brought before the Justices of the Peace at Ludlow, charged with giving liveries to fourteen lower status men of two Shropshire parishes in an attempt to retain them on 10 August 1476.[29] Due to a statute of 1390 which limited retaining to noblemen such retaining was illegal, but very common. Both Hugh and his brother-in-law, Sir Humphrey Stanley, brought retinues to Bosworth Field in August 1485 when they were sent by Lord Stanley to shore up the vanguard of Henry Tudor's army.[30] Hugh certainly retained men in peacetime. In 1466, for example, the Countess of Shrewsbury accused him of 'collecting together a great body of malefactors and disturbers of the peace, and breaking into her closes and houses at Whitchurch and Blakemere, and so threatening her servants and tenants that for fear of their lives they were unable to attend to their business or perform their duties to her'.[31] In 1477, Hugh led seventy-two others in an attack on the house of Sir William Young, in which Young's servants were severely beaten. Later that same year both Hugh and his father, Humphrey Peshall, were accused in Star Chamber of leading

[25]Ibid., p. 459.

[26]*Historical Manuscripts Commission: Report on the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Bath Preserved at Longleat: vol 4: Seymour Papers 1532-1686,* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968), pp. 69-70.

[27]*Calendar of State Papers, Scotland,* vol 1, ed. Joseph Bain (Edinburgh: HM General Register House, 1898), p. 318.

[28]The National Archives (hereinafter TNA) C 1/1307/23; *Historical Manuscripts Commission: The Manuscripts of the Duke of Rutland, K.G., Preserved at Belvoir Castle,* vol 1, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1888), p. 108; 'A Calendar of the Shrewsbury Papers in the Lambeth Palace Library', ed. E.G.W. Bill, *Derbyshire Archaeological Society Record Series,* 1 (1966), MS.705, f. 91v.

[29]Dunham, 'Lord Hastings', p. 146.

[30]'Ballad of Bosworth Field' in *Bishop Percy's Folio Manuscript, Ballads and Romances,* vol III, ed. J.W. Hales and F.J. Furnivall, (London: N. Trubner & Co, 1868).

[31]George Wrottesley, ed., 'Extracts from the Plea Rolls, 34 Henry VI to 14 Edw IV, inclusive', *Collections for a History of Staffordshire,* New Series, 4 (1901), p. 138.

twenty men to attack one Richard Berell at Gnossall in Staffordshire.[32] Hugh evidently did keep a group of men ready to serve him in peace and war, with these groups looking little different from the sixteenth-century evidence of retaining by the family.

Both Sir Thomas Blount of Kinlet and his eldest son, John Blount, who married Hugh Peshall's daughter, served as captains in the retinue of the Earl of Shrewsbury in France in 1513 and were each in charge of 98 men.[33] Of his 98 men, Thomas had personally supplied twelve who were part of his personal retinue and whom he mustered in response to letters sent by the king.[34] There is clear evidence that Sir Thomas Blount employed retainers both in times of peace and war. In 1522, a military survey was conducted in order to make assessments for the forced loans to finance war in France. Survivals are patchy, although those for part of Worcestershire, where Thomas was a very minor landowner, do exist.[35] In these, 87 retainers were listed, with 77 of those retained by the Marquess of Dorset and two archers and three billmen retained by Sir Thomas Blount.[36] Based only on a tiny sample of Thomas Blount's lands in 1522, it is clear that he had the ability to raise a military force through the retainer system. There was nothing unusual in this. In a letter to Thomas Cromwell dating to the late 1520s, Thomas Blount's son, Sir John Blount of Kinlet, makes it clear that Sir William Compton, the recently deceased patron of his estranged younger brother, Edward, had maintained a local retinue.[37] According to John, Compton had imprisoned thirty of his servants, while, when he attempted to secure their release, he found that, 'I can have no favour be reyson of my brether and other that were master Comptons servants also here'[38]. Both men's 'servants' look very like retinues as would be understood in a medieval sense of the word, with the men ready to serve their lords in war.

There are many other examples in the Blount family. In 1543 Thomas Blount of Sodington was accused in Star Chamber of arraying twelve men 'lyk men of warr' during a dispute over common land in the manor of Sillingford, with his opponent, Thomas Meysey, arriving with nine or ten men of his own.[39] In a separate matter, Sir

[32]Beverley Murphy, 'The Life and Political Significance of Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond, 1525-1536' (University of Wales, Bangor, PhD thesis, 1997), p. 30.
[33]TNA SP1/231, f. 215.
[34]TNA SP1/2, f. 127; TNA SP1/229, f. 53.
[35]Michael Faraday (ed.), 'Worcestershire Taxes in the 1520s: The Military Survey and Forced Loans of 1522-3 and the Lay Subsidy of 1524-7', ed. Michael Faraday, *Worcestershire Historical Society,* New Series, 19 (2003).
[36]Ibid., f. 32, f. 53.
[37]TNA SP1/68, f. 116.
[38]Ibid.
[39]TNA STAC2/20/370; TNA STAC2/24/101; TNA STAC10/4/32.

George Blount also expressed himself in military terms, complaining that Thomas Meysey's men had entered the Forest of Wyre, of which he was steward, and 'hunted within the said forest in warlike manner', acting, after killing a deer, 'as yf they had trewlie gotten and won a greate victorie and upper hande' shooting their arrows in the air in a celebration, something that was 'visible to the greate terror and fere of all the country'.[40] George's uncle, Walter, described a similar event in 1557 when he claimed that, as keeper of Bewdley Park, he had been assaulted by Sir Robert Acton and twenty of his men 'beinge arraigned in manner of warre'.[41] While violence in Star Chamber proceedings must be treated with caution since allegations of violence were a requirement to list a matter in the court, the idea that members of the gentry could muster forces of local men was clearly considered probable. It is difficult to see any distinction between these peacetime servants and the retainers that the men could muster for war.

Court records also provide information on the way that men were enlisted to accompany Sir George Blount of Kinlet on Henry VIII's Boulogne campaign in 1545 and the Duke of Somerset's war in Scotland in 1547. In one Star Chamber case, it was recalled that Thomas Southall, one of George's tenants at Kinlet, had served under him in both these campaigns 'and none of all the lordship went at that tyme but onlie he'.[42] During Kett's Rebellion in 1549, Southall and his brother instead hired a mercenary 'of their owne cost and charge to go with the said Sir George to Norwich', with this recalled as being at their 'proper costs and charge'. The Southall brothers' recruitment of a mercenary to serve with George during Kett's Rebellion in their stead demonstrates just how real the obligations of retainership had remained. It is clear that, in relation to the Blounts at least, some level of retaining continued until well into the sixteenth century.

The Growth of the Militia

The militia had always been a means by which kings could raise troops, with writs surviving from the late thirteenth century for Staffordshire and Shropshire, for example.[43] Sir John Blount of Sodington was appointed commissioner of array in Worcestershire by the king in September 1403, for example, to muster men to fight in Wales.[44] As leaders of the local community, members of the Blount family were frequently employed to raise militia troops in the Tudor period too. In 1539, Walter

[40]TNA STAC5/B5/3.
[41]TNA STAC4/4/54.
[42]Ibid.
[43]Wrottesley, 'An account of the military service performed by Staffordshire tenants in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries', p. 10, p. 11.
[44]J.T. Driver, 'Worcestershire Knights of the Shire', *Transactions of the Worcestershire Archaeological Society*, 3rd series vol 4 (1974), p. 29.

Blount of Uttoxeter, was one of the commissioners appointed to muster 'all and singular men at arms and armed men capable for arms, as well archers as other men, horse and foot, above the age of sixteen years, resident in the several places within the County of Stafford'.[45] Walter Blount of Astley was similarly appointed for Halfshire Hundred in Worcestershire and his Blount of Sodington cousins for Doddingtree Hundred, with both men resident in the hundreds in which they were appointed.[46]

The 1542 muster returns for Grendon Warren, Marston and Grendon Bishop in Herefordshire show a community headed by the elderly Sir John Blount of Grendon.[47] He was found to possess horse and harness for two men, while his parish included eleven men suitable to serve as billmen and four as archers.[48] In total, the parish possessed three additional pairs of harnesses, one breastplate, one set of archer's equipment and a bow, four sallet helmets, four bills, three pairs of splints and one horse – far from sufficient to furnish the men that the parish could raise. Musters for other Shropshire hundreds also show a similar reliance on archers and billmen, with inadequate equipment in many cases.[49] The position had improved in Shropshire by 1580, although the weaponry recorded were still inadequate. For Stottesdon Hundred, for example, in 1580, there were only 55 pikes, 33 bills, 32 bows and 2 guns, in spite of the fact that there were 250 men able to fight.[50] While this inadequacy of weaponry, which was nationwide and first noted by the government in 1522, has been suggested as encouraging the monarch to enforce the statutory provisions more rigorously, there is little evidence of this from the examples above.[51] Instead, where there is significant evidence of weaponry is in the hands of the local gentry. Legal cases concerning the Blounts from the 1540s onwards make it clear that both they and their gentry neighbours possessed significant armaments, with which they equipped their

[45]'The Muster Roll of Staffordshire of AD 1539 (Offlow Hundred), ed. W. Boyd, *Collections for a History of Staffordshire,* New Series, 4 (1901), p. 215.
[46]TNA SP1/146, f. 1.
[47]Wrottesley, 'Military service performed by Staffordshire tenants during the reign of Richard II', p. 243.
[48]*The Herefordshire Musters of 1539 and 1542,* ed. Michael Faraday (Independently Published, 2012), pp. 164-165.
[49]'Muster Rolls of the Hundreds of Bradford, Munslow, &c., AD 1532-1540', ed. C.H. Drinkwater, *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society,* 3rd series, 8 (1908), pp. 245-286.
[50]'A Particular Certificate for the Countie of Salop, 1580' in W. Phillips (ed.), 'Papers relating to the trained soldiers of Shropshire in the reign of Queen Elizabeth', *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society,* 2nd Series, 2 (1890), pp. 215-294.
[51]Goring, 'Military Obligations', p. 22.

servants.[52] Given their importance in the militia musters, it seems highly likely that the Blounts, and other, similar gentry families, would be called upon to also provide armaments, This has been identified by Lois Schwoerer in her work on early modern gun culture in England, noting significant overlap in gun ownership for military and civilian purposes, with the local gentry commonly the means through which lower status individuals became familiar with firearms.[53] Such private armouries, as identified in legal cases relating the Blount family, would have been essential to the militia, demonstrating that the compliance of the local gentry in the raising and equipping of the militia was essential.[54]

The importance of the local gentry can also be seen in the evidence of militia musters. On 27 June 1563, faced with conflict with France, Elizabeth I sent a letter to the Justices of the Peace in Shropshire (who included Sir George Blount of Kinlet), requiring them to carry out a muster to raise 500 soldiers.[55] The Justices were required to choose only 'the most ableste men for servyce', as well as ensuring 'that sume of the best yn degree, yn that shyre, being no barons, and yet mete to take charge of men, may be ordered to be the capteynes and conductors of the same'. George, along with four other men, levied 122 troops in four of the hundreds, with 39 of these coming from Stottesdon Hundred, where Kinlet is situated. As well as supplying men, the commissioners were also required to arm them at the county's expense, with 30 shillings to be raised for each man from the towns of the shire.[56] Although the monarch ordered the raising of the militia, the administration took place at a local level, with the county gentry particularly involved. In 1596, for example, the Justices for Staffordshire, of whom Sir Christopher Blount of Kidderminster was one, were ordered to muster men at Lichfield on 5 April 1596.[57] Indeed, it was usual for militia captains to be tasked with raising men from the areas in which they held their lands.[58] Christopher Blount, for example, was sent to raise troops in Gloucestershire, Shropshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire for an expedition to Cadiz in March 1596, with it intended that he would lead the men recruited in these

[52]TNA STAC3/3/37; TNA STAC2/20/370; TNA STAC2/27/68; TNA STAC5/B5/3; TNA STAC2/17/220; TNA STAC4/4/54; TNA STAC4/5/47.
[53]Lois G. Schwoerer, *Gun Culture in Early Modern England,* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016), p. 3, p. 76, p. 80.
[54]Younger, *War and Politics,* p. 138.
[55]Phillips, 'Trained soldiers of Shropshire', p. 230.
[56]'A Particular Certificate for the County of Salop, 1580' in Phillips, 'Trained soldiers of Shropshire'.
[57]'The Staffordshire Quarter Session Rolls Vol III 1594-1597', ed. S.A.H. Burne, *Collections for a History of Staffordshire* (1933), p. 156.
[58]Goring, 'Military Obligations', p. 59.

counties in which he and his family held lands.[59] It is clear that local patronage networks were taken into account, even when the instructions were addressed to the militia.

The Blount family's association with the more prominent Dudley family also illuminates the nuanced way in which troops were raised in the late sixteenth century. The families were very distantly related, with Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, who shared a great-great-grandmother with Thomas Blount of Kidderminster referring to him in correspondence as 'Cousin Blount', while Sir George Blount of Kinlet served as an executor to Leicester's mother's will.[60] Blounts served the Dudleys as senior household servants, including Thomas Blount of Kidderminster, who acted as the Comptroller of the Household of John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland.[61] He later became the Earl of Leicester's principal administrative officer, who was trusted enough to be appointed to investigate the suspicious death of his patron's wife in 1560.[62] While the majority of this patronage was centred on everyday affairs, there was a strong military element to the service which very closely resembles the retinue service of earlier Blounts. This can be seen in the late sixteenth-century conflict in the Netherlands which, although Elizabeth I offered little direct support, saw the involvement of a number of Protestant English noblemen.[63] While religion was likely

[59]*Acts of the Privy Council of England, vol 25, 1595-1596,* ed. John Roche Dasent, (London, 1901) [hereafter *APC* 25], p. 323.

[60]TNA PROB 11/37/342.

[61]Gilbert Blount of Kidderminster and Humphrey Blount received Leicester's livery in 1567-8, with Humphrey also attending the earl's funeral in 1588. John Blount of Warwick (a Kidderminster Blount) served Leicester by August 1585. Sir George Blount of Kinlet was probably a member of Leicester's household in 1558-9 when he was twice entrusted by Dudley to make payments on his behalf. His nephew, George Blount of Bewdley, appears in Leicester's accounts for 1558-9, probably as a minor household official. (*Household Accounts and Disbursement Books of Robert Dudley Earl of Leicester, 1558-1561, 1584-1586,* ed. Simon Adams, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 50, p. 53, p. 77, pp. 82-83, p. 105, p. 299, pp. 419-420, p. 426, p. 427, p. 454). Sir George Blount of Kinlet was known to be close to the Earl of Warwick (TNA SP15/20); *Acts of the Privy Council of England, vol 4, 1552-1554,* ed. John Roche Dasent, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892), p. 324, p. 342.

[62]Simon Adams, *Leicester and the Court,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 157; *Court Rolls of Romsley 1279-1643,* ed. M. Tompkins (Worcester: Worcestershire Historical Society, 2017), p.677; Adams, *Household Accounts*, 464; George Adlard, *Amye Robsart and the Earl of Leycester,* (Teddington: Wildhern Press, 2007), p. 32.

[63]David Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacob's Wars' The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610', (King's College London, PhD thesis, 2002), pp. 28-29.

one of the motivating factors in Leicester's involvement in the Netherlands, he did not specifically seek out troops desirous to serve for religious reasons, instead using the retinue system to raise the bulk of his troops. As he wrote himself to the Queen's councillor, Sir Francis Walsingham,

> uppon hir first order geven, both from hir self and also confirmed further by your letters by hir majesties commandment, I dyspached, between Thursday night and yesternight iiij a clocke, above 200 lettres to my servaunts, and sondry my frends, to prepare themselves, according to the order I had my self, with all the spede they could possible, to serve hir majestie, under me, in the Low Countreys.[64]

He had a substantial body of men to call upon, with the leases of Leicester's tenants on his Denbighshire estates, for example, requiring them to serve with him 'in tyme of warre'.[65] He also equipped his soldiers, writing to Walsingham in late September 1586 that he had purchased armour and steel saddles 'as many as must cost me a good pece of money'.[66] The personal nature of the service is clear from a subsequent letter, when Leicester considered that

> I hope, sir, I may have that I made you acquainted with v or vi c [500 or 600] of my owne tenauntes, whom I wyll make as good reconing of as of 1000 of any that as yet gonn over, and no way to increase hir majesties chardges'.[67]

The Earl of Leicester was a staunch Protestant and a number of his Puritan friends regarded the expedition as 'a crusade for the Gospel'.[68] However, there is no indication that Leicester's retinue had any choice about where they served, since the earl had a diverse range of contacts. Indeed, Sir Edward Blount of Kidderminster, who sailed with him in late 1585 was openly Catholic.[69] Leicester was not able to raise all his men through the retinue system, asking in December 1585 for 600 or 700 men from the militia England 'to fill up our bands', although a sizeable proportion of his men were drawn from his relatives and tenants.[70]

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[64]*Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, During his Government of the Low Countries, in the Years 1585 and 1586,* ed. John Bruce, (London: Camden Society, 1844), p. 5.
[65]*Transactions of the Denbighshire History Society,* 24 (1975), p. 206.
[66]Ibid., p. 6.
[67]Bruce, *Correspondence of Robert Dudley,* pp. 10-11.
[68]Adams, *Leicester and the Court,* p. 176.
[69]R.C. Strong and J.A. Van Dorsten, *Leicester's Triumph,* (Leiden: Sir Thomas Browne Institute, 1962), p. 110.
[70]Bruce, *Correspondence of Robert Dudley,* p. 27.

The service of Sir Christopher Blount of Kidderminster, who arrived in the Netherlands with Leicester and served on more than one Dutch campaign, can be viewed through the prism of his social ties with his patron. Christopher distinguished himself in the Netherlands, leading his own horse-band by 1587, for example, and saving the life of Sir Francis Vere at the Battle of Zutphen in September 1586.[71] He was notably brave, as his desire in the summer of 1588 to be 'placed very near the enemy' attests, while he also led the doomed defence of Rheinberg with his friend, Captain Shirley.[72] However, in spite of these personal successes, he remained firmly within Leicester's patronage networks even after his patron returned to England. In June 1588, for example, he wrote to Leicester's brother, Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick, requesting funds to pay his troops – suggesting again the retinue nature of at least part of the army.[73] As late as July 1588 he was describing himself as 'captain of the Earl of Leicester's company', in spite of the fact that his troops by that stage were mostly Dutch.[74] Only a few months before, Christopher and Captain Anthony Shirley, had petitioned Leicester's lieutenant in the Netherlands for an English company which had previously been offered to the Dutch by its Captain.[75] Leicester continued to rely on Christopher's reports from the Netherlands, with the Earl relaying 'the advice of Mr Digges and Mr Christopher Blunt' to Lord Burghley regarding the Netherlands on 18 October 1587.[76]

Leicester himself considered that he still had a responsibility towards Christopher. From England on 12 June 1588, he wrote to the new English commander, Lord Willoughby to 'thank you for the favour you doe continually show to my friends there and specially to my servant Capt. Blount', indicating the degree of favour in which Christopher was held and that he was considered one of Leicester's 'friends' (i.e. clients).[77] Leicester acknowledged that the loyalty these men owed him as patron was superior to that which they owed to Willoughby as their military commander, with the Earl including in his letter the assurance that

> I doe protest and assure your lordship that longer than they shall behave themselves to you in all commandments and duty as they would toward my self

[71]TNA SP84/31, f.189; Cyril Falls, *Mountjoy: Elizabethan General,* (London: Odhams Press, 1955), p. 28.
[72]*Manuscripts of the Earl of Ancaster*, p. 136.
[73]Ibid., p. 154.
[74]Ibid., p. 121.
[75]*Calendar of State Papers, Foreign: Elizabeth, vol 22, July-December 1588,* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), p. 22, p. 30.
[76]Ibid., p. 247.
[77]TNA SP84/24, f. 108.

> if I move them: I will neither speake to your lordship for them nor think well of any them then.[78]

That same month Christopher referred to himself in a letter to Leicester as 'a man that was known to be yours', something which had caused him political difficulties in the Netherlands.[79] Christopher was anxious to retain his patron's favour, arguing that everything that he had done contrary to Willoughby's instructions were 'in performing but my duty to you: when you bethink yourself of a more convenient means to conserve your honour amongst these people, then that which your honour gave me in my instructions at my going away'. His loyalty to Leicester was his primary one, causing him to disobey the orders of the queen's commander in the Netherlands if they proved contradictory.

There were considerable tensions when Willoughby first arrived in the Netherlands and attempted to assert his control over Leicester's men, due to the existing patronage networks. In September 1588, shortly after the Earl's death, Christopher wrote to Willoughby to apologise for 'my untowardly corse taken with you at my first entry into thes partes', which he assured him was down only to a direction from 'him whom I felt myself most affected unto [i.e., Leicester]'.[80] It was only with Leicester's death that he felt able to commit himself to Willoughby. This was almost certainly caused by the loss of Leicester's patronage and Christopher's need to establish a new patronage network to support his position in the Netherlands. As late as December 1588, there was still a dispute over who was liable to pay Christopher's company.[81] By March 1589 his horse-band had been discharged.[82] He returned to England and evidently hoped to return to the Netherlands that summer but, by July his service abroad was expressly ruled out, with Lord Burghley writing in his rough notes that 'Sir Christopher Blount is not to go'.[83] His lack of ability to find a place in the army in the Netherlands after 1588 may be linked to the death of the Earl of Leicester. Leicester's followers would naturally transfer their loyalties to his stepson, the Earl of Essex, who was effectively his political heir, although in Christopher's case this continuing patronage was by no means guaranteed due to his scandalous union with Leicester's widow, a marriage which his new stepson, Essex, considered to be an 'unhappy choyse' and 'ill match'.[84]

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[78]Ibid.
[79]BL Cotton Galba D/III, f. 199.
[80]*Manuscripts of the Earl of Ancaster,* p. 226.
[81]Ibid., p. 233.
[82]TNA SP84/31, f. 121.
[83]TNA SP84/33, f. 159.
[84]BL Lansdowne MS 62, f. 78.

In spite of this, Christopher Blount was able to rapidly transfer his service to his new stepson, with the importance of the military service he owed to Essex evident in his service in Ireland, which was to become the major conflict of Elizabeth's reign. By January 1599 it had been decided that the Earl of Essex (who had volunteered to do so) would serve in Ireland, with it widely recognised that he would recruit his officers through his patronage networks, with these men drawn from his 'followers' or 'creatures' as some contemporaries put it. Given the scale of the Earl of Tyrone's rebellion in Ireland, which had, as its central aim, the restoration of Catholicism, the English requirements for new recruits were massive, with 1300 footmen sent over in early 1590, for example and the queen expending £29,700 a year towards her army there by February 1591.[85] As a result, recruitment for the Irish wars used a range of systems including the militia, retinues and conscription, with Essex's troops – below the ranks of officers – largely raised through the militia system, as previous armies for Ireland in the 1590s had also been recruited.[86] Given the sheer demand for troops, this is unsurprising. Essex required 17,000 men at an estimated cost of more than £277,782 a year, with only the militia in any way capable of supplying such a huge number of men.[87] While Essex's troops were primarily raised from the county militias, there was some conflict as to whom, exactly, they were serving, with the queen paying them, but Essex commanding them.[88] This uncertainty was probably largely due to the fact that, while the militia supplied the troops, the commanders were largely drawn from Essex's retinue, as the case of Sir Christopher Blount shows, while he was also criticised for making 59 knights in Ireland by August 1599, something that was probably a way in which he was able to further bind his troops to him.[89]

[85]Dudley Edwards, *Church and State in Tudor Ireland,* (Dublin: Talbot Press, 1935), pp. 282-283; Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars,* (London: Methuen, 1950), p. 1985, p. 16; John McGurk, 'The Recruitment and Transportation of Elizabethan Troops and their Service in Ireland, 1594-1603', (University of Liverpool, PhD thesis, 1982), p. 5; McGurk, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland,* p. 21; Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion,* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), p. 215; Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 146; *Calendar of the Carew Manuscripts, Preserved in the Archiepiscopal Library at Lambeth 1589-1600,* vol 3*,* eds. J.S.Brewer and William Bullen (eds.), (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1869)*,* p. 71, p. 107.

[86]Fissel, *English Warfare,* p. 89; McGurk, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland,* p. 30.

[87]*Carew Manuscripts,* 292; McGurk, *Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland,* p. 262.

[88]*Letters by John Chamberlain,* ed. Williams, XX.

[89]Ibid., XXIV.

Christopher Blount, on hearing of Essex's appointment, wrote to him to offer the use of 'my sword (which is ever at your command)'.[90] As the inheritor of Leicester's patronage networks, it is unsurprising that Essex also inherited Christopher's loyalty, particularly with the additional family tie of Christopher's marriage to his mother. Christopher frequently served with Essex, for example commanding a regiment of 1000 men as colonel during his stepson's expedition to Cadiz in 1596.[91] It was also Essex who arranged his appointment in March 1599 as a marshal of the queen's army in Ireland although, at the same time, Elizabeth refused the Earl's request to make Christopher a member of the Council of Ireland, with it clear that Christopher – whom the queen disliked – was present in Ireland only at Essex's behest. Christopher Blount was, in any event, injured during the first months of the campaign and spent much of his time recuperating in Dublin.[92]

Unsurprisingly, given the dominance of the conflict in Ireland in the 1590s, other members of the Blount family were also involved in the army there. In August 1598 the Catholic Richard Blount of Mapledurham in Oxfordshire was reported to the Privy Council for refusing to supply funds for horses to be sent to Ireland.[93] This could be due more to a disinclination to make a financial contribution in this way, but religious objections are worth exploring. Certainly, the religion of Christopher Blount's brother, Sir Edward Blount of Kidderminster, proved a major problem when he sailed for Ireland with his cousin, Lord Mountjoy, when he was appointed as Lord Deputy of Ireland in 1599.[94] Robert Cecil evidently objected to the appointment, since Mountjoy wrote in February 1600 to assure him that Edward came only to oversee his 'domestical affairs', something which suggests that he was considered not to be appropriate to join the army there, while he also attempted to defend his character, while confessing that he was 'I think, somewhat affected to the other religion'.[95] In

[90]Ibid., XXIV; *Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, vol 14: Addenda,* ed. E. Salisbury (London, 1923), p. 84.
[91]*APC* 25, pp. 351-352; *Calendar of the Cecil Papers in Hatfield House, vol 6, 1596,* ed. R.A. Roberts, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1895), p. 361; *CSP, Domestic: Elizabeth, 1595-1597*, p. 104.
[92]*Calendar of State Papers, Ireland, 1599-1600,* ed. Ernest George Atkinson, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1899) [hereafter *CSP, Ireland, 1599-1600],* p. 68, p. 140.
[93]*Acts of the Privy Council of England, vol 29, 1598-1599,* ed. John Roche Dasent, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1905), p. 29.
[94]*Calendar of State Papers, Ireland, 1600,* ed. Ernest George Atkinson, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1903) [hereafter *CSP, Ireland, 1600]*, p. 91; Falls, *Mountjoy*, p. 236; F.M. Jones, *Mountjoy 1563-1606: The Last Elizabethan Deputy,* (Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds, 1988), p. 87.
[95]*CSP, Ireland,1599-1600*, p. 128.

April, Mountjoy wrote again to Cecil, defending his cousin as 'a true, honest man, a good fellow [i.e. good man] papist, and as I think as much or more my friend than he is to any'.[96] In the face of government pressure, Mountjoy returned Edward to England later that month.[97] This hostility towards English Catholics going to Ireland can be understood within the context of the Irish rebels' links to Spain, while military identities within Ireland were themselves complex.[98] There clearly was concern in the English government about sending Catholics to Ireland, while Catholics themselves may also not have wished to support this war. However, the fact that Lord Mountjoy was prepared to take Sir Edward Blount and so vocally vouch for him makes it clear that the loyalty that existed between a patron and client or, to use terminology more usually applied to the medieval period, the retainer and the retained, could override religious loyalties.

Conclusion

War was central to the lives of the late medieval and early modern gentry: both as part of their self-image and in the reality of the regular demands for troops. Even in the face of Elizabeth I's perennial reluctance to go to war, the military pervaded society at all levels, regardless of the relative rarity in which gentry, like the Blounts, actually served. There were many reasons why a man might go to war – not least because his patron decreed that he should. The medieval indenture system, as used by Lord Hastings in relation to Hugh Peshall, made it clear that the retainer was expected to follow their lord when required. Similarly, when the Earl of Leicester sent out his letters to his 200 'servants' and 'friends' to ask them to ready themselves to serve with him in 1585, he did not ask for their consent to the motives behind his action. He expected them to obey his summons as, indeed, it appears that they did.

As members of the country gentry, the Blounts were both patrons and clients in the Tudor period, and retainers and the retained in the medieval period. There was a strong resemblance between these roles. While the sixteenth century saw considerable change in the way that such relationships functioned – with the monarch, in particular, able to establish direct links to the country gentry in some cases - the requirements for retinue service remained in place. The majority of the service offered by a retainer in the medieval period and the sixteenth century was in relation to everyday life, but the military element remained a key one in the relationship between the patron and client, as can be seen in relation to the Blounts. Even with the increasing

[96] *CSP, Ireland 1600*, p. 91.
[97] Ibid,, p. 105.
[98] Ruth A. Canning, "Trust, desert, power and skill to serve': the Old English and military identities in late Elizabethan Ireland' in Matthew Woodcock and Cian O'Mahony, eds., *Early Modern Military Identities, 1560-1639,* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2019), pp. 138-157.

use of the militia in the sixteenth century, such ties of patronage or retinue remained important, with militia captains frequently drawing their troops from within their spheres of interest and, ultimately, serving a lord to whom they had a patronage relationship. At the same time, the Blounts show that patronage could be a stronger motivation for going to war than religion, as the involvement of family members in the conflicts in the Netherlands and Ireland attest. While the Blounts were just one family, a detailed analysis of their military service in the late sixteenth century can help add to historians' understanding of the often complex motivations that a man might have for going to war in the period. While statute and a desire to serve an increasingly centralised state might play a part, there were often stronger ties – of family, location or religion – that could override or inform their service, just as their ancestors had done in the centuries that preceded them.

Loyalty and Rebellion: Irish soldiers in the British military during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

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ABSTRACT
Irish participation in the British Army has a long and complex history. The tradition firmly took hold during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars where Irish soldiers and sailors may have represented roughly one third of Britain's armed forces. This article examines how this tradition developed from one of Irish emigration to European armies to enlistment in the British military. It explores how internal pressures including Catholic Relief and rising Protestant loyalism, external pressures including the French Revolution and the demands of Britain's war effort, combined to accelerate Irish enlistment, despite the threat of emerging nationalism, and even separatism, republicanism, and rebellion.

Introduction

From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, Irish troops represented roughly one third of British military manpower, forging an Irish identity within a wider British military structure. How did this tradition come about and why? This article explores the history of the Irish soldier in the eighteenth century, and how the Irish military tradition evolved from one focused on France and other European countries to one focused on Britain. The political context of Dublin-Westminster relations, the social context of class and the religious context of Catholic-Protestant relations is also addressed. The professional military tradition, and the growing amateur military traditions, are considered. Reasons of space preclude a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of Irish military history, but rather this is intended as a springboard for further

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1644

research and investigate why Irishmen chose to enlist and how they were used as part of the British war effort against France, from 1793 to 1815.

Research on the Irish soldier in the Age of Revolutions

While Irishmen had fought for Britain for centuries, the eighteenth century's 'Age of Revolutions' was the period where this tradition truly took hold. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars have been the subject of intensive research, although in most cases Ireland is only mentioned briefly; the failed French invasion in 1796, the United Irishmen's Rebellion in 1798, and a few lines about recruits from Ireland.[1] This is understandable given the broad scope of these works. Despite the numbers involved, public awareness of the Irish in the British service during the Napoleonic Wars has not yet reached the same level as awareness of Irish involvement in the First World War.[2] The position of the army in society has been considered in recent studies, although most of these focus on Britain rather than Ireland.[3] Not everyone has included Ireland; in Colley's study of how the people of the United Kingdom developed a 'British' identity, Ireland was deemed to be too different, too Catholic and too pro-French to play a part in the invention of Britishness.[4] This assessment will be re-examined in this article, in particular in relation to Anglo-Irish officers. Many works have examined Ireland in the eighteenth century, but generally with a focus on the radicalisation of Irish society, the 1798 rebellion and evolution of loyalism, rather than the role of Irishmen in the wider British military.[5] The Irish Militia

[1]Charles Esdaile, *Napoleon's wars: an international history, 1803-1815,* (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 49, p.104; Roger Knight, *Britain against Napoleon: the organization of victory, 1793-1815,* (London: Penguin, 2014), pp. 85-87, pp. 90-91; Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Napoleonic Wars: a Global History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 70-72; J. E. Cookson, *The British armed nation, 1793-1815,* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 153-181. Cookson's work is an exception in that it has an entire chapter dedicated to Ireland.

[2]An exception to this lack of awareness in popular culture is the fictional character of Sergeant Patrick Harper from Donegal, in the *Sharpe* novels by Bernard Cornwell and subsequent TV series.

[3]Catriona Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish: Irish Catholic soldiers in the British army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars' in Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack (eds), *Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 37-56; Catriona Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars: military and civilian experience in Britain and Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, 'Defining Soldiers: Britain's military, c.1740-1815', *War in History* 20, 144 (April, 2013), pp. 144-159.

[4]Linda Colley, *Britons: forging the nation, 1707-1837,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, 5th ed., 2012), p. 7.

[5]Thomas Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion: Ireland, 1793-1803' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (eds), *A military history of Ireland,* (Cambridge:

has also been reassessed, and Irishmen do make an appearance in the extensive research into Wellington's army in the Peninsular War.[6] More recently, scholarship has begun to specifically examine the Irish soldiers under Wellington in the Peninsula, as well as the Irish at Waterloo.[7] Irish recruits also feature in recent work on revolutionary warfare in Ireland and America, and the Irish garrison in the 1770s.[8] Yet an overarching examination of the Irish soldier, at home and abroad, during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars remains elusive.[9]

Eighteenth-century Irish society

Ireland's role in a wider British military history is intrinsically linked to the social, religious and political situation on both islands during the late eighteenth century. Ireland was very much a 'divided kingdom', with a minority Protestant Anglican (Church of Ireland) upper class, known as the Ascendancy, ruling over the Catholic majority. The Ascendancy owed their position to the Protestant victory in the Williamite Wars of the late seventeenth-century, whilst the Catholic majority had

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Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 247-93; Thomas Bartlett, 'The Emergence of the Irish Catholic Nation, 1750-1850' in Alvin Jackson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 517-543; S. J. Connolly, *Divided kingdom: Ireland 1630-1800,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Ian McBride, *Eighteenth-Century Ireland: The Isle of Slaves,* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2009).

[6]I. F. Nelson, *The Irish militia 1793-1803: Ireland's forgotten army,* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007); Ciarán McDonnell, "Zeal and Patriotism': Forging Identity in the Irish Militia, 1793-1802', *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 42, 2 (June, 2019), pp. 211– 228; Edward J. Coss. *All for the King's Shilling: The British Soldier under Wellington, 1808–1814,* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010); Kevin Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army: recruitment, society and tradition, 1807-15,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[7]James Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier to the British Army during the Peninsula campaign 1808 – 1814', *Journal of Military History and Defence Studies*, 1, 1 (January 2020), pp. 4-68; Peter Molloy, 'Ireland and the Waterloo Campaign of 1815', *Journal of Military History and Defence Studies*, 1, 1 (January 2020), pp. 69-119.

[8]Matthew P. Dziennik, 'Peasants, Soldiers, and Revolutionaries: Interpreting Irish Manpower in the Age of Revolutions' in Frank Cogliano and Patrick Griffin (eds), *Ireland and America: Empire, Revolution, and Sovereignty,* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2021), pp. 105-25; Andrew Dorman, '"Fit for immediate service": Reassessing the Irish Military Establishment of the Eighteenth Century through the 1770 Townshend Augmentation', *British Journal for Military History*, 7, 2 (2021), pp. 42-63.

[9]For more see Ciarán McDonnell, 'Irishmen in the British Service During the French Revolutionary Wars, 1793-180' (PhD thesis, Maynooth University, 2013).

their rights restricted by the Penal Laws that followed the defeat of the Jacobite cause. Protestant Dissenters, most notably Presbyterians who formed a sizeable minority on the island, especially in the northeast, also had their rights restricted. Demographics were not absolutes; there were Anglicans and Dissenters in the middle and lower classes, and as will be seen, Catholics in the middle and upper classes. Ireland had aspects of both kingdom and colony; Irish Protestants sat in a House of Commons and House of Lords in Dublin (and later London), yet executive power was held by the Westminster-appointed Lord Lieutenant and his government based in Dublin Castle, as well as the Commander of the Forces based in the Royal Hospital Kilmainham.

The Ascendancy had a complicated if not conflicted identity; some were descendants of Protestant settlers of the seventeenth century whilst others descended from the families that had arrived with the Norman conquest of the late twelfth century (many of whom had later converted to Protestantism), and most still saw themselves as English as well as Irish.[10] They did not automatically disdain the land which their forebears had colonised,[11] and many of these 'Anglo-Irish' desired that Ireland be put on a par, politically, with Britain.[12] The Ascendancy also dominated the military sphere in Ireland and the army was preoccupied with keeping the peace during the century, and was an important 'prop' to the Ascendancy.[13] Many Ascendancy families maintained a strong tradition of military service to the British crown.[14] They believed they needed to maintain their monopoly of the military lest it become infiltrated by Catholics, who were officially barred from enlistment. Until 1745 even Irish Protestants were excluded from the ordinary ranks of the British Army, for fear of Catholic infiltration.[15] Some have even compared the Anglo-Irish families, with their military interests and large country estates, to the Junkers of Prussia.[16] It must be remembered however that variations existed in regards religion, politics and social

[10]R. F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600-1972,* (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 248; J. L. McCracken, 'Ch. II: The social structure and social life, 1714-60' in T. W. Moody and W. E. Vaughan (eds), *A new history of Ireland: vol. IV Eighteenth century Ireland 1691-1800,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 31-56, at p. 35.

[11]Thomas Bartlett, '"A people made rather for copies than originals": the Anglo-Irish, 1760-1800', *The International History Review*, 12, 1 (April 1990), pp. 11-25, at pp. 12-14.

[12]E. M. Johnson-Liik, *History of the Irish parliament: 1692-1800, 6 volumes,* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2002), i, p. 41.

[13]J. L. McCracken, 'The political structure, 1714-60' in Moody and Vaughan, *A new history of Ireland: vol. IV*, pp. 57-83, at p. 82.

[14]Peter Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army, 1792-1922: suborned or subordinate?', *Journal of Social History*, 17, 1 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 31-64, at pp. 35-6.

[15]Bartlett, *Ireland*, p. 170.

[16]Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army, 1509–1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey,* (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 314–15.

class and we cannot treat the Ascendancy, or by extension Irish Protestants, as a single entity.[17]

Despite the Penal Laws, the situation of Irish Catholics had improved significantly in the latter half of the eighteenth century; Catholics were still allowed to participate in certain trades, such as commerce and medicine,[18] or as farmers whose wealth increased as agriculture improved.[19] There was also a 'semi-gentry', consisting of a small minority of Catholic noblemen and gentry who had managed to retain (or reclaim) their lands and titles with oaths of loyalty to the crown.[20] An 'underground gentry' of Catholic middlemen often handled the affairs of Protestant landlords.[21] The emergence of this middle class paved the way for the campaign for Catholic relief. The Catholic Committee, led by members of the surviving Catholic gentry and also wealthy Dublin businessmen, spearheaded the movement for relief.[22]

While officially banned from enlisting in the British military, many Catholics continued to do so covertly.[23] Others emigrated to the Catholic armies of Europe, in particular those of France and Spain. These Irish Brigades, along with priests and merchants, formed the 'Wild Geese', the romantic name given to the network of Irish migrants in Europe. Others joined the armies of Portugal, Austria and Russia, and many rose to high rank.[24] As the Jacobite cause waned, it ceased to be a potential rallying-point for Irish Catholics, and the Jacobite links were effectively severed in 1766 when the Vatican ended its recognition of the Stuart claim to the British throne.[25] Irish Catholic migration had lessened, although it did not stop completely after 1766, showing that the migration could be economic as well as political. As the French connection waned, the British connection began to grow.

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[17]Nicholas Perry, 'The Irish Landed Class and the British Army, 1850-1950', *War in History*, 18, 3 (July 2011), pp 304–32, at p. 318.
[18]Jacqueline Hill, 'Convergence and Conflict in Eighteenth-Century Ireland', *Historical Journal*., 44, 4 (Dec 2001), pp. 1039-63, at p. 1041.
[19]Allan Blackstock, *An Ascendancy army: the Irish yeomanry, 1796-1834,* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), p. 25.
[20]Ibid.
[21]Kevin Whelan, 'An underground gentry? Catholic middlemen in eighteenth-Century Ireland', *Eighteenth-Century Ireland / Iris an dá chultúr*, 10 (1995), pp. 7-68, at p. 13.
[22]R. B McDowell., 'The age of the United Irishmen: reform and reaction, 1789-94.' in Moody and Vaughan, *A new history of Ireland: vol. IV*, pp. 289-338, at p. 303.
[23]Cookson, *The British armed nation*, p. 153
[24]Harman Murtagh, 'Irish soldiers abroad, 1600-1800' in Bartlett and Jeffery (eds), *A military history of Ireland*, pp.294-314; Christopher Duffy, *The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne 1705-1757,* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964).
[25]Bartlett, *Ireland*, p. 169.

Use of Catholics in the military

Britain's rising military demands during the century resulted in the gradual acceptance of Irish Protestant, and later Catholic contribution to the armed forces.[26] The demand for more troops during the Seven Years War necessitated a 'blind eye' being turned to Catholic enlistment.[27] This was more likely to happen when the regiment was destined for overseas service.[28] Sometimes Irish Catholics were even sent to Scotland by colonels so as to be recruited there as Scots, and so circumvent the ban.[29] Furthermore, by 1760 Catholics were permitted to join the Royal Marines and the Royal Irish Artillery, while the Royal Navy unofficially took in Catholic sailors.[30] The East India Company also admitted Catholics into its armed forces and provided employment for many Irish throughout its existence.[31] In fact the pay was better than the regular army, and during the later years of the Company, from 1825 to 1850, 'the Bengal Army drew 47.9 per cent of its European recruits from Ireland.'[32] Captain Robert Brooke of the Bengal Army, an Irishman and collector of revenues, claimed in 1778 that by recruiting Irish soldiers for the Company, 'Idle and dissolute Mechanics will find that Employment of which they were deprived at Home… the Kingdom will no longer wear a face of poverty.. and Ireland will be purged of a riotous Peasantry, that often pass their Lives in beggary, and generally conclude them in Jail'.[33] The

[26]Ibid., pp. 169-70.

[27]Alan J. Guy, 'The Irish military establishment, 1660-1776' in Bartlett and Jeffery, *A military history of Ireland*, pp 211-30, at p. 219; Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 56, n. 20.

[28]Bartlett, *Ireland*, pp 170-2.

[29]Thomas Bartlett, '"A weapon of war yet untried": Irish Catholics and the armed forces of the Crown, 1760-1830' in Fraser, T. G., Jeffery, Keith (eds), *Men, women and war: papers read before the XXth Irish Conference of Historians, University of Ulster, 6-8 June 1991,* (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1993), pp. 66-85, at p.69.

[30]Bartlett, *Ireland*, p. 172; Patrick Walsh, 'Ireland and the Royal Navy in the Eighteenth Century', in John McAleer and Christer Petley (eds), *The Royal Navy and the Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2016), pp. 51-76, at p. 66.

[31]Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', pp 56-7, n. 20; Charles Benson, 'Nabobs, soldiers and imperial service: the Irish in India', *History Ireland*, 18, 4 (July/Aug 2010), pp. 6–7; Alexander Bubb, 'The Life of the Irish Soldier in India: Representations and Self-Representations, 1857–1922', *Modern Asian Studies*, 46, no. 4 (July, 2012), pp. 769-813, at p. 773

[32] Bubb, 'The Life of the Irish Soldier in India', pp. 773-74.

[33]Margaret Makepeace, "Lads of true spirit' – recruiting for the East India Company in Ireland', British Library Untold Lives Blog, 3 October 2018

economic necessity of the recruits combined with the desire of the authorities to relocate potential rebels. Many senior officials and officers were Anglo-Irish, including Richard and Arthur Wellesley, and Sir Eyre Coote.[34] Given these avenues for employment, the Irish contribution to the British military was not as restricted as it first seems.

The American War of Independence heralded significant changes for the role of Irishmen in the British military. Permission was granted in 1775 to recruit Irishmen for regiments (English or Irish) stationed in Ireland and it was tacitly understood that some recruits would be Catholics.[35] Ireland also faced the threat of an invasion by France, who had allied with the American colonists. The Irish government was unwilling to finance a militia to augment the garrison, and the Irish Volunteers, a private militia of mostly middle and upper-class Protestants, was formed to guard against invasion and assist the local magistrates.[36] The movement proved very popular, with numbers rising to almost 89,000 members in 1782.[37] Volunteers wore their uniforms at every opportunity, eager to emulate a heroic ideal of both masculinity and Irishness.[38] Defence of the Protestant military tradition was very important; some of the more conservative corps actively excluded Catholics from joining, although others did enlist Catholics, sometimes after taking an oath of allegiance.[39]

However, the Volunteers quickly became an armed lobby group for the Patriot Party in the Irish House of Commons who pushed for economic and political reforms in favour of Ireland. Marches and demonstrations threatened violence if their demands were not met, and concessions were granted, including Free Trade and the legislative independence of the Irish parliament. This rise of armed Protestant patriotism, and the militarisation of Irish society, alarmed the authorities in Dublin Castle and Westminster and would have a bearing in the wars of the 1790s.

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https://blogs.bl.uk/untoldlives/2018/10/lads-of-true-spirit-recruiting-for-the-east-india-company-in-ireland.html. Accessed 24 January 2022.

[34]Neville Craig, 'The Irish and the East India Company', *History Ireland*, 18, 4 (July/Aug, 2010), pp 13–13. The Franco-Irish also took part in colonial operations, most notably Thomas Arthur, Comte de Lally-Tollendal, who served as governor-general of French India.

[35]Vincent Morley, *Irish opinion and the American Revolution, 1760-178,3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 137.

[36]Padraig Higgins, *A nation of politicians: gender, patriotism and political culture in late eighteenth Ireland,* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), p. 129.

[37]Blackstock, *An Ascendancy army*, p. 44.

[38]Higgins, *A nation of politicians*, pp 166-7.

[39]Ibid, pp 147-9.

The demand for manpower and threat of invasion prompted the British government to consider concessions for Catholics, which would appease the clergy and Catholic nobility, who would both in turn encourage enlistment.[40] Irish Catholics were described as 'a weapon of war untried'.[41] In 1778 a Catholic Relief Act was passed that relaxed some of the penal laws.[42] The first draft had contained sweeping changes but the final act was truncated due to Ascendancy opposition.[43] Irish Catholics were still officially barred from bearing arms and enlisting in the military, although other concessions were passed to maintain Catholic loyalty in this and a subsequent Relief Act of 1782.[44] The precedent for concessions to Irish Catholics in a time of war had been set, and would emerge again in the early 1790s.

The French Revolution

The French Revolution brought a significant change to the dynamic of Irish military migration by blocking a traditional route for many prospective Irish Catholic soldiers. This was not a sudden rupture; as the century had progressed the number of Irish-born soldiers in France's Irish Brigade had decreased steadily among the rank-and-file. However, the officer corps had mostly remained either Irish-born or the French-born sons of Irish parents. Their Catholic, foreign, and often aristocratic status made their position in the revolutionary army very dangerous. Many took part in the mass emigration of some 66% of French army officers that took place in the early years of the revolution. They joined the royalist émigré armies in exile, and some even offered their services to Britain.[45] For Britain, Ireland was considered both an asset (in terms of recruits and supplies) but also a weakness (as a potential backdoor for a French invasion of Britain and as a place for internal rebellion). In 1791 a pro-French group of radicals known as the United Irishmen were formed to unite Protestants, Catholics, and Dissenters for the common cause of Ireland, although not yet as a separatist republican movement.[46]

Catholic Relief and military service at home

The Catholic Committee had also summoned a convention in Dublin in 1792, where more than 230 delegates, supported by the Irish Catholic clergy, had drawn up

[40]Robert Kent Donovan, 'The military origins of the Roman Catholic relief programme of 1778', *Historical Journal*, 28, 1 (March 1985), pp 79-102, at p. 89.
[41]Ibid, p. 93.
[42]Ibid, pp. 83-4.
[43]Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p. 245.
[44]Cookson, *The British armed nation*, p. 154.
[45]Ciarán McDonnell, 'A 'fair chance'? The Catholic Irish Brigade in the British service, 1793-98', *War in History*, 23, 2 (April 2016), pp. 155-168.
[46]Theobald Wolfe Tone, *An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland,* (Belfast, 1791).

demands for further concessions for Catholics.[47] In an effort to maintain Catholic loyalty the British authorities sought to introduce a new Catholic Relief Act, with a short 1792 act and a more substantial one in 1793. As well as giving the vote back to forty-shilling freeholding Catholic men, the 1793 Catholic Relief Act also included the right to bear arms; Irish Catholics could now officially take part in the defence of Ireland.

At the outset of the war the Irish garrison, also known as the Irish Establishment, was augmented from 15,000 men to 19,000.[48] Ireland needed to be guarded but Dublin Castle did not want a repeat of the unregulated Volunteers of the 1780s. As a result of the Catholic Relief Act, Catholics could now be openly recruited, and an Irish Militia was established in 1793 to defend Ireland and to free up regular troops for overseas service.[49] The militia reflected Irish society, Protestant officers commanded Catholic, Protestant and Presbyterian rank-and-file, with Catholics making up the majority of recruits. Regimental identity was fostered through the use of Irish cultural symbols (visual symbols defining Irishness such as the colour green, the shamrock or crowned harp, and traditional Irish airs and ballads) in the uniforms, music, regimental colours and other aspects of the unit, as well as linking to a wider Irish identity within the British military.[50]

Demand for recruits continued to increase and the Establishment was expanded in 1794 by fencible regiments, which were also raised for home defence duties.[51] Internal disaffection continued, in particular after the United Irishmen were outlawed in 1794.[52] Driven underground, the movement allied with the Defenders, a pro-Catholic secret society that had mostly acted as agrarian activists rather than revolutionaries before this point. Now the two movements sought to overturn British rule in Ireland, and they fervently hoped that Catholics in the militia would flock to their cause in the event of rebellion. The United Irishmen also established links with the new French Republic; Theobald Wolfe Tone, a Protestant Dublin lawyer-turned-revolutionary, travelled to Paris where he persuaded the Revolution's Directory to start organising a large-scale expedition to Ireland. Tone's success is impressive; the force consisted

[47]Bartlett, 'The emergence of the Irish Catholic nation,' p. 522.
[48]National Library of Ireland, Dublin (hereinafter NLI), Kilmainham Papers (KP) 1002/86, Dundas to Westmorland, 24 Mar. 1793; NLI KP 1002/127, Dundas to Westmorland, 25 Nov. 1793.
[49]McDonnell, "Zeal and Patriotism", p. 211.
[50]Ibid., pp. 215-216.
[51]Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion', p. 257.
[52]Bartlett, *Ireland*, p. 211.

of around 14,000 troops commanded by the talented general Lazare Hoche.[53] However, Tone's assurances that the militiamen were ready to desert *en masse* was overly optimistic.[54]

By 1796 the authorities also feared that mass desertions could take place in the militia and a new, mostly-Protestant and decidedly loyalist Irish Yeomanry was formed to guard Ireland. Many yeomanry corps evolved from earlier Volunteer corps, such as the Doneraile Yeomanry that included many former Doneraile Volunteer Rangers.[55] The yeomanry embodied the Protestant defence tradition, perceiving themselves to be under siege within a hostile population. They were tasked with localised counter-insurgency duties, while the militia were rotated around Ireland, guarding it from invasion.

Rebellion and Union

These invasion fears were confirmed when a fleet of French ships almost succeeded in landing a force at Bantry Bay in Cork in December 1796, but bad weather thwarted the plans of the United Irishmen and their French allies. The near-miss of Bantry Bay spurred the Irish government into increased security spending and galvanised the growth of loyalism and in particular numbers for the yeomanry. 1797 saw a purge of disaffection in the militia, with some 20 soldiers executed and many more flogged.[56] This was mirrored by a widespread campaign of disarming and military terror in Ulster, heartland of the United Irishmen. Houses were searched and burned, people flogged, and many mass-arrests and executions were carried out by the military to suppress any disaffection.[57] Politicians and officers justified these measures as necessary to fight terror with terror and drew direct comparisons with the recent brutal suppression of a royalist rebellion in the Vendée region in France.[58]

Despite the attempts to crush them, the United Irishmen (bolstered with the Defenders) eventually rose in rebellion in the summer of 1798. Initial and localised gains were lost as the determined British counterattack struck. French reinforcements

[53]French military archives, Paris (Service Historique de la Défense), 'l'Expédition d'Irlande' files, B 11/1, Hoche au directoire exécutif, 6 August 1796.
[54]Sylvie Kleinman, 'Tone and the French expeditions to Ireland, 1796-1798: Total war or Liberation?', in P. Serna, A. de Francesco & J. A. Miller (eds.), *Republics at War, 1776-1840 Revolutions, Conflicts and Geopolitics in Europe and the Atlantic World,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013), pp. 83-103, at p. 93.
[55]N.L.I. Doneraile Papers Ms 12155, Minutes of a meeting of the Doneraile Yeomanry, 16 Oct. 1796.
[56]Bartlett, *Ireland*, p. 219.
[57]Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion', p. 270.
[58]Ibid.

that arrived in August were too little and too late. Notwithstanding the misgivings of the professional army, the Irish Militia proved reasonably reliable; they not only withstood but in fact defeated the rebels largely by themselves before reinforcements arrived from Britain.[59] Even rudimentary training in musketry and drill was enough to defeat a largely untrained insurgent army armed mostly with pikes. While the militia performed reasonably well in 1798, the same cannot be said for the yeomanry. Their localised nature and lack of training meant that, in the words of newly-appointed Commander in Chief, and Lord Lieutenant, Marquis Cornwallis, the yeomanry might have been effective at fighting, but they had taken 'the lead in rapine and murder.'[60] However due to its overwhelmingly loyalist identity, the yeomanry was favoured by the authorities in Dublin and Westminster as the main tool at quelling disaffection in Ireland in the years after 1798. It wasn't just the militia and yeomanry that had a mixed performance; a number of British regiments earned a reputation for brutality towards insurgents and civilians alike, such as the Ancient Britons fencible regiment from north Wales.[61]

In the wake of the defeat of the rebellion, Westminster and Dublin Castle pushed forward plans for a legislative union between the British and Irish parliaments. Many of the Ascendancy opposed the loss of their independent parliament and had to be bribed with money or titles to help the Act of Union pass.[62] In one notable incident, Lord Downshire wrote to his militia regiment to encourage their opposition to union, but this mixing of politics and the military was so outrageous that Cornwallis was forced to relieve Downshire of his command.[63] After the Union the Protestant position (whether Anglican or Dissenter) was strengthened and entrenched, and the Catholic population, following the violence of 1798, were reluctant to offer much resistance.[64] Catholic Emancipation was expected to follow the Union, but when George III refused to allow this Pitt was forced to resign as prime minister.

Loyalty had been secured, sometimes at the point of a bayonet, and the focus of the British authorities shifted from internal security in Ireland to overseas military campaigns. Irish recruits would prove very useful in these campaigns as the Napoleonic

[59]McDonnell, "Zeal and Patriotism", p. 219-20.
[60]*Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis,* ed. Charles Ross, 2nd ed., 3 vols, (London: John Murray, 1859), ii, 371.
[61]Nicholas Dunne-Lynch, 'Catholic 'Hessians'?', *History Ireland*, 27, 5 (Sept./Oct. 2019), pp. 24–26, at p. 24.
[62]Patrick Geoghegan, *The Act of Union, a study in high politics, 1798-1801,* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1999), viii-ix.
[63]*Correspondence of Cornwallis*, iii, 178.
[64]James Kelly, 'The failure of opposition' in Brown, Geoghegan and Kelly (eds), *The Irish Act of Union,* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003), pp. 108-28, at p. 128.

Wars began in earnest in 1803. In particular the militia had demonstrated how Irish loyalism and identity could be brought within a British military context, and the militia would provide a gateway into the regular army after the Union.[65] Irish airs, and symbols such as the shamrock or harp, became more popular, whether in the military or in new institutions such as the chivalric Order of St. Patrick, which was introduced to reward loyal members of the nobility and foster an Irish aspect of British identity.

Recruitment to the regular army

When war was declared between the new French Republic and Britain on 1 February 1793, the British military found itself in need of manpower. Over the next two decades the British Army expanded from about 40,000 men in 1793 to about 250,000 men in 1813, while the Royal Navy reached a height of about 140,000 men during the wars.[66] Of this, roughly one third of the army (and navy) were Irish, although the exact proportions varied over time.[67] It has been estimated that at least 150,000 Irishmen enlisted in the British armed forces between 1793 and 1815, although exact numbers are difficult to determine.[68] Ireland's population during the late eighteenth century was growing from four to five million, and represented a third of the overall population of Britain and Ireland; by the time of the Peninsular War, Irish troops made up thirty per cent of the army, with variations over the branches of infantry, cavalry and artillery.[69] Sixteen new Irish regiments were established in the early 1790s, in addition to existing Irish regiments.[70] Rapid militarisation in Ireland reflected growing militarisation in Britain and across Europe. Irishmen enlisted in the regulars in large numbers, as they did in the militia and yeomanry. Why did they do this? Economic necessity certainly played a significant part.[71] As in Britain, the benefits of regular pay (in theory), food and accommodation, and also the prospect of plunder, attracted many.[72] They were

[65]McDonnell, "Zeal and Patriotism", p. 223. In 1811 a Militia Interchange Act allowed Irish Militia regiments to serve in Britain, and for British militia regiments to serve in Ireland.

[66]David Gates, 'The transformation of the army, 1783-1815' in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds), *The Oxford history of the British army,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp 132-60, at p. 132.

[67]Bartlett, 'Total War', pp. 256-7.

[68]D. A. Chart, 'The Irish levies during the Great French War', *English Historical Review*, 32, 128 (Oct. 1917), pp. 497-516, at p. 516.

[69]Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', p. 9.

[70]Murphy, *The Irish Brigades*, pp 106-63.

[71]Keith Jeffery, 'The Irish military tradition and the British Empire' in Keith Jeffery (ed.), *An Irish empire?: aspects of Ireland and the British Empire,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 94-122, at p. 94; Coss, *The King's Shilling*, p. 85.

[72]Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army*, p. 90.

mostly Catholics of low income, typically farm labourers or poor artisans.[73] Many, especially in Ulster, were weavers, and in 1797 concern was expressed that local industry was suffering due to the number of Ulster Protestants enlisting.[74] However, army pay was low compared with skilled labour, and a cash bounty (£15) had to be offered to encourage enlistment. Recruitment posters, some even in Irish, advertised higher pay and attractive conditions of service for the regular army, and even plunder in the form of 'Spanish gold and dollars' for service in the West Indies. [75]

Economic necessity was not the only factor, as young men, whether Irish, English or other, displayed a desire for adventure and freedom from domestic responsibilities.[76] The military spectacle of uniforms and pomp attracted the public's attention and prompted enlistment.[77] Recruiting officers appealed to men's sense of patriotism and loyalty to the king.[78] Folk songs such as 'Johnny Has Gone for a Soldier' or 'The Rocks of Bawn' described the adventure of being a soldier in the British army.[79] Adverts were also placed in the local press; in 1793 the *Connaught Journal* announced the raising of the 88th (Connaught Rangers) Regiment which sought 'young men of good character, who wish to serve our beloved monarch.'[80] Family tradition among the Ascendancy and Protestant middle classes played a part too, glorifying the deeds of their ancestors and incentives were not just applied to the rank-and-file. Officers were offered 'a speedy prospect of preferment' if they hurried recruitment.'[81] Family connections also facilitated the appointment of officers; in the 88th Regiment many were related to the

[73]Karsten, 'Irish Soldiers in the British army', p. 37.

[74]National Archives of Ireland (hereinafter NAI), State of the Country Papers (SOC) 1016/5, Bisset to Pelham, 2 July 1797.

[75]Denman, Terence, 'Hibernia officina militum: Irish recruitment to the British regular army, 1660-1815', *Irish Sword*, 20 (1996), pp. 148-66, at p. 165; Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 38; 'British War Office army recruiting poster in the Irish language, 1806', Whyte's Irish Art & Collectables Auctioneers, 16 April 2011 https://www.whytes.ie/art/1806-1-november-napoloeonic-wars-an-extremely-rare-british-war-office-army-recruiting-poster-in-the-irish-language/134526/. Accessed 22 February 2022.

[76]Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army*, pp. 92-93.

[77]John Morrissey, 'A lost heritage: the Connaught Rangers and multivocal Irishness' in Mark McCarthy (ed.), *Ireland's heritages: critical perspectives on memory and identity,* (Aldershot: Routledge, 2005), pp. 71-87, at p. 77.

[78]Alan Forrest, *Napoleon's men: the soldiers of the Revolution and Empire,* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2002), pp. 134-5.

[79]Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 38.

[80]G. A. Hayes-McCoy, 'The raising of the Connaught Rangers, 1793', *Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society*, 21, 3/4 (1945), pp. 133-139, at p. 135

[81]NLI KP 1002/130, Circular from War Office to infantry colonels, 1 Nov 1793.

colonel, John Thomas de Burgh.[82] Like the recruits, the gentlemen would have also recognised the social prestige of a smart uniform, and military service as an officer offered an avenue to display one's loyalty, whilst also enjoying the trappings of military life.

Regiments did not exclusively recruit from their assigned districts; they sought men from wherever they were stationed, and this affected the national composition of each battalion of the regiment. The 89th Regiment began its recruitment in Ireland and finished it in Bristol.[83] Its second battalion spent a number of years rotating around England and so had a large proportion of English recruits; out of 504 men, 374 were Irish, twenty-seven were Scottish, eight were 'foreign' and the remaining 95 were English.[84] On the other hand, the 88th completed their numbers almost entirely from Connaught before departure, and therefore were predominantly Irish and Catholic.[85] While some regiments were mostly Catholic, this was not by design. The recruitment strategy employed generally allowed diversity of national identity within the British military. A united British identity was regarded as a great advantage by some commanders; Sir John Moore believed the best regiments were one third English, one third Irish and one third Scottish.[86] The large resource of manpower that Ireland offered meant that many English and Scottish regiments were also recruiting in Ireland.[87] In fact, more Irish served in these regiments than in the 'Irish' regiments, in particular as manpower demands increased during the Peninsular campaign.[88] English regiments also recruited Irishmen resident in Britain; the 57th (West Middlesex) Regiment included about 34% Irish in 1809, recruited from the London area.[89] Recruitment to the army was highest in the southwest and the interior of Ireland, and lower in Ulster, where many remained to work in the linen industry.[90]

[82]Hayes-McCoy, 'The raising of the Connaught Rangers', p. 135.
[83]Chart, 'The Irish levies during the Great French War', p. 499.
[84]Henry Harris, *The Royal Irish Fusiliers* (London: Cooper, 1972), p.43.
[85]Hayes-McCoy, 'The raising of the Connaught Rangers', p. 135.
[86]Denman, '*Hibernia officina militum*', p. 166.
[87]Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion', p. 257.
[88]Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', pp. 4-5.
[89]Nicholas Dunne-Lynch, 'Humour and defiance: Irish troops and their humour in the Peninsular War', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 85, 341 (Spring, 2007), pp. 62-78, at p. 63.
[90]Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 38.

Overseas service

Desertion rates were high in the regular army, as well as in the militia.[91] In 1794, 2,000 recruits deserted the Irish Establishment of 22,525.[92] Bounty jumping was common, where a recruit took the enlistment money and promptly deserted, only to enlist in another regiment and claim another bounty. Rewards were offered to catch bounty jumpers and regiments were sent out of Ireland as soon as they were completed, to avoid excessive desertion.[93] While enlisting was usually a voluntary decision, after 1798 many captured rebels were given the option of either standing trial or enlisting in a regiment that was destined for overseas service.[94] Many of the men who enlisted in the 88th in 1800 were former rebels, as were recruits to the 89th.[95] English regiments such as the 30th Foot also took in pardoned Irish rebels.[96] One officer claimed that his best men were six Irishmen who had been captured at Vinegar Hill in 1798.[97] Former rebels could rise high; Sergeant Major Adams of the 95th Rifles had been a rebel who later enlisted in the Irish Militia and from there the regulars.[98] One officer described former rebels who were drafted into the army, and by shedding their old clothes and old way of life, emerged as new men, part of the transformative effect of service in the British Army.[99] Despite the alleged large numbers of former rebels, as well as former militiamen who had volunteered for the line, the Irish contribution to the regular army was generally seen as positive, with no examples of major disaffection. The one exception was the 5th Irish Light Dragoons, where several men were found to be United Irishmen in 1798 and the regiment was subsequently disbanded for sixty years.[100] Overall, the Irish in the regular army remained loyal throughout 1798 and did not desert as Tone and the United Irishmen had hoped. About sixty Irishmen were court-martialled for treasonable conduct, but when compared with the thousands serving on the Establishment, and in the rest of the Army, this remains a very small proportion.[101]

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[91]Denman, '*Hibernia officina militum*', p. 163.

[92]Ilya Berkovich, *Motivation in War: the experience of common soldiers in old-regime Europe,* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 91.

[93]Cookson, *The British armed nation*, p. 155.

[94]Chart, 'The Irish levies during the Great French War', p. 509.

[95]Hayes-McCoy, 'The raising of the Connaught Rangers, 1793', p. 138; John Fortescue, *History of the British army*, 13 vols (London: Macmillan, 1915), iv, part two, 622.

[96]Fortescue, *History of the British army*, iv, part two, 622.

[97]Ibid., 701-2.

[98]Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', p. 13.

[99]Kennedy, "True Brittons and Real Irish", p. 41.

[100]Murphy, *Irish Brigades*, p. 140.

[101]Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 42.

New Irish regiments were usually quickly trained and then sent for overseas garrison duty, allowing experienced regiments to undertake offensive operations.[102] Some senior regiments were still assigned garrison duties; the 18th Royal Irish Regiment took part in the Toulon and Egyptian expeditions, but spent the rest of the wars on garrison duties on the Channel Islands and in the West Indies.[103] The 8th Royal Irish Light Dragoons took part in the Flanders campaign before garrison duty in South Africa.[104] Garrison duty did not mean inactivity; the 1st battalion of the 83rd (County of Dublin) Regiment took part in suppression of the Maroon Rebellion of former enslaved people in Jamaica.[105] Ireland itself became an important dépôt; in addition to being an extremely important Royal Navy station, most of the supplies sent to Wellington in the Peninsula came from Cork.[106] The exports were not just for the military; Ireland was busy feeding a hungry Britain during the wars.[107]

Fourteen Irish regiments were sent to the Peninsula to serve under Wellington.[108] These Irish soldiers achieved a reputation for ability, if not necessarily discipline; Irish regiments had a high number of courts martial.[109] Wellington even threatened to dismount the 18th Irish Hussars and send them home after they looted Joseph Bonaparte's royal baggage train in Spain.[110] However, this indiscipline was countered by a reputation for Irish humour and hardiness.[111] The Irish were seen as good soldiers due to their tough peasant upbringing and potato-rich diet.[112] Humour as a means of enduring hardship whilst on campaign is a common theme for many armies, and not restricted to Irish troops, and this 'positive stereotype' was one that some Irish soldiers were happy to accept.[113] This is understandable, considering the mistrust or even vilification of Catholics that had been commonplace in Britain and Ireland during the eighteenth century. Despite discipline issues in some regiments, overall Irish regiments performed well in the field; the 88th Connaught Rangers were noted for their courage and tenacity, especially on the charge, and were often used for the difficult task of storming defences, while the 87th Prince of Wales's Own Irish was the

[102]Chart, 'The Irish levies during the Great French War', p. 503.
[103]Murphy, *Irish Brigades*, pp 110-1.
[104]Ibid., p. 147.
[105]Ibid., p. 166.
[106]Bartlett, 'Total War', p. 259.
[107]Knight, *The organization of victory*, p. 160.
[108]Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion', p. 257.
[109]Fortescue, *History of the British army*, vii, 192-3; Charles Oman, *A history of the Peninsular* War, 7 vols, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), vii, 149.
[110]Murphy, *Irish Brigades*, pp 164-5.
[111]Dunne-Lynch, 'Humour and defiance', p. 62, p. 76.
[112]Denman, '*Hibernia officina militum*', p. 166.
[113]Dunne-Lynch, 'Humour and defiance', pp 64-6.

first British regiment to capture a French regimental eagle standard.[114] At Waterloo the 27th Inniskilling endured a murderous cannon bombardment; Lieutenant John Kincaid of the 95th Rifles described how, 'the 27th regiment were lying literally dead, in square.'[115]

The Irish regiments were used like any other English, Welsh or Scottish regiment; battalions were sent wherever they were needed. The 1st battalion of the 27th fought in Flanders in the 1790s, performed garrison duties in the West Indies, and then served in the Egyptian and Waterloo campaigns, while the 2nd and 3rd battalions took part in the Peninsular campaign and the 1812 war in North America.[116] The 1st battalion of the 87th took part in the expedition to the Low Countries and then garrison duties in the West Indies, while the 2nd battalion saw garrison duty in Ireland and the Channel Islands, before it was sent to the Peninsula.[117] The contribution of the Ascendancy to the regular army was also significant.[118] Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, was the most famous of the Anglo-Irish officers that served during the French Revolutionary wars, but many of his most notable subordinates were also Anglo-Irish, including William Carr Beresford who was a general in both the British and Portuguese armies, Galbraith Lowry Cole, colonel of the 27th and commander of the 4th division, and Robert William 'Light Bob' O'Callaghan, commander of the 39th regiment.[119] Major-General Denis Pack, son of the Dean of Ossory (Kilkenny) served in numerous campaigns including Flanders, South America, the Peninsular War and Waterloo. The Irish regiments did not have a monopoly on fame and reputation; many English and Scottish regiments also gained, or built upon, reputations in the wars. While Henry Dundas believed the Scottish Highlands were an excellent recruiting ground, Scotland contributed less than what he believed, about 15.7% of the recruits and 25% of the officers.[120] Despite this the image of the Scottish Highlander would go

[114]Richard Holmes, *Redcoat: The British soldier in the age of horse and musket,* (London: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 59; Mike Chappell, *Wellington's Peninsula regiments (1): the Irish,* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), p. 33.
[115]John Kincaid, *Adventures with the Rifle Brigade*: *in the Peninsula, France and the Netherlands from 1809 to 1815,* (London, 1830), p. 342.
[116]Murphy, *Irish Brigades*, pp 130-1.
[117]Ibid, pp 176-7.
[118]Karsten, 'Irish soldiers in the British army', p. 35.
[119]C. T. Atkinson, 'The Irish regiments of the line in the British army', *Irish Sword*, 1, 1 (1949-53), pp. 20-3.
[120]Charles Esdaile, 'The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815' in E. M. Spiers, J. A. Crang and M. J. Strickland (eds), *A military history of Scotland,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), pp. 407-35, at pp. 409-10, 412-3.

on to become one of the iconic images of the British Army and by extension the British Empire.[121]

Irish identity in the British Army

The creation of an Irish identity within the British military was key to the integration of Irishmen in the armed forces. Visual manifestations of Irish identity included regimental colours and badges; older regiments bore numerous battle honours and newer regiments quickly gained honours of their own. Popular regimental songs like 'Garryowen' and 'St. Patrick's Day', and the wearing of shamrock on 17 March, also helped foster a sense of Irish identity within the British military.[122] While there were many Protestants and Dissenters serving in the ranks, and the officer corps was mostly Protestant, the majority of the rank-and-file were Catholic. This did not mean that their religion was their defining characteristic; Wellington dryly observed that any overt display of piety by Irish soldiers were usually reserved for eliciting wine from the Spanish and Portuguese civilians, as fellow Catholics.[123] Mass-going was not necessarily a common practice back in Ireland, and for many Irishmen, regular attendance may only have begun when they enlisted.[124]

When anti-Catholic feelings did occur, they appear to have been mostly restricted to certain Irish Protestant officers.[125] This is unsurprising, given the domestic oppression of Catholics by the Ascendancy. However, such views were now being countered by growing support for Catholic relief. The British Army also actively sought to avoid sectarian problems (such as by attempting to halt the spread of pro-Protestant Orange Order lodges in the regiments), recognising the threat to both regimental and army-wide cohesion.[126] Discrimination by British officers did still exist however; in 1810 Lt. Gen. Sir James Craig, Governor-General of Canada, blamed the widespread desertion and indiscipline of the 100th (County of Dublin) Foot at their posting in Upper Canada on the fact that they were badly officered and 'nearly to a man Papists'.[127] Despite the moves towards Catholic Relief, the officer corps remained almost exclusively Protestant. Even after the Union, Catholic officers could only hold their commissions in the regular army within Ireland and had to give them up if they left the country. As a result, many did not disclose their religion.[128] Others converted for advancement

[121]Kennedy, "True Brittons and Real Irish", pp. 38-39.
[122]Cookson, *The British armed nation*, p. 178.
[123]Holmes, *Redcoat*, p. 355.
[124]Kennedy, "True Brittons and Real Irish", pp 47-8.
[125]Ibid, p. 48.
[126]Linch, *Britain and Wellington's Army*, p. 146.
[127]TNA WO 1/644, ff 499-500, Craig to the Adjunct-General, Quebec 8 June 1810.
[128]Bartlett, "'A weapon of war untried'", pp. 76-7.

purposes. In 1817 Catholics were finally granted the right to hold commissions.[129] Discrimination would continue until 1829, when Catholic Emancipation was finally passed, but overall, the British military was willing to place practicality over prejudice, utilising the Irish Catholics in the war against France.

Irish soldiers made a significant contribution to the British war effort during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, representing roughly one third of the army. As the preceding sections demonstrate, they did this for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from economic necessity through to family tradition and a sense of patriotism. Whether this was a strictly Irish patriotism or a wider and more fluid 'British' patriotism, especially post-Union, it is difficult to say for certain; although it is clear that Irish service in the British military is not as much a paradox as first seems. While many in Ireland, Catholic or Protestant, sought a break from Britain and the establishment of a republic, there were also many Irish Catholics and Protestants who embraced the British link with Ireland, or at least tolerated British control of Ireland, and military service was an avenue open to them. Colley has highlighted the ways in which warfare and the 'nation-in-arms' had a profound effect on forging a British national identity.[130] However, Kennedy argues that Colley's focus on domestic troops like the militia, and domestic matters of mobilisation, neglects the 'attitudes and experiences within the armed forces', namely the experiences of those who enlisted in the regular army and served overseas.[131] The same point is made by Linch and McCormack.[132] Kennedy highlights the importance of the army, which 'can be viewed as a crucial arena in which national identities were formed and articulated.'[133] As a result the decision by Colley to omit Ireland from a study of the creation of a British national (and martial) identity seems less straightforward than first seems, and further considerations of these complexities will be of great use to researchers of this period. The military offered a space where multiple (military) identities could come together and serve together.[134] It did not necessarily impose a single 'British' identity, and a regimental form of Irishness developed within the army.[135] The regimental system itself offers a paradox; regimental traditions might have been localised but as has been seen the battalions took their recruits from wherever they could get them. As a result, the British Army was a complex and complicated formation during this period. As mentioned already Sir John Moore believed the best regiments were mixed ones,

[129]Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish', p. 42.
[130]Colley, Britons, pp. 289-325
[131]Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish'.
[132]Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack, 'Wellington's Men: The British Soldier of the Napoleonic Wars', *History Compass*, 13, 6 (2015), pp. 288–296, at p. 292.
[133]Ibid.
[134]Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars*, p. 4.
[135]Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish', p. 51.

whilst Rifleman Kincaid also approved of mixed corps formations.[136] The Royal Navy was similarly a multinational and multi-ethnic force.[137] The Irish contribution to the navy was significant, but reasons of space preclude an examination here.[138] The army offered opportunities many Irish would otherwise not have had access to, and both Catholic ranker and Anglo-Irish officer took advantage of these opportunities.[139] It also offered a relatively tolerant space for Catholics, at least usually more tolerant than at home.[140] An Irish recruit would have found much more in common with his fellow English, Scottish or Welsh working-class recruits than any major differences.[141] In the heat of battle, it was for their brothers-in-arms that the redcoats fought.[142]

Conclusions

As this brief survey has demonstrated Ireland was indeed 'a vital participant in the British "armed nation".'[143] The French Revolution had severely damaged the Franco-Irish military tradition, and the British government was there to take advantage of the situation by diverting the flow of would-be recruits into their own armed forces; army, navy, and numerous amateur defence formations.[144] Britain was determined to both secure a potentially unstable flank and to take full advantage of what Ireland offered. Fears of religious differences were set aside against the threat of a radical and secular French republic. In the wake of the Act of Union many more Irish soldiers were brought into an expanded army, in Irish regiments as well as the many more Irish recruits distributed right across the British Army.[145] Motivations for enlistment varied; some Irish recruits, in particular the Anglo-Irish officer class, would have seen themselves as loyal British patriots, others were former republican rebels forced into

[136]Denman, '*Hibernia officina militum*', p. 166; Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish', p. 54.
[137]Sara Caputo, 'Alien Seamen in the British Navy, British Law, and the British State, c.1793 - c.1815', *Historical Journal*, 62, 3 (2019), pp. 685-707.
[138]Walsh, 'Ireland and the Royal Navy in the Eighteenth Century', pp. 51-76.
[139]Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', p. 36.
[140]Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish', p. 51.
[141]Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', pp. 35-36.
[142]Coss, *The King's Shilling*, p. 238.
[143]Kennedy, *Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars*, p. 4.
[144]Franco-Irish military connections were not completely severed during this period. An Irish Legion was later formed by Napoleon Bonaparte, with former United Irishmen officers and a mix of nationalities in the rank-and-file, but this bears little resemblance to the royalist Irish Brigade that preceded it.
[145]Kennedy, 'True Brittons and Real Irish', p. 37; Deery, 'The contribution of the Irish soldier', pp. 4-5.

military service by their oppressor.[146] Most recruits probably fell somewhere in between these two contrasting positions, a reminder that Irish history is full of complexity and nuance, rather than stark binaries.

Loyalty was paramount; to serve in the armed forces demonstrated loyalty to the crown. However, within Ireland a less even approach was taken, favouring Protestant loyalism in the form of the yeomanry and Orange Order as an expedient for political and domestic stability. However, the Irish contribution to the British military did not result in the same strengthening of Union connections as had happened in Scotland.[147] Despite their contribution to victory, Irish Catholics did not reap the rewards after 1815. Emancipation would not come until 1829, although this was not unique to Ireland; the ruling elites across Europe were tightening their grip on power after the shock of the French Revolution.[148] Nevertheless Irish enlistment continued throughout the nineteenth century, despite famine, political agitation, and rebellion. More work is needed to unravel the complexities of how Irish identity (or indeed identities), were incorporated into the British military, and how these fit in with ideas of the British nation and/or Irish nation, and those who fought against British rule. This will complement growing work on Ireland's role in colonialism and the rise of the British Empire.[149] Continued research on the experiences of Irish soldiers in the British military will also prove fruitful, especially when taking into account wider society and topics including class, gender and race. The history of Irish soldiers in the British military is complicated and complex, much like the wider histories of the two islands.

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[146]While nationalism is a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the origins of Irish separatist republicanism can be found in the events of the 1790s.

[147]Cookson, *The British armed nation*, pp. 181-2; Kennedy, "True Brittons and Real Irish", pp. 38-39.

[148]Bartlett, 'Total War', p. 260-1.

[149]Kevin Kenny (ed.), *Ireland and the British Empire,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Nini Rogers*, Ireland, Slavery and Anti-Slavery: 1612-1865,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Timothy McMahon, Michael de Nie and Paul Townend (eds.), *Ireland in an Imperial World: Citizenship, Opportunism, and Subversion,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Loughlin Sweeny, *Irish Military Elites, Nation and Empire, 1870–1925,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Daniel Sanjiv Roberts and Jonathan Jeffrey Wright (eds.), *Ireland's Imperial Connections, 1775–1947,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Colin Barr, *Ireland's Empire: The Roman Catholic Church in the English-Speaking World, 1829–1914,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Caoimhe Nic Dháibhéid, Shahmima Akhtar, Dónal Hassett, Kevin Kenny, Laura McAtackney, Ian McBride. Timothy G. McMahon and Jane Ohlmeyer, 'Round table: Decolonising Irish history? Possibilities, challenges, practices', *Irish Historical Studies*, 45, 168 (2021), pp. 303–32.

It is hoped that this short paper, and the other works cited therein, will prompt further work on this important aspect of Irish and British history.

Disgraceful Conduct: Parliamentary Regulation of Homosexuality in the British Army, 1829-1992

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ABSTRACT
The injustices created by the historical criminalisation of consensual same-sex sexual acts between adult men in the UK are now widely recognised and in 2012 and 2017 the UK Parliament enacted legislation with the aim of righting the wrongs of the past. What has been less recognised are the historical injustices suffered by armed forces personnel who were convicted of service discipline offences for engaging in consensual same-sex sexual acts that would today be lawful. This article provides an analysis of how one service discipline offence, the offence of 'disgraceful conduct', was used to regulate homosexuality in the British Army. It focuses on the making and maintaining of this aspect of service law by Parliament, from the early nineteenth to the late twentieth century, and examines the attitudes and intentions of the legislators who shaped it. The article explains the significance of legislation enacted in 2022 which, in acknowledgement of the discriminatory use of service discipline offences in the past, provides redress to service personnel who were convicted of such offences for conduct involving same-sex sexual activity that would be lawful today.

Introduction

The Armed Forces Act 2006 – which provides a single system of service law for the British armed forces – contains a provision that makes it an offence to engage in disgraceful conduct of a cruel or indecent kind.[1] The 'Commanding Officers Guide' to service law states that, for the purposes of this offence, 'an act of sexual nature that occurs in private with the consent of persons present and where such persons are old

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1645
[1]Armed Forces Act 2006, s. 23.

enough to give consent will not generally be regarded as indecent'.[2] Those unaware of the history of the offence of disgraceful conduct may be surprised that commanding officers need to be informed that consensual sexual acts between adults in private will not generally be regarded as 'indecent'. Yet, this information is given in the context of the offence of disgraceful conduct having previously been used by the British armed forces – including the British Army during a period of 163 years[3] – to discipline personnel who engaged in same-sex sexual acts which, in some cases, would be lawful today and, for some of the period the offence was used, were lawful if committed by civilians.

This article considers the history of the offence of disgraceful conduct and its use to regulate same-sex sexual acts committed by Army personnel. It focuses on the making and maintaining of this aspect of service law by the UK Parliament.[4] The article traces the evolution of the offence of disgraceful conduct from the time that Parliament introduced it in the early part of the nineteenth century and examines the attitudes and intentions of the legislators who shaped it. Disgraceful conduct was not the only offence by which same-sex sexual acts were regulated in the Army; other service discipline offences could be applied[5] and, in certain contexts and at specific times, Army personnel could be prosecuted under service law for civil offences that regulated

[2]Commanding officers guide (manual of service law: JSP 830 volume 1) ch. 7, pp. 1-7-76 to 1-7-77.

[3]From the time of the Mutiny Act 1829 (10 Geo. 4 c. 6, An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters) to Parliament ending, in 1992, prosecutions under service law of same-sex sexual acts that were otherwise legal in civilian life (HC Deb 17 June 1992 vol. 209 cols. 989-990).

[4]For broader historical considerations of the regulation of homosexuality in the British armed forces and the experiences of gay service personnel, see: Stephen Bourne, *Fighting Proud: The Untold Story of the Gay Men Who Served in Two World Wars*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2017); Matt Cook, *London and the Culture of Homosexuality, 1885-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); John Costello, *Love, Sex, and War: Changing Values, 1939-45*, (London: Collins, 1985); Matt Houlbrook, 'Soldier Heroes and Rent Boys: Homosex, Masculinities, and Britishness in the Brigade of Guards, circa 1900–1960', 42, no. 3 (July 2003), pp. 351-388; Matt Houlbrook, *Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918-1957*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Graham Robb, *Strangers: Homosexual Love in the Nineteenth Century*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004); Emma Vickers, *Queen and Country: Same-Sex Desire in the British Armed Forces, 1939–1945*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

[5]For example: Army Act 1955, s. 64 (scandalous conduct of officer) and s. 69 (conduct to prejudice of military discipline).

same-sex sexual acts.[6] Nevertheless, as the article shows, the offence of disgraceful conduct was a principal provision by which the Army sought to regulate its personnel in respect of homosexual conduct.

The history of the use of offences such as disgraceful conduct to regulate consensual same-sex sexual acts has been relevant to recent legislative initiatives. In 2012, the UK Parliament took action to address historical injustices suffered by gay and bisexual men and made available a scheme whereby a person living with a conviction or caution, secured under English law for certain abolished offences, can apply to have that conviction or caution disregarded.[7] Furthermore, in 2017, Parliament made provision for those convicted or cautioned for the same abolished offences under English law to be pardoned.[8] The principal offences covered by the disregard and pardon schemes upon enactment were buggery and gross indecency and, insofar as civil offences could be prosecuted as service offences, the schemes extended to those convicted of these offences under service law.[9] However, as originally enacted the disregard and pardon schemes contained two key problems in respect of the armed forces which, between 2016 and 2022, the author worked with Lord Cashman and Lord Lexden to address.

The first problem identified with the pardon scheme was that the provisions made to grant posthumous pardons to armed forces personnel convicted under service law of

[6]For purposes of clarity, throughout this article I use the term 'service discipline offence' to mean those offences which can only be committed under service law and distinguish these offences from civil (criminal) offences which can be dealt with under service law.

[7]Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, pt. 5, ch. 4 (as enacted). Scotland and Northern Ireland are covered by separate legislative provision.

[8]Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 164-167 (as enacted). This Act also makes provision for Northern Ireland (see: s. 168-172) in respect of disregards and pardons. Scotland is covered by separate legislative provision.

[9]As originally enacted the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s. 92(1) provided that a person convicted of or cautioned for an offence under particular provisions, which criminalised buggery and gross indecency between men, may apply to have the conviction or caution disregarded. The references in s. 92(1) of the Act to offences under particular provisions were to be read (by virtue of s. 101(3) of the Act) as including references to offences under certain sections of the Service Discipline Acts which allowed a 'corresponding civil offence' to be dealt with under service law (for example: Army Act 1955, s. 70). Similar provision was made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 164, as originally enacted, to grant posthumous pardons in respect of service offences corresponding to offences under particular civil provisions which criminalised buggery and gross indecency between men (and s. 165 of the Act made provision to grant pardons for those still living).

certain abolished civil offences, involving conduct which would not be an offence today, were inadequate in respect of the Army and Royal Marines. This inadequacy was eventually rectified by provisions in the Armed Forces Act 2021.[10]

The second problem identified was that convictions for same-sex sexual acts under service discipline offences, such as disgraceful conduct, were not within the scope of the disregard and pardon schemes.[11] The inadequacy of the disregard and pardons schemes was recognised by the Government when, in 2016, it accepted amendments to the Policing and Crime Bill, moved by Lord Cashman, to enable the Secretary of State to extend, by regulations, the list of offences eligible to be disregarded and

[10]Posthumous pardons were granted by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 164 as originally enacted for particular civil offences, including civil offences of buggery extending back to 1533. At the time that this legislation was considered by Parliament, I pointed out that it was inadequate in respect of the equivalent service offences. The matter was raised by Lord Lexden (HL Deb 12 December 2016 vol. 777 col. 1017) and, as a consequence, amendments were moved to provide for posthumous pardons in respect of the Royal Navy extending back to 1661 (HL Deb 19 December 2016 vol. 777 col. 1477). However, posthumous pardons were not granted to Army personnel or Royal Marines personnel (when ashore) prior to 1881. I conducted research to identify the legislation relevant to the Army and Royal Marines and this underpinned two Private Members Bills introduced by Lord Cashman (Armed Forces (Posthumous Pardons) Bill [HL], introduced 23 October 2019; Armed Forces (Posthumous Pardons) Bill [HL], introduced 21 January 2020). The essence of those Bills found expression in the Armed Forces Act 2021, s. 19 which provided posthumous pardons, under certain conditions, to those convicted under provisions in the Articles of War made under any Mutiny Act or Marine Mutiny Act previously in force (the Mutiny Acts extend back to an Act of 1688). For a historical overview see: Lord Lexden, HL Deb 7 September 2021 vol. 814 cols. 763-764. The Armed Forces Act 2021, s. 19 has since been subject to amendments by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (see note 16).

[11]The Home Office previously made clear that the disregard scheme extended to convictions under service law 'in respect of acts contrary to the provisions listed' in s. 92(1) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (as originally enacted) and applications for 'any other convictions cannot be accepted' (Home Office, *Disregards and pardons for historical gay sexual convictions: Application form and guidance notes on applying for a disregard and pardon of convictions for decriminalised sexual offences*, 15 February 2021). That meant that civil offences of buggery and gross indecency dealt with under service law were covered by the disregard scheme, but other specific service discipline offences were outside of its scope. This was also the case for the pardon scheme (see: Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 164-165, as originally enacted).

pardoned.[12] The power created by the Policing and Crime Act 2017[13] to extend the disregard and pardon schemes was never utilised by the Government, despite repeated representations from Lord Cashman,[14] Lord Lexden,[15] and other parliamentarians on the importance of the issue. Finally, however, provisions in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 expanded the disregard and pardon schemes to cover any person convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence 'in circumstances where the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex' (providing that any other person involved in the sexual activity was aged 16 or over, the offence has been repealed or abolished, and the sexual activity would not now constitute an offence).[16] Consequently, those convicted of engaging in consensual same-sex sexual acts under service discipline offences, such as disgraceful conduct, are now able to apply to have a conviction disregarded, and to be pardoned.

This article examines the regulation of same-sex sexual conduct in the Army during three historical periods. It begins at the time that the offence of disgraceful conduct was introduced, during a period when the regulation and discipline of the Army was governed by an annual Mutiny Act passed by Parliament and by Articles of War made by the Crown under the authority of the Mutiny Acts. During this period, Parliament paid no attention to what would later be termed 'homosexuals' and 'homosexuality' but, rather, focused attention on the regulation of 'indecent' and 'unnatural' conduct. The article then considers the period during which the provisions in the Mutiny Acts and the Articles of War were consolidated and harmonised into one single Act of Parliament. From this point onwards, Parliament gradually began to focus explicitly on the issue of homosexuality and the 'problem' of homosexual soldiers serving in the Army. The article finally considers the period following the partial decriminalisation of homosexual acts in England and Wales, and the progressive movement to end the regulation of such acts under service law. During this period, Parliament gave extensive consideration to issues relating to homosexuality and the Army, becoming increasingly critical of the regulation of Army personnel for engaging in conduct that was, in civilian

[12]Baroness Williams of Trafford, HL Deb 12 December 2016 vol. 777 col. 1021.
[13]Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 166.
[14]HL Written Question tabled on 7 February 2017 (HL5299); HL Deb 12 July 2018 vol. 792 col. 1015; HL Written Question tabled on 4 June 2020 (HL5288).
[15]HL Written Question tabled on 7 October 2020 (HL8867); HL Deb 9 June 2021 vol. 812 col. 1421.
[16]Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, pt. 12. This change resulted from Government amendments that, as Baroness Williams of Trafford explained, drew heavily on earlier amendments to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill and the Armed Forces Bill that I had worked on with Lord Cashman and Lord Lexden (HL Deb 10 January 2022 vol. 817 cols. 910-913).

life, lawful. The article concludes by outlining the significance of the recent legal reforms that make disregards and pardons available to those convicted of disgraceful conduct and other service discipline offences, and considers what more could be done in the future to address the injustices of the past.

The Mutiny Acts and the Articles of War: 1829-1878

Parliament introduced the offence of disgraceful conduct in the Mutiny Act 1829 to classify certain conduct and specify the powers available to the courts martial to deal with it.[17] The Act of 1829 made explicit that disgraceful conduct concerned 'vice or misconduct' and empowered a court martial to punish such conduct and 'recommend such offender to be discharged as unfit for the service … he having been once previously convicted of disgraceful conduct'.[18] The Act of 1829 did not explicitly specify any 'vice or misconduct' of a sexual nature but, later that year, in respect of the issuing of Supplementary Rules and Articles of War, a War Office Circular communicated the following explanation:

> I … call your attention to the amendment made in the 70th Article of War, in which 'Disgraceful Conduct' is declared to mean any offence of a disgraceful character … In order that the practical application of the words 'Disgraceful Conduct,' and offences of a 'Disgraceful Character,' may be liable to the least possible misconception … I have to state that 'Disgraceful Conduct' implies confirmed vice, and all unnatural propensities, indecent assaults, repeated thefts and dishonesty, ferocity in having maimed other soldiers or persons, self-mutilation, tampering with the eyes, and all cases of confirmed malingering where the conduct is proved to be so irreclaimably vicious, as to render the offender unworthy to remain in the army.[19]

The term 'unnatural propensities' was reportedly already in use in the courts martial – in respect of 'crimes which the English law … declares *unfit to be named among christians* [and] which military law does not stain its annals by any recognizance' – and

[17] 10 Geo. 4 c. 6 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 9. For a discussion of the introduction of the offence of disgraceful conduct, see: Thomas Frederick Simmons, *The Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial (Seventh Edition)*, (London: John Murray, 1875), p. 102. For a discussion of the role of the then Secretary at War, Sir Henry Hardinge, in introducing the offence in the Mutiny Act and Articles of War, see: Henry Marshall, *Military Miscellany*, (London: John Murray, 1846), p. 84.

[18] 10 Geo. 4 c. 6 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 9.

[19] Circular, War Office, 23 November 1829, in *The United Service Journal, and Naval and Military Magazine*, 1830, pt. 1, p. 115-116.

can be read as including sexual conduct between men.[20] 'Unnatural' (meaning against the 'order of nature'[21]) was then a long-established legal term that denoted acts within the scope of the offence of buggery (sodomy) which regulated, inter alia, anal intercourse between men.[22] One of the earliest uses of the word unnatural in statute in respect of buggery was in the Navy Act 1661,[23] and it was used thereafter in a number of other equivalent enactments. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for example, used the designation 'unnatural offences' to group together a number of offences that regulated male same-sex (and other) sexual acts, including buggery, attempted buggery, assault with intent to commit buggery, and indecent assault upon any male person.[24] The offence of buggery encompassed, what would be termed today, both consensual and non-consensual sexual acts and, in 1829,[25] consent provided adult men who had engaged together in such acts with no defence to a charge because, as Coke put it, both 'the agent and consentient are felons'.[26]

Four months after the War Office Circular was issued, Parliament expanded provisions in the Mutiny Act 1830 relating to disgraceful conduct which more explicitly

[20]General Orders, 9 December 1809, reported in Robert Bisset Scott, *The Military Law of England, With All the Principal Authorities [Etc.]*, (London: T. Goddard, 1810), pp. 33 and 35. The term 'unnatural propensities' was used again in a Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of 18 July 1850 relating to the use of corporal punishment. George D'Aguilar, *Observations on the Practice and the Forms of District, Regimental, and Detachment Courts Martial*, (Dublin: The University Press, 1865), p. 19.

[21]Edward Coke, *The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England*, (London: W. Clarke and Sons, 1817), p. 58.

[22]From the time of an Act of 1533, English law criminalised the 'detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast' (25 Hen. 8 c. 6, An Acte for the punysshement of the vice of Buggerie) and this was progressively interpreted by the courts which, over time, led to certain acts being included within, or excluded from, the ambit of the law. By the late 20th century, buggery was generally formulated as 'sexual intercourse per anum by a man with a man or a woman, or per anum or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal' (*Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom* (1981), series A, no. 45, para. 14). For a history of the offence see: Paul Johnson, 'Buggery and Parliament, 1533-2017', *Parliamentary History*, 38, issue 3 (2019), pp. 325-341.

[23]13 Cha. 2 St. 1 c. 9 (An Act for the establishing Articles and Orders for the regulating and better Government of his Majesties Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea), s. 32.

[24]Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 61-62.

[25]9 Geo. 4 c. 31 (An Act for consolidating and amending the Statutes in England relative to Offences against the Person), s. 15.

[26]Coke, *The Third Part of the Institutes*, p. 59.

specified the scope of the offence. The legislation provided that a soldier could be convicted and punished for, in addition to certain enumerated acts, 'any other disgraceful conduct, being of a cruel, indecent, unnatural, felonious, or fraudulent nature'.[27] This 'any other disgraceful conduct' limb of the offence can be seen as a general, catch-all provision. Moreover, the specific provision made for dealing with 'indecent' and 'unnatural' conduct can be seen as capable of regulating a wide range of sexual acts, including consensual acts between adult men, that, if committed today, would be lawful. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Act of 1830 did not reproduce the language of the War Office Circular relating to 'indecent assaults' but, instead, employed the more general term 'indecent' which, arguably, was capable of capturing disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind that did not amount to assault.

The general provision on disgraceful conduct of a 'cruel, indecent, unnatural, felonious, or fraudulent nature' remained in the Mutiny Acts only until 1833. The Mutiny Act 1833 removed the reference to 'felonious' or 'fraudulent' conduct from the 'any other disgraceful conduct' limb of the provision.[28] This left in place a general, catch-all provision covering 'any other disgraceful conduct, being of a cruel, indecent, or unnatural kind'[29] and this endured in the Mutiny Acts until 1860 – although the whole provision on disgraceful conduct was repositioned in the Mutiny Acts from 1847 onwards under a new heading relating specifically to forfeiture of pay and pension by sentence of court martial.[30]

By 1849, it was clear that the administration of the offence of disgraceful conduct was causing some problems. A Circular Memorandum of that year stated that the term disgraceful conduct 'should never be employed in framing charges, except in relation to those offences strictly contemplated by the Mutiny Act and Articles of War' because it was 'evident' that 'indiscriminate use of the term tends to weaken its moral

[27]11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4 c. 7 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 9. Separate provision on disgraceful conduct was also made from 1830 in respect of the Royal Marines (11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4 c. 8, An Act for the Regulation of His Majesty's Royal Marine Forces while on Shore) and from 1840 in respect of the East Indies (3 & 4 Vict. c. 37, An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws for punishing Mutiny and Desertion of Officers and Soldiers in the Service of the East India Company [etc]).
[28]3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 5 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion; and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 9.
[29]Ibid.
[30]10 & 11 Vict. c. 12 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 28. See also: s. 33 and s. 34 of this Act.

effect'.[31] A further Circular Memorandum in 1851 stated that doubts had arisen about the legality of trying soldiers by court martial for disgraceful conduct in respect of 'any offence amounting to actual felony' and that, whilst the Attorney and Solicitor General had found that such offences could be tried and punished by courts martial, officers in command should bear in mind that 'the proper tribunals to deal with this class of offences are the Civil Courts'.[32] The Circular Memorandum added that courts martial should only deal with such cases when 'the Civil Authorities may decline or omit to prosecute' or when circumstances 'render it difficult to bring the case' before the civil courts.[33]

The Mutiny Act 1860 omitted the provisions previously in force relating to disgraceful conduct, leaving in place only an explicit provision in respect of the power to inflict corporal punishment for disgraceful conduct.[34] Explicit provision on the acts covered by disgraceful conduct was now confined to the Articles of War.[35] The legal framework in place in 1860 provides a good illustration of the potential complexity of dealing with same-sex sexual acts committed by a soldier during this period. For example, dealing with a case of buggery (a felony punishable by death under the civil law[36]) would have brought into play a provision in the Articles of War that required, in respect of an accusation of certain crimes (including capital crimes, and offences against the person), relevant officers, upon application, to use their utmost endeavours to deliver the accused person to the civil magistrate.[37] The courts martial did have jurisdiction to deal with such offences, as civil offences, in places beyond the seas (either in or outside

[31]Circular Memorandum Horse Guards, 19 November 1849, in D'Aguilar, *Observations*, p. 39.

[32]Circular Memorandum Horse Guards, 29 November 1851, in A Brevet Major, *Charges and Penalties with Reference to the Mutiny Act and Articles of War*, (Bombay: Bombay Education Society's Press, 1852), pp. xvii-xviii.

[33]Ibid., p. xviii.

[34]23 & 24 Vict. c. 9 (An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 22. The Marine Mutiny Acts continued to make explicit provision for the acts covered by disgraceful conduct.

[35]*Rules and Articles for the Better Government of Her Majesty's Army, from 25 April 1860*, published by Her Majesty's Command, (London: George E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1860), art. 84-88.

[36]9 Geo. 4 c. 31 (An Act for consolidating and amending the Statutes in England relative to Offences against the Person), s. 15. The last execution in England for a civil offence of buggery was in 1835, and the crime ceased to be capital in 1861.

[37]*Rules and Articles for the Better Government of Her Majesty's Army, from 25 April 1860*, art. 18. See also: Mutiny Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 9, An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion, and for the better Payment of the Army and their Quarters), s. 75, which made provision for the ordinary course of criminal justice not to be interfered with.

of the dominions) where, because there was either no civil judicature or court of civil judicature in force, they could not be tried in an ordinary criminal court.[38] Moreover, same-sex sexual acts determined not to be within the purview of the criminal courts, but nevertheless deemed to be 'indecent' and/or 'unnatural', could have been proceeded against as disgraceful conduct, for which the courts martial had jurisdiction.[39]

Although Parliament was provided with regular information during this period on the prosecution and punishment of soldiers for disgraceful conduct, it is not possible to discern from parliamentary records alone the extent to which this covered sexual acts involving adult men that would, by today's standards, be deemed consensual. The information provided to Parliament on the number of soldiers prosecuted and punished for disgraceful conduct often contained no details about the nature of the conduct constituting the offence and, as such, did not differentiate indecent or unnatural offences from other offences.[40] Where details were given that indicate an offence concerned indecent or unnatural conduct, it is not possible to know if the offence involved same-sex sexual acts or whether any acts would, by today's standards, be deemed lawful.

Parliamentary records do, for example, show instances of individuals in the Army being punished for 'unnatural crime',[41] 'disgraceful conduct (attempt to commit sodomy)',[42] 'disgraceful conduct (an indecent assault on the person of private John McDougall)',[43]

[38]*Rules and Articles for the Better Government of Her Majesty's Army, from 25 April 1860*, art. 146-148.

[39]Ibid., art. 86. Same-sex sexual acts could also have been dealt with under the provision on 'scandalous behaviour of an officer' (ibid., art. 84). Moreover, a general provision (ibid., art. 109) allowed the courts martial to deal with 'all crimes not capital' and, depending on the 'nature and degree of the offence', this potentially also covered certain same-sex sexual acts.

[40]For example, see data on soldiers belonging to regiments and depots in Great Britain and Ireland convicted and punished for disgraceful conduct. House of Commons Papers, *Returns of Punishments in Royal Marines, Royal Artillery and Army, 1831-37*, 1837-38, XXXVII.151, p. 153.

[41]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Persons flogged in Army of Great Britain and Ireland: 1854-55*, 1857 Session 1, IX.201, p. 201.

[42]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Persons flogged in Army of Great Britain and Ireland: 1856*, 1857-58, XXXVII.307, p. 308.

[43]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Soldiers undergoing Punishment in Military Prison of Gibraltar*, 1861, XXXVI.385, p. 396.

'indecent conduct',[44] and 'disgraceful conduct, and unnatural crime'.[45] Moreover, such records provide details of the number of individuals in the Army tried by the civil powers for 'indecent offences' which included 'unnatural offences',[46] and the number imprisoned for civil and military offences including 'sodomy', 'attempted sodomy' and 'indecent assault'.[47] However, from these records alone, it is not possible to know whether the conduct constituting any offence involved, what would be considered today, consensual same-sex sexual acts between adult men. Some parliamentary records invite speculation – such as the record of a soldier imprisoned in 1872 for 'Disgraceful conduct in allowing an indecent assault to be committed on him', with its notable inclusion of the word 'allowing'[48] – but, ultimately, it is not possible to know from such records either the nature of the conduct constituting the offence or whether such conduct would be an offence today.

What parliamentary records do tell us is that disgraceful conduct was regarded as one of the 'gravest offences'[49] and that it was regularly prosecuted and punished. In 1878, for example, a total of 1042 offences of disgraceful conduct were tried by the courts martial – 605 at home, and 437 abroad.[50] Parliament was informed in 1878 that the offence of disgraceful conduct was 'mostly' used to deal with 'petty thefts and acts of that description which one soldier commits towards another',[51] but it was also made aware that the offence was used to deal with more serious indecent or unnatural conduct. The following exchange in a Select Committee in 1878, on the meaning of the terms indecent and unnatural in the offence of disgraceful conduct, suggests an awareness of how the offence related to the unnatural (civil) offence of buggery:

> Sir H. Thring (Government Draftsman): The 'indecent or unnatural' kind [of conduct covered by the offence of disgraceful conduct] of course explains itself.

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[44]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Persons flogged in Army and Militia: 1863-65 (Number of Men marked with Letters D. or B.C.)*, 1866, XLI.453, p. 454 and 462.
[45]House of Commons Papers, *Return of subsequent Conduct of Men in H.M. Military Forces subjected to Punishment by Lash*, 1866, XLI.413, p. 425.
[46]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Non Commissioned Officers and Men serving with Army at Home tried by Civil Power, 1870-75*, 1876, XLIII.803, p. 803.
[47]House of Commons Papers, *Return of Number of Soldiers under Punishment for Civil or Military Offences in Prisons, 1869-75*, 1876, XLIII.605. Several entries also record 'sodomy and bestiality'.
[48]Ibid., p. 756.
[49]House of Commons Papers, *Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, Report (Army), Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index*, 1850, X.1, q. 2543.
[50]*General Annual Return of British Army: 1878*, 1878-79, C. 2435, p. 33, table 32.
[51]House of Commons Papers, *Select Committee on Mutiny and Marine Mutiny Acts, Report, Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index*, 1878, X.253, q. 793.

> Chairman: If that means an unnatural offence it seems very extraordinary that the military punishment of it should be of so very different a character from the civil punishment of it; but I should imagine that it means something less than that?
>
> Sir H. Thring: I presume that it means something less than the actual offence.[52]

This exchange can be seen to show that disgraceful conduct was understood as an offence that could be used to deal with conduct that fell short of the full civil offence of buggery. There may be a temptation to infer from this exchange that what is being described is the regulation of a wide range of sexual acts, including consensual sexual acts, committed between men. In part, that may be true, but it is important to remember that the designation 'unnatural offence' covered a range of conduct that included sexual acts committed between people, as well as sexual acts committed by people with other animals.[53] It is therefore not possible to know the extent to which parliamentarians in this period would have perceived, what we would now call, consensual sexual acts between adult men as distinct from other conduct captured by the term 'unnatural offence'. Any debates in Parliament during this period about what we would now call 'homosexuality' – a word not recorded in a parliamentary debate until 1937,[54] when its speaker noted that it was 'a matter which is almost foreign' to Parliament[55] – was framed in largely euphemistic terms where, in place of specific details about sexual conduct, words such as indecent and unnatural were used.[56]

[52]House of Commons Papers, *Select Committee on Mutiny and Marine Mutiny Acts, Report, Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index*, 1878, X.253, q. 793-794. The Select Committee was considering a draft Bill that proposed that the punishment of disgraceful conduct should be any punishment not exceeding imprisonment (cl. 23), and the proposed maximum term of imprisonment was two years (cl. 46) (ibid., pp. 418 and 421). It is reasonable to assume that the 'very extraordinary' difference referred to by the Chairman is the difference between the proposed military punishment and the then punishment for the offence of buggery – designated an unnatural offence – which was penal servitude for life or for any term not less than ten years (Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 61).

[53]See 'Unnatural Offences' in Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 61-63.

[54]HL Deb 28 June 1937 vol. 105 col. 829. The word 'homosexual' is first recorded in HC Deb 4 August 1921 vol. 145 col. 1800.

[55]Lord Dawson of Penn, HL Deb 7 July 1937 vol. 106 col. 144.

[56]For a discussion see: Leslie J. Moran, *The Homosexual(ity) of Law*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

Consolidation and harmonization: 1879 to 1966

Parliament consolidated and harmonised the Mutiny Act and Articles of War in the Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879.[57] This brought back into parliamentary legislation the explicit provisions regulating 'disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent, or unnatural kind'.[58] Parliament set the maximum punishment for disgraceful conduct as imprisonment for two years.[59]

An important feature of the Act of 1879 is that it simplified the approach to the prosecution of civil offences committed by those subject to military law. The Act gave the courts martial jurisdiction to deal with any offence which was punishable by the law of England.[60] Although exceptions to this applied to a certain class of offences (treason, murder, manslaughter, treason-felony, and rape) the Act made clear that civil offences, such as buggery, were within the jurisdiction of the courts martial.[61] When a person was found guilty of a civil offence (other than the certain class of offences previously mentioned) by a court martial they were liable either to be punished in accordance with provisions in the Act of 1879 relating to conduct to prejudice of military discipline (a term of up to two years of imprisonment)[62] or in accordance with the punishment assigned for an offence by the law of England.[63]

The Act of 1879 was replaced by the Army Act 1881, but the provisions relating to 'disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent, or unnatural kind' remained the same.[64] The Act of 1881, like the Act of 1879, grouped together a wide range of offences under

[57]The final Mutiny Act of 1878 was temporarily continued (by the Mutiny Act (Temporary) Continuance Act 1879) until the Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879 came into force.

[58]Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879, s. 18(5). This Act extended to the Royal Marines in certain circumstances; provisions relating to 'disgraceful conduct, being of a cruel, indecent, or unnatural kind' in the Marine Mutiny Acts had endured until the final Marine Mutiny Act 1878.

[59]Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879, s. 18 and s. 44 (see also: Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Act 1881, s. 4 which made provision for summary punishment of a soldier on active service for an offence of disgraceful conduct under the Act of 1879).

[60]Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879, s. 41.

[61]The jurisdiction of the courts martial was, in this respect, subject to provisions in the Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879 that prevented interference with the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

[62]Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879, s. 40. This was the maximum punishment for soldiers; the maximum punishment for officers was cashiering.

[63]Army Discipline and Regulation Act 1879, s. 41(5).

[64]Army Act 1881, s. 18(5).

the heading 'disgraceful conduct of soldier' but, as one contemporary commentator observed, only a charge relating to 'cruel, indecent, or unnatural' conduct should have included the words 'disgraceful conduct' because those words were only explicitly applied by the Act to that specific conduct.[65] The Act of 1881, like the Act of 1879, also gave the courts martial jurisdiction in respect of any civil offence.[66]

In 1885, Parliament created the civil offence of 'outrages on decency' which criminalised any male person who, in public or private, committed, or was a party to the commission of, or procured or attempted to procure the commission by any male person of, 'any act of gross indecency with another male person'.[67] This offence provided an encompassing statutory framework to regulate, what contemporary commentators termed,

> men [who] have been guilty of filthy practices together, which have not been sufficiently public to have constituted indecent exposure, or which have not had sufficiently direct connection with a more abominable crime to allow of an indictment for conspiring or for soliciting one another to commit an unnatural offence.[68]

In other words, the offence of gross indecency expanded provisions in the statute law regulating consensual same-sex sexual acts between adult men in private.[69] The offence of disgraceful conduct had long empowered the military authorities to regulate 'indecent' acts committed by soldiers and the maximum punishment for that offence – imprisoned for a term not exceeding two years[70] – was the same as the civil offence of gross indecency.

Seven decades passed following the enactment of the Act of 1881 until Parliament next considered substantially changing the legislation that provided for the discipline

[65]Major F. Cochran, *A Handy Text-Book on Military Law*, (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1884), p. 22.
[66]Army Act 1881, s. 41.
[67]Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, s. 11.
[68]Frederick Mead, and A.H. Bodkin, *The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 with Introduction, Notes, and Index*, (London: Shaw and Sons, 1885), p. 69.
[69]For a discussion of the extent to which s.11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 widened the scope of statute law in respect of regulating consensual sexual acts committed between adult men in private see: H.G. Cocks, *Nameless Offences: Homosexual Desire in the Nineteenth Century*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Paul Johnson and Robert M. Vanderbeck, *Law, Religion and Homosexuality*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 37.
[70] Army Act 1881, s. 18 and s. 44.

and regulation of the Army. As a consequence of the significant social changes that had taken place during that period of time, parliamentary discussions of the regulation of homosexuality by service discipline law became much more detailed and candid. This is illustrated by, for example, a discussion in the Select Committee dealing with a proposed new Army Act, in 1953, regarding the need for and scope of the clause relating to disgraceful conduct, which was proposed to be pared back to deal only with conduct of a cruel, indecent and unnatural kind.[71] Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth McLean explained the need for the offence:

> From the purely Army point of view, we have these men in a monastic community. Naturally these indecent offences loom much larger than in civil life when you get soldiers all boxed up with their own kind, and we must stamp on this the moment it is found. You may not be able to produce all the requisite evidence you need for these rather technical offences under civil law. Out in the desert you do not know the details of the civil law, but you must have something so that you can pounce upon this sort of offence at once.[72]

Mr. Sée (Parliamentary Counsel) elaborated that the offence was necessary to 'hit cases where there was consent, and it is particularly wanted for the case which is not grave enough to amount to gross indecency, and where there is consent and yet nevertheless it must be stopped'.[73] Clearly, therefore, a chief concern was to retain a catch-all provision capable of dealing with same-sex sexual acts that may not amount to an offence under civil law, or be too difficult to prosecute under civil law. That this provision was intended to apply to sexual acts committed between women[74] demonstrates that it was considered appropriate to regulate in certain circumstances, what Mr. Wyatt MP called, 'such things [that] are not punished by the civil law'.[75]

Much of the discussion in the Select Committee was focused on the issue of abusive and coercive same-sex sexual acts, including acts committed against individuals under sixteen years old.[76] In this respect, Mr. Nield MP distinguished between two kinds of offence: 'the older man who seduces the boy and two grown up persons'.[77] There was also discussion of the difference between, what Mr. Paget MP called, persons 'born

[71]House of Commons Papers, *Report from the Select Committee on the Army Act and Air Force Act together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of the evidence and appendices*, 1952-53, III.633.
[72]Ibid., q. 600.
[73]Ibid., q. 601.
[74]Ibid., q. 606.
[75]Ibid., q. 607.
[76]Ibid., q. 602.
[77]Ibid., q. 614.

unnatural and others natural'.[78] These discussions led one member of the Select Committee, Mr. Harvey MP, to argue that there were 'three very clear categories' of cases of same-sex sexual activity:

> The first is the purely medical case. Then there are those offences between senior and junior in rank, and possibly in age. Then there are the cases where the normal sex impulse is not having its natural expression. It seems to me there are three very clear categories in which there should certainly be a difference in treatment in terms of punishment.[79]

Similarly, Mr. Paget MP felt that the offence and its punishment should distinguish between cases involving a 'senior and junior in rank' and 'two equals'.[80]

As a consequence of this debate about the appropriateness of the offence and its scope – which touched upon the extent to which 'psychiatry and medical treatment' should be employed to deal with same-sex sexual conduct[81] – the Select Committee referred the matter to the Departmental Committee which, in due course, produced a Memorandum that can be seen as one of the earliest official justifications for the offence of disgraceful conduct to deal with 'homosexual' acts.[82] In the Memorandum, the Departmental Committee sought to address three questions: first, whether some distinction could be made between different types of disgraceful conduct cases, for example between 'the true pervert and the person guilty only of a single offence'; secondly, whether the punishment for such offences should be kept as imprisonment not exceeding two years; and thirdly, whether treatment could be arranged for offenders.[83] The Departmental Committee reached the conclusion that it should be left to administrative action by the Army to ensure that the 'psychiatric aspects' of each case were taken into account when sentencing, in order to decide whether to 'discharge the accused who is a true pervert' or provide 'treatment either while the soldier is serving his sentence or while he is under suspended sentence'.[84] It was noted, however, that 'many soldiers who indulge in homosexual practices, such as those who do so when deprived of an opportunity for normal sexual relationships, are not in need of psychiatric treatment'.[85] The Departmental Committee stated that in 1951

[78]Ibid., q. 611.
[79]Ibid.
[80]Ibid., q. 616.
[81]Ibid., Mr. Hutchison MP, q. 616.
[82]Ibid., Annex 36 (M.45 (1952-53)) Memorandum by the Departmental Committee on offences of an indecent or unnatural kind.
[83]Ibid., p. 1138.
[84]Ibid., p. 1140.
[85]Ibid., p. 1139.

and 1952 there had been a total of approximately 250 convictions of offences of an indecent or unnatural kind, but no information was given as to the nature of the conduct constituting any of the offences.[86] The Departmental Committee stated:

> From the disciplinary point of view, it is essential in the Services that all offences of an indecent or unnatural kind should be dealt with swiftly, and that in most cases they should be dealt with severely. Any appearance of leniency might lead it to be believed that such offences are not regarded seriously by the Authorities.[87]

When the Select Committee considered the Memorandum, Mr. Paget MP remained unconvinced about the offence of disgraceful conduct on the grounds that the Army 'have the civilian law' and asked '[w]hat is the offence which should be punished in the Army and which should not be punished in civilian life?'[88] Mr. Cahn (Assistant Judge Advocate-General) replied:

> … the civil law is so complicated. Although you probably could get a person in all indecency cases if you charged the right offence, and if the evidence was cleverly led and it was cleverly argued by Counsel, it is really thought in cases of this kind it is necessary for the military to have a simple offence which alleges indecency.[89]

It is clear, therefore, from this and other aspects of the Select Committee discussion that what the Army desired to retain was a provision to deal with the widest possible range of sexual activity, including activity that may not amount to an offence under civil law or would be too difficult to prosecute under civil law. The arguments that the offence of disgraceful conduct was necessary to regulate abusive and coercive sexual acts because civil law provisions proved problematic in the military context, and was required to deal with situations in which 'vice spreads widely' – for example, in the context of a 'barrack room' in which '[o]nce you get it started … you get the whole lot corrupted'[90] – ultimately persuaded the Select Committee that the offence should be retained. None of the concerns expressed in the Select Committee about the need to differentiate between types of offences – such as those involving conduct between adult men that were characterised as consensual – prevailed and retaining the offence was recommend.[91]

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[86]Ibid. It was noted that 'all serious cases of this kind are charged as civil offences'.
[87]Ibid.
[88]Ibid., q. 2005.
[89]Ibid., q. 2007.
[90]Ibid., q. 615, Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth McLean.
[91]Ibid., p. 651.

The Army Act 1955 contained the offence of 'disgraceful conduct of a cruel, indecent or unnatural kind'[92] and identical provision was made for the Royal Air Force.[93] In 1956, proposals were made to include in naval law a provision on disgraceful conduct similar to the Army provision, 'to cover immoral or dirty acts contrary to nature which, owing to the circumstances in which they are committed, do not amount to offences under the criminal law'.[94] The original proposal was to create a naval offence covering 'any disgraceful conduct of an indecent or unnatural kind'[95] but the Select Committee considering this heard concerns regarding the inclusion of the word 'unnatural' which, it was said, would problematically allow 'homosexuality' to be dealt with under this provision.[96] Naval law (unlike Army law) had made specific provision for offences of buggery (sodomy) since 1661[97] and, in the context of a draft Bill that proposed to remove this specific provision,[98] there was a concern that including the word unnatural in the offence of disgraceful conduct would create an overlap with those unnatural offences dealt with under civil law provisions.[99] A specific concern was that this would allow homosexual acts to be dealt with summarily under the disgraceful conduct provision rather than as (more serious) civil offences.[100] This concern was in stark contrast to the view expressed on the Army in the 1953 Select Committee, discussed above, where it was argued that the offence of disgraceful conduct was necessary because of stated inadequacies in the operation and application of the civil law in the military context.

The Select Committee engaged in an extensive consideration of the meaning of the word unnatural which, the Chairman noted, was used in the Army Act and intended

[92]Army Act 1955, s. 66. This offence extended to any person subject to military law, in contrast to previous enactments that limited the offence to soldiers.
[93]Air Force Act 1955, s. 66.
[94]House of Commons Papers, *Report from the Select Committee on the Naval Discipline Act together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and appendices*, 1955-56, IX.489, p. 625.
[95]Ibid., p. 950.
[96]Ibid., q. 990-991.
[97]13 Cha. 2 St. 1 c. 9 (An Act for the establishing Articles and Orders for the regulating and better Government of his Majesties Navies, Ships of War, and Forces by Sea), s. 32.
[98]See the justification for removing specific provision for sodomy in respect of civil offences. House of Commons Papers, *Report from the Select Committee on the Naval Discipline Act together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and appendices*, 1955-56, IX.489, p. 626.
[99]Ibid., q. 990.
[100]Ibid., q. 991 and 1000.

to refer to 'homosexual acts'.[101] Mr. Montagu (Judge Advocate of the Fleet) thought that retaining the word 'unnatural' was important because 'every indecent offence which can be committed on a ship is almost certain to be homosexual', because no female personnel were present, and '[w]e ought not to risk its being construed differently from the Army Act, because any indecent offence in a ship is almost certain to be "unnatural"'.[102] In contrast, Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett MP stated:

> … I do press strongly for the omission of 'unnatural'. I should have thought that the clause was quite strong enough to meet our purposes if it simply said 'disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind'. If that clause had existed in the Naval Discipline Act when I was Captain of a ship, I would have made use of it in what I consider to be minor cases of unnatural vice, in order to save the trouble of applying for a court martial.[103]

These discussions demonstrate how the terms 'indecent' and 'unnatural' were used to denote particular homosexual acts and the strong concern to ensure the most robust regulation of such acts. Upon enactment, the offence of disgraceful conduct in the Naval Discipline Act 1957 was limited to 'conduct of an indecent kind'.[104] However, in 1971, following the partial decriminalization of male homosexual acts (discussed below), which meant that these acts could (to the extent they had been decriminalised) no longer be tried under service law as civil offences, Parliament amended the disgraceful conduct offence in the Naval Discipline Act 1957 to correspond with the provision in the Army Act 1955 and, by including the word unnatural, made clear that conduct classified as such could continue to be tried as a service discipline offence.[105]

Decriminalisation of homosexual acts: 1967 to 1992 (and beyond)

In 1967, consensual homosexual acts between men (buggery and gross indecency) ceased to be an offence in England and Wales if committed in private by two people of or over the age of 21 years.[106] This legislative change had a considerable impact on Army and other service law. Until 1967, homosexual acts committed by armed forces personnel could be prosecuted under either civil or service law, and as civil offences under service law. Following the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 1967,

[101]Ibid., q. 993.
[102]Ibid., q. 997-999.
[103]Ibid., q. 990.
[104]Naval Discipline Act 1957, s. 37.
[105]Armed Forces Act 1971, s. 31. For a discussion see: House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill [Lords]*, 1970-71, l.175, q. 361.
[106]Sexual Offences Act 1967, s. 1(1).

homosexual acts, of a kind decriminalised in England and Wales, that were committed by Army or other service personnel could no longer be prosecuted as civil offences under service law. This meant that the Army was, for the first time, entirely reliant upon its own service discipline offences – such as disgraceful conduct – to prosecute such acts. By virtue of special provision made in the Act of 1967, the Army remained free to prosecute and punish individuals under service discipline offences, such as disgraceful conduct, for engaging in consensual same-sex sexual acts that were no longer a criminal offence for civilians.[107]

Retaining the jurisdiction of the Army and other branches of the armed forces to prosecute homosexual conduct that was no longer a criminal offence was proposed by the 'Wolfenden Report' in 1957.[108] The Wolfenden Report, which proposed the partial decriminalization of male homosexual acts, stated:

> We recognise that within services and establishments whose members are subject to a disciplinary régime it may be necessary … to regard homosexual behaviour, even by consenting adults in private, as an offence. For instance, if our recommendations are accepted, a serving soldier over twenty-one who commits a homosexual act with a consenting adult partner in private will cease to be guilty of a civil offence … The service authorities may nevertheless consider it necessary to retain Section 66 of the [Army] Act (which provides for the punishment of, *inter alia*, disgraceful conduct of an indecent or unnatural kind) on the ground that it is essential, in the services, to treat as offences certain types of conduct which may not amount to offences under the civil code.[109]

When the first of several Bills was introduced in Parliament to give effect to the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report relating to homosexual acts in private,[110] there was considerable concern about its impact on service law. A chief anxiety was that the legislation would reduce the scope of the offence of disgraceful conduct which, it was noted, 'ensures that homosexual behaviour, even with consulting [sic] adults, is dealt with by court martial'.[111] Viscount Dilhorne expressed 'without the slightest doubt' that decriminalising male homosexual acts in civilian life would lead to individuals who were prosecuted for disgraceful conduct saying 'it is not an offence

[107] Sexual Offences Act 1967, s. 1(5).
[108] Home Office, Scottish Home Department, *Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution*, 1957, Cmnd. 247.
[109] Ibid., para. 144.
[110] HL Deb 13 May 1965 vol. 266 col. 268.
[111] Baroness Gaitskell, HL Deb 24 May 1965 vol. 266 col. 685.

for me to do it'.[112] On this basis, Viscount Dilhorne unsuccessfully attempted to amend the Bill so that the provisions it made to decriminalise homosexual acts did 'not operate at all in relation to any members of the Armed Forces' and, as a consequence, would permit them to be tried for criminal offences that had been decriminalised for civilians.[113] Parliament, instead, decided that special provision should be made in the Bill to ensure that the partial decriminalization of homosexual acts 'shall not prevent an act from being an offence (other than a civil offence) under any provision of the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 or the Naval Discipline Act 1957'.[114] The Lord Chancellor confirmed that this would preserve the ability of the armed forces to continue to prosecute individuals under service discipline offences for engaging in conduct that would cease to be an offence for civilians.[115]

In 1966, the Select Committee examining the Armed Forces Bill considered the extent of homosexual offences committed by members of the armed forces. No mention was made of the Army, but it was stated that there were 'quite a lot' of offences in the Royal Navy,[116] and a 'very constant problem' in the Royal Air Force.[117] In light of proposals to decriminalise consensual homosexual acts in private for civilians, the Select Committee was told that 'discipline would be very adversely affected if it could not be treated as an offence' in the armed forces.[118] Although the Sexual Offences Act 1967 did preserve the ability of the armed forces to prosecute homosexual conduct that was no longer a criminal offence for civilians, the punishment of those convicted was limited to the maximum available sentence allowed by service law – which, for disgraceful conduct in the Army, was imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.[119] However, it is notable that, four years after the Sexual Offences Act 1967 was enacted, when the Select Committee examining the Armed Forces Bill asked witnesses whether that Act had changed the sentences awarded for homosexual offences under service law, it was told '[b]roadly speaking I understand not',[120] and '[n]o, we are dealing with them exactly as before'.[121]

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[112]HL Deb 24 May 1965 vol. 266 col. 707.
[113]HL Deb 21 June 1965 vol. 267 cols. 350-352.
[114]HL Deb 16 July 1965 vol. 268 col. 431. Enacted as Sexual Offences Act 1967, s. 1(5).
[115]HL Deb 16 July 1965 vol. 268 cols. 435-436.
[116]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill together with the proceedings of the committee minutes of evidence and appendices*, 1966-67, X.39, q. 448, Rear-Admiral Woodifield.
[117]Ibid., q. 450, Air Commodore Allen Jones.
[118]Ibid.
[119]Army Act 1955, s. 66 (upon enactment).
[120]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill [Lords]*, 1970-71, I.175, q. 362, Mr. Kent (Deputy Under-Secretary of State).
[121]Ibid., Captain Jobling (Chief Naval Judge Advocate).

In 1981, the Select Committee examining the Armed Forces Bill gave extensive consideration to the continuing regulation of consensual same-sex sexual acts committed by members of the armed forces. The Select Committee requested data on homosexual offences and was informed that, in respect of the Army, 29 servicemen in 1979, and 31 servicemen in 1980 had been convicted of such offences.[122] The Select Committee also considered a Memorandum from the Campaign for Homosexual Equality which argued that the special provision in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 allowing consensual homosexual acts to be prosecuted as service discipline offences should be repealed.[123] The Select Committee was divided on this issue and eventually rejected a proposal to recommend that the Service Discipline Acts be amended to provide that homosexual acts should not be offences unless the conduct can be shown to be prejudicial to good order and discipline, and that the special provision made in the Act of 1967 for the armed forces be repealed.[124] The Select Committee reached the conclusion that, although it found the official argument that legalising homosexuality in the armed forces would make homosexuals more open to blackmail 'at best a poor one', it accepted the submission by the Services that 'the tolerance of homosexual practices might erode the trust and confidence within and between all ranks on which the successful operation of the forces depends'.[125]

When the Armed Forces Bill was re-committed to the House of Commons from the Select Committee a further attempt was made to prevent prosecutions for homosexual acts (that were legal for civilians) as service discipline offences unless the conduct could be shown to be prejudicial to good order and discipline, and repeal the special provision in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 relating to the armed forces.[126] In moving an amendment to the Bill to achieve this, Mr. Davidson MP argued:

> I do not wish to initiate a major debate on homosexuality. I certainly do not want to go into the argument whether legalising homosexual acts makes those who indulge in them more or less vulnerable to blackmail. Neither do I seek to

[122]This includes convictions by court martial, summary hearings and the civil courts. Data were also provided for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill. Together with the proceedings of the committee. Minutes of evidence and appendices*, 1980-81, HC 253, p. 81.
[123]Ibid., p. 84.
[124]Ibid., p. xvi-xvii. The Select Committee divided Ayes, 2 and Noes, 3.
[125]Ibid., p. viii.
[126]HC Deb 19 May 1981 vol. 5 col. 249.

> bring Armed Forces lawfully into line with the law in general. I seek merely to cure a massive injustice and a blatant act of discrimination.[127]

The amendment was not approved, Parliament being persuaded by the argument that 'the need for absolute trust and confidence both within and between all ranks, require that the potentially disruptive influence of homosexual practices should be excluded'.[128]

The Memorandum that had been submitted by the Campaign for Homosexual Equality to the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill in 1981 was part of a broader and long-standing campaign to address discrimination against and ill-treatment of gay people serving in the armed forces. This campaign was aided by a number of media considerations of the issue which brought it more into public view.[129] For example, national newspaper coverage was given to '[f]our private soldiers serving in the Army's Eastern District' who were to 'face court martial for alleged homosexuality' after being charged with 'disgraceful conduct of an indecent nature'.[130] Following the conviction of the four soldiers for disgraceful conduct, the Campaign for Homosexual Equality and the National Council for Civil Liberties stated that 'nothing remotely like these cases could have been brought if the men had been civilians'.[131] Press attention was also given to John Bruce, a Campaign for Homosexual Equality member, who had been convicted of disgraceful conduct and discharged from the Army in consequence of having same-sex relationships, and who was bringing a case under the European Convention on Human Rights.[132] That case, which was unsuccessful,[133] also attracted the attention of the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill.[134]

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[127]Ibid.

[128]Mr. Goodhart MP, HC Deb 19 May 1981 vol. 5 col. 251.

[129]For a discussion see: Nigel Warner, 'Peter Ashman Memorial Archive: Notes on CHE law reform archive (1973-1990)', unpublished draft obtained from author.

[130]'Homosexuality charges', *The Times*, 6 August 1981, p. 3.

[131]Campaign for Homosexual Equality, 'CHE protests as soldiers are jailed: "Suspicion is enough," says Minister', *Broadsheet: a Monthly Report from National CHE*, 1 Nov 1981, p. 3.

[132]'Ministry defends Forces bar on homosexuals', *The Times*, 15 April 1981, p. 4.

[133]For a consideration of this case see: Paul Johnson, *Going to Strasbourg: An Oral History of Sexual Orientation Discrimination and the European Convention on Human Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 31-32.

[134]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill. Together with the proceedings of the committee. Minutes of evidence and appendices*, 1980-81, HC 253, q. 280.

In 1981, Parliament was informed that over the five years to the end of 1980 there were 137 discharges from the Army of servicemen following conviction for 'homosexual misconduct', and 95 soldiers had been given custodial sentences before discharge.[135] Information was not provided about the number of these cases which would not have involved a criminal offence if the conduct in question had taken place between civilians. In the same period, 138 servicemen and 175 servicewomen had been administratively discharged from the Army on the grounds of homosexuality without any disciplinary proceedings having been taken.[136] By 1985, further information provided to Parliament on the Army suggested a decline in cases involving homosexual conduct being prosecuted in the courts martial (41 cases in 1981, compared to 9 cases in 1984) while the number of administrative discharges (258 cases between 1981 and 1984) remained stable.[137]

In 1986, the Select Committee examining the Armed Forces Bill received detailed submissions from the Campaign for Homosexual Equality, the National Council for Civil Liberties, and AT EASE (a counselling service) on the subject of the treatment of gay people in the armed forces.[138] The Select Committee gave extensive consideration to the continuing regulation of same-sex sexual acts under service law and considered the following recommendation proposed by Mr. McNamara MP:

> The Ministry [of Defence] witnesses [on homosexuality and the armed forces] displayed muddle, confusion and at times came near to contradicting each other's evidence … The opinions expressed were of 'perceptions of society' which were not substantiated by any solid scientific or sociological research. The contradictions and the apparent denial of natural justice by the Services had not been examined, nor had the possibility that maintaining 'disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind' as a specifically military offence could lead to homosexuals being blackmailed and thus an avoidable security risk created from conduct which in civilian life is not illegal if in private and if the partners are of full age and are consenting. The Committee therefore recommend that homosexual acts should be treated in military law as they are in the ordinary criminal law,

[135]HC Written Answers 16 June 1981 vol. 6 col. 346.
[136]Ibid., cols. 346-347. Statistics are also provided for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.
[137]HC Written Answers 8 March 1985 vol. 74 cols. 624-625. Statistics are also provided for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.
[138]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, Session 1985-86, Together with the proceedings of the committee and the minutes of evidence, with appendices*, 1985-86, HC 170.

> and should only constitute a military offence where they amount to conduct likely to be 'prejudicial to good order and discipline'.[139]

The Select Committee rejected the proposed recommendation,[140] and instead recommended that it would not 'be wise to change the existing law' because the 'existence of sexual relationships between servicemen' would be 'intrinsically liable to generate social and emotional tension of a kind which could only be harmful to morale and military efficiency'.[141]

Witnesses before the Select Committee in 1986 confirmed that the offence of disgraceful conduct was used to regulate the consensual same-sex sexual relationships of members of the armed forces, even when those relationships took place outside of the service environment.[142] In other words, 'a relationship which went off base' could 'amount to disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind'.[143] This was not least because, in some cases, 'one has an admission made by the soldier himself when he has come back'.[144] It was now absolutely clear to Parliament that the offence of disgraceful conduct was being used to prosecute service personnel who were engaged in conduct away from their workplaces (sometimes with civilian partners) which was completely lawful in civilian life. It was on this basis that Lord Graham of Edmonton attempted to amend the Armed Forces Bill to make provision to nullify the special provision in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 that allowed consensual homosexual acts, which were lawful for civilians, to constitute service discipline offences:

> … something which is legal and permissible outside the armed forces – homosexuality between two consenting adults in private – when it takes place between one or two members of the armed forces is held to be disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind. In simple equity, let alone in justice and humanity, I believe that we ought not to tolerate a situation in which that is the law of the land.[145]

This amendment found no support and several members of the House of Lords strongly objected to it on the grounds that, for example, homosexuality was 'like a

[139]Ibid., p. xxxi-xxxii.
[140]Ibid., p. xxxii. The Select Committee divided Ayes, 3 and Noes, 5.
[141]Ibid., p. xi.
[142]Ibid., q. 689-692.
[143]Ibid., q. 691, Mr. Stuart-Smith (Judge Advocate General).
[144]Ibid.
[145]HL Deb 19 May 1986 vol. 475 cols. 38-39.

virus' that 'runs … through the services' and was in need of regulation by military law.[146] Consequently, the law remained unchanged.

In 1991, extensive consideration was again given to the issue of homosexuality by the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill. It was now clear that the number of Army personnel dismissed as a result of a conviction for a service discipline offence in respect of 'homosexual activities' (22 male personnel, between 1987 and 1990) was far lower than the number of Army personnel administratively discharged for such activities (77 male personnel, and 98 female personnel, between 1987 and 1990).[147] As such, the Army was more commonly dismissing personnel for 'homosexual activities' by means of administrative rather that disciplinary action. The Select Committee again received detailed submissions from groups seeking to end discrimination against gay people in the armed forces, including from the recently founded Stonewall Group, members of which appeared before the Select Committee to give oral evidence.[148] Specific information was provided to the Select Committee in respect of the use of service discipline offences to deal with homosexual conduct:

> … under Service law offenders are generally charged under the provisions dealing with disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind, or conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, or possibly (but very rarely) scandalous conduct by officers. I will not say that dismissal is automatic in every case of a prosecution under the Service Discipline Acts, but I will say it is almost certain. To explain that, if there were a fairly minor piece of homosexual activity which perhaps grew out of over-intense horseplay amongst very young men or adolescents, in such a case it might be considered that whatever punishment of presumably a fairly minor nature was visited upon the offenders it would not be necessary to dismiss from the Service if it could be categorised as a transient phase rather than an orientation towards homosexuality.[149]

After extensive consideration, the Select Committee was 'not persuaded that the time has yet come to require the Armed Forces to accept homosexuals or homosexual

[146]Lord Marshall of Leeds, HL Deb 19 May 1986 vol. 475 col. 41.
[147]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and memoranda*, 1990-91, HC 179, Supplementary Memorandum from MoD on Service Personnel dismissed/discharged the Armed Services for homosexual activities, p. 177. Statistics are also provided for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.
[148]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and memoranda*, 1990-91, HC 179, p. 95.
[149]Ibid., Captain Lyons, q. 622.

activity' but, however, that 'we see no reason why Service personnel should be liable to prosecution under Service law for homosexual activity which would be legal in civilian law'.[150] On this basis, the Select Committee recommended that 'homosexual activity of a kind that is legal in civilian law should not constitute an offence under Service law'.[151]

In 1992, the Government announced that the recommendation of the Select Committee had been accepted and that the special provision in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 relating to the armed forces should no longer apply and 'criminal proceedings should no longer be brought'.[152] It was stated that the purpose of this change was to 'tidy up the differences between military and civilian law' and was 'not intended to alter the present disciplinary climate of service life'.[153] The Sexual Offences Act 1967 (and equivalent legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland) was amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to remove the exemption of the armed forces from provisions partially decriminalizing male homosexual acts.[154] The result was 'the removal of the most overt but increasingly irrelevant form of discrimination against homosexuals in the armed forces'.[155] It was 'increasingly irrelevant' because, in the vast majority of cases in which the armed forces successfully took action against a homosexual serviceperson because of their sexual orientation, the serviceperson was administratively discharged without any formal disciplinary charge being laid.[156] Of those personnel that had been administratively discharged from the Army on the grounds of sexual orientation in the four years preceding 1991, over half were women – the armed forces being 'no more lenient of lesbianism than of homosexuality in men'.[157] Indeed, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 made explicit that the changes it made in relation to service discipline offences did not 'prevent a homosexual act (with or without other acts or circumstances) from constituting a ground for discharging a member of Her Majesty's armed forces from the service'.[158] The administrative discharging of armed forces personnel on grounds of sexual orientation

[150]Ibid., p. xiv.
[151]Ibid.
[152]Mr. Aitken MP, HC Deb 17 June 1992 vol. 209 col. 989-990.
[153] Ibid., col. 990.
[154] Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 146-147.
[155]Gerry R. Rubin, 'Section 146 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the "Decriminalization" of Homosexual Acts in the Armed Forces', Crim. L.R. 393, (1996), p. 402.
[156]House of Commons Papers, *Special report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and memoranda*, 1990-91, HC 179, p. xiv.
[157]Ibid.
[158]Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 146(4) and 147(3).

ended in 2000, following successful litigation in the European Court of Human Rights, when the Government announced that 'homosexuality will no longer be a bar to service in Britain's armed forces'.[159] The provisions in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 permitting such discharges were repealed in 2016.[160]

Conclusion: the past, the present and the future

Between 1829 and 1992, Parliament made and maintained legislation that provided the basis for regulating and punishing those in the Army who engaged in same-sex sexual acts that were deemed to be disgraceful conduct of an indecent or unnatural kind. During this period, the disgraceful conduct offence provided a means of regulating same-sex sexual acts that, by today's standards, would be classified as consensual and lawful. After 1967, the offence of disgraceful conduct could still be used to regulate consensual sexual acts committed between adult men of a kind which were by then lawful in civilian life. It is not possible to know how many service personnel were convicted of the offence of disgraceful conduct for engaging in same-sex sexual acts that would, if committed today, be lawful. However, on the basis that it was possible to convict service personnel under this or other service discipline offences for acts that would today be lawful, it is important that Parliament has recently enacted legislation to address any historical injustices.

The expansion of the disregard and pardon schemes in 2022 to include repealed service discipline offences 'rights historic wrongs'[161] by providing those living with a conviction for an offence such as disgraceful conduct, where the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, with the opportunity to apply to have a conviction disregarded and, if successful, be pardoned for the offence.[162] Moreover, the pardon scheme now grants, subject to certain conditions, a posthumous pardon to those who were convicted of repealed service discipline offences such as disgraceful conduct, where the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, and who have since died.[163] Extending the disregard and pardon schemes to include repealed service discipline offences was important for at least three reasons: first, it provides an important form of redress for those previously cruelly treated solely because of their sexual orientation; secondly, it acknowledges and draws a line under a shameful and long history of state-sanctioned

[159]Mr. Hoon MP, HC Deb 12 January 2000 vol. 342 col. 288. For a discussion of the litigation in the European Court of Human Rights see: Johnson, *Going to Strasbourg*.
[160]Armed Forces Act 2016, s. 14. This was the result of evidence I gave, with Mr. Duncan Lustig-Prean (former Lieutenant Commander, Royal Navy), to the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill (see: HC Deb 11 January 2016 vol. 604 col. 601).
[161]Mrs. May MP, HC Deb 1 March 2011 vol. 524 col. 213.
[162]Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s. 92 (as amended).
[163]Policing and Crime Act 2017, s. 164 (as amended).

discrimination; and third, it sends a clear message that such discrimination must never happen again. This latter point is particularly important at a time when, in various parts of the world, discriminatory legislation continues to be proposed and enacted in order to regulate individuals solely on the grounds of sexual orientation.

The UK government has announced that it will commission an independent review into the impact that the ban on homosexuality in the armed forces has had on LGBT veterans today.[164] This review will 'seek to better understand the experience of LGBT veterans who served in the Armed Forces between 1967 and 2000'.[165] The experience of many such LGBT veterans will almost certainly have been shaped by the fact that same-sex sexual acts were punishable, for most of the period of time covered by the review, as service discipline offences. A review of the impact of this legal regulation on the lives of armed forces personnel during this period is therefore essential in order to fully acknowledge and address the pain and suffering it caused. It is to be welcomed that the government has also explicitly stated that it will 'explore ways to enable veterans with convictions for service offences relating to their sexual orientation to apply to the Home Office for a disregard'.[166]

[164]Office for Veterans' Affairs, *Veterans' Strategy Action Plan: 2022-2024*, January 2022, CP 598.
[165]Ibid., p. 29.
[166]Ibid., p. 4.

'The Staff College candidates are not right yet':[1] The Importance of Nomination to British Army Staff College Entry, 1919-1939

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ABSTRACT
Between 1919 and 1939, entry to the British Army Staff College was via a dual process of competitive examination or nomination by a panel of senior officers. Recent historiography has scorned the latter, arguing that by allowing entry to the less academically gifted the Staff College's place as an elite institution was undermined, calling into question the belief that the Staff College represented the most academically rigorous educational institution within the Army. This article contends such an interpretation of the process of nomination to the Staff College is incorrect. Using fresh analysis and underutilised sources, it argues that officers obtaining vacancies via nomination often performed better than those entering on competitive vacancies. Furthermore, it will argue that, far from being a flaw in the system of entry, the process of nomination represented a means to achieve a balanced staff, not only in terms of representation by arm of service but also in terms of the type of personality required.

Introduction

In his 2015 article, 'Qualified, but Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s', Edward Smalley asserted that the process of nomination to the Staff College, Camberley, 'reached the point of undermining the credibility of the Staff

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1646

[1]The UK National Archive (hereinafter TNA) WO 279/65, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 14 to 17 January 1929, p. 117.

College graduates' by allowing inferior officers to gain access to this elite institution.[2] Building on this, he argued that not only did these officers undermine the status of the college in the interwar period, but the army inexplicably continued to support the use of nominations despite their contribution to the declining quality of officers in attendance. Smalley's argument is supported by comments by Major-General Charles Gwynn (Commandant of Camberley 1926-1931).[3] However, this conclusion is not supported by a detailed examination of nomination to the British Army Staff College in this period. Not only do they underestimate the capabilities of officers who gained nominated vacancies to the Staff College, Camberley, but they fail to appreciate fully the centrality of the role of nomination in assembling a student body composed of officers with wide experience and talents, and its place in attempts to reform the system of staff training in the interwar British Army. Akin to this, the recent application of a 'client, broker and patron' framework to British Army systems of patronage ties promotion not only to effectiveness and skill, but also to traditional notions of patronage in the British Army, and establishes a narrative of a British Army keen to promote merit however it was identified.[4]

Consequently, this article aims to add to the growing body of literature challenging the notion of the British Army as a rigidly hierarchical institution in the interwar period; it was, instead, consistently seeking to advance those deemed worthy, and with varied talents, not simply the academically gifted. Further, it will argue that far from being an alternative method of entry, nomination represented an integral and much-valued aspect of the process of Staff College entry, with nominated candidates maintaining existing academic standards. It will highlight that the British Army had recognised problems with the quality of Staff College candidates by the late 1920s. It then sought to find the means to address this through ensuring that officers responsible for selecting officers for the Staff College had correctly assessed not just the academic qualities of their subordinates, but also the suitability of their personal qualities as officers and future commanders. Such arguments continue to re-evaluate our knowledge of officer education, emphasising its broader impact on the social

[2]Edward Smalley, 'Qualified but Unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s,' *British Journal of Military History,* Vol. 2, No. 1, (November 2015), pp. 55-72, p. 59. Hereafter, the 'Staff College, Camberley' will be referred to as 'Camberley'.
[3]Edward Smalley, *The British Expeditionary Force, 1939-40,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 188-189.
[4]Aimée Fox, 'The Secret of Efficiency? Social Relations and Patronage in the British Army in the Era of the First World War, *English Historical Review,* Vol. 135, No. 577 (2020), p. 1529 & p. 1557.

construction and operational capabilities of the British Army, and highlighting efforts to prepare officers for commitments of varying scope and intensity.[5]

Any examination of nomination and its place within the interwar British Army sits within the broader historiographical examination of the role played by patronage and networking within the nineteenth and twentieth century British officer corps. A key issue was whether the system of promotion was dominated by personal influence and rivalries, becoming a highly personalised system built on relationships as a driver of an officer's career.[6] However, recent historiography has highlighted that while a feature of the British Army's institutional ethos, it functioned alongside more recognisable attributes of professionalism in ensuring the progression of meritorious officers, albeit through personal patronage networks.[7] Similarly, the continuation of this system via the promotion of meritorious officers to the staff in the First World War through the various 'staff learner' schemes stands as a further example of the positive influence of a patronage/nominative approach to training. Initially an ad-hoc system of apprenticeship to introduce regimental officers to the junior roles of General Staff Officer 3rd Grade (GSO3) and Staff Captain, the War Office formalised the system through GHQ directives over the course of 1916-1917.[8] The process was continued alongside the establishment of Junior and Senior staff schools by the War Office,

[5]Such studies include Ian F. W. Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army,* (Norman, OK.: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018); Roger Broad, *The Radical General: Sir Ronald Adam and Britain's New Model Army 1941-46,* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2013); Anthony Clayton, *The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present,* (London: Pearson, 2007) and Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. Engen and Meghan Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Military Education and the British Empire, 1815-1949,* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018).

[6]Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918,* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 6 & p. 11.

[7]For examples see Ian F.W. Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army,* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), and Fox, 'The Secret of Efficiency,' p. 1534, and Mark Frost 'The British and Indian Staff Colleges in the Interwar Years,' in Douglas E. Delaney, Robert C. Engen and Meghan Fitzpatrick (eds.), *Military Education and the British Empire, 1815-1949,* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), pp. 152-175. For a theoretical examination of what features can be used to define professionalism in a modern military force see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,* (Cambridge [Ma]: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7-19 and Sam C. Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism,* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 5-41.

[8]Paul Harris, *The Men Who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army in the Western Front, 1914-1918,* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 98-100.

initially at Hesdin, France and Mena House, Egypt, before their transfer to Britain in 1917.[9]

The success of such courses and the utility of nomination to educational courses in wartime can be determined by the congruence of the declining number of pre-war Staff College trained officers employed on the staff in the latter years of the war, and the continued improvement of staff processes and organisation across the British Army from 1916.[10] This is not to dismiss pre-war trained staff officers, or to suggest that it was only through nomination that British staff processes improved. Indeed, that the British Army continued to improve its efficiency in spite of a reliance on war-commissioned and war-trained officers serves to confirm that, whilst not perfect, a paternalistic, patronage-based system of nomination did not diminish the capabilities or quality of the British Army staff, despite the increasingly complex and technical staff requirements of the First World War. In addition, the use of civilian experts and their temporary nomination to prominent roles in the wartime army to address particular requirements further recognises that many senior officers had a knack for spotting and encouraging talent, to the benefit of the British Army.[11] In short, the British Army continued to strike a balance between outright paternalistic selection and professional meritocracy. As the examination of nomination to Camberley will show, this continued throughout the interwar period, with the complex interaction between patronage and academic merit represented through nomination's continued usage and advancement in discussions of reforms to staff training.

[9]Harris, *The Men Who Planned the War,* pp. 105-114, and Aimée Fox, *Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914-1918,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 85-94.

[10]Harris puts the percentage of staff officers with a *p.s.c.* in 1918 at 20%, *The Men Who Planned the War,* p. 129. For examinations of the development and growth in efficiency of army staffs in the second half of the First World War see Peter Simkins, "Building Blocks': Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the BEF's Offensive Operations, 1916-1918,' in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), *Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army's Experience 1914-18,* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007), pp. 141-173, and Aimée Fox-Godden, "'Hopeless Inefficiency"? The Transformation and Operational Performance of Brigade Staff, 1916-1918,' in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney & Stuart Mitchell (eds.), *A Military Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in The British Army, 1792-1945,* (Solihull: Hellion, 2014), pp. 139-157.

[11]For examples see Christopher Phillips, *Civilian Specialists at War: Britain's Transport Experts and the First World War,* (London: University of London Press, 2020), and Fox, 'The Secret of Efficiency,' pp. 1546-1550.

Staff College Entry

Nomination had been a feature of Staff College selection since 1880, when a War Office committee established it as an additional method of entry into Camberley. Entry had initially been restricted to a competitive process where the top scorers of the Staff College entrance examination were selected for attendance, but the introduction of nomination allowed opportunities for those that passed, but did not qualify, to gain entry based on their personal merits.[12] The examinations were held once a year in London and Delhi, with officers in isolated postings able to compete locally under standardised conditions.[13] It was divided into two sections (obligatory and voluntary subjects) and tested the skills deemed necessary to succeed as a staff officer. Mandatory subjects included: Training for War (four papers); Organisation and Administration (two papers); and Imperial Organisation (two papers). Optional subjects included a variety of languages, alongside physics, chemistry, political economy, and the history of British India, for a total of eleven papers.[14] With its emphasis on training and organisation, this list of subjects resulted from ongoing reform, reflecting a growing professionalisation, emphasis on military subjects and a reduction in focus on mathematics and science.[15] The inclusion of optional subjects recognised that 'every branch of military science and organisation […] will continue to become, infinitely more complex than in the past.'[16] The result was an examination which was notoriously competitive, arduous, and represented a stiff test for any officer.[17] It should be noted that such efforts of professionalisation were not without precedent outside of the army. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Civil Service

[12]A.R. Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College,* (London: Constable & Co.,1927), pp. 189-194, and F.W. Young, *The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958,* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1958), p. 1.

[13]For examples see British Library (hereinafter BL) IOR/L/MIL/7/3187, Entrance Examination, Staff College, Quetta & Camberley, and TNA CO 795/95/4, Northern Rhodesia Regiment: Staff College Entrance Examination.

[14]*Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta held in February-March 1925 with copies of the Examination Papers and Remarks of the Examiners Thereon,* (London: HMSO, 1925), p. 2.

[15]A.R Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, pp. 160 & 213, and Young, *The Story of the Staff College,* p. 8

[16]*Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta held in February-March 1921 with copies of the Examination Papers and Remarks of the Examiners Thereon,* (London: HMSO, 1921), p. 4.

[17]The nature of the process of entry to the Staff College in this period is highlighted in; Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College,* pp. 278-80; Mark Frost, 'The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges in the Interwar Years,' p.154-155; David French, *Military Identities,* pp. 160-161 and David French, *Raising Churchill's Army,* p. 62.

underwent a similar balancing act between traditional systems of patronage and new professional practice. It has been noted that whilst the entrance examination introduced in the 1870s was based on the desire to promote merit, patronage and selection remained as another way of recognising talent and ensuring its continued progression through the ranks of the Civil Service.[18]

To be eligible, for anonymous nomination to Staff College by the Military Members of the Army Council an officer had to achieve the minimum pass mark on the competitive examination, establishing a baseline competency for all officers admitted to Staff College.[19] Between 1919 and 1920, officers were selected via nomination to attend a shorter, one-year course to overcome the backlog resulting from the closure of both colleges in 1914 and enable 'distinguished field officers to supplement their battlefield experience with formal, theoretical training in staff matters.'[20] Its secondary purpose (which assumed greater importance through the 1920s) was to allow those who struggled to perform in the examination, but were considered to be deserving of a place on the staff, due to their dedication and performance.[21] As noted, this facet of nomination has been heavily criticised, with Smalley arguing that it 'undermined the credibility of the Staff College.'[22] Such an approach takes a binary view of Staff College entry and assumes that academic ability provided the only metric by which to judge ability.

Evidence suggests that passing the entrance examination did not necessarily indicate the requisite ability to succeed at the Staff College. While many officers undertook an intensive period of study over several years to prepare themselves for the arduous examination process, others did not, instead engaging the services of a 'crammer.'[23] This allowed an officer to receive a condensed burst (usually a few weeks in duration) of instruction in the types of question to be encountered and the information required

[18]Patrick Joyce, *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 200-201, pp. 258-262.
[19]See Mark Frost, 'The British and Indian Staff Colleges,' p. 155, and David French, 'Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army, 1919-39,' in G.C. Kennedy and K. Neilson (eds.), *Military Education Past, Present and Future,* (Westport CT: Prager, 2002), p. 109.
[20]Smalley, 'Qualified but Unprepared,' p. 58.
[21]TNA WO 279/57, Report on the Staff Conference held at Staff College, Camberley, 17-20 January 1927.
[22]Smalley, 'Qualified but Unprepared', p. 59.
[23]J. Smyth, *Milestones,* (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1979), p. 77.

to pass.[24] Although impossible to definitively assess the extent of their influence, contemporary references by Major-General A.R. Goodwin-Austin, highlight the large number of such courses, and suggests that many officers made use of their services.[25] As a result, although the examination represented a test of an officer's intellectual capabilities, for many, it represented a test of their ability to retain information temporarily. Furthermore, with officers able to sit the examination three times, there were opportunities to play the system if failing the examination by acquiring the knowledge to pass in subsequent sittings.[26] Such an approach was the result of a conflicting institutional ethos within the British Army emphasising the importance of regimental-led officer training whilst simultaneously recognising the importance of a highly trained staff. This led to uneven educational practices across the officer corps depending on the enthusiasm of commanding officers.[27] Such a conclusion can be extrapolated from the available data on the Staff College's examination pass-fail rate between 1923 and 1926.

	1923	1924	1925	1926
No. Competitors	200	240	360	400
% Failure Rate	44.9	71.5	45.2	74.1

Table 1. Overall Percentage of Failures, Staff College Entrance Examination: 1923-1926.[28]

The relatively stable fluctuations suggest that those with lower failure rates contained a greater proportion of officers who had previously failed and had a better understanding of the examination requirements. Some substance can be given to this by examining the published reports on the Staff College examinations. In years that experienced high failure rates, it was noted that:

A very noticeable point was the lack of care with which candidates appeared to read the questions to be answered […] Too many officers […] wrote round their subject,

[24]Goodwin-Austin suggests that not all such courses were reputable, whilst even those that were made use of information readily available to the candidates themselves. Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College,* p. 283.
[25]Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College,* p. 283 and French, *Military Identities,* pp. 160-161.
[26] Mark Frost, 'The British and Indian Staff Colleges,' p.155; Young, *The Story of the Staff College,* p. 25 and Edward Smalley, *The British Expeditionary Force,* pp. 187-188.
[27]David French, *Raising Churchill's Army*, p. 59.
[28]TNA WO 32/3090, Figures taken from Staff College Examinations, Allotment of Vacancies by Arms to be Abolished & Report on the Staff Conference held at the Staff College, Camberley, 17-20 January 1927, Appendix B.

apparently hoping that the examiner would evolve an opinion for them out of the half-expressed ideas they had written.[29]

In contrast, the 1923 and 1925 reports focussed more on the standard of English expression and the format of answers rather than failings of content.[30] Where content was highlighted, it was noted that 'The desire to display knowledge, whether it was relevant to the question or not, was also noticeable […] It also lends colour to the suspicion of cramming.'[31] Such comments, linked to the variance in failure rates, suggest that many of those who failed to pass the entrance examination on their first attempt proceeded to engage a crammer to be better assured of passing the examination in the future. This combination of factors serves to undermine the idea that officers gaining competitive vacancies to the Staff College represented the cream of the army's officer corps and also undermines the belief that nominated officers were the only contributing factor to any qualitative decline. Indeed, as will be seen, the British Army was faced with a far more pervasive problem with the quality of officer applying to Staff College.

Manpower Problems: The Selection of Candidates for the Staff College

In highlighting this issue, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir George Milne, stated in 1929 that 'the Staff College candidates are not right yet […]. The two points that have got to be considered are how to get the proper candidates and then how best to admit these officers to the Staff College.'[32] The problems highlighted by Milne were so severe that the following year he commented that, 'going through the recommendations by commanding officers, I am astonished at the casual way they recommend officers for the Staff of the Army, and I…would not have some of them on my staff at any price.' [33] This failure to ensure appropriate candidates were gaining access to the Staff College was a longstanding problem for the

[29]Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta. Held in February-March 1924. With Copies of the Examination Papers and Remarks of the Examiners Thereon, (London: HMSO, 1924), p. 3.

[30]Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta. Held in February-March 1923. With Copies of the Examination Papers and Remarks of the Examiners Thereon, (London: HMSO, 1923), and Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, (London: HMSO, 1925).

[31]Report on the Examination for Admission to the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta, (London: HMSO, 1925), p. 3.

[32]TNA WO 279/65, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 14 to 17 January 1929, (London: HMSO, 1929), p. 117.

[33]TNA WO 279/66, Report on the Staff Conference held at the Staff College, Camberley 13 to 16 January 1930, (London: HMSO, 1930), p.59,

interwar British Army. In 1925, the Commandant of Camberley, Major-General Edmund Ironside, stated that although ninety-eight per cent of officers received the *p.s.c.* (passed Staff College) qualification, in his opinion only fifteen per cent were truly capable of holding high rank. Despite this, 'to the army, all *p.s.c.* certificates are equal.'[34] This was demonstrated in 1926 during a discussion over the withholding of *p.s.c.* certificate from officers receiving adverse reports in their staff posts. Whilst in theory, officers deemed unsuitable for staff employment after their first year should be returned to their units, arguments were made for awarding all officers completing the two-year course the coveted *p.s.c.* The Director of Staff Duties (DSD), Major-General Archibald Cameron suggested that an officer who:

> Has been through the full two years course at the Staff College […] must have benefited by the instruction he has received. The effect of refusing an officer the *p.s.c.* is to leave a stigma against him and in a worse position than if he never went up for it.[35]

As the British Army was struggling to recruit officers in this period, and was working to improve the pay and conditions of regimental officers, such reputational damage resulting from the withholding of the *p.s.c.* would have been a bitter blow.[36] Unsurprisingly in this context, in November 1927 Cameron sent a memoranda to Camberley Commandant Charles Gwynn, establishing that an officer's suitability for a *p.s.c.* would no longer be included on their final report, and that the Army Council would make the final decision. He also noted that it should be rare that an unfit officer was allowed to complete the Staff College course as those deemed unfit should be ejected at the end of their first year.[37] From this it is clear that the declining quality of Staff College graduate was in part the result of the army's need to retain career progression and to improve conditions of service for officers.

Additionally, efforts to ensure good candidates were put forward for Staff College were hampered by hostility from regimental commanders, and the regimental system's pervading influence on the institutional culture of the British Army. David French has

[34]TNA WO 32/4840, Report on Higher Education for War, December 1925.
[35]TNA WO 32/3102, Major-General Archibald Cameron to Field Marshal Sir George Milne, 2 November 1926.
[36]TNA WO 32/3737, Report Lord Plumer's Committee on the Promotion of Officers in the Army (1925); TNA WO 32/3744, Committee on the Promotion of Regimental Officers (1935); TNA WO 32/4461, Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers and TNA WO 279/65, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College (1929), pp 96-116.
[37]TNA WO 32/3102, Major-General Archibald Cameron to Major-General Charles Gwynn, 17 November 1926.

noted that, 'some commanding officers regarded subordinates who wanted to widen their knowledge by attending the Staff College as being disloyal to their regiment.'[38] With commanders being responsible for providing an officer with their Certificate D attestation as to fitness for command and staff posts, Milne's assertion that sceptical commanding officers were using the Staff Colleges as a way to get rid of unwanted officers has merit.[39] Likewise, while studies are quick to conclude that the increased competition for places at the Staff Colleges speaks to the recognition of its importance to promotion to the highest levels of army command, such conclusions mask a broader range of motivations among British officers.[40] For many, it was their regimental duties, contact with the troops, and combat leadership that served to shape their careers and their motivation for continued service. Colonel Thorpe, a General Staff Officer with the British Army of the Rhine, noted: 'There are lots of officers I know who do not wish to go on the staff, but would rather command their battalion or regiment.' [41] Gwynn expressed similar views, noting that 'there are a great number […] who do not compete at all, they are keen on regimental work […] and to work at the Staff College, they must neglect some of their regimental work.'[42] The extent to which these attitudes were widespread, or whether they represented a desire to avoid the tedium of office work associated with the staff, or a lack of familiarity with headquarters duties is open to interpretation.[43] However, these comments highlight the division between the British Army's regimental culture and its desire to retain a centrally trained corps of officers for planning and organisation. This points to a further challenge in the selection of candidates.

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[38]French, *Military Identities,* p. 153. Similarly, Field Marshal Ironside recounted an example during his time in hospital in India when his visiting commanding officer questioned the books on military matters at his bedside suggesting he should be happy as a gunner officer, Ironside, Edmund, 'The Modern Staff Officer,' *JRUSI,* Vol. 73, No. 491 (August 1928), p. 436. Similarly, in 1910 W.N. Nicholson when deciding to apply for the Staff College was told by his company commander that only wasters left the regiment. W.N. Nicholson, *Behind the Lines: An Account of Administrative Staffwork in the British Army, 1914-1918,* (London: Strong Oak Press, 1939), p. 168.

[39]TNA WO 32/3103, Memorandum by the C.I.G.S on points dealing with the entrance and selection &c., of officers to the Staff College discussed during the War Office Staff Conference, January 17-20. Milne's belief in unscrupulous commandants was expressed in TNA WO 279/57, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17th to 20th January 1927, p. 45.

[40]For examples see: Frost, 'The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges,' pp. 156 – 158; French, *Raising Churchill's Army,* p. 62, and French, *Military Identities,* p. 160.

[41]TNA WO 279/57, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17th to 20th January 1927.

[42]Ibid, p. 48.

[43]French, *Raising Churchill's Army,* p. 164.

While a proportion of the British officer corps was evidently happy with regimental promotion and desired nothing more than to command their regiment, this was not enough for many in the interwar period. [44] Between 1919 and 1939, with the drastic reduction in the army's size and its reversion to a role primarily garrisoning the empire, the rapid promotion and enhanced career opportunities of wartime service disappeared. Instead, officers found themselves wedded to a system of promotion that was glacial, with some serving twelve or more years as Lieutenants before promotion to Captain.[45] In this context, attendance at the Staff College allowed officers to break away from the regimental promotion structure, allowing rapid advancement for ambitious officers in the interwar British Army.[46] By doing so, the British Army, whilst recognising the importance of its regimental tradition, sought to build on an ever-developing ethos which emphasised the promotion of merit and experience. Recognising this, increasing numbers of officers applied for the limited number of vacancies available each year, with 440 officers competing in 1926 and 409 in 1929 for only 56 vacancies.[47] Accompanying this was a surge in the number of competing officers from the technical arms, particularly the Royal Engineers.[48] Promotion in the engineers was slower than in combat arms as all officers in the Corps were placed on one promotion list and promoted via seniority.[49] Coupled with this was the assertion that many regimental officers and potential candidates for commissions were discouraged by the army's relative lack of prospects and seeming deadening of

[44]TNA WO 279/57, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17th to 20th January 1927; TNA WO 279/65, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 14 to 17 January 1929, p. 116 and Smalley, *The British Expeditionary Force,* p. 182.

[45]Anthony Clayton, *The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present,* (London: Pearson, 2007), p. 195.

[46]David French, *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c.1870-2000,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 162.

[47]Brevet-Major A.R. Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College,* (London: Constable & Co., 1927), p. 278, and David French, *Raising Churchill's Army,* p. 62.

[48]By 1930, the number of Royal Engineer officers in the top 50 of the Staff College examination had doubled from seven in 1926 to fourteen in 1930. Correspondingly, the number of infantry officers in the top 50 had declined from nineteen in 1926 to twelve in 1930. Figures from TNA WO 32/3092, Staff College Entrance Examinations 1926-1930. Distribution by Arms of first 40, 45 and 50 candidates competing for Camberley.

[49]Ian F.W. Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army,* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), p. 38, and French, *Military Identities,* p. 28.

ambition due to the monotonous nature of regimental duties in peacetime.[50] Regardless of an officer's suitability for staff or command roles, many saw Staff College as the only way to break free of limited promotion prospects and thus attempted to take steps to assure themselves of a qualifying mark and entry to the Staff College via competitive examination.

Underpinning these problems was the subjective nature of The King's Regulations regarding the requirements for an officer put forward for Staff College. Paragraph 723, (1923), stated that an officer must be capable of: '(i) Steadiness and prudence; (ii) Activity, energy and force of character; (iii) Intelligence and discretion […](iv) Disposition and temper; (v) Efficiency as a leader and instructor.'[51] Colonel R. G. Finlayson, then an instructor at Camberley, noted that these regulations gave 'to a commanding officer who is not perhaps so knowledgeable, strong, or conscientious as others, quite a loophole if he is held up to answer for the consequences of putting a bad officer on the list, and it does not help him very much if he doesn't know what is wanted.'[52] Furthermore, they could not be adequately assessed purely through the Staff College examination, reinforcing the notion that whilst competitive vacancies represented a test of an officer's academic ability, they did little to guarantee that such officers were suited for staff training. To overcome this, a change was made to the wording of the regulations. Milne's new wording unambiguously stated that to be considered eligible for staff work, an officer should 'be in every respect a thoroughly good regimental officer; he must possess professional ability, industry and power of command.'[53] Although seemingly at odds with a role that emphasised the need 'to assist their commander in the execution of the duties entrusted to him, to transmit his orders and instructions,'[54] this view of the required attributes of a future staff officer was widely accepted.[55] Furthermore, these attributes would have been easily

[50]TNA WO 32/4461, Second Report of the Committee on the Supply of Army Officers, December 1937, p.8.

[51]TNA WO 32/3103, Memorandum by the C.I.G.S on points dealing with the entrance and selection &c., of officers to the Staff College discussed during the War Office Staff Conference, 17-20 January 1927.

[52]TNA WO 279/57, Comments of Colonel Finlayson on Subject 6. Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17-20 January 1927, p. 45.

[53]TNA WO 279/57, Comments of Colonel Finlayson on Subject 6. Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17-20 January 1927, p. 45.

[54]Field Service Regulations, Volume I: Organization and Administration, (London: HMSO, 1923).

[55]TNA WO 32/3092, Lieutenant-General Charles Bonham-Carter to Lieutenant-General Archibald Cameron, 11 October 1928; TNA WO 32/3092 Lieutenant-General Hastings Anderson to Field Marshal Sir George Milne 3 November 1928; TNA WO 32/3092, Lieutenant-General Sir Webb Gillman to Field Marshal Sir George

identifiable by Colonels Commandant and individual commanding officers responsible for recommending officers for the Staff College who themselves may not have been through the institution.

The process of Staff College entry was beset with inconsistencies which had little to do with the process of nomination. Consequently, pinning the dilution of the Staff College's status on the continued use of nominations belies the shortcomings highlighted with the competitive examinations and wider problems of candidate suitability. Underlying these problems was the belief that any lowering of quality identified in the 1920s was the result of wartime casualties among junior officers rather than a more general problem with the quality of officer candidates. In a 1925 report to the Army Council, Ironside noted that during his period in command, officers attending the college could be broadly categorised into ability groups:

> First Year
> (i) All officers, with the exception of about 2%, are fitted for posting to a 3rd Grade appointment. The unfit 2% leave the Staff College at the end of the First Year.
> (ii) About 50% are obviously unfitted for anything but lower staff appointments.
> (iii) About 18% are doubtful cases. They are underdeveloped or otherwise difficult to judge.
> (iv) About 30% are obviously fitted for further training.
> Second Year
> (i) The 50% labelled as unfit […] fall further and further behind [...] Their presence in the second year, moreover, retards the better students […]
> (ii) Of the doubtful 18%, about 8% prove themselves […]
> (iii) Of the remaining 30%, the best forge rapidly ahead […] About 10% of the officers distinguish themselves above the others.[56]

Despite such damning opinion, these concerns were dismissed. In responding directly to Ironside's report, Cameron, requested that, 'when considering Ironside's proposals will you take into consideration that he may take an unduly severe view of the proportion of officers fitted to undergo the second year of the course, as he has been

Milne, 6 November 1928; TNA WO 279/57, Colonel Thorne, Report on the Staff Conference Held at the Staff College, Camberley 17th to 20th January 1927, p. 42; An Ex-Staff Officer, 'Personality on the Staff,' *JRUSI,* Vol. 68, No. 469 (February 1923), pp. 126-131; An Ex-Staff Officer, 'Some Staff Duties,' *JRUSI,* Vol. 68, No. 472 (November 1923), p. 203; Edmund Ironside, 'The Modern Staff Officer,' *JRUSI,* Vol. 73, No. 491 (August 1928), p. 442.

[56]TNA WO 32/4840, Higher Education for War, 15 December 1925.

dealing with officers still suffering from the abnormal state of the Army since the war.'[57] Similar views were expressed by the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Major-General Sir John Burnett Stuart, who suggested that 'the majority of the best officers who would have gone to the Staff College in the last few years were killed in the war. In time the standard will recover.'[58] As a result, not only were the army experiencing serious problems in the recruitment of officers in the face of competition from both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, but those officers setting the army's future direction refused to acknowledge problems within the system, preferring to blame any declining standard on casualties suffered amongst junior officers during the First World War.

The Allocation of Vacancies

Smalley has asserted that nomination to Staff College principally led to a decline in the quality of officer attending. However, to place the blame squarely on nominated officers overlooks both their performance at Staff College and structural inequalities in the manner in which vacancies were allocated to the various arms of the British Army. Under the system of allocation enacted in the interwar period (except for 1927–1929), each arm of service (Infantry, Royal Artillery [R.A.], Royal Engineers [R.E.], Cavalry, Royal Tank Corps [R.T.C.], Royal Army Service Corps [R.A.S.C.] and Royal Corps of Signals [R.C.S.]) was allocated competitive vacancies to the Staff College based upon the future needs of the army, with the remainder of competitive vacancies to be filled by a limited number of officers from India and the Dominions and the rest to be filled by nomination.

Arm of Service	Infantry	Royal Artillery	Royal Engineers	Cavalry	Royal Corps of Signals	Royal Army Service Corps	Royal Tank Corps
Vacancies	16	8	4	2	1	1	1

Table 2: 1930 Allocation of competitive vacancies to Staff College, Camberley. [59]

[57]TNA WO 32/4840, Lieutenant-General A.R. Cameron to General Sir Walter Braithwaite, 11 March 1926 & A.R. Cameron to Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, 11 March 1926.

[58]TNA WO 32/4840, Major-General Sir John Burnett-Stuart to A.R. Cameron, 11 March 1926.

[59]TNA WO 32/3092, Major-General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter to Field Marshal Lord Milne, 14 July 1931.

While this may have ensured that the proportion of officers attending the Staff College broadly met the army's needs, the imposition of a quota system had a negative qualitative impact on the officers gaining competitive vacancies. In 1931, the D.S.D., Major-General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, noted that to fill the allocated infantry vacancies would require selecting officers who had placed between 70th and 85th in the order of merit.[60] An appreciation of the quality gap of candidate this represented requires an examination of the results of a June 1926 War Office examination into the removal of the quota system. Placing all British Service officers on a single list and awarding the top thirty-three candidates' competitive vacancies at the Staff College, the lowest qualifying mark increased by 456 to a total of 5929 out of a possible 10,100.[61] This represented an eighty-one per cent improvement in the lowest officer's qualifying score for those entering via competition and would have provided an instant panacea to the declining quality of officers gaining competitive vacancies. This experiment was not continued, largely due to the desires of senior officers to avoid the domination of the staff by technical officers and their preference for regimental officers on the staff.[62] Instead, it was decided to retain the quota system but limit competitive vacancies to officers passing in the top 50 candidates with any unfilled places added to those for nomination.[63]

While establishing a baseline requirement for officers obtaining competitive vacancies to the Staff College, the maintenance of the quota system effectively served to lower the average quality of officer attending. That many arms were not even able to meet these standards was evident from the extent to which these vacancies remained unfilled. In examining the allocations for 1930 and 1931, Bonham-Carter noted that while the theoretical distribution was eighty per cent competitive compared to twenty per cent nominated, the reality was closer to a fifty-fifty split.[64] Thus, although nomination has been blamed for the declining quality of officers obtaining Staff College vacancies, the real qualitative failure rested on the inability of the army's various arms

[60]TNA WO 32/3092, Bonham-Carter to Milne, 24 July 1931.

[61]TNA WO 32/3090, Staff College [Examinations], allotment of vacancies [by arms to be abolished], 1926 and TNA WO 32/3090, Field-Marshal Sir George Milne to Lieutenant-General's Robert Whigham, Walter Campbell and Noel Birch., 17 June 1926.

[62]TNA WO 32/3090, Staff College [Examinations], allotment of vacancies [by arms to be abolished], 1926. For more detailed discussion of this see Iain Farquharson, 'A Scientific of Regimental Staff: The Reform of Staff College Selection in the British Army, 1927-31,' *Marine Corps University Journal,* Vol. 9, No. 1, (Spring 2018), pp. 53 – 73.

[63] TNA WO 32/3092, Bonham-Carter to Milne, 14 August 1930.

[64] TNA WO 32/3092, The exact percentages presented were: 1930 – 52% competitive, 48% nomination and 1931 – 59% competitive, 41 % nominated. Bonham-Carter to Milne, 24 July 1931.

to put forward candidates capable of meeting competitive entry requirements. This lack of capability naturally led to an increased prevalence of nominated candidates to ensure student cohorts were full. While it is impossible to definitively state what position in the order of merit nominated officers were selected from, they were still required to have achieved a passing mark in the examination. Thus, much like the limiting of competitive vacancies to officers in the top 50, this requirement meant that no matter how suitable an officer's character may have been, they were still required to meet an academic baseline to be considered for admittance to the Staff College.

Furthermore, statistics presented at the time demonstrate that nominated offers were as capable, indeed more so, of succeeding at the Staff College. In examining the distribution of officers in the final order of merit, Gwynn demonstrated that nominated officers were, in most cases, equal to those who had gained entry via the competitive examination (see Table 3).



Table 3: Order of Merit of officers passing out of the Staff College, Camberley by method of entry 1926-28.[65]

In the three years examined by Gwynn, the lower half of the order of merit was consistently dominated by officers obtaining competitive vacancies, with no more than a third having gained entry via nomination. Gwynn further subdivided these statistics

[65]Numbers compiled from TNA WO 32/3092, 'Results of the Division passing out Dec. 1926.'

by arm of service and the dominions in 1928. He found that British officers accounted for sixty-seven per cent of officers who had obtained a competitive vacancy and passed out in the bottom half of the order of merit. Conversely, only forty per cent of nominated candidates in this lower half came from the British service.[66] However, the analysis of the 1928 figures only dealt with the junior division, with Gwynn conceding that 'it is too early as yet to weight the order of merit […] The marking must be taken as a very rough approximation.'[67] As a result, contrary to Smalley's assertion, the nomination process was not allowing deficient officers to gain access to Staff College. Indeed, on average, nominated officers were performing better than those gaining entry via the examinations who tended to dominate the lower end of the order of merit. As a result, despite being set up as a fundamental flaw within the structure of staff training, nomination helped maintain academic standards at the Staff College. When discussion in the late 1920s turned to the allocation of vacancies to the Staff College by arm of service, its utility shifted from allowing deserving officers to access Staff College education, to seeking to maintain a balance of all-arms at the Staff College. In a memorandum to senior officers at the War Office, Milne noted that 'if it is necessary to adjust the numbers of the different arms […] this should be done by the nominations in the hands of the Army Council.'[68] This view was broadly accepted among senior officers, with both Lieutenant-Generals Hastings Anderson and Webb Gillman (Q.M.G. and M.G.O. respectively) believing that the staff should contain an even proportion of officers from all arms.[69]

Moreover, nomination was consistently a feature of proposals for reforming staff training suggesting that, far from weakening the staff, reformist officers recognised its advantages in ensuring that the most suitable candidates were able to attend Staff College. Ironside's 1925 Report on Higher Education for War, alongside its highly critical commentary on the suitability of officers for future staff roles proposed, alongside the division of the staff course to a junior staff course and a senior war course, that entry should be fifty per cent competitive, fifty per cent nominated.[70] By 1938, the Report on the Military Education of the Army Officer, whilst also pushing for the division of staff training into two distinct courses, recommended a division of

[66]Numbers compiled from TNA WO 32/3092, 'Results of the Division passing out Dec. 1926.'
[67]TNA WO 32/3092, Report by Commandant Staff College on Junior Division 1928.
[68]TNA WO 32/3090, Field Marshal Lord Milne to Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Whigham, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell and Lieutenant-General Noel Birch, 17 June 1926.
[69]TNA WO 32/3092, Lieutenant-General Hastings Anderson to Field Marshal George Milne, 3 November 1928 & Lieutenant-General Webb Gillman to Milne, 6 November 1928.
[70]TNA WO 32/4840, Higher Education for War, 15 December 1925.

entry which was twenty-five per cent competitive and seventy-five per cent nominated.[71] Following the debates discussed above, this additional emphasis was caveated with the note that the judgment of the recommending officer would be questioned if a nominated candidate proved deficient.[72] In both cases, access to the higher-level war courses was to be by nomination only, with both allowing an officer who hadn't attended a junior staff course to be admitted if it was believed they were exceptionally suited to higher-level posts.[73] Reliance on a form of nomination to fill vacancies at the Staff College was even more pronounced in the armies of the Dominions. Australia had, by 1930, developed a system whereby an officer's suitability for staff training was noted on their confidential reports, and the list of officers recommended was reviewed annually by the Military Board. This system was noted as being 'of great value in ensuring that only suitable candidates are allowed to sit for the examination.'[74] Amongst both reform-minded officers and those senior officers at the War Office there was clearly a recognition that it was not necessarily the most academically gifted officers who were best suited to staff roles. Indeed, one of the points of agreement between these two groups was the belief that more extensive use of nominations represented the means to address the deficiencies in the army's staff training system.

This client-patron system can also be identified as continuing into the Second World War. Pre-war patronage networks remained in operation, with Staff College connections being much in evidence among those appointed to subordinate command and staff positions by Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery.[75] Indeed, it has been noted that in July 1941 he informed the divisional commanders of XII Corps that, 'he personally selected the officers from his command who were to be sent to the Staff College.'[76] The extent to which this practice was commonplace across the British Army and its impact during the Second World War requires further research, but it is evident there

[71]TNA WO 32/4357, Report of the Committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer, March 1938.
[72]Ibid.
[73]TNA WO 32/4357, Report of the Committee on the Military Education of the Army Officer, March 1938.
[74]National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA) B1535 765/2/35, Staff College Entrance Examination, 2 May 1930.
[75]See Mark Frost, 'The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges,' pp. 164-7.
[76]Corps commanders' personal memoranda to commanders, 20 July 1941, Allfrey MS 1/5, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), quoted in David French, 'Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War against Germany, 1939-1945.' *English Historical Review*, Vol. 111, No. 444 (November 1996), p. 1195.

is a degree of continuity, albeit an evolving process based on the particular circumstances of the period under examination.

Conclusion

As a result, the idea that nomination to Staff College served only to undermine its graduates' quality should be firmly dismissed. Instead, several other factors served to undermine the quality of officer graduating from the Staff College. Key among these was the lack of consideration of its students' differing abilities and the continued commitment of as many as forty per cent to higher-level training from which they, and the army, derived no benefit. Alongside the misguided belief that all *p.s.c.'s* were equal (despite assigning classifications and the branch to which they were best suited in their final reports), this led to many unsuitable officers finding their way onto British staffs, a problem only mitigated with the division of the Staff College course in 1938. Similarly, the methodology used in appointing officers to the Staff College Selected List and their progression to the Staff College Examination are worthy of criticism. It is evident that some regimental commanders utilised the Staff College as a means to remove unpopular or ineffective officers, whilst for others, the complex language used in King's Regulations to describe the requirements for staff officers allowed enough ambiguity to put forward unsuitable candidates who wished to attend Staff College, or simply to become confused as to what was required of them. That nomination was continually utilised by advocates and opponents of reform speaks to its broader centrality within the army's culture of promotion and advancement in the continuing process of the development of its ethos of promoting by skill, merit and an element of personal interest. This recognition requires some revision of our existing understanding of the British Army's officer education system in the interwar period, not dismissing existing conclusions regarding the arduous and testing nature of the Staff College examination, but recognising that examination success should not be taken as the only, or indeed the most accurate measure of ability.[77]

Finally, it is clear that for those officers pressing the cause of Staff College reform, nomination was seen not only as a way to overcome many of the existing problems associated with selecting candidates and the allocation of vacancies, but also as a key element in the process of officer education. Across all discussions, the percentages of nominated candidates were significantly increased, suggesting widespread support for the practice among senior officers. In addition, the three-year examination of the allocation of vacancies demonstrated that nominated candidates performed significantly better than officers gaining competitive vacancies. As a result, far from undermining the Staff College's status, the nomination process can be seen to have

[77]Examples of this emphasis can be seen in French, *Raising Churchill's Army*, p. 62; French *Military Identities*, pp. 160-161; Frost, 'The British and Indian Army Staff Colleges,' pp. 154-156 and Goodwin-Austin, *The Staff and the Staff College*, p. 276.

improved the qualitative output and served as a means of ensuring that the most suitable officers were progressing to staff and command roles within the British Army. Such conclusions do much to underpin broader studies of officer education and military education in general by establishing the importance of nomination and the lengths taken to preserve its use.[78] Through this, we can continue to revise our understanding of the British Army, highlighting that whilst adhering to a hierarchical command structure, this structure did not stifle ingenuity and merit. Indeed, through the persistence of patronage and influence, the interwar army maintained a meritocratic promotion system on the staff within what was otherwise a strictly hierarchical system of promotion by seniority.

[78]Alongside the studies already mentioned above, such broader examinations encompassing military educational developments include Jay Luvaas, The Education of An Army: British Military Thought 1815-1940, (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 1964); Gregory C. Kennedy & Keith Nielson eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present and Future,* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002); Brian Bond, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914,* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972). Such studies are not limited to the army, but also encompass those looking at the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Key studies of these forces include Joseph Moretz, *Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly: The Higher Education and Training of Royal Navy Officers, 1919-39,* (Solihull: Hellion & Co., 2014), and Randall Wakelam, David Varey & Emanuele Sica (eds.), *Educating Air Forces: Global Perspectives on Airpower Learning,* (Lexington KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2020).

The Evolution of Czechoslovak Defence Planning, 1918-1992

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ABSTRACT
Throughout its existence (1918–1992), Czechoslovakia had to fight to maintain its state sovereignty and independence. This struggle owed much to its geographical location in the heart of Europe, where the superpower interests of the main actors in global politics regularly clashed. As a rule, Czechoslovak operational plans did not reflect national interests. Nor did war plans, in many cases, correspond to real Czechoslovak economic and military capabilities, and the often offensive nature of such plans is somewhat surprising. On the other hand, the content of operational documents does reveal many features specific to Czechoslovakia – considerations regarding the shape of the state territory, the small depth of defence, and the factor of the German presence. Despite these strong foreign influences, Czechoslovak war plans still express a wealth of domestic military thought and military science.

Introduction

From the autumn of 1918, the Czechoslovak state faced enemies inside and outside the state's territory. As early as November and December, its newly emerging army had to occupy the Sudetenland, where the German population expressed a desire not to live in a country with a Slavic majority. In addition, the Seven-Day War with Poland over the border area of the Těšín region in January 1919 was a dispute not with its own population, but with an enemy sovereign state and its armed forces. In this situation, the decision making of the emerging Czechoslovak Armed Forces were not coordinated at the operational level by any well-thought-out war plan based on Czechoslovak military doctrine and strategy. They were guided by the *ad hoc* situation that arose here and the need to address it urgently. This became particularly evident

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1647

after April 1919 in the war with Hungary.[1] The operational deployment of the Czechoslovak army did not have a consistent basis. The advance of the troops was governed by the interstate Czech-Romanian agreement and the order of the Ministry of National Defence (MNO) of 7 April 1919. On its basis, a line was to be occupied along the demarcation line east of the Danube. All this forced the unification and standardisation of the planning process, which was undertaken by France, the main Czechoslovak military ally. The nation-states formed after the First World War, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Romania, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, sought to establish closer military-political contacts with victorious France and its army. Paris, therefore, sent military missions to their territories.[2]

Figure 1: Map of Czechoslovakia showing key cities and provinces. (Public Domain)

French influences on defence planning

The first Czechoslovak war plans arose within the operational department of the French Military Mission. Just after the birth of the republic, this department was simultaneously also the 3rd Department of the General Staff (GS) of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. Following its establishment on 12 July 1919 the General Staff was headed by the French Colonel Henri Éduard Rozet.[3] In October 1920 Rozet moved

[1]The French Army Colonel Bujac, 'Operace r. 1919 proti maďarské republice sovětů', *Vojenské rozhledy* 4 (7–8) (1923) p. 321.

[2]R. Břach, *Generál Maurice PELLÉ: první náčelník hlavního štábu čs. branné moci,* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky 2007), p. 55.

[3]R. Břach and J. Láník, *Dva roky bojů a organizační práce: československá armáda v letech 1918–1920,* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky 2013), p. 117.

to the position of adviser to the head of the already mentioned operational department of the General Staff and, by virtue of his position, became the coordinator and mastermind of the first Czechoslovak war plans.[4] The reports drawn up under his supervision strongly reflected the still fresh experience of the First World War and reflected, too, the military-political and geographical specifics of the Czechoslovak state.[5] Although the French operational officers initially considered themselves to be 'mere' advisers to their Czechoslovak counterparts, they soon became the creators[6] of the Czech state's first war plans[7] thanks to their experience and influence. The basic structure of their texts was similar, containing two main, logically self-contained areas. The first of these dealt with covering and guarding the borders. This took the form of providing strategic cover for the period in which the framework army units were filled with mobilised men. After units had been concentrated, manoeuvres began, according to which they moved to their designated areas depending on the planned defence or attack.[8] Each plan then mostly addressed the following set of issues: firstly, the military-political aspects of the planned military operation in terms of the situation of the Czechoslovak Republic and its rivals; secondly, the assembly point area of the Czechoslovak army in terms of its dislocation; thirdly, upcoming military-political measures to start operational activities; fourthly, signalling for border guarding, concentration of mobilised units in Czechoslovak territory, and troops' rearward support; and finally, organisation of the command and control system in terms of grouping military units and their command posts, together with specification of the General Staff's tasks.

Czechoslovak war plans created in the ambit of the French Military Mission did not have a consistent formal arrangement and, indeed, differed from each other to no small extent. Their designation derived most often from identifying the main enemy, and they were coded accordingly. Plans of operations against Germany were designated 'A' (*Allemagne*) or 'N' (*Německo*), 'H' stood for Hungary (*Hongrie*) and 'P' for Poland. Sometimes, their designation was derived from the territory of the expected battlefield, as in the case of 'S' plans (*Slezsko*/Silesia), or from a politically defined enemy group in operational reports under 'B' (*Bolševici*/Bolsheviks). Their

[4]J. Fidler and V. Sluka, *Encyklopedie branné moci Republiky československé 1920–1938,* (Praha: Nakladatelství Libri 2006), p. 561.
[5]J. Bílek et al., *Vojenské dějiny Československa III. díl (1918–1939,)* (Praha: Naše vojsko 1987), p. 114.
[6] S. Polnar, 'Francouzská vojenská mise a počátky československého myšlení o válce', *Sborník prací Pedagogické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity, řada společenských věd* 33 (1) (2019) p. 15.
[7]R. Kalhous, *Budování armády,* (Praha: Melantrich 1936), p. 254.
[8]V. Galatík et al., *Vojenská strategie,* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky – PIC MO 2008), p. 124.

authors described some of the planning documents as mere studies, with significant deviations from any formalised structure; they are more reminiscent of essays on critical strategic topics related to the Czechoslovak Republic's defence. In this case, political and doctrinal considerations prevailed, and the military-technical parts of plans were absent. In other words, they did not contain their own operational algorithm for deploying and developing troops in the field, along with more detailed forecasts of different variants of combat activity.

Such texts included, for example, *Plan A* from May 1920. This was primarily a set of strategic considerations. According to *Plan A*, Rozet expected armed conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia – aimed at restoring Berlin's military-political potential – only in the distant future, when German remilitarisation was expected. The main issue was considered to be the need for an effective alliance, as Prague could not seriously contemplate a successful solitary war against a much stronger neighbour. Contemplations anticipated the active defence of Bohemia and a fighting retreat in Moravia and Slovakia only under conditions of a decentralised war industry and military organisation. To slow the German advance, the plan proposed creating defensive zones and permanent fortifications in sensitive areas that would hold back enemy columns. These columns would be attacked during the defence by a mobilised Czechoslovak manoeuvre army transported by trains and cars.

The French Military Mission's operational plans, containing a complete military-technical section, very often had an unusually broad information context. Specifically, they emphasised the political background of the future conflict, along with the reasons for Czechoslovakia's participation in it. We can also read into them the reflections of French officers on the geopolitical value of Czechoslovak territory for an armed conflict. The first study of an invasion by Czechoslovak troops from the Cheb area towards Bayreuth, which the 3rd Department of the Mission dated as early as 25 May 25 1919, had clear political motivation.[9] This somewhat unrealistically planned operation was based on France's interest in intervening militarily against Germany if it refused to accept the peace accord negotiated at the Paris Peace Conference (18 to 21 January 1920). A Czechoslovak division of two brigades was to set out from the Cheb area to occupy the town of Bayreuth in northern Bavaria.

The plan for this operation had nothing to do with defending the territory but was motivated by France's wider interests from a pan-European context. From the point of view of general geopolitical considerations, both 'B' plans are highly telling. The first contained a set of measures in the event of a Soviet offensive against Poland and

[9]R. Břach, *Francouzská vojenská mise v Československu 1919–1939, sv. 4,* (Praha: Vojenský historický ústav 2009), doc. no. 1, pp. 205–207.

Romania and emerged in January 1921.[10] The plan saw Carpathian Ruthenia as a 'pendant' of Czechoslovakia, immediately threatened by the potential advance of Soviet troops. This territory was considered difficult to defend due to its great distance from the Prague centre and its poor communication links with other parts of the republic. The second version of the 'B' plan, from 1 March 1921, modelled a plan to defend Carpathian Ruthenia in the case that the Soviet army would attack the Polish Armed Forces in Galicia and the Romanian Army in Bukovina.[11] The French planners then arrived at a general assessment of the situation, i.e. that the defence of this part of the Czechoslovak Republic faced extraordinary difficulties due to its elongated shape, the territory's insufficient depth, and the isolation of individual valleys separated by mountains. The influence of the members of the French Military Mission on the first Czechoslovak war plans was absolutely fundamental. This is also true of their operational component in terms of the transformation of Paris's military-political interests in Central Europe. Formally, this was expressed by the fact that, from the end of May 1919 to the end of 1925, the mission in Czechoslovakia operated as a command mission.[12]

Defence planning and the threat of Nazism

During the Locarno conference in October 1925 the head of the 3rd Department of the General Staff, Colonel V. B. Luža, prepared Operational Plan II directed against German aggression and its variant II-A, allowing for a military conflict with Horthy's Hungary.[13] At the turn of 1925, Czechoslovakia was not yet directly militarily endangered; however, the gradual weakening of its position and importance on the European superpower chessboard had begun.[14] Plan II against Germany, approved in December 1925, was therefore primarily defensive in nature, but provided for offensive activities in selected essential directions. The planners divided Czechoslovak territory into the main northern battlefield, including the Czech lands, and the secondary (southern) battlefield, i.e., the territory of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Three armies were planned to be deployed against Germany on the main

[10]R. Břach, *Francouzská vojenská mise v Československu 1919–1939, sv. 4,* (Praha: Vojenský historický ústav 2009), doc. no. 21, pp. 268–273.

[11]R. Břach, *Francouzská vojenská mise v Československu 1919–1939, sv. 4,* (Praha: Vojenský historický ústav 2009), doc. no. 22, pp. 274–279.

[12]R. Břach, 'Závěrečná zpráva generála Fauchera z 15. prosince 1938 o francouzské vojenské misi v Československu', *Historie a vojenství* 57 (3) (2008) p. 71.

[13]A. Maskalík, *Elita armády: československá vojenská generalita 1918–1992,* (Bánská Bystrice: HWSK 2012), p. 386; J. Malypetr and F. Soukup and J. Kapras, *Armáda a národ,* (Praha: Nakladatelství L. Mazáč 1938), p. 307.

[14]P. S. Wandycz, *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarisation of the Rhineland,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), p. 29.

battlefield. At the same time, military security against a possible Hungarian attack was considered. The core of Czechoslovak forces was to be located in Central Bohemia, so they could intervene in endangered directions as soon as possible. The Operational Plan II-A then contained an offensive variant with the aim of penetrating as deeply as possible into Hungarian territory to meet the Yugoslav and Romanian armies. In summary, operational document II and its variant II-A formed the basis for war planning until 1933. They served as a starting point for assembly plans against Nazi Germany in the second half of the 1930s. At the turn of 1927, Plan III was created, again focused on Germany, with Hungary, Austria, and the Soviet Union still considered secondary opponents. Eight divisions, twelve brigades, and most artillery were expected to be deployed against Germany on the main battlefield. The goal of the defence against Germany was to maintain the integrity of the Czech part of the state by covering the borders. The main Czechoslovak forces were to concentrate at assembly points north of the Rakovník-Prague-Hradec Králové line.[15] Operational document III underwent further modification in November 1929, in the event of a conflict with Hungary under the designation III-A, the essence of the latter being a rapid offensive of about 50 km into Hungarian territory with the aim of occupying critical industrial areas and paralysing arms production.[16]

In 1933, the Military Office of the President of the Republic, the Ministry of National Defence, the General Staff and provincial military headquarters prepared a large number of documents for the Supreme National Defence Council (SNDC). These were seen as an initial directive for developing a comprehensive operational plan. In the contemporary understanding of the time, the war plan became a general document based on legislative measures the aim of which can be characterised as universal preparation of the Czechoslovak state for waging war.[17] The war plan included, in general, measures for building up the armed forces and the tasks of the state in its economic, diplomatic and political preparation for armed conflict. The war plan was not a comprehensive and final document, but rather a framework guide for the coordination of war efforts by SNDC. Its concretisation was to take place according to the development of the war situation.[18] The written form of operational documents III and III-A was very simple. On maps at a scale of 1:200,000, a line-up of border-guarding and covering units was plotted according to the proposals of individual provincial military commanders. One page of the text (at most) contained instructions

[15]K. Straka and T. Kykal, *Československá armáda v letech budování a stabilizace 1918–193,2* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky 2013), p. 134.
[16]P. Pech and J. Anger, 'Plány použití buržoazní čs. armády v letech 1918–1938 (I)', *Historie a vojenství* 34 (4) (1985) pp. 52–53.
[17]J. Anger and P. Pech, 'Plány použití buržoazní čs. armády v letech 1918–1938 (II)', *Historie a vojenství* 34 (5) (1985) p. 77.
[18]Ibid., p. 78.

for deploying units in the assembly area. The war plans did not even specify the intention to use the air force or other types of weapons in operation.[19] The primary strategic idea in creating these studies became a variant of parallel military conflict between the Czechoslovak Republic and Germany, Hungary, and Austria in a pan-European war, in a joint action with France, the Little Entente and Poland. Only in the early 1930s was Nazi Germany seen in defensive planning terms to be the dominant and most dangerous enemy.[20]

Preparations for war and Munich 1938

Based on a comprehensive analysis, the Czechoslovak Armed Forces' General Staff concluded in early 1934 that Germany was the decisive security threat to the Czechoslovak Republic. This logically brought about a decrease in the intensity of defence preparations focused on Hungary and Austria. Operational planning began to express the principle of so-called strategic defence, based on the coalition ties of the Czechoslovak state. At the same time, the planners in the General Staff realistically assumed that maintaining the western half of the republic, and within it especially the 'Czech square' with the capital Prague in the middle, was not possible in the long run due to growing German military potential. Therefore, a strategic fighting retreat towards the east to delay was planned with a simultaneous transfer of combat activity to Austrian territory. However, this was based on the assumption of the entry of German troops into Austria.[21] In an internationally isolated encounter between Czechoslovakia and Germany lasting more than three weeks[22], the state was considered to be in danger of defeat due to the significantly greater military strength of Hitler's Wehrmacht and the strength of the Nazi war economy. Czechoslovak war preparations and plans therefore consistently envisaged a coalition form of conflict, with the absence of a French and allied commitment creating an insoluble military situation for Czechoslovakia.[23]

After 1935, the war plans under the General Staff's auspices took on the nature of the underlying military-political documents, which the SNDC were using as a tool for

[19]J. Fetka, *Československá válečná armáda 1918–1939: K vydání připravil Pavel Šrámek,* (Praha: Mladá fronta 2015), pp. 28–29.

[20]M. Koldinská and I. Šedivý, Ivan, *Válka a armáda v českých dějinách: sociohistorické črty,* (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny 2008), p. 47.

[21]K. Straka, *Československá armáda, pilíř obrany státu z let 1932–1939,* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky - AVIS 2007), p. 34.

[22]V. Kural and F. Vašek, *Hitlerova odložená válka za zničení ČSR,* (Praha: Academia 2008), p. 157.

[23]The Military History Archive (hereinafter MHA) Prague, Compendium 'Military Intelligence', File MI 36/I, The Military Situation Within the Time Period of Munich (Culmination of Tension Between Czechoslovakia and Germany), Secret, p. 1.

political, economic, technical and psychological preparation for war. Contrary to deep-rooted ideas, however, from the military-technical point of view there was no single text, but several documents. The basic organisation of the units and their wartime support was determined by the 1st Department of the General Staff according to the financial, material and human resources of the army and the state.

The assembly plan had intelligence, operational and material-transport components kept separately in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Departments of the General Staff. They were updated according to changes in the mobilisation plan, whereas the operational component was considered the master one. The material-transport component fully respected the operational intention and determined the mobilisation and assembly movements of the Czechoslovak armed forces accordingly. It also dealt with logistical support at the time and place of the planned deployment of troops. Of course, the war plans and their form were also influenced by the progress in fortification work after 1935 and the reorganisation of the peacekeeping and warfighting army. The army was preparing itself both for a stubborn defence and strategic manoeuvre. Therefore, it functionally divided into those units providing border security and cover, and units of the manoeuvre army. The new wartime organisation further manifested itself by inserting a corps-level of command between the army and the division.[24] As a result, the operational capabilities of the Czechoslovak armed forces increased sharply, having partially broken free from the constraints of French defensive doctrine.

In the years 1936 to 1938, all this was reflected in specific passages of the new assembly plans, with serial numbers IV and V.[25] The fourth variant still provided for the possibility of Czechoslovakia being simultaneously attacked by Germany and Hungary. Only three infantry divisions were planned to fight Hungarian troops because the plan assumed help from the Little Entente allies, Romania, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Plan V already showed a high degree of harmonisation with the applicable military legislation since it was based on calling up the three youngest years, the so-called first reserve and the necessary specialists. They were to join in a coordinated manner the border guard units in the main defensive position. [26] The assembly plan VI, valid from 15 February 15 1938, envisaged, despite calculating on the help of the allies, that the army would lead an isolated struggle against German superiority for two months according to the principle: '*The better the fortifications, the smaller the Czechoslovak army retreat and the smaller the threat of its encirclement and*

[24]Act No. 320/1936 Coll. of 18 December 1936 on the Change of the Administrative Scope of Military Units, as amended.
[25]M. John, *Září 1938. II. díl*, *Možnosti obrany Československa,* (Brno: Bonus A 1997), pp. 401–402.
[26]Provisions of § 22 of the Conscription Act of the Czechoslovak Republic No. 193/1920 Coll. of 19 March 1920, as amended.

destruction.'[27] The operational document moved the Czechoslovak defence to Lower Austria in anticipation of the Wehrmacht crossing the German-Austrian border. The assembly plan VI assigned the role of specific 'bait' to the 1st Army in Bohemia, which was to slow down the enemy's advance so that the Czechoslovak armed forces could mobilise, evacuate and carry out destructive work. In the case of unsustainable pressure from the German army, there was to be a retreat, a shortening of the front line, and taking up a defensive line in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands with support from the North Moravian heavy fortifications. If Moravia could not be held, it was planned to take up another defensive line in the Little Carpathians, Javorníky and Beskid Mountains.



Figure 2: Simplified map of languages spoken across Czechoslovakia (Map by Mariusz Paździora, CC BY 3.0)

As a result of the Anschluss of Austria with Germany, a modified version of the assembly plan VI-A came into force from April 1938, and this changed the composition of border security units and strengthened the number of reserve units in South Moravia.[28] From 15 July 1938, the assembly plan VII, which controlled the Czechoslovak army's operational line-up during the Munich crisis, applied. The basic

[27]J. Anger and P. Pech, 'Plány použití buržoazní čs. armády v letech 1918–1938 (III)', *Historie a vojenství* 34 (6) (1985) pp. 74–75.

[28]P. Šrámek, 'Nástupový plán československé armády v září 1938', A. Binar et al., *Ozbrojené síly a československý stát,* (Brno: Univerzita obrany 2020), p. 74.

philosophy was that of its predecessors. Still, at the same time, planners projected into it an even distribution of forces, inserting units into the gaps in light fortification, strengthening the most endangered stretches of defence, and specifying the areas of concentration for the of the manoeuvre army.[29] Within this plan, the General Staff realistically counted on the German army's efforts to achieve victory within ten days by rapidly traversing the republic in the area around Brno and encircling the core Czechoslovak forces in Bohemia. This would prevent attempts to take up defence in the Bohemian-Moravian Highlands or make a strategic retreat to Slovakia. Therefore, Assembly plan VII provided for a time-limited defence of the Czech square only for the purposes of rapid mobilisation, assembly movements, and orderly evacuation. The dramatic turn of events in summer and early autumn of 1938 brought its provisions to life early and put them to the test. Based on the fear that riots among the German population on the Czechoslovak border would become an excuse for a military attack, the Head of the General Staff asked General Ludvík Krejčí to declare 'Plan C' under § 22 of the Defence Act. This happened on the night of 13 September 1938. The president and the government only agreed to call up reservists-specialists (120,000 men). The number of Czechoslovak armed forces then reached more than 380,000 men.[30]

The decisive moment for describing the implementation of the assembly plan VII was the announcement of general mobilisation on 23 September 1938. On this day, the Czechoslovak Republic entered a state of defence emergency, and during the mobilisation process the Czechoslovak army went from a peace to a war footing. According to the mobilisation plans, the reserve bodies of the peacetime units built up units to war numbers, and in reality doubled existing units. Thus, the Czechoslovak warfighting army achieved the organisational structure that had come into force on 15 February 1938, based on the mobilisation plan effective until 15 February 1939.[31] However, the real situation in September did not correlate in detail with the plan.[32] In this regard, the decisive role fell upon the main headquarters under the code name 'PALACKÝ' (GS), which commanded the rapidly emerging warfighting armed forces. Initially, it was based in Prague-Klánovice, from where it moved to the Vyškov area on

[29]M. John, *Září 1938. II. díl, Možnosti obrany Československa,* (Brno: Bonus A 1997), p. 407.
[30]P. Šrámek, 'Československá armáda na podzim 1938', *Mnichov 1938: sedmdesát let poté: sborník textů,* (Praha: CEP 2008), pp. 108–109.
[31]R. Sander, 'Válečná československá armáda v září roku 1938', *Historie a vojenství* 44 (6) (1995) p. 44: MHA Bratislava, Special Collection of Military Historical Works, SC VI. A-833. MND to the ref. number 0053507 OMS 1955, Report on the Army of the Pre-Munich Republic, p. 51.
[32]J. Fiedler, V. Francev and E. Stehlík, 'Mobilizovaná československá armáda – iluze a realita', *Historie a vojenství* 45 (2) (1996) p. 167.

26 September.[33] The day before, while still in Klánovice, the General Staff, directed by General Ludvík Krejčí, issued two key operational documents in the form of an order and an instruction, in which they specified the implementation of the general assembly plan.

Based on a report written by the Head of the 2nd Department of the General Staff (Intelligence), the Commander-in-Chief ordered the implementation of variant XIII of assembly plan VII with partial changes.[34] The order's addressees were the commanders of the 1st Army (Bohemia), 2nd Army (northern Moravia), 3rd Army (Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia) and the 4th Army (southern Moravia). These changes aimed at strengthening the defence of Liberec and southern Bohemia. An acute danger of a German break into the main defensive position was expected in these directions. However, according to the content of same intelligence report, General Krejčí did not consider it necessary to change the instructions for the defence of the northern and southern sections of the border as a whole. The relevant senior commanders received the document's versions. The order determining variant XIII put an end to those items of the assembly plan that were inconsistent with it, which only confirms the view of the plan's framework character and generality. In general, variant XIII was based on the scenario of the March Anschluss of Austria and assumed a German effort to occupy the Czech borderland. It was grounded in transferring some divisions from the Moravian central reserve to endangered directions in Bohemia[35]. On the same day, 25 September 1938, at 10:00 pm, the Commander-in-Chief issued a personal and secret instruction for the operating armies' commanders, which set out further details of the operational situation.[36] The 1st Army was given the combat task of guarding the Aš salient, the Ohře River valley and the Klatovy fortifications against enemy actions in case they penetrated the main defensive position in the Šumava Mountains. The 2nd Army commander had to secure his western flank from a possible attack led from the Kladsko salient. The task of the 4th Army was quite obvious due to the incomplete fortifications on the southern Moravian border. Its commander was given the task of intensifying fortification works on the defensive positions I and II of border-guarding units and received an order to use the available civilian population to complete the work. The 3rd Army devoted its main effort to strengthening the Bratislava bridgehead. In his orders the Commander-in-Chief instructed all army commanders to move their

[33]P. Minařík and P. Šrámek, 'Několik poznámek k mobilizované československé armádě v září 1938', *Historie a vojenství* 45 (3) (1996) p. 140.
[34]P. Minařík and P. Šrámek, 'Dokumenty československé armády z podzimu 1938: rozkazy hlavního velitelství od 24. do 28. září', *Historie a vojenství* 45 (5) (1996) p. 87.
[35]P. Šrámek, *Ve stínu Mnichova: z historie československé armády 1932–1939,* (Praha: Mladá fronta 2008), p. 82.
[36]L. Krejčí, *Já se generálem nenarodil: z písemností hlavního velitele čs. armády nejen o roce 1938,* (Praha: Codyprint 2018), pp. 184–185.

troops in the event of pressure from the attacker so as to to support the defence of the endangered area, even at the expense of other sections of the front line.

Thanks to the mobilisation, approximately 1,127,000 soldiers joined the Czechoslovak army, and its total number rose to approximately 1,500,000 men. They served in 42 divisions, 55 combat squadrons, and the Danube river flotilla. This powerful force had 2,500 artillery pieces, 1,000 anti-tank guns, 348 tanks, 900 mortars, 568 combat aircraft and 36,000 motor vehicles, 190,000 horses and 32,000 wagons.[37] It is not the purpose of the present study to evaluate all the international-political or moral aspects of the events surrounding the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938. The occupation of the Czechoslovak borderland that took place in the Czech lands from 1 to 10 October 1938, and in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia in November of the same year, resulted in a humiliating demobilisation of the Czechoslovak armed forces. This was accompanied by numerous restrictions and redeployments, with only about 139,500 men returning to the peacetime organisation from the mobilised army.[38] Even in this context, it is necessary to appreciate Czechoslovakian operators and planners' foresight. In the summer of 1938, they supplemented assembly plan VII with variant VIII, which assumed the loss of Czechoslovak border areas without disrupting its defence system. However, events were already irresistibly heading towards the March occupation of the next year, and thus the demise of Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state. This was the swan song for the assembly plans of the Czechoslovak army of the 1930s not only in a symbolic, but also in a physical sense. During tense moments on 14 and 15 March 1939, the plans were destroyed at the behest of the Head of the General Staff, along with other classified intelligence and operational documentation.[39] However, the fight for the renewal of the Czechoslovak Republic was just beginning.

Defence plans and Czechoslovak London exile

The centre of the foreign Czechoslovak resistance was located in London between 1940 and 1945 as a part of a temporary state establishment under the leadership of Dr Edvard Beneš. Its goal at both a political and military level was clear: to restore the Czechoslovak Republic within its pre-Munich borders. The military structures of the resistance were gathered within the framework of the Ministry of National Defence. Also concentrated here were theoretical considerations of war. From the Czechoslovakian military experts' perspective came an entirely new impetus to start thinking about irregular forms of combat, specifically guerrilla or petty warfare. This form of combat activity was expected from domestic resistance organisations in the

[37]J. Anger, *Mnichov 1938* (Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda 1988), pp. 143–144.
[38]R. Sander, 'Válečná československá armáda v září 1938 (dokončení)', *Historie a vojenství* 45 (1) (1996) p. 59.
[39]V. Sluka, 'Československá armáda v datech III (1935 – 1939)', *Historie a vojenství* 45 (1) (1996) pp. 120–121.

protectorate, which were to disrupt the German war efforts through intelligence activities, sabotage, diversionary actions, and propaganda. And at an opportune moment, they were to unleash a nationwide armed uprising. The military doctrine and strategic thinking of pre-war Czechoslovakia did not anticipate these new forms of armed struggle.

The concept of irregular war was unfamiliar within established Czechoslovak military doctrine, and no pre-war defence plans provided for the possibility of launching this form of warfare.[40] The Czechoslovak armed forces did not carry out preparations for guerrilla warfare, or diversion, and sabotage in the enemy's rear. It seems odd that they had no technical, material or training basis for such activities, because, in the 1920s, Czechoslovak military experts had considered this form of warfare in response to the expected strategies of Germany and the Sudeten German minority in the Czechoslovak borderland.[41] Such strategies could not have come as a surprise: it was for these cases that the State Defence Guard was established.[42]

However, of all the Second World War participants, the United Kingdom found itself at the forefront in developing the concept of irregular warfare. In 1940, the British created the Special Operations Executive (SOE) as an effective tool for implementing this form of warfare.[43] The fact that the SOE was subordinate to the Ministry of Economic Warfare spoke volumes about the concepts that lay behind SOE's inception. The Minister of Economic Warfare, Hugh Dalton, said that this new way of waging war would be better executed under civilian management than under a purely military one. [44]

From the foreign based Czechoslovak resistance, the British expected above all the destabilisation of German military, political and economic power in Central Europe. The intelligence group under General František Moravec[45] (1895–1966) at the London based Ministry of National Defence (MND) complied with these efforts and arranged aid for the domestic resistance to be delivered by air. The culmination of their

[40]J. Šolc, *Podpalte Československo! kapitoly z historie československého zahraničního a domácího odboje (1939–1945),* (Praha: Naše vojsko 2005), p. 24.
[41]F. Vejmelka, 'Zajištění hranic a kryt. (Studie.)', *Vojenské rozhledy* 6 (6) (1925) p. 267.
[42]Act No. 270/1936 Coll. Of 23 October 1936 on the State Defence Guard, as amended.
[43]J. Šolc, *Přijdeme za svítání: diverze v neregulérní válce československého odboje v letech 1939–1945,* (Praha: Naše vojsko 2005), p. 11.
[44]M. Tillotson, *SOE and The Resistance: As told in The Times Obituaries,* (London: Bloomsbury 2011), p. 1.
[45]MHA Prague, Compendium Military Personal Files, Military Personal File of František Moravec, born 1895, the Counterfoil No. 9. D.

activities was the well-known May 1942 attempt on the life of Reinhard Heydrich, the Deputy Reich Protector and a high-ranking Nazi official. With regards to conceptual thinking, the British initiatives were mainly taken up by a study group formed at the 1st Section of the II Department of the London MND between June 1941 and January 1943. At that time, they were incorporated into the Staff for the Armed Forces Build-up (SAFB). It was here that planning of an uprising on Czechoslovak territory and providing assistance to the domestic resistance was concentrated. František Moravec then assessed the domestic conditions for carrying out an anti-German uprising as follows. He characterised Bohemia and Moravia's possibilities as extremely unfavourable, mainly because they lay in the middle of Europe locked between the hostile areas of Germany and Hungary. In 1943, when he formulated his views, the Czech-Moravian area was very far from the front lines, and its accessibility by air was complicated.[46] Besides, he characterised the protectorate's borders as impenetrable. Transporting people, equipment, and material to this area by air and land was difficult. Also, the importance which the occupiers attached to the Czech lands made it hard to start an armed uprising. This territory was considered a weapons manufacturing base for the Third Reich and was therefore of paramount importance to their waging war, and this resulted in the presence of a locally very rigid security regime.

These general conditions for the domestic space persisted for almost the entire war. They changed only at the very end of the Second World War. The study group at the London MND drew upon them as early as the beginning of August 1941, when they formulated their initial plans for an uprising's organisational structure.[47] The basic principle was formulated quite clearly: an armed uprising was to rely on the domestic population and their determination to break the occupying regime. The foreign resistance saw its role as providing organisational guidelines and military assistance (especially aircraft and paratroopers) with the necessary weapons and military equipment. During the first days, commanding military and civilian officials were to be transported to the home country. The specific time for the start of the action was agreed, in the planners' minds, to coincide with the final phase of the war, the position and movement of front lines, and possible anti-German uprisings in the surrounding countries. However, each variant assumed that the then foreign based political and military headquarters should be moved from London to as close as possible to the fighting forces in domestic territory. In terms of command structures, the study group assigned leadership to former officers and soldiers of the Czechoslovak army.

[46]F. Moravec, 'Partyzánská válka', *Vojenské rozhledy* 3 (2) (1943) p. 11.

[47]MHA Prague, Fund of Central Public Security Administration, sign. MND – Study Group, the ref. number 20014-Secret Study Group. The Preparation of a Revolutionary Organisation in Czechoslovakia. London, 5 August 1941.

In January 1942, the London based MND study group drew up a comprehensive planning document which discussed preparations for the domestic uprising, including organisational matters.[48] This was no longer just a plan of irregular war actions, but an important proposal of a mobilising nature based on the Czechoslovak Republic's military legislation. The proposal divided the planned action into three phases. In the first phase, armed actions were to break out throughout pre-Munich Czechoslovakia on the initiative of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpathian Ruthenians. The second phase was mobilisation, and the resulting military units were to occupy the entire territory of the republic, including areas inhabited by Germans and Hungarians. The occupation of some regions beyond the Czechoslovak Republic's original borders was also planned, if this step could improve the strategic conditions for the state's defence. The third phase of the uprising was similar to the second phase, because additional troops were to be mobilised with the aim of creating a Czechoslovak armed forces' peacekeeping organisation. The eventual occupation of parts of Germany and Hungary was also planned. There were no clear dividing lines between the periods, rather individual phases could permeate one another or take place simultaneously.

In their deliberations, the London planners relied on the organisational structure of the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as the central part of the Czechoslovak Republic, and specified for it plans for the uprising, the subsequent occupation and securing of state borders, and the formation of a provisional army. The organisation and command were to be based on political districts with their relevant municipalities, with several political districts forming a group with common tactical tasks. The higher unit was the area in which several groups were to combine based on a communication link. The organising of the uprising was given a solid framework by the already mentioned occupation and securing of the Czechoslovak state borders. Great emphasis was placed on the psychological moment of surprise when foreign territories that were strategically advantageous for the Czechoslovak Republic were to be occupied, and at a time when the Allies had not yet made a final decision on the post-war peace settlement. The state border's closure was planned so that German occupiers could not export state, public or private property, or documents from protectorate offices. This step also aimed at preventing war criminals from fleeing abroad.

Experts in the study group relied on Czechoslovak defence legislation in organising the uprising. They, therefore, proceeded from Beneš's idea of state and legal continuity with the pre-Munich Czechoslovakia. These notions presupposed that the Munich Pact and the March 1939 occupation had no basis in international law. Under this concept,

[48]MHA Prague, Fund of Central Public Security Administration, sign. Study Group MND-London. The Proposal of Preparatory Work for the Domestic Revolution and Organisation of Military Forces. January 1942. Number of Sheets: Dossier.

Czechoslovakia continued de jure, including legal regulations that regulated its defence issues. In this respect, the annexes to the plan as of January 1942 can be considered particularly instructive. The legal structure of the mobilisation and build-up of the army under the conditions of the uprising took the following outlines. By decree of the President of the Republic, a partial mobilisation of members of the Czechoslovak armed forces was to be announced under the Defence Act of 1920.[49] The plan subsequently assumed that the Czechoslovak government, by its decree, would put the entire state on a defence emergency footing under the State Defence Act of 1936.[50] The Minister of National Defence would then execute the presidential mobilisation decree using a regulation and specify the conditions for partial mobilisation. Failure to obey the call-up notice was punishable within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Defence Act.[51] Based on the above facts, we can appreciate the invention of the London study group members, who included in the plan of uprising the possibility of using all armed units in the Protectorate to restore state power, public order, and security, and as soon as possible.

Broadly speaking, these plans were well thought through and doctrinally beneficial. However, whether or not the uprising would take place and in what form depended on how the war would take shape, but conditions did not stabilise in a form corresponding to that assumed at the beginning of 1942. To understand the thinking of the London MND, draft plans for the uprising of autumn 1944 have survived, and they take into account the experience of the Warsaw uprising and the Slovak National Uprising (SNU) [52]. Two uprisings against the German occupiers had occurred in August of the same year. Czechoslovak soldiers concluded that if armed revolt was to make any sense at all, it had to be carried out in the rear of German-occupied territory and make a significant contribution to the collapse of the eastern front. At the end of 1944 it was the overall situation on the eastern front and the intentions of the Soviet High Command that would decide when to start the insurgency.

The irregular war and nationwide uprising eventually took place on Czechoslovak territory in a significantly different way to that planned by the London study group specialists. Perhaps most telling is the activity of the Office of the Government

[49]Provisions of § 3 of Act No. 193/1920 Coll. of 19 March 1920 (Defence Act of the Czechoslovak Republic), as amended.
[50]Provisions of § 57 of Act No. 131/1936 Coll. of 13 May 1936 on the Defence of the State, as amended.
[51]Provisions of § 50 of Act No. 193/1920 Coll. of 19 March 1920 (Defence Act of the Czechoslovak Republic), as amended.
[52]MHA Prague, Compendium 'Military Intelligence', Archive Box No. 1, document No. 31 Organisation of the Uprising in Bohemia and Moravia – The Preparation for Battle Operations + the Map, the ref. number 156-taj.5.1944.

Delegate for the Liberated Territories of Dr František Němec (1944–1945).[53] As a representative of the London exiles and the renewed Czechoslovak state administration, he quarrelled with both the insurgent Slovak National Council and the Soviets. They ignored him and subsequently expelled him from the territory of liberated Carpathian Ruthenia. The Liberated Territories Command, headed by General Antonín Hasal, working within the Office, in the end fulfilled almost nothing that the London planners had devised. The mobilisation of Czechoslovak citizens announced in Carpathian Ruthenia failed completely thanks to Soviet propaganda.[54] However, all these obstacles in no way diminish the planning efforts of the exiled MND, which, under British influence, broadened the horizons of Czechoslovak operational considerations.

The Cold War and the Sovietisation of Post-War Plans

Two fundamental facts influenced Czechoslovak war planning after the Second World War. Firstly, the beginning of the nuclear era, and secondly, geopolitical fluctuation between East and West in the years 1945 to 1948, that culminated in events in Prague in February 1948 and the incorporation of Czechoslovakia within the USSR's sphere of influence.[55]

The Soviet leader, Stalin, purposefully created a system of states allied to the USSR to act as a buffer zone with the western states.[56] They were fearful of the large Soviet army, given the then small size of the armies of the European states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.[57] However, Stalin remained afraid of an open confrontation with the United States and its European allies. On the other hand, goaded by his own suspicions he modernised the already massive ground forces of the

[53]K. Schelle, *Československé dějiny státu a práva v dokumentech VI. díl: období nesvobody (1939–1945),* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita 1993), p. 248.

[54]F. Hanzlík, 'Působení vládní delegace a Velitelství osvobozeného území na Zakarpatské Ukrajině – představy a realita', *Československá armáda 1939–1945 (plány a skutečnost): příspěvky z mezinárodní konference 22–23 října 2002,* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany České republiky - AVIS 2003), p. 208.

[55]F. Sauer, *Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U. S. Nuclear Weapons*, (Basingstoke: Pallgrave Macmillan 2016), p.1; K. McDermott, *Communist Czechoslovakia, 1945–1989: A Political and Social History,* (Basingstoke: Pallgrave Macmillan 2015), p. 21.

[56]B. Kendallová, *Studená válka: nový pohled na konflikt mezi Západem a Východem,* (Praha: Euromedia Group 2018), p. 35.

[57]J. Hoffenaar, 'Problémy s hlavní obrannou linií v hlavním sektoru NATO počátkem 50. let', *Historie a vojenství* 52 (3–4) (2003) p. 655.

Eastern Bloc.[58] In August 1949 the USSR ended Washington's nuclear monopoly. Soviet war planning after 1945 was based on these circumstances, along with experience gained from Second World War operations. For Czechoslovak operational experts, such planning was the exemplar of how to plan and carry out a large-scale offensive campaign.[59] Within Cold War operational planning, there was only one significant modification, i.e. the idea of creating breakthroughs using nuclear weapons and the massive use of air power.[60] Soviet strategists had been adapting their war plans to incorporate the use of nuclear weapons since the mid-1950s. The Soviet Field Regulations of 1955 assumed their use both against strategic targets in the deep hinterland of the European theatre of war and at the tactical level on the battlefield.

However, the war plans authored by the Operational Department, later the Operational Administration of the Czechoslovakian General Staff, did not consider nuclear attack until 1957. Between 1951 and 1953, operational guidelines and plans with the code designations OREL, PĚST, SOKOL and HVĚZDA were created. The latter two documents, drawn up before the Warsaw Pact had been established, were presented to the Soviet General Staff in February 1952, which actively intervened in their final form before even the Czechoslovak Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (and President of the Czechoslovak Republic) Klement Gottwald approved them in September 1952.[61] It was, therefore, impossible to talk about any independent creative work by Czechoslovak planners. These operational documents contained no, or only brief, military-political justification of their origin, while the military-technical and organisational component was predominant. This was especially true of the OREL war plan from the beginning of February 1951, which stated that in the event of a potential attack by Western armies against the USSR, Czechoslovak territory would not represent a strategic direction for them. OREL therefore primarily dealt with defensive plans and positions to take up when covering the country against attack. In such an attack, a fierce defence was envisaged by units within the defensive zone, so that the mobilisation and concentration of the Czechoslovak army could take place. Should the enemy break through, counter-strikes would restore the integrity of the defence.[62] The absence of a Czechoslovak capability to deploy nuclear weapons in this period is understandable, as Stalin underestimated the role of nuclear weapons during this period, because they were not yet operationally deployable.

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[58]J. Fučík, *Stín jaderné války nad Evropou: ke strategii vojenských bloků, operačním plánům a úloze Československé lidové armády na středoevropském válčišti v letech 1945–1968,* (Praha: Mladá fronta 2010), p. 122.
[59]J. Ťokan, 'Plánování útočné operace armády', *Vojenská mysl* 2 (2) (1952) p. 14.
[60]K. Štěpánek and P. Minařík, *Československá lidová armáda na Rýnu* (Praha: Naše vojsko 2007), p. 39.
[61]Ibid., pp. 100–101.
[62]Ibid., pp. 100–101.

At the turn of 1957, the war plan ZÁSTAVA brought a new approach in a defensive (Z 1) and offensive (Z 2) variant, which had to be pre-negotiated in Moscow. These variants also took into account the abolition of command levels of the rifle corps. ZÁSTAVA's operational intent already counted upon the deployment of nuclear weapons, both in the defence variant, in the case of an offensive by NATO states, and conversely, also during a Soviet attack on NATO. However, even the offensive variant Z 2 cannot be considered as a transition to offensive planning. According to the Soviet General Staff's explicit recommendation, it was an operational document for concentrating troops and regrouping them to a starting position for a strike in the direction of Pilsen and Nuremberg; all this while using Soviet nuclear weapons. The subsequent course of the offensive campaign was not specified at that time.[63] When activating the ZÁSTAVA plan, the Czechoslovak People's Army was to be commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces: a body of the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact, despite the fact that the military structures of the Pact were only just being formed.[64] The turn of the 1950s brought new momentum to the war plans. The operational preparations of the Eastern Bloc clearly shifted to an offensive strategy. At the same time, from the state's point of view, creating an independent strategic-operational unit, the so-called Czechoslovak Front (CF), played a decisive role. Only the resources of the Czechoslovak People's Army's (CPA) were used for its build-up, and therefore it had the status of a first-tier national union within the Warsaw Pact troops. It was a massive grouping, formed, among other divisions, by the 1st, 4th Divisions and the special 10th Air Force, which could deploy up to 1,920 tanks. However, the CPA's missile arm was not established until 1962, and until then the Czechoslovak Front did not include any means for a nuclear attack on the enemy. [65] If Czechoslovak war plans provided for the use of nuclear weapons at that time, the atomic warheads would be exclusively Soviet delivered and controlled. Therefore, only the Soviet command could decide on nuclear deployment.

This was expressed in the Plan of Action of the Czechoslovak People's Army during Wartime created in 1964 in a single copy (in Russian) during a meeting of senior officials of the Czechoslovak army at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Moscow. [66] For the initial period of a war, it was planned to move from an

[63]Ibid., p. 142.

[64]M. Bílý, 'Je načase opustit alianci s Moskvou? Organizace Varšavské smlouvy v kontextu krize východního bloku v roce 1956', *Paměť a dějiny* 10 (1) (2016), p. 25.

[65]V. Mohyla and V. Šufajzl et al., *Taktické jaderné prostředky ČSLA* (Praha: Československý spisovatel 2012), p. 226.

[66]S. Polnar and B. Prokop, "'Memorandum 68" v kontextu československého strategického myšlení 60. let', *Sborník prací pedagogické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity, řada společenských věd* 33 (2) (2019), p. 133.

initial defence of the state's border to an offensive campaign. The emphasis on the offensive campaign was also reflected in the growing importance of highly mobile tank corps and divisions. The average operating pace of advance was estimated at 90 to 110 kilometres per day. According to these calculations, the army's planned main force was a thousand tanks in two divisions.[67] Military theorists did not appreciate the fact that a completely new situation would arise on the battlefield in the case of a bilateral nuclear strike. According to the American strategic concept of 'Shield and Sword', the entire Eastern Bloc had to expect strikes by B-52 bombers carrying nuclear warheads of up to several tens of megatons.[68] In this context, it is clear that the plan of 1964 prepared an early strike against the Czechoslovak Front's missile forces, and its frontal and long-range aviation forces. The offensive campaign's success was based on the use of 131 Soviet nuclear missiles and atomic bombs. The first nuclear strike was to take place in conjunction with an airborne forces operation that would cross the German rivers Neckar and Rhine. The offensive sequence of the CF operational line-up was intended for an offensive in the direction of Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Strasbourg, Epinal, Dijon and finally, Lyon. According to Soviet planners, Lyon was to be achieved on the ninth day after the campaign had started.[69]

According to the 1964 plan, the Soviet plan was to reach and occupy the Atlantic coast as quickly as possible, especially the entire depth of French territory.[70] This was to prevent the seaborne influx of American reinforcements to NATO. Concerning the CF's tasks the plan was based on unrealistic assumptions. The CF's nuclear strikes were intended to destroy the enemy's operational line-up from a depth of 100 to 150 km beyond the Czechoslovak border. In this situation, the CF's armed forces would be faced by undamaged and well-armed conventional NATO forces. Behind them, the attacking Czechoslovak troops would encounter a devastated 'no man's land'. In these conditions it would be impossible to maintain an operational pace of advance of around 100 km per day. The plan only copied the visions of the Soviet General Staff, expressing as it did the subordination of the Czechoslovak command.[71] Its main weakness was an

[67]J. Nečas, 'K některým problémům plánování útočné operace', *Vojenská mysl* 11 (4) (1961), p. 93.
[68]J. Tůma and J. Pokštefl, *Svět a jaderné zbraně: štěpné – vodíkové – neutronové* (Praha: Nakladatelství politické literatury 1962), p. 50.
[69]P. Luňák, 'Za devět dnů jsme v Lyonu: plán použití Československé lidové armády v případě války z roku 1964', *Soudobé dějiny* 7 (3) (2000), p. 414.
[70]MHA Prague, Fund Collection of Czechoslovak Military Regulations after 1945 (Part 1), carton 218, inv. no. 3380, volume 1965, OPER-52-6, Military-Geographical Handbook of the Western Battlefield, Part VI. (France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), pp. 84-86.
[71]M. Zachariáš, *Příběh vojáka: pohled na čtyřicetiletou službu vojáka z povolání, od poručíka po generálporučíka, od 50. let až po listopadovou revoluci v roce 1989 a krátce po ní* (Praha:

isolated understanding of the course of possible campaigns. The situation that would have arisen within the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic following a NATO nuclear strike was not considered at all.

Another CPA operational plan was created in December 1977, and this can be considered a relative shift compared to the war plan of 1964. In the event of a NATO attack the plan envisaged it using conventional weapons and nuclear weapons from the very beginning. The primary CF task was to cover the borders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic adjacent to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Austria. However, after repelling the attack, the Czechoslovak Front was to move on to an offensive campaign in the direction of Pilsen, Ulm, Freiburg, and with part of the forces towards Munich. The front's next target was nothing less than reaching the French and Swiss borders on the eighth or ninth day of operational activity. It aimed therefore at the complete destruction of NATO troops in the southern part of the FRG and overall control of Western Europe. The poor Soviet understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons manifested itself in planning for a nuclear variant of the attack, where the Czechoslovak Front was expected to be allocated 258 atomic warheads (162 for the missile forces and 96 for the air forces).[72] It was a plan based on the Soviet concept of the offensive strategic operation of the front.[73] The Czechoslovak war plan of October 1986 did not represent any fundamental shift in this respect. The planning of the Czechoslovak Front's combat activities again provided for both a nuclear variant and a purely conventional variant. After repelling hostile aggression, the plan's internal structure would move over to an offensive campaign, this time, however, with more 'realistic' operational deadlines of fifteen to sixteen days to reach eastern borders of France and Switzerland's Basel. Still, in its atomic variant, the plan again represented 'nuclear madness', with the incredible number of 344 nuclear warheads planned for the Czechoslovak Front's offensive campaign.[74]

The second half of the 1980s brought more significant shifts. In May 1987, following the changes initiated by Gorbachev's Soviet leadership, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee adopted for the first time the official military doctrine of the Pact, which can simply be described as 'perestroika' or restructuring in the military

Dokořán 2012), p. 202; J. Hoffenaar and Ch. Findlay, (eds.), *Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict during the Cold War: an Oral History Roundtable Stockholm, 24–25 April 2006,* (Zurich: Centre for Security Studies 2007), p. 94.

[72]P. Luňák, (ed.), *Plánování nemyslitelného: československé válečné plány 1950–1990,* (Praha: Dokořán 2019), pp. 261–262.

[73]FM 100-2-1, Headquarters – Department of the Army. *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*. Chapter 4: Front Offensive (4-1). 16 July 1984.

[74]P. Luňák, (ed.), *Plánování nemyslitelného: československé válečné plány 1950–1990* (Praha: Dokořán 2019), p. 297.

field. It was a defensively minded document to which the CPA command had to respond once it had been approved by the Czechoslovak political leadership. There were also efforts to develop a domestic military doctrine; however, realistic changes were ultimately reflected in the greater emphasis of Czechoslovak military science (and therefore operational art) on elaborating defence issues and, in that context, carrying out counterattacks and counterassaults.[75] Consequently, it is evident that the practical implications of the new doctrine on operational planning, although primarily defensive in nature, did not exclude offence as a primary combat activity.[76] This corresponded to the wording of the last Czechoslovak war plan, as signed by the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Gustav Husák at the beginning of July 1989, which took full account of the 'recommendations' of the Soviet General Staff from the previous year. The defensive campaign was again prepared in both conventional and nuclear variants. Should the war enter the nuclear stage, the Czechoslovak Front was to destroy NATO troops with tactical nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, Soviet strategic forces would attack targets throughout the depths of West German territory. It was planned that the Czechoslovak Front would be allocated 546 nuclear warheads and would move into the FRG in a subsequent counterattack.[77]

Collapse of the bipolar world and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia

The final period of Czechoslovak war planning began in January, and in his own distinctive way by the first post-November 1990 president, Václav Havel. He confirmed the operational plan from the previous year with his signature, after requesting the removal of the paragraphs referring to a possible counterattack and emphasising that this would only apply in situations where NATO attacked the Warsaw Pact. When the Czechoslovak state entered its last period of existence between 1990 and 1992, the military-political situation in Europe was dominated by entirely different trends to those of the Cold War. A security vacuum emerged in Central Europe, and a treaty to limit conventional weapons in Europe was implemented.[78] The new strategic reality expanded the treaty's essential functions to include conflict prevention, crisis management, communication with former enemies,

[75]M. Bílý, '"Každý metr země socialistických států musí být urputně bráněn": proměna vojenské doktríny Varšavské smlouvy ve druhé polovině 80. let', *Historie a vojenství* 68 (2) (2019), pp. 30–31.

[76]M. Stráňava and S. Beránek, 'Organizace, plánování a řízení komplexního palebného ničení nepřítele v obranné operaci', *Vojenská mysl* 37 (7) (1987) p. 25.

[77]P. Luňák, (ed.), *Plánování nemyslitelného: československé válečné plány 1950–1990* (Praha: Dokořán 2019), p. 341.

[78]J. Kútik and M. Janhuba, *Vojenskostrategické koncepce zahraničních armád: skripta* (Brno: Vojenská akademie 1991), p. 25.

and strengthened tendencies towards collective defence and dialogue.[79] In this context it was logical that the military doctrine of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, approved in a resolution of the Federal Assembly dated 20 March 1991, was based on: a purely defensive principle; and did not define a specific enemy (azimuth defence principle): and banned the production, possession and deployment of all nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[80] Preparation for the previously ubiquitous threat of nuclear attack was no longer relevant.[81]

The Operational Plan for the defence of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, signed by President Havel on 28 January 1992, was based on these principles.[82,] The military doctrine for the Czechoslovak Army's ground forces would be defensive campaigns, most likely conducted by the army corps, and without any use of WMD.[83] In the first half of the 1990s, the Army Corps was to consist of five brigades with 24,600 personnel (including corps units and corps rear), 240 tanks, 350 armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and 12 combat helicopters.[84] There were also proposals for abolishing the divisional level and for transition to the structure, battalion – brigade – army corps.[85] The brigade was now considered the optimal and basic operational-tactical unit for ground forces.[86] This would allow greater flexibility and speed of command in the conditions of a defensive campaign. Analysis of the initial period of a war, especially how it would start and how the aggressor's attack would be repelled, continued to be of considerable importance for the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic's defence. The probability of a sudden attack against the state territory decreased significantly, since any crisis situation would

[79]S. A. Johnston, *How NATO adapts: strategy and organisation in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950,* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2017), p. 118.
[80]Resolution No. 122 of the Federal Assembly, https://mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/1991%20Vojenska%20doktrina%20CSFR.pdf Accessed 19 Oct 2022.
[81]M. Štangl, 'Místo a úloha zbraní hromadného ničení včera a dnes', *Vojenské rozhledy* 33 (9) (1992), p. 31.
[82]The alteration of the title of the Czechoslovak People´s Army (CPA) to the Czechoslovak Army was realised on 14 March 1990, on the basis of Act No. 74/1990 Coll; P. Tomek, *Československá armáda v čase Sametové revoluce: proměny ozbrojených sil na přelomu osmdesátých a devadesátých let* (Cheb: Svět křídel 2019), p. 168.
[83] R. Janderka, 'Vojenská doktrína ČSFR a principy operačního umění', *Vojenské rozhledy* 33 (3) (1992) p. 46.
[84]M. Sládeček and K. Štěpánek, *Vojenská strategie* (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany ČR 1993), p. 103.
[85]M. Štembera, 'Problémy profesionalizace ČSA', *Vojenská mysl* 41 (3) (1991) p. 19.
[86]L. Klíma, 'Profesionalizace a struktura ozbrojených sil', *Vojenská mysl* 41 (3) (1991) p. 13.

doubtless be preceded by escalating political tensions. Use of the armed forces had to be planned so that they would be able to operate in any part of the Czechoslovak federation and be able to defend it in all possible directions.

Conclusion

Is it possible to pinpoint unifying points in the long period of existence of the Czechoslovak state that were reflected in its war plans as a whole? It is, even if there are not many such points.

Firstly, the shape of the state territory and its geopolitical position at Central Europe's crossroads meant operational planning took these facts into account, even though it was significantly influenced by the prevailing international-political climate in which the republic sought to define its own concept of defence.

Secondly, alliances have always exerted a powerful effect on the format of the plans for military operations. After 1918 this influence came from France, and during the war years from Britain, and after 1948 the Soviet Union. Plans to wage war at those times were not primarily aimed at promoting the interest of the state, but instead largely served the ambitions of other players on the European chessboard.

Thirdly, another turning point was the emergence of nuclear weapons and their planned implementation in the operational planning of socialist Czechoslovakia from the mid-1950s. The ideas prevailing at the time, of conflict with the North Atlantic Alliance, were far closer to apocalyptic visions than the idea of armed conflict as an active tool for achieving political goals. The transformation of the European continent into a glowing atomic cauldron could only have resulted in defeat for many and victory for none.

Fourthly, and more importantly, an emphasis on defensive planning before 1938 which culminated in the mobilisation of a large army in September 1938, and a reversion to a defensive posture after 1990.

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Post-War Change

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ABSTRACT
In 1945 the Admiralty owned a large number of Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, most of which were oil tankers with the larger freighting tankers transporting oil to naval bases, and the smaller attendant tankers issuing it to the Royal Navy in harbour or at sheltered anchorages. During the war a new requirement had emerged for replenishment at sea, and in the post-war period this became the main activity for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). This article describes how the post-war RFA met that demand by changing its ships and organisation away from its mainstream British Merchant Navy roots towards the Royal Navy it supports.

Introduction

Figure 1: RFA Resource – Off South Africa 1971.[1]

While no firm definition exists, it is generally accepted that a fleet or naval auxiliary is a government owned ship which supports combatant warships. A typical 1970s British

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1648
[1]Author's own photograph taken from RFA Resurgent.

Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) is shown above. The term fleet or naval auxiliary is not normally applied to small vessels, such as harbour launches, tugs, and barges operating within and around naval ports.

In 1905 the Admiralty designated four of its existing auxiliaries as RFAs although they continued to operate them with civilian crews as though they were a part of the British Merchant Navy.[2] That practice continued virtually unaltered until 1945 but after that 'the RFA' began to emerge as a distinct entity within the Merchant Navy. In the post-war period the RFA has increasingly moved away from that Merchant Navy model towards one with a very close alignment to the Royal Navy. As of April 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence states that 'the RFA' is one of five organisations that make up the Naval Service: the Surface Fleet; the Fleet Air Arm; the Submarine Service; the Royal Marines; and the RFA.[3] Further noting that, 'The RFA is the largest UK employer of British merchant seamen and in June 2020, had 1,625 trained personnel, comprising 561 Officers, 244 Chief or Petty Officers and 820 Ratings, with a further 86 Officers and 131 Ratings under training.'[4] The RFA was then about 5% of the size of the Royal Navy in personnel terms, and operated eleven ships, two of which were in reserve.

This article briefly considers the history of British fleet auxiliaries up to the end of the Second World War before examining why and how the RFA undertook its post-war journey.[5]

The Royal Navy: Coal, Oil & Tankers

The emergence of the steam engine as source of warship propulsion made coal essential for the defence of the United Kingdom. During the 1850s the Admiralty began buying Steam Coal from new mines in South Wales. This was the optimum type of coal for marine boilers, and in 1904 alone the Admiralty bought 1.25 million tons of it.[6] By 1900 the South Wales coalfields had sufficient reserves to meet the Admiralty's requirements for 200 years.[7] With a secure domestic supply, and access to a commercially sophisticated, and largely British owned global coal supply chain, the

[2]In 1920 King George V granted the term Merchant Navy to recognise British commercial shipping companies' service and losses during the First World War. The term was in use before 1920 , as was Mercantile Marine, for what was, and remains, a disaggregated entity without any formal structure.

[3]https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk. Accessed 6 April 2022. 'Our organisation.'

[4]https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk. Accessed 25 November 2021. Since updated.

[5]This article is not intended to be a post-1945 RFA history as such, for a complete history see sources in Appendix 1.

[6]Warwick Michael Brown, Unpublished PhD Thesis: *The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1898-1939; The Transition From Coal to Oil,* (London: King's College, 2003), p. 23.

[7]Ibid., p. 26.

Admiralty neither needed to own coal mines, nor own railways and colliers. The Admiralty's Fleet Coaling Service (FCS) could contract on the open market for coal delivery to worldwide FCS stockpiles.

When oil emerged as a superior marine fuel it altered this status quo and in time oil would replace coal, although it was a slow process. In 1905 the Admiralty bought 10,000 tons of oil, less than 1% of the coal it had bought in 1904.[8] The story of the Admiralty securing oil supplies from Burma and Persia is well known, but less obvious are differences in the coal and oil supply chains of that period. Whereas the coal supply chain was disaggregated with numerous mine, railway and ship owners in economic competition, there were fewer oil companies, and they preferred vertically integrated businesses. With control over all stages of their supply chain from well to customer they could and did control oil supply, transport, and prices.

Faced with this situation, the Admiralty needed more than access to oil supplies, it also needed to own freighting tankers to protect it from the oil companies' dominant transport position.

The Early Years

The first reference to a naval stores function can be found in the Tudor period, and by the late Victorian period this had evolved into the Royal Navy Supply and Transport Service (RNSTS), a civil service organisation within the Admiralty that reported to the Fourth Sea Lord. This late Victorian RNSTS sourced and organised the transport of the Royal Navy's food, coal, naval stores, ammunition, and spare parts. Around 1900 the Fleet Coaling Service (FCS) was created within the RNSTS to buy and arrange the transport of coal to naval stockpiles for FCS supply to the Royal Navy. The FCS operated 10 civilian crewed harbour tugs, 5 floating coal depots, 2 coal hulks, 20 miscellaneous vessels, and 224 coal barges and lighters. During the First World War the FCS became the Fleet Fuelling Service (FFS) to reflect the Royal Navy's increasing use of oil.[9] This period has not been well researched, with one expert on the RFA's history noting it remains 'a subject that has floated in uncertain waters for nearly a century.'[10]

At the same time the Admiralty was also seeking to differentiate commissioned warships, with Royal Navy crews, flying the White Ensign, and subject to the Naval Discipline Acts, from the Admiralty's numerous civilian crewed auxiliaries, flying a Blue

[8]Ibid., p. 54.
[9]Ibid., p. 33.
[10]http://www.rfaa-london.org.uk/app/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/RFA-history-09-origins-of-the-RFA.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2021. See an article by Tom Adams MBE, at one time RFA Advisor to the Royal Navy Historical Branch.

Ensign, and subject to the Merchant Navy Acts. In 1900 the first attempt failed to satisfy the requirements of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act. A partial solution came in 1905 when four Admiralty owned auxiliaries were identified as RFAs, and those under contract from commercial owners recognised as Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries (MFAs).[11] The residual legal issues were resolved in 1907 and 1911 although none of this legal activity introduced the concept of an RFA organisation - the entire focus was on the registration and operation of ships.[12]



Figure 2: RFA Maine: 2,780 GRT.[13]

The four Admiralty designated RFAs, were a hospital ship, the *RFA Maine,* generally recognised as the first RFA, the *RFA Petroleum*, an oceangoing oil tanker, and the *RFA Kharki*, a large collier, bought for conversion to a tanker. At a time when the Royal Navy depended on coal the Admiralty only owned only one large collier, the *RFA Mercede*s, and showing how much the Admiralty relied on Britain's position in the global coal supply chain.

[11]An MFA is today called a 'Ship Taken Up From Trade' (STUFT) and would be shipowner operated.

[12]Thomas Adams & James Smith, *The Royal Fleet Auxiliary – A Century of Service,* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2005), pp. 9-12 for more details.

[13]http://historicalrfa.org/ships-starting-with-m/1895-rfa-maine-1.%20Accessed%2015%20February%202021. Accessed 6 April 2022; see Appendix 1 for definitions.

Year	Freighting Tankers	Attendant Tankers	Others	RFA Total
1905	2	0	2	4
1914	1	5	10	16
1918	26	81	20	127
1939	18	36	3	57
1945	37	64	26	127

Figure 3: RFA Fleet Analysis[14]

It can be seen that: before 1945 most RFAs were Attendant Tankers, that made coastal freighting voyages or in the manner of the FCS, bunkered the Royal Navy within ports or at sheltered anchorages. The centrality of oil tankers to the pre-1945 RFA is apparent.

The Admiralty's numerous small support vessels, such as harbour tugs, barges and passenger craft never became a part of the RFA, they remained within the FCS/FFS and the Admiralty Yard Craft Service, or its successor the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service. This role was outsourced to Serco in 2008 under a Private Finance Initiative.

Before 1945 the RFAs were operated in accordance with Merchant Navy practice since that was the most attractive commercial and operational model for what were in all respects merchant ships. These RFAs were designed to Merchant Navy standards, were built in British shipyards, were registered in the UK, were subject to UK legislation, were inspected and certified by Lloyds Register, and their Merchant Navy crews were subject to the UK's Merchant Shipping Acts. How the RFA's crews were sourced will be discussed later, but here it is sufficient to say that also followed contemporary practice. It is worth noting that RFA crews were not, and even now are not, subject to the Naval Discipline Acts that regulate the Royal Navy.

The Development of Replenishment at Sea (RAS)

The full story of the Anglo-American development of afloat support in the period 1900-1953 has been well documented by Peter Nash.[15] This history is not replicated here but a brief outline of the relevant events and techniques is included to aid understanding of their influence on the transformation of the post-war RFA.

[14]Compiled and interpreted from sources in Appendix 1.

[15]Peter Nash, *The Development of Mobile Logistic Support in Anglo-American Naval Policy, 1900-1953,* (University of Florida Press: Gainsville Fl., 2009), pp. 9-11. See also http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/GSBO-01.html. Accessed 6 April 2022. *Gray Steel and Black Oil - Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the US Navy 1912-1992,* is an excellent resource.

Although the Royal Navy had carried out coal and oil RAS trials in the early 1900s the outcomes were poor and were ultimately unimportant to a Royal Navy with numerous naval bases. For the United States Navy (USN), bounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, RAS had a higher priority.[16]

Two techniques for refuelling at sea were in use before 1939, the astern method and the trough method.

Figure 4: Astern RAS 1940s.[17]

The astern method is relatively simple and requires the tanker to stream a hose astern and then maintain a steady course. The receiving ship picks up the hose and brings it inboard for supply to start.

[16]The Four Power Agreement of 1921 and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty specifically prohibited the USA from building forward bases in the Philippines.
[17]Geoff Puddefoot, *Ready For Anything - The Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1905-1950*, (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2010), Plate IX, Crown Copyright TNA.



Figure 5: Trough RAS - USS Maumee & USS McCall 1917.[18]

The trough method requires specialised equipment on the tanker and greater ship handling skills than does the astern method. Before 1940/1 its use was restricted to naval vessels.

While these two early techniques were in use before 1939 it was only after they had been proven were they adopted by the RFA. By 1942 *Ranger* class RFAs were routinely refuelling Atlantic and Arctic convoy escorts, three at a time, and they supported 21 of the 25 Arctic Convoys. Nineteen RFAs were lost during the war including *Aldersdale* on the 1942 Arctic Convoy PQ17, and *Grey Ranger* on the return convoy QP14.[19]

Although the Admiralty's RFAs were undertaking RAS in the early years of the Second World War, by 1939 the USN already had superior RAS techniques, equipment and purpose-built tankers. The 29 *Cimarron* class tankers of 1939 onwards were not only large at 16,000 DWT but were also well-armed, and capable of 18 knots.[20] With the single exception of the *RFA Olna* of 1946, the RFA had nothing like the *Cimmarons* until

[18]https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/m/maumee-ii.html. Accessed 22 December 2021. The first operational use of the trough method, by Lt. Chester Nimitz.

[19]http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-war-losses. Accessed 22 December 2021. The small 3,950 DWT *Ranger* class tankers made 13 knots. Six of the 1944 and onwards 11,900 DWT *Wave* class made 13 to 15 knots. Data from Adams & Smith, p. 60, p. 63 & p. 83.

[20]Nash, *Logistic Support,* p. 19, some *Cimarrons* served until the early 1970s. See Appendix 1 for a definition of Deadweight Tons (DWT) and Gross Registered Tons (GRT).

the *Tides* of the mid-1950s.[21] The technical maturity and effectiveness of American techniques were demonstrated in 1942 when the *USS Cimarron* and *Sabine* provided the 'reach' needed for the 'Doolittle Raid' on Japan. The aircraft carrier *USS Hornet* left San Francisco on 2 April and after two mid-Pacific RASs proceeded directly, over a distance of more than 6,000 kms, to a position 1,000 kms from Japan where the bombers were launched on 18 April.

Despite RAS developments in the early part of the Second World War it remained a small part of the RFAs work and only 21 RFAs were RAS equipped. The remainder continued on freighting and attendant tanker duties. In contrast, by 1945 the USN had deployed a 100 ship plus Logistic Support Force (LSF) for its Pacific carrier operations and had also begun the transfer of stores and ammunition at sea. Interestingly, and despite this large, and demonstrably functional fleet train it considered its wartime logistics to have been effective rather than efficient and saw post war improvement as necessary.[22]



Figure 6: Battleship USS South Dakota receiving 16-inch shells – 1945.[23]

After 1945 the USN and Royal Navy improved methods for both fuel and stores transfer, and the highline or heavy jackstay system came into use. A wire rope is pulled across by the vessel being replenished and is secured in place. This wire is then kept

[21]Data from Adams & Smith, *Century of Service,* p. 93. The four *Early Tides of 18,000 DWT* made 17 knots fully loaded; and were the first purpose designed RFA tankers.
[22]Nash, *Logistic Support,* Chapter 4 describes post war efforts by both navies.
[23]https://mobile.twitter.com/HazeGreyHistory/status/1364579007589715969/photo/1 Accessed 12 September 2021. An explosion of 16-inch propellant charges in a later operation saw the loss of 11 lives.

taut by special winches on the auxiliary that compensate for the ships' relative movement.[24] Once the wire, or jackstay in British parlance, is taut it can support underslung hose catenaries or a travelling carriage for stores transfer. During a RAS the ships move ahead in a more or less straight line at around 10 to 15 knots. This is now the preferred method of RAS and the wire fixing points, hose connections, and signals are now compatible across NATO navies and auxiliaries.

Figure 7: HMS Yarmouth, RFA Tidereach, RNZS Royalist & HMS Belfast[25]

Figure 7 dates from 1963 and shows three RAS refuelling techniques. The trough method to the frigate HMS Yarmouth at the left; the heavy jackstay method to the cruiser HMNZS Royalist on the right; and the astern method to the cruiser HMS Belfast. It goes without saying that a purpose built RFA, and a very high degree of ship handling competence is needed for multi-ship operations of this type.

[24]Auto Tension Winches appeared in the 1950s, they made Abeam RAS methods safe and reliable.

[25]https://www.shipsnostalgia.com/media/rfa-tidereach.463892/. Accessed 6 April 2022.

The Royal Navy's Post War Search for Fleet Mobility

Recognising the advances made by the USN and the need to support British operations in the Pacific in 1945, the Admiralty started to look for ways to increase fleet mobility. That search began with the Admiralty requisition of the *SS Hyalina,* a tanker building for Shell.[26] Modified for the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) it was commissioned as *HMS Olna* in April 1945. Six weeks of RAS trials followed before it arrived in the Pacific in July. This 17-knot ship performed much better than could the BPF's *Wave* class RFAs and it was seen as comparable in capability to the *Cimmaron* class tankers. As *RFA Olna* from 1946 onwards, and with an RFA crew, it carried out further RAS trials and underwent additional modifications during a long and active RFA career ending in 1966. As *HMS Olna* it had a Royal Navy crew of 300 that reduced to 77 in RFA service, showing some of the cost advantage of operating an auxiliary as an RFA.[27]

Figure 8: RFA Olna - 17,520 DWT – early 1950s configuration.[28]

A second step came with the Royal Navy's 1945 acquisition of a war prize, the *Kriegsmarine* tanker/supply ship *Nordmark.* This had supported German surface raiders and submarines in the Atlantic in 1941/2, with one operation lasting more than eight

[26]Nash, *Logistic Support,* Chapters 4 and 5.

[27]Puddefoot, *Ready for Anything*, p. 150; http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-olna-ships-details. Accessed 6 April 2022.

[28]http://historicalrfa.org/rfa-olna-ships-details. 6 April 2022. See Adams & Smith, p. 85 for details of *RFA Olna*.

months.[29] Built in 1936 this capable vessel could carry 7,900 tons of fuel, 972 tons of ammunition, and 890 tons of stores and food in dry, chilled, and refrigerated storage rooms. The *Nordmark* was well armed, carried a floatplane, and at 21 knots was fast, even by USN standards. The *Nordmark* was also unusual in having a purpose designed internal layout, and an advanced hull form with twin inward turning propellers that produced hardly any wake, making it ideal for Astern RAS operations. Uniquely the *Nordmark* was a 'one stop ship' where a naval vessel could find fuel, ammunition, stores and food, this would become an interesting concept for the post-war Royal Navy and USN.[30]



Figure 9: Kriegsmarine Troßschiff *Nordmark 22,500 GRT – HMS Bulawayo*[31]

In 1947 the *Nordmark* commissioned into the Royal Navy as *HMS Bulawayo* while her sister the *Dithsmarschen* became *USS Conecuh*. These ships proved to be, 'the indispensable cornerstone of early post-war replenishment trials.'[32] *HMS Bulawayo* was fitted with a 70-foot trough type rig that showed Abeam RAS was possible at a 1,200 tons/hour fuel transfer rate and at speeds up to 20 knots, and at lower speeds in Force 7 weather conditions.[33] The trials continued until 1950 when the *Nordmark* was laid up. Consideration was given to *Bulawayo* becoming an RFA, but by then it was in poor physical condition, was not compliant with UK Merchant Navy certification standards,

[29] http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/auxships/nordmark/history.html. Accessed 6 April 2022. See also Geoffrey Jones, *Under Three Flags,* (London: Corgi, 1975), Jones served on HMS Buluwayo.

[30] A report from a USN Team that investigated wartime German naval logistics can be found at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/617953. Accessed 6 April 2022. The USN team was dismissive of German RAS technology and operations, because refuelling only used the astern method, in calm weather only, and with the ships either stationary or near stationary. All stores and ammunition were transferred by boat.

[31] http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/auxships/nordmark/history.html. Accessed 6 April 2022.

[32] Nash, *Logistic Support,* pp.199-200 and Chapter 7 for trials histories; Puddefoot, *Ready for Anything*, p.151.

[33] Nash, *Logistic Support,* p. 200.

and needing a crew of more than 200 was considered too costly for RFA service.[34] The *Nordmark* was scrapped in 1955.[35]

In September 1947 Exercise Mainbrace saw the first North Atlantic deployment of an Anglo-American carrier strike fleet. It consisted of four USN fleet carriers, a battleship, two Royal Navy fleet carriers, and numerous cruisers, and destroyers. Eight auxiliaries, five USN and three RFA provided support. The post exercise report noted the USN auxiliaries had transferred fuel at higher rates than could the RFAs despite some having new RAS equipment. The critical operational limitation was the maximum 700 tons/hour fuel pumping rate of the wartime *Wave* class RFAs. The post exercise report observed it had been, 'a useful reminder for the Admiralty that more work and significant change was still necessary if they were going to get the most out of future joint exercises. Not least was the need for a proper *(British)* fleet train.'[36] More damningly the USN observed that 'while the British oilers gave an outstanding performance considering their limitations … the mobility of the support group was considerably reduced.'[37] The slow speed of all the auxiliaries, but principally the RFAs, was a tactical concern as during RAS, when only minor course corrections are possible, both ships were vulnerable to submarine and air attack. Additionally, the concept of an immense but slow Pacific LSF was impossible in the nuclear age. The only safe place for an auxiliary was with the carriers – and they operated at 20-30 knots.

However, this exercise did see the RFA refuelling in bad weather using the astern method when the USN could not operate at all with the trough method. The report noted, 'The Royal Navy and RFA persisted with Astern RAS as it might prove to be the only available option when using commercial tankers in an emergency, such as in the initial stages of a war.'[38] This proved to be a wise decision in 1982 when BP and Shell tankers were taken up from trade (STUFT) for the Falklands War. The minimal astern RAS equipment facilities built into them were ideal for a shuttle tanker role and top up the frontline RFA tankers.[39]

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[34]Author's correspondence with Mr T James OBE 18 May 2021.

[35]http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-stories/1111-one-stop-replenishment-is-history. Accessed 6 April 2022, has a description of the trials and shows what a capable ship this was by contemporary Royal Navy and USN standards.

[36]Nash, *Logistic Support,* pp. 194-198, p. 197; and p. 49 notes the USN abandoning Astern RAS in 1932. Author's italics.

[37]Ibid., p. 197; and TNA ADM 1/24039 Exercise Mainbrace Report.

[38]Ibid., p.197. Meaning after a nuclear war in what were termed 'brokenback' operations.

[39]John Johnson-Allen, *They couldn't have done it without us,* (Woodbridge: Seafarer Books, 2011), Chapter 4 'The tankers'.

In November 1952 the Royal Navy carried out an arctic exercise, Autumn Bear. This included a fleet carrier, *HMS Eagle,* a battleship, *HMS Vanguard,* 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers, and support from *Wave Premier*. The RFA Captain's post-exercise report noted that: the RFA crew was too small in numbers to sustain long multiple ship RAS operations, and low fuel transfer rates were also a problem. *Wave Premier* often had to reduce speed to 12 knots or less to maintain a steam supply to the heating coils in the tanks where the fuel oil was beginning to solidify. The Master also noted the constant dampness of the accommodation and an inability to heat it above 17°C.[40] Nevertheless, 17 RASs were carried out, 3 astern and 14 abeam in 10 days.

These exercises demonstrated that RFAs of an improved type were badly needed.

> Auxiliary ship design, for example, was highlighted as a cause when it was pointed out (not for the first time) that the US Navy built and manned their fleet oilers for fleet issue whereas the RFAs were designed as freighting tankers fitted out for replenishment at sea.[41]

The Korean War

In June 1950 North Korean forces began moving south and Royal Navy vessels already present in the Far East were quickly moved to the west of the Korean peninsula where they maintained a presence until the July 1953 ceasefire. Thirty-two Royal Navy vessels participated in operations, with a light fleet carrier, one or two cruisers and several destroyers on station for most of that period. They steamed over 2 million miles, consumed half a million tons of fuel, flew over 20,000 aircraft sorties, and carried out numerous shore bombardments, including one by *HMS Unicorn*, an aircraft carrier![42] RFAs were also there from the beginning, with 13 tankers including *Olna* and the wartime build *Rangers* and *Waves*. Food, stores and ammunition were issued by four 7,253 GRT *Fort* class ships. An RFA tanker was always on station off Korea because the British carriers required refuelling every five days or so. Another RFA tanker would be away topping up in Japan before rotating back to Korea on a month on/off basis.[43] Only a few ammunition RASs were attempted, with most ammunition and stores transferred by boat/lighter in harbour or at anchorages. The fourth and last hospital ship, *Maine,* also served off Korea. Fortunately, no RFA personnel or ships were lost.

[40]TNA ADM 1/24041 RFA Wave Premier Master's Report Exercise Autumn Bear 17-27 November 1952.
[41]Nash, *Logistic Support,* p. 196 writing on Exercise Mainbrace.
[42]Eric Groves, *Vanguard to Trident,* (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp. 137-150.
[43]Geoff Puddefoot, *The Fourth Force – The Untold Story of the RFA since 1945,* (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2009), pp. 11-14.

Notable differences in oil transfer rates and RAS durations were again seen for the Royal Navy and USN. A modern, late wartime build Royal Navy destroyer could accept fuel at up to 300 tons/hour from a *Wave* class tanker using two hoses, although most destroyer captains would only work with one at 150 tons/hour. USN destroyers designed for the Pacific routinely took 350 tons/hour from a USN auxiliary using a single hose, partly because of higher pumping rates but also because the USN destroyers had a superior internal arrangement of fuel tanks and piping.[44] During the war 90,000 tons of fuel was supplied by RAS, with *Wave Chief* alone supplying 27,000 tons, and *Fort Rosalie* supplying no less than 9,000 tons of munitions over an 18-month period, although only a small part of that by RAS.[45]

Now largely forgotten, Korea showed what the RFA could do, even with outdated equipment.[46]

Post War RFA Fleet Renewal

Following the *Bulawayo* and *Olna* trials the Admiralty put considerable effort into identifying the requirements for new auxiliaries and even produced a specification for an 'Ideal RFA Tanker' and an 'Ideal RFA Store Ship'. But, looking at those sketches today both designs are for merchant ships with added RAS gear. Neither were purpose designed RAS vessels, and they both reflect the ongoing Merchant Navy mindset of RFA operation at the lowest possible cost.[47]

The first new vessels to actually see service emerged in the mid-1950s and were replacements for the increasingly inadequate wartime *Wave* class tankers which had all been built for freighting duty with some having RAS equipment added later. The first of the four *Early Tide* fast fleet replenishment tankers was launched in 1954, with two more *Improved Tides* following in 1962. The last of these, *RFA Tidespring,* went out of service in 1991, although *RFA Tidepool* was sold to the Chilean Navy in 1982 and was scrapped in 1997.

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[44]A Royal Canadian Navy destroyer, *HMCS Athabaskan*, set a new record for an Abeam RAS with *Wave Knight.* From taking up station it was ready to receive fuel within 84 seconds. Ibid., p.14

[45]Adams & Smith, *Century of Service,* p.90.

[46]Nash, *Logistic Support ,0*p. 215 observes that Royal Navy vessels experienced less damage during RAS operations than loading at anchor – a testament to RFA professionalism.

[47]Ibid., pp.122-128.

Figure 10: RFA Tidereach - 16,848 DWT - an Early Tide.[48]

The six *Tides* were designed as fleet replenishment tankers and were a vast improvement on the *Waves* or for that matter the Ideal Tanker. They could simultaneously supply Furnace Fuel Oil (FFO), Diesel, Aviation Gasoline (Avgas) and Aviation Kerosene (Avcat) through five RAS stations, three on the port side intended for a fleet aircraft carrier, two to starboard for cruisers and destroyers, and two more for ships astern. A limited amount of drummed lubricating oil, motor gasoline, water, stores and food could also be supplied, although they were never intended to be a 'one stop ship'. At 17 knots they were a huge improvement on the 13 knot *Waves* and had modern accommodation for a crew of 90.

In 1961 slow RFAs had delayed the deployment of Royal Navy vessels from Singapore to Kuwait, with a later 1966 report examining the deployment of Indian Ocean task groups in more detail.[49] At that time fleet aircraft carriers like *HMS Eagle,* would sustain 20 knots on passage, but they could not operate jet aircraft for more than a few days without supplies of Avcat – jet kerosene. The Royal Navy and USN's wartime carriers had all been designed to operate piston engine aircraft which required much less fuel than did 1960/70s jets. With aviation fuel storage tanks too small for sustained jet operations regular RAS was vital, about every 2 to 3 days for *HMS Eagle* and *Ark Royal* in the 1960s, and with each RAS lasting 3 to 4 hours.

[48] http://historicalrfa.org/rfa-tidereach-ships-details. Accessed 17 March 2021. See Appendix 1 for a definition of Deadweight Tons (DWT) and Gross Registered Tons (GRT).

[49] TNA DEFE 48/714 Indian Ocean Operational Analysis 1966.

Next to arrive were the *Olwen* class Fast Fleet Tankers. Based on the *Improved Tides* and completed in 1965/6 they were capable of 21 knots and could stay with a fleet carrier. Pumping rates increased to a simultaneous 1500, 600 and 600 tons respectively – even higher than the *Tides.* The three *Olwens* served from 1965-2000 with two *Wave* tankers of an even more modern design coming into service after 2002, they are now held in reserve. In 2017 the first of four new design 22,100 DWT *Tides* came into service. Capable of 27 knots two of them took part in CSG21 – a global deployment of the new carrier *HMS Queen Elizabeth*.

Figure 11: RFA Green Rover - 6,931 DWT 1969.[50]

The small *Ranger* class tankers of the Second World War were ideal for refuelling destroyers and convoy escorts and their successors were 5 purpose designed Small Fleet Replenishment Tankers of the 19-knot *Rover* class. Serving from 1969 to 2000 they were described as, 'Comfortable, fast, and handle very well in a wide range of sea conditions.'[51]

[50] http://historicalrfa.org/rfa-green-rover-ships-details. Accessed 17 March 2021.
[51] Adams & Smith, *Century of Service,* p. 122.

Figure 12: RFA Brambleleaf - 21,650 DWT 2009.[52]

During the post war period the RFA continued operating freighting tankers, and *Brambleleaf* was typical of them in being commercially built and in 1980 bareboat chartered from its owners for the RFA. Fitted with a trough and astern RAS capability, it served until scrapped in 2009. It was the last of its type.

By the 1950s the existing stores and ammunition RFAs also needed replacement. The RFA had relied on the eight 7,200 GRT *Fort* class that were in essence Canadian built *Liberty* ships. Korea had shown that it was RAS capable floating warehouses the Royal Navy needed, not traditional cargo ships like these with open holds and flat hatch covers. Worse still the *Forts* were slow at 11 knots. As an interim measure three commercial cargo liners were purchased in the early 1950s and converted for RFA service. While initially adequate they were outdated by the early 1970s.[53] Purpose built replacements arrived with three *Ness* class Stores Support Ships, one of which is shown in Figure 13. This 21-knot class were designed to support fleet carriers and came into service in the mid-1960s. Designed as 'floating warehouses' they had large crews with *Lyness* having 100 RFA plus another 50 RNSTS to run the 'warehouse'. They were not required following the 1978 decommissioning of the carrier *HMS Ark Royal*. Two participated in the Falklands War, but by 1983 all three had been sold to the USN's MSC.[54]

[52] http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-brambleleaf. Accessed 22 December 2021.
[53] *Retainer* & *Resurgent* were Armament Support Ships, *Reliant* an Air Stores Support Ship.
[54] The US Military Sealift Command is a civilian manned organisation set up in 1949 to operate a number of former USN auxiliaries. The USN continues to commission its more complex auxiliaries.

Figure 13: RFA Stromness - 12,732 GRT Indian Ocean 1971.[55]

Another replacement for the wartime *Forts* were two 21-knot *Regent* class Fleet Replenishment Ships. Purpose designed to support fleet carriers they came into service in 1967.[56] Focussed on armament supply, including nuclear weapons, they had large crews of 125 RFA and 44 RNSTS. Their complex design was reflected in needing four years to build. *Regent* was sold for scrap in 1992, and *Resource* in 1997.

Two new 21-knot, and at 18,029 GRT, large *Fort* class Fleet Replenishment Ships came into service in 1978/9 and were purpose built to support the Royal Navy's three *Invincible* class Light Aircraft Carriers. Both served in the Falklands War and had busy careers before being laid up in 2018. Two larger and more sophisticated 22-knot 28,820 GRT 'one stop ships' came into service in 1993/4 with the now elderly *Fort Victoria* still in service in 2022 (Figure 14). Three new Fleet Solid Stores Ships (FSS) are planned but the tendering process is running late.

[55]Author's own photograph.
[56]See Figure 1 for *Resource*.

Figure 14: RFA Fort Victoria - 28,820 GRT.[57]

Despite the length of the previous two sections many other ships and ship types have been omitted in order to constrain the narrative, they include hospital ships, ocean going tugs, and salvage vessels etc. But one RFA role that cannot be overlooked is amphibious operation support. During the Second World War some *Dale* class freighting tankers were fitted with gantries to deploy landing craft, and from 1970 to the early 2000s the RFA operated the six *Round Table* class Landing Ship Logistics (LSLs). Now out of service they were replaced in the early 2000s by four large purpose-designed *Bay* class Landing Ship Dock Auxiliaries. These versatile ships often replace Royal Navy ships on duties such as Caribbean hurricane relief.

It can be seen in this brief description that the RFA is now operating specialised auxiliaries that differ greatly from present day merchant ships. In that sense the RFA although much diminished in ship numbers, meets the vision of those who in the 1950s and 1960s wanted a different RFA.

[57] https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/royal-fleet-auxiliary/stores/rfa-fort-victoria. Accessed 27 October 2022.

A Need for Change

In 1950 there were 106 RFAs ranging from *Olna*, 8 RAS capable *Waves*, 29 *Wave* & *Dale* freighting tankers – some with astern RAS gear, 20 small attendant tankers, 6 *Fort* class ammunition/stores issuing ships and 3 others, 11 salvage vessels, 19 ocean going tugs, 2 Royal Research ships and a hospital ship.[58] In 1950 the Admiralty was managing about 10% of the entire British tanker fleet in tonnage terms.[59]

While impressive in numbers the RFA fleet consisted of 'wartime standard' ships with not a single one purpose built for RAS operations. But that was only half the problem. While new ships were needed, the Royal Navy also wanted change in how these RFAs operated,

> Although the RFA was now providing a replenishment-at-sea service for the Royal Navy on a routine basis, its crewing arrangements were clearly far from perfect, despite a gradual increase in contract officers, petty officers and ratings. A large number of ratings were still employed from The Merchant Navy Pool, often for a single voyage, although many were … certainly very regular visitors to RFAs.[60]

This is an example of the Admiralty operating the RFAs on Merchant Navy lines while the Royal Navy was beginning to want something else. In 1958, and on the same theme, a correspondent for The Naval Review, who had just returned from a trip on an RFA wrote:

> I would challenge any Merchant Navy captain to take on with equanimity the responsibility for refuelling at night, with their ships darkened, a Fleet carrier on one side, a destroyer on another and a frigate astern simultaneously in the Arctic, knowing that about 75% of his crew, he himself, his Chief Officer and Boatswain had joined only a week earlier. Most of the crew had no previous replenishment experience whatsoever.[61]

The National Archives hold a number of similar documents which show that the Admiralty understood the problem. An early example exists in a 1959 file from an Admiralty panel focussed on RFA salaries, working conditions and operating practices. It concluded that RFA pay and employment conditions were not as attractive as those offered by Shell and BP. An example given was a compulsory retirement age of 55 for Shell and BP officers but 60 for the RFA, and with Shell and BP offering more generous

[58]Puddefoot, *Ready for Anything,* pp.155-158.
[59]Nash, *Logistic Support,* p. 110; in 1948.
[60]Puddefoot, *The Fourth Force*, pp. 8-9.
[61]Ibid., p 9.

pension payments. Interestingly, we see the Admiralty's selection of two commercial tanker companies as benchmarks at a time when most RFAs were freighting or attendant tankers. The same report observed that the habitability of crew accommodation on austere wartime built RFAs compared very poorly to that available on modern commercial vessels. Such factors were recognised to be significant barriers to the RFA attracting and retaining British seafarers.[62]

Importantly, in the same file we find the panel's Royal Navy stakeholders wanting the separation of the RAS capable RFAs from the freighting tankers and other auxiliaries in order to prioritise their availability and improve their support to naval operations. The Royal Navy also wanted specific RFAs to be permanently allocated to specific groups of RN ships to ensure operational familiarity. A case was cited of an RFA completing a freighting trip late and then immediately having to undertake RAS work without having a RAS experienced crew aboard. The Admiralty's civil servants rejected most of the panel's recommendations arguing that pooling the larger RFA tankers for freight and RAS was the optimal economic solution at a time of financial stringency. Very apparent in that rejection is the Merchant Navy, low-cost model then in use for the RFAs, and the cost driven mindset of the Admiralty's civil servants.

The Royal Navy's Commander in Chief Far East Fleet also wanted an RFA code of discipline because 'the behaviour of British crews of RFAs on some occasions leaves a lot to be desired'; he also wanted RFA ratings to have and wear an RFA uniform. During the 1950s only Merchant Navy/RFA officers bought a uniform, and even then, its use was not commonplace on many merchant ships; while ratings and petty officers had no uniform and wore civilian working clothes. The RNSTS/FFS responded that the free issue of an RFA uniform to ratings would be costly although making it more widely available at 'reasonable prices' would be considered.[63] These are the first archival references to the Royal Navy seeking a 'navalisation' of the RFA.

A second example exists in an extensive 1964/5 'Report on the manning and management of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service and other marine auxiliary services of the Royal Navy.' It was produced by a panel of 7 Royal Navy officers and 2 Admiralty civil servants, and notably without a RFA officer as a panel member.[64] Tasked with looking at the current and future situation it had many conclusions, amongst which were:

[62]TNA ADM 1/27538 Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service – implementation of certain recommendations of the panel appointed to consider the manning of RFAs.
[63]Ibid., RNSTS DoS response to note from CinC Far East Fleet.
[64]TNA ADM 1/29064 RFA Working Party.

> The major civilian auxiliaries …. are in a class by themselves as our deliberations in Part 1 of the report will show …. and it is our conclusion that they will function best as a tight-knit organisation on their own.[65]
>
> The Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service consists of 35 foreign-going vessels of which 32 are equipped for front-line support.
>
> British Merchant Navy crews are, basically, not a disciplined force. They thus show themselves to best advantage in active ships which spend a large part of their time at sea; they will not tolerate lengthy periods in harbour which is foreign to their tradition and to commercial practice. … Merchant Navy crews are highly individualistic. They like to sign on and off ships as they feel inclined … and, on completion of a voyage are inclined to live like kings for a short period before signing on any ship which happens to be available. Given good leadership and employed on jobs which they understand, they can give very good service. If faced with long periods of inactivity in port their discipline and morale deteriorate.
>
> Because Merchant Navy manpower of the necessary calibre is strictly limited, the scope of the RFA Service should be limited to the front-line support of the Fleet which is its primary service.
>
> Each additional special to Navy equipment, procedure and practice required of an RFA vessel accentuates the difference between the RFA Service and the Merchant Navy and thus brings further manning and management penalties. This point needs to be carefully weighed …. because what is ultimately at stake is the whole concept of a Merchant type auxiliary service.[66]

Here we see more evidence of the Royal Navy wanting an RFA Service with an emphasis on RAS operations.

The report suggested that 'The management and operation of the other ocean going civilian manned vessels should be centralised under a separate organisation …. with conditions based on the present Admiralty Cable Service.'[67] Perversely, a 22 December 1964 memorandum in the same folder notes the extreme difficulties experienced in crewing the cable ships due to poor working conditions and low salaries! The report also contains a vigorous Admiralty Hydrographic Service defence of the status quo and a determination to continue the commissioning of survey ships.

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[65]Ibid.
[66]TNA 1/29064 RFA Working Party 1964. Findings.
[67]Ibid. Sheet 2.

By the mid-1960s there is considerable evidence of the Royal Navy wanting RFAs to have a primary role in front-line fleet support, and not freighting or attendant operations, with the RFA crews becoming more professional and practiced in RAS operations. At the same time the Admiralty staff controlling the RFA continued to prioritise operation on a minimum cost Merchant Navy model.

Figure 15: RFA Regent - 18,029 GRT at South Georgia 1982.[68]

A 1977 study considering task forces and NATO reinforcement convoys from the USA highlighted the vulnerability of large High Value Targets (HVTs) such as the ammunition and stores ship *Regent* (Figure 15). Under sustained Soviet air attack, the accompanying destroyers and cruisers might fire their entire missile inventory and then urgently need RAS from an RFA carrying the other half of the task force's missile stock. Furthermore, because of ship stability reasons, the endurance of modern frigates and destroyers might only be six days without a refuelling RAS.[69]

Sourcing & Retaining Crews

Traditionally RFA crews were recruited on the basis of minimising cost to the Admiralty. The UK's Merchant Shipping Acts require British registered merchant ships to have a British Master, Chief Officer and Chief Engineer, but that requirement does

[68] http://www.historicalrfa.org/rfa-regent. Accessed 17 March 2021.

[69] TNA ADM 219/713 Tactical Reliance on RFAs 1977; and TNA DEFE 24/1373 Future Support Concepts 1979. New gas turbine powered frigates and destroyers could not take seawater ballast into empty fuel tanks without risking fuel contamination.

not apply to the rest of the crew. It has therefore been long-term practice for British shipping companies to employ lower-cost non-British crews. The RFA was no exception, with non-British RFA ratings and petty officers routinely recruited from Hong Kong, Malta, the Seychelles etc. In 1979 more than 700 Hong Kong Chinese (HKC) ratings crewed a third of the RFAs, and during the 1982 Falklands War 9 of the 22 RFAs deployed had HKC crews.[70]

Until the mid-1960s the Admiralty continued this practice with the British officers and ratings sourced from the Merchant Navy's own labour system. Operated on behalf of British shipowners by The Shipping Federation it was colloquially known as 'The Pool'. Simplifying and summarising greatly, the Pool acted as a labour exchange that put shipowners and seafarers in contact, and with the seafarer guaranteed at least the minimum wage agreed annually between the National Union of Seamen and the shipowner funded and controlled Shipping Federation. The seafarer was offered a limited choice of ships and would 'sign on' to a ship's industry standard employment contract – known as a Ship's Articles. The seafarer contractually committed to work for either a specific voyage or a specific term, and for many years were not paid until that commitment was complete. Seafarers could however give 48 hours' notice to leave a ship at the next port. They did not receive sick pay, paid leave or any other benefits, so it was an ideal system for shipowners seeking to minimise labour costs and not pay for crews when their ships were not in service.

Until the early-1960s many RFA officers, most petty officers, and all British ratings were employed via the Pool. Beginning in the mid-1930s some senior RFA officers, mainly Masters, were offered two/three-year employment contracts, a trend that continued, with longer terms, until it was the norm for RFA officers by the late 1960s. After 1947 selected RFA Petty Officers were also offered employment contracts, and some Ratings after 1989.[71] Today all RFA officers, petty officers and ratings are salaried RFA employees. Many are also members of the Royal Maritime Reserve.

For the Admiralty a major disadvantage of the Pool system was retention, particularly for skilled officers and petty officers. After 1938 Merchant Navy officers could participate in the Merchant Navy Officers Pension Fund (MNOPF) which was independent of the shipping companies. Together, the Pool and MNOPF, gave officers

[70]Adams & Smith, *Century of Service,* p.142; TNA DEFE 69/765 paper dated 3 December 1982 lists RFAs *Stromness*, *Pearleaf, Plumleaf* and six LSLs with HKC crews.

[71]Richard Woodman, *Fiddlers Green – A History of the Merchant Navy Volume 5,* (Cheltenham: The History Press, 2010), Kindle Version location 507 of 617; notes that in 1980 the Merchant Navy had 31,000 British ratings at sea, by 2005 there were 9,000 and most of those were in RFAs or in Ro-Ro Ferries to European ports - an enormous decline; Puddefoot, *The Fourth Force,* p. 141.

an opportunity to seek the best employment and working conditions, so only a few officers, and even fewer petty officers and ratings had any ties to a particular shipping company – including the RFA. As noted earlier, the post-war commercial tanker operators, such as Shell and BP, offered better pay, long-term employment contracts, and superior accommodation on newer ships.

Since the early 1900s UK legislation has required a British registered merchant ship to have a minimum number of British officers holding Maritime and Coastguard Agency Certificates of Competency. Commonly known as 'tickets' there are various grades, and they can only be gained after periods of qualifying sea service and then successfully passing written and oral examinations.[72] Until relatively recently RFA officer and crew training, and career development, followed the Merchant Navy model towards gaining tickets.

In 1982, and before the six *Round Table* LSLs left Ascension Island for the Falklands some unrest occurred within their HKC crews. This was resolved by: assuring them the LSLs would not be used in an opposed beach landing role; and by increasing their pay to that of a British RFA rating.[73] Most of the HKC ratings continued on to the Falklands but after such a mood shift a decision was taken in London to replace the HKC with British ratings although the war ended before that could happen. All six LSLs came under air attack at San Carlos Water with one hit by a bomb that did not explode, and two LSLs were temporarily abandoned there. Two LSLs came under air attack again at Fitzroy, where both were set on fire and abandoned, one was later sunk as a war grave. A post war report noted,

> The consensus of opinion of Masters on the spot was that the HKC were very good seamen in normal circumstances. They are clean, reliable and not prone to disciplinary or alcoholic problems. In war conditions, however, they showed themselves liable to panic, displayed insufficient resolve, and were often willing to do only the minimum required. In short they had to be driven rather than led. In cases of battle damage or fire they could not be relied upon to apply their full energies to counteracting the damage, thus further endangering both themselves and UK officers. This view of experience under fire has been confirmed by all Masters on their return from the South Atlantic.[74]

Interestingly of the three Falklands War George Medal awards one went to an RFA Engineer Officer and a second to a HKC Sailor, both from *Sir Galahad* for actions in damage control at Fitzroy.

[72] https://www.edumaritime.net/uk-mca. Accessed 22 December 2021.
[73] TNA DEFE 69/765 memo of December 1982.
[74] Ibid.

The transition to all British RFA crews was politically sensitive in Hong Kong and was not achieved until 1989.

The Falklands War

Puddefoot comprehensively covers the RFA during the Falklands war so there is no need for repetition here.[75] It is though relevant to record that 22 RFAs and 60 MFA/STUFTs took part. The liners *Canberra, Queen Elizabeth 2* and *Uganda* were the centre of press attention but excellent service was also provided by the less glamorous tanker and Ro-Ro MFAs from BP, Shell, Norland and many others. One RFA, *Sir Galahad*, and one MFA/STUFT, *Atlantic Conveyor,* were lost, as were 8 RFA personnel. All of the MFA/STUFTS had a small RFA and Royal Navy detachment aboard to assist with RAS operations and telecommunications. This was an important contribution by the RFA and remains generally unrecognised.

The Ministry of Defence's rapid assembly of an ad hoc 'fleet train' was a remarkable achievement, and the creation of this 12,700 km long supply chain from the United Kingdom to the Falklands via a temporary base at Ascension Island, and without any prior warning, shows just how far the Admiralty had come since its BPF problems in 1945. The RFA achieved remarkable things during the Falklands War including notable events such as Operation Insomnia when, on 16 April, *Fort Austin* began a 48 hour long continuous RAS with over 600 loads transferred to various ships.[76]

Nevertheless, everything did not go perfectly. Numerous problems were encountered with RFA equipment and training and

> Although much was made in the media at the time about the phenomenal success of the logistics effort, the supply system and its underlying organisation had been severely stressed and it was certainly starting to unravel by the early weeks of June.[77]

In retrospect, although the RFA achieved much during the Falklands War, it also marked a watershed by highlighting ongoing problems with organisation and equipment, and identifying a need for further change. While the origin of the route to alignment with the Royal Navy can be found with the BPF in 1944/5, the Falklands War led to a step change in scope and pace, and most notably, in a decline in freighting and other duties which by 2009 had disappeared completely.

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[75]Geoff Puddefoot, *No Sea Too Rough – the RFA in the Falklands War,* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2007).
[76]Puddefoot, *The Fourth Force*, p.107.
[77]Ibid., p. 130.

Arming RFAs

During the world wars most British merchant ships and RFAs had some defensive armament, and the peacetime, defensive arming of a UK registered merchant ship remains legally permissible. However, legal opinion has it that problems would arise following use, and because of such concerns the arming of RFAs outside war zones was never routine before 1985.[78] Indeed, the Royal Navy position in 1955 was, 'Guns mounted in afloat support ships have been more for morale purposes than with a view to contributing to any effective anti-aircraft defence.[79] That view ignored British merchant ships destroying both enemy submarines and aircraft during the Second World War, and the RFA claiming to have downed two Argentine aircraft in 1982.

A significant change came in the 1960s with the arrival of the new RFAs. Faced with the Soviet submarine threat the Admiralty had these RFAs built with facilities for the larger anti-submarine helicopters that could not be carried on contemporary frigates and destroyers. When the tanker *Tidespring* sailed for the Falklands in 1982 it embarked three such helicopters and had the swimming pool in use as a magazine for AS-12 Air to Surface missiles.[80] Those same helicopters airlifted elements of 45 Commando Royal Marines and Special Forces for the recapture of South Georgia. At that time was *Tidespring* acting as a warship or as an auxiliary?

A debate on permanent arming followed, and the outcome has been the routine arming of RFAs. To deal with the legal issues a decision was taken in 1985 that RFAs would no longer be registered as British merchant ships, although they do comply with most of the remaining legislation applicable to merchant shipping, such as trade union recognition, officer qualification, and Lloyds Register certification.

Things went a step further in 1994 with *Fort Victoria,* it now routinely carries up to four large *Merlin* helicopters and has a permanent fit of 2 Phalanx and 2 x 20mm Bofors guns. It was also built for, but not fitted with, a 15 cell Vertical Launch System for the Sea Wolf missile.

Operational Control

Within the Merchant Navy the larger companies, like Cunard, Shell and BP, designate a senior Captain as Commodore - in effect a recognition of that person as *primus inter pares*. The Commodore is normally a seagoing officer, with some companies also designating a Commodore Chief Engineer.

[78]TNA FCO 46/4258 Arming & Legal Status 1984.
[79]Puddefoot, *No Sea Too Rough,* p. 26. Director of Gunnery Division, Naval Staff.
[80]Ibid.; p. 5.

A 1948 note considering the creation of an RFA Commodore states, the 'award of this distinction would be governed by good service and continuing general efficiency' and 'the general intention is that the Commodore should hold the rank for the last two years or so before retirement.'[81] Characteristically for the Admiralty of that time it observed that the Commodore would be selected from a Captain within the freighting tanker fleet. A 1948 Treasury note in this same archive folder voiced reluctance at the additional £10/month expense - when Shell was paying their Commodores an additional £20/month. The first Commodore RFA was appointed in 1951 and the first Commodore Chief Engineer RFA in 1960.

Civil servants within the Admiralty/MoD continued to control the RFA until 1993 when operational control passed to the Royal Navy. The Commodore RFA is now a shore based, One Star position, responsible to the Royal Navy's CinC Fleet - a very different role to that proposed in 1948.

Royal Navy Alignment

Figure 16: Commodore RFA Handover aboard HMS Victory 2020.[82]

Taken in Nelson's cabin aboard *HMS Victory*, Figure 16 is indicative of how much the RFA has changed since 1945. Indeed, the RFA of 2022 shares many Royal Navy trappings: from 1962 RFAs have had ships crests like those for naval vessels; in 1969

[81]TNA ADM 1/2304 RFA Commodores: Memo dated 24 May 1948.
[82]https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/-/media/royal-navy-responsive/images/news/new/20201030-new-head-of-rfa/commodore-david-eagles-left-with-commodore-duncan-lamb-in-hms-victorys-great-cabin.jpg. Accessed 17 March 2021. Commodore Lamb (left) to Commodore Eagles, 30 October 2020.

the RFA was granted a distinctive Blue Ensign with a vertical gold anchor to distinguish it from other users of the Admiralty's Blue Ensign; in 2001 an RFA Long Service Medal was introduced; in 2006 Prince Edward was appointed Honorary Royal Commodore RFA; and in 2008, and unusually for what is a civilian organisation, the RFA was granted a Queen's Colour, the first ever awarded to a nominally non-combatant service. RFA uniforms and badges are now closely aligned with those of the Royal Navy although some differences remain such as gold diamonds above an RFA officer's cuff stripes instead of the Royal Navy's curl.

The training of RFA officers has slowly been aligned with that of Royal Navy officers with aspiring RFA officers now trained at the Britannia Royal Navy College alongside their RN colleagues. Their training and career path is now very different to that taken by aspiring post-war Merchant Navy officers.

In 1961 an RFA navigating officer attended the Royal Navy Command course and since 1982 it has become the norm for all RFA officers under consideration for command. RFA officers now routinely take part in specialised Royal Navy training and career development courses, with mid/senior-career officers also attending the Defence Academy at Shrivenham.[83] Commodore Lamb (Commodore RFA 2015-20) served aboard a Royal Navy ship as a Principal Warfare Officer in addition to his commanding a number of RFAs.

These may seem minor changes but taken together reflect the RFA's progressive journey away from its Merchant Navy roots towards shared values, standards, and training that is aligned with the Royal Navy.

Summary

In 1905 the Admiralty identified selected government ships as RFAs. Their numbers increased during the World Wars and with a dominant emphasis on freighting and attendant tankers operated on a Merchant Navy model.

Before 1939 British RAS technology and practice lagged behind the USN and its purpose-built auxiliaries and more mature RAS techniques. Nevertheless, the USN, Royal Navy, and RFA all continued refining RAS after 1945. From 1941 the Royal Navy increasingly looked to the RFA for RAS, initially for escort ships in the Atlantic and Arctic, and by 1945 for the BPF. In the post war period as bases were lost the Royal Navy became more dependent on RAS and the RFA.

By the 1960s the Royal Navy wanted an RFA focused on front line fleet support, with the traditional freighting and attendant tanker duties moved to a separate civilian

[83]Puddefoot, *The Fourth Force,* p.40

organisation. Initial resistance to changing the RFA's low-cost Merchant Navy model was eventually overcome with the 1982 Falklands War providing additional impetus.

It was the Royal Navy's post-war demand for fleet mobility that resulted in the emergence of an RFA Service which today has purpose-built ships operated on a unique crewing model, with a new legal status, and RFA operational control fully integrated into the Royal Navy it supports.

Appendix 1: Bibliography

With two exceptions these lack academic or official provenance. However, they were written by, and/or have received significant input from, serving and ex members of the RFA and the Admiralty/MoD. They provide a reliable, although anecdotal RFA record.

A considerable number of Admiralty/MoD files on the RFA are held in the UK National Archives and elsewhere. Most are commercial and administrative records but some provide insight into why and how the RFA evolved, they have been the principal source for this article.

The author acknowledges the kind assistance provided by Mr Tom Adams MBE in identifying sources.[84]

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[84]Mr Adams, worked within the Ministry of Defence on RFA matters, he kindly provided the author with a comprehensive RFA bibliography. It can be found at https://www.rfaa-london.org.uk/app/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RFA-selected-bibliography-ed2016.pdf. Accessed 23 December 2021.

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USN RAS 1912-1992: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/GSBO-01.html.

Appendix 2: Tonnage Definitions

Merchant ships are measured in Gross Registered Tons (GRT). This is derived from the internal volume of a ship with 1 GRT = 1000 cubic feet. GRT is used for cargo ships, passenger liners etc.

Net Registered Tons (NRT) are GRT with engine rooms and accommodation etc. omitted. It is a measure of cargo capacity.

Oil tankers are measured in Deadweight Tons (DWT) – meaning how much oil they can carry. For auxiliaries DWT misleads because auxiliaries carry less oil than commercial tankers of a similar size.

Warships are measured in Displacement tons – of water.

Towards a 'Forward Defence' for Singapore: Revisiting the Strategy of the Singapore Armed Forces, 1971-1978

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ABSTRACT
Conventional narratives emphasise Singapore's defence policy from 1965 to the early 1980s as defensive-oriented. Drawing on previously under used research materials from Australia, Britain and the United States, this article examines Singapore's defence strategy during the 1970s and argues that during that period Singapore's Armed Forces (SAF) focused on acquiring the capability to conduct an offensive military campaign within Malaysia in the event of threats to Singapore's security or the continuity of its water supply from Malaysia. The United States termed this strategy forward defence. The article also discusses Australian, British, and the United States' contributions towards Singapore's 'forward defence' strategy.

Introduction

In July 1975, after the communists came to power in Cambodia and South Vietnam, defence officials from Singapore and United States met to discuss Singapore's threat perceptions and requirements for additional military aid that the United States could provide to the small island-state. More significantly the meeting confirmed the United States' suspicion that Singapore was shifting its defence posture towards an offensive-oriented strategy. In other words, Singapore was rushing to build the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) into an offensive-oriented force, capable of launching a pre-emptive military campaign within Malaysia with the setting up of defensive lines in Johore, the Malaysian state located north of Singapore. This strategy, which the United States termed forward defence, would be implemented if there was a threat from Malaysia to either Singapore's security or the continuity of Singapore's water supply from reservoirs in Johore.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1650

Drawing on archive materials from Australia, Britain and the United States, this article argues that Singapore's quest to prepare the SAF for forward defence shaped the island-state's actions during the 1970s. The primary factor that influenced Singapore's decision to adopt the forward defence strategy was Singapore's lack of strategic depth and the need to secure continuity of the water supply from Malaysia. From 1975 onward, Singapore moved quickly to ensure the SAF could implement that forward defence strategy within the next three years. The primary reason for haste was the perceived threat of a communist insurgency in West Malaysia, which by 1975 had caused the security situation there to deteriorate.

This article covers the period from 1971 to 1978 and begins in November 1971 when Singapore assumed full control for its defence following Britain's withdrawal from previous defence commitments. Seven years later in December 1978, Singapore's security environment changed again when the Third Indochina War began with the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. The military conflict in Cambodia significantly influenced Singapore's threat perceptions and defence strategy, but that is an area beyond this article's scope.

This article begins with an overview of the debates concerning Singapore's military history. It then moves on to examine the Singapore's forward defence strategy, tracing the development of the strategy and the rationale behind it. Drawing mainly from declassified British intelligence reports, the third part discusses the likely SAF operational plan to intervene in West Malaysia. The fourth part examines the SAF modernisation programme during the 1970s. It focuses on three broad areas that would be critical for the SAF to successfully implement the forward defence strategy.

The Debates on Singapore's Military History

The conventional debates on Singapore's military history describe Singapore's defence strategy after its independence from Malaysia in 1965 as that of a 'poisonous shrimp – any predator swallowing the shrimp would have to pay a high price.[1] According to Tim Huxley in his book *Defending Singapore*, this strategy acted as a deterrent to any potential external hostile power as the cost to invade and occupy Singapore would

[1]The argument that Singapore's defence policy rested on the concept of a 'poisonous shrimp' has been advanced by several scholars, Singaporeans or otherwise. For examples see; Mohamad Faisol Keling and Md Shuib, 'The Impact of Singapore's Military Development on Malaysia's Security', *J. Pol. & L.,* 2: 68 (2009), p. 70; Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan, 'Small Country 'Total Defence: A Case Study of Singapore', *Defence Studies*, 7:3, (2007), p. 380; Tan See Seng, 'Mailed Fists and Velvet Gloves: The Relevance of Smart Power to Singapore's Evolving Defence and Foreign Policy', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38:3, (2015), p. 335.

outweigh the benefit.[2] Bernard Loo observes that due to Singapore's urbanised terrain, the 'poisonous shrimp' strategy meant that any would-be aggressor would be deterred by the potential high human and material costs of fighting the SAF in Singapore's urban areas.[3] Although there is a general agreement amongst scholars that the post-independence Singapore later adopted a 'poisonous shrimp' strategy, there are divergent views on the exact point when Singapore shifted its strategy from one of defence towards an offensive-oriented strategy. Many works consider the early 1980s as the period when the SAF shifted from 'poisonous shrimp' towards an offensive-oriented strategy.[4] However, a few conclude that Singapore shifted its defence strategy towards an offensive-oriented one before the 1980s. For example, Andrew Tan advances the theory that the communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the mid-1970s led Singapore to shift to a more offensive-oriented defence strategy which called for a 'pre-emptive conventional capability that emphasised airpower, armour, and mobility'.[5] Tan's position, therefore, places 1975 as the turning point. Conversely, Ng Pak Shun argues that the SAF had been undertaking an offensive-oriented build-up since the late 1960s.[6]

There is still a lack of historical work on the post-1971 period because Singapore's defence-related records for this period remain classified. This situation makes such work difficult, a point acknowledged by Bernard Loo.[7] Having said that, historical work on Singapore's military covering the period up to 1971 does exist. Two are Chin Kin Wah's *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore* and *Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from the First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal*, a collection of essays

[2]Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore,* (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 2000), p. 56.

[3]Bernard Loo Fook Weng, 'Goh Keng Swee and the Emergence of a Modern SAF: The Rearing of a Poisonous Shrimp', in Emrys Myles Khean Aun Chew and Kwa Chong Guan (eds), *Goh Keng Swee: A Legacy of Public Service,* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012), p. 127.

[4]Ho Shu Huang and Samuel Chan, *Singapore Chronicles: Defence* (Singapore: Straits Time Press, Singapore, 2015), p. 55; Bilveer Singh, *Arming the Singapore Armed Forces: Trends and Implications,* (Canberra: Australian National University, 2003), p. 26; Bernard Tay, 'Is the SAF's Defence Posture Still Relevant as the Nature of Warfare Continues to Evolve', *Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces,* Vol 42, No 2, (2016), p. 25.

[5]Andrew Tan, 'Singapore's Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (1999), p. 458.

[6]Ng Pak Shun, *From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine: An Analysis of Singapore's Defence Posture Change in the Early 1980s,* (Canberra: Australian National University, 2005), p. 1.

[7]Bernard Loo Fook Weng, 'Goh Keng Swee and the Emergence of a Modern SAF', p. 127.

written by Singapore-based scholars such as Malcolm Murfett and Brian Farrell.[8] Relying primarily on non-Singaporean documents, these works provide an excellent and in-depth study of Singapore's military history, covering the period before and after Singapore's separation from Malaysia. In the absence of access to Singapore's archives all scholarly work must therefore rely either on strategic theory or an examination of the SAF's actions during this period. A case in point is Andrew Tan's article written in 1999 which seeks to explain the trend in Singapore's military build-up from 1965, its argument is framed by concepts such as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[9] Although Tan briefly discusses the forward defence strategy from an operational perspective, he also uses evidence from Singapore's defence budget and arms procurement programmes.

Similarly, Ng Pak Shun argues that the SAF had undertaken an offensively oriented build-up since the late 1960s. However, he does not provide any evidence to support the argument. Instead, his argument is framed through organisational behaviour theories such as Rational Actor and Organisational Process.[10]

One major work on Singapore's defence policy written at the turn of the 21 Century is Huxley's *Defending Singapore.* Although Chapter Two discusses Singapore's forward defence strategy, it has been framed from a military-strategy perspective, focusing on implementation at the operational level. Furthermore, the sources cited come mainly from newspaper articles and an interview with Singapore's Defence Minister, rather than from any archive data.[11]

This brief review of the literature on Singapore's general military history, and Singapore's forward defence strategy in particular, reveals a gap in the post-1971 debate, and this is significant given Singapore's change in its defence orientation. This article attempts to fill that gap and contribute to the debate on Singapore's military history.

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[8]For the discussion on defence related issues concerning Singapore from 1965 and 1971, see Chapter 7 to 9 in Chin Kin Wah, *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore the Transformation of a Security System, 1957-1971*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Chapter 11 in Malcolm Murfett et al., *Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal*, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2011).

[9]Andrew Tan, 'Singapore's Defence', p. 457.

[10]Ng Pak Shun, *From Poisonous Shrimp to Porcupine,* pp. 1-6.

[11]For a detailed discussion on the likely scenario of a military conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, see Chapter Two of Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City.*

The Forward Defence Strategy

Since the late 1960s, British military intelligence and diplomatic staff in Singapore suspected that Singapore was shaping the SAF's orientation towards forward defence to be carried out in West Malaysia. In 1969, British intelligence conducted a study on Singapore's arms procurement patterns and concluded that Singapore was adopting a strategy that would enable the SAF to fight outside the island. The report highlighted that the military equipment the SAF had, or planned to acquire, was increasingly offensive-oriented. Some of that equipment included self-propelled artillery, amphibious vehicles, bridge laying tanks, and minefield breaching tanks, equipment with no obvious utility for a defensive posture within an urban environment like Singapore.[12] The British assessed that the equipment might 'have a use for offensive operations against Malaysia'.[13] Critically, the British came to this assessment after receiving information from classified sources suggesting that Singapore had military contingency plans to move its forces into Johore. A military intervention in Johore would likely occur if Malaysia's internal security situation worsened to the point that there was a threat to either Singapore's security or the continuity of the water supply from Johore.[14]

Besides observing the pattern of Singapore's arms procurement and information from classified sources, the British closely monitored statements made by Singapore's political leaders, some of whom had publicly advocated a forward defence strategy. For example, during one of the budget speeches in the late 1960s, Singapore's first Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee stated that 'Singapore could not be defended by sitting tight on the island but that it would be necessary to base the defence on Malaysian beaches – e.g. to hold the peninsular against attack from the North or from the sea.'[15] Goh's statement reflected his view that Singapore's successful defence would require the SAF to form defensive lines in West Malaysia, although we cannot be sure if this was Goh's personal view or was reflective of Singapore's policy

The United States shared Britain's suspicion of Singapore's military intentions in Malaysia. When Singapore attempted to buy Centurion tanks from Britain in 1970, the Americans were convinced that Singapore's interest was based on an intent to conduct a military campaign in Malaysia. Charles Cross, then the United States Ambassador to

[12]The UK National Archives (Hereinafter TNA) FCO 24/568, Singapore Interest in Acquiring 'Sharp Weapons', 7 November 1969.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid.
[15]TNA FCO 24/568, Singapore - Possible Future Armed Purchases, 14 November 1969. Goh had also alluded to the need for 'forward defence' in his Parliamentary speech in 1968. See *The Straits Times,* 'How S'pore hopes to bridge that $300 mil. gap in defence', 4 December 1968, p. 8.

Singapore, said, 'what else the Singaporeans would do with the tanks but to use them over the causeway' i.e., in Malaysia.[16] The SAF already had 72 AMX-13 light tanks purchased from Israel in January 1968.[17] Besides the Centurion tanks, Singapore was also interested in acquiring amphibious load-carrying vehicles.[18] Such vehicles would be suitable for crossing the narrow Johore Strait that separates Singapore from Johore, and would enable the SAF to move its troops into Malaysia even if the Malaysians had destroyed the causeway.

Why Forward Defence?

Two critical factors influenced Singapore's political leaders and defence planners to consider a forward defence strategy. Firstly, with a land area of less than 700 square kilometres Singapore lacks the strategic depth needed to defend itself, Singapore cannot therefore be defended based on a defence in depth or by guerrilla warfare.[19] Securing defensive lines in West Malaysia, especially in Johore, would provide Singapore with some strategic depth and could protect Singapore's main island from direct enemy attack. The new Republic of Singapore was not of course the first to recognise the need to set Singapore's defensive lines in West Malaysia to deal with threats from the north. Before the Japanese invasion of West Malaysia, then known as Malaya, in 1941 the British had recognised the significance of West Malaysia to Singapore's defence. In the late 1930s, Major-General William Dobbie, then the General Officer Commanding (Malaya), was concerned that enemy forces establishing themselves in Johore could attack Singapore.[20] Writing on the British defence strategy for Singapore during the Second World War, the historian Ong Chit Chung writes, 'the defence of Singapore and Malaya was indivisible; the defence of Singapore meant in effect the defence of Malaya'.[21] Nearly thirty years after the Second World War had ended, the British assessment was that Singapore's security was intertwined with that

[16]TNA FCO 24/906, Telegram Number 25 Addressed to FCO Telno 25 of 12 January RFI to POLAD, Kuala Lumpur and Washington, 12 January 1970.

[17]Barzilai, Amnon, 'A Deep, Dark, Secret Love Affair: A team of IDF officers, known as the Mexicans, helped Singapore establish an army. It was the start of a very special relationship', *Haaertz*, 16 July 2004, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4758973. Accessed on 21 January 2020. See also Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Hereinafter SIPRI) database, Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.

[18]TNA FCO 24/906, Defence Equipment for Singapore, 14 January 1970.

[19]Mak Joon-Num, *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change,* (Canberra: Australia: Australian National University, 1993), p. 95.

[20]Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn, *Did Singapore Has to Fall?* (London: Routledge, 2004), p 38

[21]Ong Chit Chung, *Operation Matador- World War Two: Britain's Attempt to Foil the Japanese Invasion of Malaya and Singapore,* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2011), p. 55.

of West Malaysia i.e. 'no force could defend Singapore indefinitely against a strong attack from neighbouring territories'.[22] The Americans had a similar assessment. As John Holdridge observed, the Singaporean political leaders remembered the island-state's vulnerability during the Second World War when the Japanese military advanced down West Malaysia before capturing Singapore, and they too recognised that defending Singapore would be impossible if Johore was in enemy hands.[23]

Secondly, Singapore relied on Johore for most of its water supply, even before Singapore's independence from Malaysia in 1965. The first agreement on water supply from Johore to Singapore was signed on 5 December 1927 between the municipal commissioners of the town of Singapore and the Sultan of Johore. Singapore's growing reliance on water supply from Johore was reflected in two additional water agreements signed in 1961 and 1962 between the city council of the state of Singapore and the Johore state government.[24] By 1974, Johore was supplying about 75% of Singapore's daily water consumption.[25] After Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, its critical reliance on water from Malaysia had been used as leverage by Malaysian politicians. At times, Malaysian politicians sought to coerce Singapore by threatening to cut the water supply from Johore.[26] It was, therefore, crucial for Singapore to build up the SAF's capabilities to secure Singapore's water supply from Johore, a point Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew highlighted to then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in 1978.[27]

Communist Insurgency in West Malaysia

While the need to establish strategic depth and secure its water supply influenced Singapore to look at forward defence, the increasing tempo of communist insurgency

[22]TNA FCO 15/1912, Singapore Armed Forces, 18 March 1974.

[23]Access to Archival Database, National Archives and Records Administration (Hereinafter AAD NARA), Document Number 1976SINGAP01046, Film Number D760082-0461, U.S. Policy Review of Singapore Purchases of Military Equipment, 4 March 1976. Holdridge was the American Ambassador to Singapore in the second half of the 1970s.

[24]Joey Long, 'Desecuritizing the Water Issue in Singapore—Malaysia Relations', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), p. 510; Valerie Chew, 'Singapore-Malaysia water agreements', *Singapore National Library Board*, https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1533_2009-06-23.html. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[25]TNA FCO 15/1912, Singapore Armed Forces: Part I, 18 March 1974.

[26]Joey Long, 'Desecuritizing the Water Issue in Singapore—Malaysia Relations', p. 103-104.

[27]Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000,* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000), p. 243.

in West Malaysia during the 1970s triggered Singapore to accelerate its military-build up. The insurgency was led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which aimed to establish a communist state in 'Malaya' that covered both West Malaysia and Singapore.[28] First active in the post-war period it relaunched its armed insurgency against the Malaysian government in 1968, and during the 1970s, had stepped up an armed campaign in West Malaysia. As a result, the security situation in West Malaysia had deteriorated by the second half of 1975.[29] The CPM's threat led Singapore's defence planners to consider the insurgency as a security threat.[30] It also prompted Singapore to seek United States' assistance to build up the SAF's capabilities and allow it to implement a forward defence strategy.

In July 1975, Singapore's defence planners met their visiting counterparts from the United States to discuss additional military assistance, and Singapore's perception of the ongoing communist insurgency in West Malaysia. Singapore's delegation to the meeting was led by SR Nathan, the Director of Security Intelligence Division (SID), part of Singapore's Defence Ministry, and Colonel Winston Choo, the SAF's Director of the General Staff.[31]

Based on a United States' report of the meeting, Singapore had requested the United States to supply the SAF with the following equipment: helicopters, transport planes, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), howitzers, and riverine craft, amongst others. Singapore also requested the United States conduct a seminar and share with the Singaporean military, police, and internal security officials American counter-insurgency knowledge and experience from the Indochinese conflict. The report noted that the primary reason for Singapore's requests for American military equipment and training was Singapore's perceived threat of a growing communist insurgency in West Malaysia. According to the report, Singaporean officials planned for the SAF to have the capability to intervene in West Malaysia by as early as 1978.[32]

From the report, this article identifies three issues. Firstly, Singapore was concerned that the communist insurgents in Malaysia could gain the upper hand in their armed campaign and pose a threat to Singapore's security or the water supply from Johore. Secondly, due to a risk that Malaysia's security situation might deteriorate, Singapore wanted the SAF to have the capability to intervene in Malaysia within three years.

[28]National Archives of Australia (Hereinafter NAA) A13883 213/1/9/5/1 Part 2, The Threat to Airbase Butterworth to the End of 1975, September 1974.
[29]NAA A703, 564/8/28 Part 8, Security Butterworth, 3 October 1975.
[30]AAD NARA, Document number 1975SINGAP03216, Film Number D750258-0951, Visit of U.S. Team to Discuss Counterinsurgency Equipment and Training, 26 July 1975.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Ibid.

Thirdly, the SAF had to be able to launch a military intervention in Malaysia, with or without the Malaysian government's consent, if Singapore assessed its security or its water supply to be under threat., This article suggests that the SAF was planning a two-stage military campaign in West Malaysia. In the first stage, the SAF would move forces into Johore and engage the Malaysian armed forces (if the Malaysians resisted) in conventional warfare. In the second stage, SAF forces would engage the communist insurgents in Johore through counter-insurgency operations.

Although the United States was initially hesitant, declassified documents suggest that the Americans changed their position sometime in 1976. In March that year, Holdridge cabled Washington and argued the United States should support Singapore's forward defence strategy via arms sales. Holdridge suggested that any arms sales to Singapore, 'should be sufficient to support at least some form of credible defense which would necessarily entail the development of some capability to take up a defense beyond the causeway… We would suggest that the development and equipment of armed forces sufficiently strong to contemplate a defense perimeter across roughly the southern third of the state of Johore.[33]

A month later, on 6 April 1976, Holdridge recommended approval of Singapore's request to procure 217 APCs. Holdridge justified the sale on the basis that Singapore would only implement its forward defence strategy in the event of a significant and irreversible worsening of the security situation in West Malaysia. Significantly, he also stated that it would be in the United States' interest that Singapore be able to defend itself in such a situation.[34]

Likely Scenario of a Military Intervention in Johore

This section outlines Singapore's strategy and the SAF's critical capabilities for a successful military campaign in West Malaysia. As Singapore's defence documents remain classified, the analysis in this section draws on declassified diplomatic and intelligence documents and reports from Australia, Britain, and the United States.

Located north of Singapore, Johore is the southernmost Malaysian state in West Malaysia. It is separated from Singapore by the narrow Johore Straits. The only overland transport link between Singapore and Johore during the 1970s was the causeway, which also carried Singapore's water supply from Johore. At the end of the causeway on the Johore side was Johore Bahru, the Malaysian state's administrative centre. In the 1970s, only one main road linked Johore Bahru to the reservoirs that

[33]AAD NARA, Document Number 1976SINGAP01046 Film Number D760082-0461, U.S. Policy Review of Singapore Purchases Of Military Equipment, 4 March 1976.
[34]AAD NARA, Document Number 1976SINGAP01673 Film Number D760129-0138, US Response to Singapore Request, 6 April 1976.

supplied water to Singapore. This road also linked Johore Bahru to Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital.[35]

According to a British intelligence assessment, the SAF would likely first seek to secure Singapore's water supply from Johore in the event of a Singaporean military intervention in Malaysia. There were two routes the SAF could use to reach the water reservoirs located about 50 km north of Johore Bahru. The primary route would take the SAF through Johore Bahru via the causeway. From Johore Bahru, the SAF could then rapidly move using the Johore Bahru-Kuala Lumpur Road to reach the reservoirs. A secondary route to the reservoirs would involve an amphibious landing about 20 km southwest of Johore Bahru. The SAF units would then move towards the reservoirs using minor roads in the western parts of Johore.[36] This strategy would require the SAF to conduct amphibious landings using Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) and other vessels.

From the British intelligence assessment, the SAF would advance into Malaysia without any warning or after a warning had been given. Without a warning it was expected the Malaysians would be caught off guard, with the SAF having little difficulty in advancing rapidly to the reservoirs and deploying its forces to deal with any Malaysian counterattacks. The British calculated that advanced SAF units could reach the reservoirs in in under two hours, with the remaining SAF troops fully deployed inside Malaysia within 24 hours. The SAF would then form defensive lines to protect the reservoirs and their physical infrastructure such as pipelines, and communication lines. In the event of a warning having been given the British expected the Malaysian armed forces to defend southern Johore, which would include troop deployment, preparing bridges for demolition, and defending the reservoirs in Johore. Without any element of surprise, the Malaysian forces operating in the jungles and plantations of Johore would slow down the SAF's advance.[37]

The British assessed that Singapore had an advantage in the air given the Malaysian air force's minimal operational capability in surveillance from the air and in ground attack. Singapore possessed an adequate air defence capability comprising air defence radar, Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. On the ground, Malaysian artillery had a range of 10 km while SAF artillery could engage targets more than 20 km away. If the SAF could form defensive lines more than 10 km deep inside Johore, the Malaysian artillery could not threaten SAF bases in Singapore. The probability of Malaysia posing a naval threat was also seen as minimal. The main Malaysian navy base

[35]TNA FCO 15/1912, Singapore Armed Forces: Part I, 18 March 1974.
[36]TNA FCO 15/1912, Singapore Armed Forces: Operational Capability – Part III, 18 March 1974.
[37]Ibid.

was located in Singapore, and the six warships in the naval base could easily be rendered non-effective. By 1975 the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) was armed with Gabriel anti-ship missiles and the British view was that the RSN could deal with any threat from the Malaysian navy.[38]

In the British assessment the SAF needed a sizeable ground force of up to three brigades to have a reasonable chance of securing the water supply in Johore, together with the tanks and APCs needed for the SAF ground units to race from the border to the reservoirs. SAF air superiority would be needed to successfully make an inroad into Johore and repulse any Malaysian counterattacks using the three main roads located in the East, West, and Central Johore.[39]

In the same assessment, the forward defence strategy required the SAF to acquire an edge over Malaysian forces in these capabilities: airpower, armour, mobility and amphibious operations. Possessing superior airpower Singapore could dominate the sky over West Malaysia, which was necessary to suppress Malaysian ground and air defences and provide Close Air Support (CAS) for SAF ground units advancing into Johore. On the ground, tanks and APCs were necessary for the SAF to have the firepower, speed, and mobility for an offensive campaign inside Malaysia. Armour would spearhead the ground invasion and overcome Malaysian army units, which did not possess any tanks. The APCs would provide speed, mobility and protection while ferrying SAF infantry to their objectives, especially the reservoirs in Johore. The LSTs would enable SAF landings on Malaysian territory across the Johore Strait. Finally, the SAF needed sufficient manpower for this strategy to be successful.

During the post-independence period and until the mid-1970s, the SAF did not have sufficient manpower or equipment such as combat aircraft, or tanks and APCs, or LSTs to mount an offensive military campaign of these types. According to a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment of the SAF's capabilities in the early 1970s, the SAF was seen as capable of maintaining internal security but had only a limited defence capability against external threats. The report assessed that Singapore would require significant outside assistance to defend against a major external attack, and it highlighted several shortcomings faced by the SAF from its small-size, and a lack of experienced officers and equipment.[40] These shortcomings were seen as preventing Singapore from undertaking a forward defence strategy before the

[38]Ibid.
[39]Ibid.
[40]Central Intelligence Agency Library, Freedom of Information Electronic Reading Room (Hereinafter CIA Library FOIA), Document Number CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090007-9, National Intelligence Survey 44c; Singapore; Armed Forces, May 1973.

second half of the 1970s. In the short term, therefore, it was logical for the SAF to adopt a defensive approach, the 'poisonous shrimp' strategy described earlier.[41] In the long term, as will be shown below Singapore modernised and expanded the SAF to acquire the capabilities consistent with a forward defence strategy.

Expanding the Capabilities of the SAF

Arguably, a critical phase in Singapore's military build-up took place around 1975 with the communist victories in Cambodia and South Vietnam. According to Andrew Tan, the events 'raised the spectre of communist invasion through Thailand and Malaysia down to Singapore', and this led to a regional military build-up in Thailand and Malaysia, and in turn resulted in Singapore's own military build-up.[42] Tan's argument suggests Singapore's military build-up was in fact driven by Malaysia's military expansion.

Primary source data however suggests Malaysia did not undergo a substantial military build-up between 1975 and 1978. On the contrary, Malaysia's annual defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in that period dropped from 4.7% to 3.7%.[43] In terms of absolute figures, the number of personnel (active and reserves) in the Malaysian Armed Forces or *Angkatan Tentera Malaysia* (ATM) fell by 10,000 between 1972 and 1978. In the same period, the number of Malaysian combat aircraft increased by only 4, to 34. The Malaysian army did not acquire any tanks but did double its inventory of Commando APCs to 400.[44] Arguably, the ATM did not pose a conventional military threat to Singapore during the 1970s. Furthermore, due to the increasing tempo of the communist insurgency in West Malaysia, the ATM had focused its resources on domestic insurgency threats.[45]

The absence of a significant Malaysian conventional military build-up during the 1970s could not explain the rapid Singaporean military expansion and modernisation programmes. Therefore, Singapore's military build-up can be argued as being shaped by its longer-term objective to acquire an offensive-oriented capability consistent with a forward defence strategy. For example, the SAF tripled its army personnel (active and reserves) from 25,000 to 75,000 between 1972 and 1978.[46] Besides expanding its

[41]Andrew Tan, 'Singapore's Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications', pp. 457-458.
[42]Ibid, p. 458.
[43]Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database.
[44]International Institute of Strategic Study (Hereinafter IISS), *Military Balance,* 1972-1973 and 1977-1978.
[45]AAD NARA, Document Number 1975KUALA02563, Film Number D750164-0812, Military Training and Procurement Assistance – Malaysia, 10 May 1975.
[46]IISS, *Military Balance,* 1972-1973 and 1977-1978.

manpower during the 1970s, the SAF further developed its capabilities in power projection, combat and command capabilities, and point-defence capabilities.

Power Projection

Power projection – the ability to transport air, sea, and land power into Malaysian territories – was one of the capabilities which the SAF sought to develop during the 1970s. The efforts to acquire a power projection capability is evidenced by the pattern of military acquisition across the three branches of the SAF – air, land, and sea. Air dominance would be critical for a successful SAF military intervention in West Malaysia. It would protect SAF ground and naval units moving into Malaysian territories from any aerial threats. Air superiority could potentially dictate the outcome on the battlefield by providing CAS to SAF ground units and interdiction of Malaysian military bases and supply lines located deeper in West Malaysia.

By 1978, Singapore had achieved a quantitative edge over Malaysia in combat aircraft. In the early 1970s, Singapore purchased 27 British-made Hawker Hunter combat aircraft, in addition to 20 it had acquired in 1969. However, the Hawker Hunter along with a few British Strikemaster attack aircraft operated by the Singapore Air Defence Command (SADC) had only limited capabilities. They could provide sub-sonic clear weather interception capabilities but by 1970 were an aging asset in terms of capability.[47] By 1972, Singapore had turned its attention to American combat aircraft, and between 1972 and 1976, it ordered 68 A-4 Skyhawk and F-5E Tiger combat aircraft from the United States.[48] The acquisition of Skyhawks reflected the SAF's plan to equip itself for a forward defence strategy. According to a CIA report, Singapore's purchase of the Skyhawks in the early 1970s signalled the importance Singapore placed on the ground support role which might even be more important than a primary air defence function.[49] The Skyhawks were ideal for CAS operations. Although the Skyhawks acquired by Singapore were ex-United States Navy (USN) aircraft, they had been refurbished and had the latest communication and weapon systems.[50] The acquisition of the F-5E Tigers, which were more advanced than either the Skyhawks or the Hawker Hunters, reflected Singapore's aim to acquire higher technology arms and weapons systems in response to Malaysian acquisition of 16 F-5E Tigers between 1974 and 1976.[51] Critically, however, the Malaysians had to divide its smaller fleet of

[47]CIA Library FOIA Document Number CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090007-9, National Intelligence Survey 44c; Singapore; Armed Forces, May 1973.
[48]SIPRI database Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.
[49]CIA Library FOIA Document Number CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090007-9, National Intelligence Survey 44c; Singapore; Armed Forces, May 1973.
[50]Peter Kilduff, *Douglas A-4 Skyhawk,* (London: Osprey Publishing, London, 1983), p. 150.
[51]SIPRI database Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.

combat aircraft to cover both West and East Malaysia. Whereas Singapore could concentrate its air assets within a smaller area.

By the late 1970s, the Singapore air force, renamed the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) in 1975 had also gained substantial airlift capabilities. Assuming a 100 per cent operational readiness of its transport platforms, the RSAF could transport 716 troops or 110.8 tonnes of cargo over a distance of 240 km in a single airlift.[52] This meant that the RSAF could airlift a substantial number of troops to capture and hold the reservoirs in Johore while awaiting SAF ground reinforcement. This airlift capability also allowed the SAF to reinforce and re-supply the frontline quickly.

The SAF received an additional 150 AMX-13/75 and 24 Centurion-3 tanks from India between 1973 and 1975 and 300 M-113 APCs from the United States in 1974.[53] A further 40 V-150 Command APCs and 500 M-113 APCs were ordered or received from the United States between 1974 and 1978. Although these tanks and APCs were second-hand, they provided the SAF with a capability and technological edge over the Malaysian army, which still did not possess any tanks.[54] With more than 200 tanks and 800 APC units, the SAF armoured formation had a distinct quantitative edge over Malaysia.[55] The acquisition of a large number of tanks and especially the APCs arguably reflected SAF's emphasis on offensive-oriented capabilities. According to the Singapore Defence Ministry's assessment, tanks could be deployed to achieve victory through manoeuvre. However, tanks were also vulnerable to anti-tank weapons. Any armoured spearhead needed to be followed closely by the APCs. The SAF assessed that the APCs' infantry would suppress enemy infantry attempting to engage the SAF tanks with anti-tank weapons. Additionally, the APCs could rapidly move infantry under protection to secure their objectives.[56] Therefore, the tanks and APCs were ideal for an offensive campaign in Malaysia, especially during the initial phase when the SAF needed to rapidly move and secure the reservoirs in Johore. The army also extended the reach of its artillery during this period. The SAF received 72 mortars

[52]NAA, A1838, 3024/12/1 Part 7, Military Study – Singapore: JIO Study No. 4/77 Amendment No 1, n.d.
[53]SIPRI database, Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.
[54]IISS, *Military Balance,* 1972-1973.
[55]IISS, *Military Balance,* 1977-1978.
[56]Ministry of Defence, *The Singapore Armed Forces,* (Singapore: Ministry of Defence, 1981), pp 56-57.

and 81 M-68 155mm towed guns from Israel.[57] The SAF M-68 guns could hit targets up to 23.5 km away, more than twice the range of Malaysian artillery.[58]

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) enhanced its sealift capabilities with the delivery of 5 former United States County-class LSTs at a token cost of US$1 each.[59] The LSTs could transport troops, equipment, tanks and APCs. Although the LSTs' primary function was claimed to be in support of SAF overseas training expeditions, they also gave the SAF a capability to mount an amphibious operation against Malaysia.[60]

Combat and Command Capabilities

Besides expanding its inventory of equipment, the SAF began to train its troops for the terrain in West Malaysia. This included preparing them for jungle warfare and counterinsurgency operations and enhancing command capabilities in overseeing a military campaign in West Malaysia.

Singapore is largely urbanised, so jungle warfare would not be required if the SAF's strategy was to fight defensive battles within Singaporean territory. According to a United States intelligence report on Singapore's military geography during the early 1970s, Singapore's terrain was densely built-up with residential, commercial, and industrial buildings and its rural areas were poorly suited for irregular force operations.[61] If Singapore's defence strategy had centred on fighting within Singapore, only a capability to fight in built-up areas, and not in jungles, would be needed. As this section has shown Singapore moved quickly to equip the SAF with a jungle warfare and counter-insurgency capability suited to the terrain in West Malaysia.

[57]SIPRI database Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.
[58] Weapon System, 'Soltam M-68', https://old.weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/DD03%20-%20M-68%20(155mm).html. Accessed 8 February 2021.
[59]SIPRI database: Transfers of major weapons: Singapore; Singapore's Defence Ministry Website, 'Tracing Our Origin', https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/navy/Tracing_our_Origins.HTM. Accessed 20 January 2021.
[60]James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie, *Navies of Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study,* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013) p. 140.
[61]CIA Library FOIA Document Number CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090012-3, National Intelligence Survey 44C; Singapore; Military Geography, May 1973.

In 1975, Singapore coordinated directly with the Bruneian government to use its facilities for SAF training.[62] There was even a plan to train about 1,000 SAF troops in jungle warfare in Brunei within that one year. The Bruneian government was receptive to having SAF troops train in its jungles and offered to pay the expenses for the construction and staffing of a Jungle Warfare Centre (JWC) in Brunei, which would be open to both the SAF and Bruneian military.[63] As Britain was responsible for Brunei's defence and foreign affairs, Singapore also sought British permission to proceed with SAF jungle training in Brunei. In October 1975 Britain informed Singapore that it had no objection to the JWC.[64] By 1976, Britain, Brunei and Singapore had agreed on jungle warfare training in Brunei for the SAF. Under the agreement, Britain would train SAF instructors at its training facilities in Brunei, following which the SAF instructors would train Singaporean troops in another camp, and up to infantry company level.[65]

In 1975 Singapore requested the United States to train SAF military, intelligence units and the Singaporean police in counter-insurgency operations.[66] The United States agreed to do so and made plans to commence the training in February 1976 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The training program was scheduled to run for three weeks involving up to 40 of Singapore's security officials.[67] Lee Kuan Yew took a personal interest in the counter-insurgency program and was concerned about its high cost, estimated to be about USD$225,000.[68] Henry Kissinger, then the United States Secretary of State, informed the United States embassy staff in Singapore to explain to Lee that the United States Congress had specified the cost of the counter-insurgency program. Despite the high cost, Kissinger also directed the embassy staff to assure Lee that the United States would consider ways to lower the training cost.[69] Defence

[62]Menon, K U, 'A Six-Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 10, No. 3, (1988), p. 309.
[63]AAD, NARA Document Number 1975KUALA04763 Film Number D750279-0313, Military Activity in Brunei, 12 August 1975.
[64]AAD NAR, Document Number 1975SINGAP04620 Film Number D750370-0243, Brunei Jungle Warfare Training Center, 24 October 1975.
[65]AAD NARA Document Number 1976SINGAP05405 Film Number D760443-0398, Jungle Warfare Training For Singapore Armed Forces in Brunei, 30 November 1976.
[66]AAD NARA, Document Number 1975SINGAP03216 Film Number D750258-0951, Visit of U.S. Team To Discuss Counterinsurgency Equipment And Training, 26 July 1976.
[67]AAD NARA Document Number 1975STATE250586 Film Number D750365-1007, Counterinsurgency Equipment And Training, 21 October 1975.
[68]AAD, NARA Document Number 1976SINGAP01235 Film Number D760096-1149, Implementation of Counterinsurgency Course, 15 March 1976.
[69]AAD, NARA Document Number 1976STATE020485 Film Number D760031-0456, Counter-Insurgency Training Course for Singapore, 27 January 1976.

Minister Goh Keng Swee agreed with Lee Kuan Yew's assessment of the importance of counter-insurgency capabilities in Singapore's defence strategy. In his meeting with General William Moore, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Goh said that Lee Kuan Yew considered the course to be a significant feature of Singapore's defence strategy.[70] At this point, it is essential to note that, unlike Malaysia, Singapore was not at that time facing an armed insurgency as its urbanised territory was unsuitable for a conventional insurgency campaign. The emphasis on counter-insurgency training is further evidence of Singapore's plan to deploy the SAF within Malaysian territory.

Besides acquiring jungle warfare and counter-insurgency capabilities, the SAF sought to prepare its commanders with the skills and capability needed to conduct a military campaign in Malaysia. According to Huxley, SAF commanders had been conducting command-post exercises in preparation for a military intervention in Malaysia since the late 1960s.[71] A critical piece of evidence that signalled Singapore's intention to equip the SAF for a military campaign in Malaysia took place in Australia during the late 1970s. According to intelligence sources in Australia, both Australia and Singapore were preparing contingency plans for military intervention in Malaysia if the communist insurgents succeeded in taking control of the southern parts of West Malaysia.[72] In building up the SAF's capability to implement a forward defence strategy, a major military exercise involving Singapore's army commanders was planned for January 1978 in Queensland, which has similar jungle terrain to the southern parts of West Malaysia. Australia trained Singapore's army commanders in scenario-planning for an advance into Malaysia and then securing gains made.[73]

Point Defence Capabilities

To mitigate potential threats from a Malaysian air attack on Singapore's key facilities, the SAF developed a point-defence capability.[74] The SAF possessed an air defence system based on Britain's Bloodhound surface to air missile (SAM) system.[75] Bloodhound used continuous carrier-wave transmission, making detection difficult and

[70]AAD NARA Document Number 1976SINGAP02038 Film Number D760157-0550, CINCPAC Chief Of Staff's Call On Singapore Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister, 26 April 1976.
[71]Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City,* p. 59.
[72]*The Canberra Times,* 'Australia, Singapore prepare to defend Malaysia', 10 May 1977.
[73]Ibid.
[74]Robert Aldridge, *First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War,* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), p. 192.
[75]IISS, *Military Balance,* 1972-1973.

it also had an electronic countermeasures capability.[76] The SAMs were deployed across different areas - Seletar airbase, Tuas and Amoy Quee - to reduce their vulnerability to Malaysian air attack.[77] To further boost its air defence capability Singapore acquired 34 GDF 35mm towed anti-aircraft guns in 1978.[78] The GDF 35mm had an advantage over the Bloodhound missiles as these had fixed launchers and were therefore vulnerable to air attack. The GDF 33mm guns were mobile and could be redeployed quickly, thus reducing vulnerability. That mobility also meant the GDF guns could be deployed to Malaysia to protect the water facilities and SAF troops deployed along defensive lines inside Johore.

The intention to transform the SAF into a force that could occupy vast areas of West Malaysia was highly ambitious and never fully realised. The SAF still faced challenges that might limit its capability to intervene in West Malaysia. There were morale issues, especially amongst SAF conscripts, and according to an Australian assessment, about 5% of SAF conscripts had taken drugs.[79] Furthermore combined operations training was limited, and the political and diplomatic consequences of such radical action were unknowable.

Conclusions

From the late 1960s to the final years of the 1970s, Singapore had shifted its defence policy from defending the island of Singapore to one of forward defence. Given Singapore's lack of strategic depth and its reliance on water supply from Malaysia, the city-state understood that any threat advancing down the Malay peninsula needed to be met as far north as possible, well before these forces came close to the Straits of Johor. This was well understood in the 1960s and early 1970s, but the security of West Malaysia was not in doubt in this period. However, it was only in the mid-1970s, when Singapore perceived the armed communist insurgency in West Malaysia as a clear and present danger, that Singapore hastened the transformation of the SAF into an offensive-oriented military force for the first time.

The understanding of the SAF as a reactive and defensive military force during the Cold War has not taken account of the reality that Singapore was prepared for a radical forward defensive posture. This history has not been captured in the existing literature and the SAF's offensive capabilities and intentions have gone unconsidered.

[76]NAA A1838 3024/12/1 Part 7, Military Study – Singapore: JIO Study No. 4/77 Amendment No 1, n.d.

[77]CIA Library FOIA Document Number CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090007-9, National Intelligence Survey 44c; Singapore; Armed Forces, May 1973.

[78]SIPRI database: Transfers of major weapons: Singapore.

[79]NAA A1838, 3024/12/1 Part 7, National Servicemen's View of the SAF, 13 May 1977.

The Technological Need: Abel & Dewar's Primary Motive for Inventing Cordite in 1889

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ABSTRACT
By the 1880s, smokeless military propellants greatly outperformed traditional black gun powders, as first shown in France in late 1884. In early 1889, the British version of a smokeless propellant for the military, Cordite, was developed by Sir Frederick Abel, a renowned War Office chemist and by Professor James Dewar from the University of Cambridge. They tested Alfred Nobel's 1888 British patented smokeless Ballistite but rejected it for a major flaw, while upgrading it to obtain Cordite in 1889. At first glance, the motive for rejecting Ballistite might be seen as driven by personal profit, but considerations of monetary gain, were actually of secondary importance. Abel and Dewar's primary motive for rejection was technical and was ultimately proven valid: Nobel made major corrections to his Ballistite patents including his correction of the flaw Dewar and Abel had noted.

Introduction

Until the mid-nineteenth century, black powder was the only gun propellant used in artillery and small arms, with the greatest impetus for new and better compositions coming from the advanced in small firearms. It was recognized by arms developers that a decrease in the gun calibre would yield a number of ballistic and tactical advantages, provided that an increase in initial velocity could be achieved to balance the loss of the lower projectile weight as a consequence of the decreased barrel diameter. As far as black powder was concerned, its limit of efficiency had been reached by the middle of the eighteenth century. About that time, a search for new propelling substances began. The organic nitrate explosives nitrocellulose, a fluffy

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1651

material, and nitroglycerine, a liquid, appeared in the mid-nineteenth century and both were candidates for scientific investigation.[1]

To adapt nitrocellulose as a gun propellant, much effort was needed to tame its uncontrolled combustion, especially for military use. As such, and until the mid-1880s, much of the nitrocellulose produced for energetic purposes was used in explosives, with some in hunting gun powder formulations, where it was mixed with black powders. These efforts to adopt it for the military achieved success in late 1884 when a dependable gun propellant composition, Poudre B, was developed in France. This had a 96% nitrocellulose content in the formulation. A recent paper proposes that the Poudre B formulation was developed within only a few weeks, during October and November 1884, beginning with the testing of celluloid (82% nitrocellulose, 18% camphor) and soon, by dispensing with the camphor, reaching the more energetic Poudre B composition in the shape of flakes.[2] The Poudre B's ballistic potential was quickly appreciated, when, only a month later in December 1884, Poudre B now shaped in ribbons, was tested in a 65 mm cannon and demonstrated its superior ballistic advantage to black powder. The next year was devoted to adopting the powder in flake form to the newly developed semi-automatic 8 mm diameter Lebel rifle, which was introduced in 1886.[3] From that year, and until 1900, Poudre B was adopted for large cannons of various size in the French army and navy, and with only slight changes in composition and grain shape over time.[4] By 1900, 72% of French military propellants were Poudre B types. In the same period Cordite, the first British smokeless military propellant, was jointly developed by Professor James Dewar from the University of Cambridge, and Sir Frederick Abel, a renowned War Office chemist. In 1898, and soon after adapting Cordite for the Lee-Enfield 0.303-inch standard rifle in 1895, the Waltham Abbey government plant was also manufacturing Cordite for the Royal Navy's 12-inch guns.[5]

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[1]Heinrich Brunswig, trans. and annotated by Charles E. Monroe and Alton L. Kibler, *Explosives, a synoptic and critical treatment of the literature of the subject as gathered from various sources,* (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1912), p. 241.

[2]Yoel Bergman, 'A New Perspective on Poudre B's 1884 Development', in Liliane Hilaire-Pérez et Catherine Lanoë (Dir.), *Les sciences et les techniques, laboratoire de l'Histoire. Mélanges en l'honneur de Patrice Bret,* (Paris: Presses des Mines, collection Histoire, sciences, techniques et sociétés, 2022), p.198 & pp. 209-210.

[3]Ibid., p. 198 & p. 202.

[4]Yoel Bergman, '*Development and Production of Smokeless Military Propellants in France 1884–1918*', Ph.D. dissertation, (Tel Aviv University, 2009), pp. 81-82. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yoel-Bergman/research. Accessed 10 August 2022.

[5]Edward William Anderson, 'The Machinery used in the Manufacture of Cordite', in *Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers,* Paper No. 3075 (1898), p. 70.

Ballistite, a powerful smokeless propellant was first patented on a provisional basis in Britain by Alfred Nobel on 31 January 1888.[6] He had added, for the first-time, nitroglycerine to smokeless propellants which previously had all been based on nitrocellulose, as for example used in Poudre B. Nobel's complete patent specification in Britain was applied for on 28 December 1888 and was approved on 15 January 1889. This patent was more technical and precise in nature, recommending as an optimal formulation, 46% nitroglycerine, 46% nitrocellulose, and 8% camphor. The mid-1889 formulation for Cordite, contained 58 % nitroglycerine, 36 % nitrocellulose and 5% petroleum jelly. The nitrocellulose used in Ballistite was specifically of the soluble form (in an ether-alcohol solution), while that used in Cordite was of the insoluble and more energetic form. The soluble form is known scientifically as di-nitrocellulose, and more commonly as Collodion. The insoluble form is known as tri-nitrocellulose and more commonly as Guncotton. This difference would later become an important legal issue.

Nobel was a determined entrepreneur, industrialist and a talented inventor in explosives and in other areas. Yet he lacked the scientific education of Abel and Dewar, the inventors of Cordite. In the 1860s he had invented and then sold the explosive Dynamite which is based on nitroglycerine mixed with a porous siliceous earth. In the 1870s, he had patented and sold the more powerful Blasting Gelatine, basically composed of nitroglycerine and soluble nitrocellulose, the same key ingredients that he used in the later Ballistite. He held patents and owned plants across Europe and intended to produce and market Ballistite internationally as he had done for his other explosives.

Ballistite's development was long, taking some eight years, and only ended in late 1887. At that time Nobel was missing for long durations, due it seems, to business needs. Research was conducted in Nobel's laboratory in Paris and field testing was performed by Nobel's Explosives Company in Ardeer, Scotland. To achieve Ballistite, Blasting Gelatine was modified to make it less explosive – a property needed for propellants, by changing the manufacturing process and by using new substances in small quantities, most notably camphor. This adds doubt to what Nobel wrote at the beginning of his patent, that Ballistite was a modification of celluloid, where part of the camphor was replaced by nitroglycerine. This seems to contradict his claim that Ballistite resembled Blasting Gelatine, with appropriate changes in process and substances. The addition of camphor, as indicated by Mauskopf, was made in the very last phase of Ballistite development. Until then, samples were made principally of nitrocellulose and

[6]Alfred Nobel, 'Improvements in the Manufacture of Explosives', English Patent No. 1471, 31 January 1888 (Provisional Specification).

nitroglycerine, thus supporting the theory that he began with Blasting Gelatine.[7] One can question how much scientific consideration Nobel gave to adding the volatile camphor. Another unanswered question is why was it so important for Nobel to indicate that Ballistite was a modification of celluloid. Was the addition of camphor intended to support the major claim made in his patent – the celluloid modification.

Smokeless propellants, when compared to black powders, are stronger mechanically since they do not disintegrate when fired in the gun as does black powder, thus assuring almost equivalent ballistic results from shot to shot. This is caused by the presence of the strong solvated, nitrocellulose matrix. This burns cleaner with almost no residues and produces much less smoke and thus does not disclose the firing position as well as enabling semi or fully automatic firing. Such formulations also have higher potential chemical energies and burn in a controllable manner, resulting, for example, in higher exit velocities for the same maximum pressure. One drawback, which appeared in the early 1890s was, however, a dangerous instability in long term storage, that was not found when storing black powders. This was due to nitrocellulose decomposition and the release of a gas at high pressure and temperature, leading to a number of large storage explosions during the early years following the adoption of smokeless propellants. Nobel, either due to requirements from countries such as Italy or through his own initiative, added a stabiliser in mid-1889.[8] In France, a suitable stabiliser had not been selected until the early 1900s following some notable storage explosions. With Cordite, the addition of 5% of petroleum jelly in the formulation ensured its chemical stability, an unintended but beneficial outcome. During the early development of Cordite Abel and Dewar had added the petroleum jelly with the intent that it would remain in the bore after each shot, thus 'lubricating' the bore before the next shot and so reduce barrel erosion due to Cordite's generation of high temperature combustion gasses. The jelly did reduce erosion, but not by lubrication. Being an endothermic substance, the jelly drew out heat and lowered the gas temperature which was increasing the barrel erosion. Another unexpected outcome was the jelly making Cordite chemically stable, without a specific stabiliser addition being needed.

France's early development and use of smokeless propellant was officially disclosed in an 1890 bulletin by the Minister of War. This announced that French armament had

[7]In 2008 Seymour Masuskopf generously provided the author with a copy of his draft review of Nobel's recollections. It noted that camphor was only tested seriously just before Nobel's filing of the first patent in Paris in late 1887. Most experimental formulations before 1887 did not contain camphor. The presence of camphor in practice and patents was subsequently and quickly dropped.

[8]Yoel Bergman, 'Alfred Nobel, Aniline and Diphenylamine', *ICON,* Vol. 17 (2012), pp. 64-66.

undergone an almost complete transformation in the last five years (1885-1890), a change which most great continental powers were then also striving to realise.[9] The advent of Poudre B for use in French military rifles and after that in artillery, and Nobel's 1887 to early 1889 patents in Europe, seem to have created a typical 'me too' syndrome in different countries. Each was quick to strive for the smokeless explosive's tactical advantages. By 1889, Tsar Alexander III had urgently ordered work on 'rifles of reduced calibre and cartridges with smokeless powder'.[10] In Britain, it was the Prince of Wales in 1888 who asked (or instructed) that an Explosives Committee be formed, and required Abel to serve as its head. The prince had shown a great deal of interest in Guncotton (or insoluble nitrocellulose) and attended lectures and demonstrations by Abel and others. Abel was a confidante of the prince and attended many of his dinners and social functions.[11] In Italy, where Nobel's company was very active, the Italian government signed a production and supply contract with Nobel in August 1889.[12] As military rifles were the first in line for black powder replacement it was first adopted for rifles such as the French Lebel in 1886, the British Lee-Enfield in 1895, and the Russian Mosin. The first Ballistite production for Italy in late 1889-1890 was made for the Italian military rifle.

The official appointment of Abel to establish and lead the Explosives Committee came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Duke of Cambridge, in the summer of 1888, and Abel directed the Committee from July 1888 to 1891 with Dewar also a key member. The committee was formed to select a modern propellant for the military, which wanted a smokeless type. Samples of smokeless Ballistite, patented by Alfred Nobel in Britain, were sent by Nobel to the Committee and were test fired in late 1888 using a British 0.303-inch military rifle.[13] After some changes by Nobel, Ballistite complied with the Committee's ballistic requirements. In more official comparative tests in 1890, using Cordite versus Ballistite in the 0.303-inch rifle, it was concluded that the ballistic results were very similar, but in detonation tests, Ballistite was more sensitive.[14] It is worth noting that due to the similar energies produced by

[9]Bergman, A New Perspective, pp. 197-200.
[10]Michael Gordin, 'No Smoking Gun: D.I. Mendeleev and Pyrocollodion Gunpowder', in *Instrumentation, expérimentation et expertise des matériaux énergétiques (poudres, explosifs et pyrotechnie) du XVIe siècle à nos jours. Actes des Troisièmes Journées Paul Vieille, Cité des sciences et de l'industrie, 19–20 octobre 2000*, (Paris: A3P & CNRS, 2001), p. 75.
[11]John Williams, *The History of Explosives, Volume II: The Case for Cordite* (UK: J. Williams, 2014), p. 5 & p. 240.
[12]Yoel Bergman, 'Nobel's Russian Connection: Producing and Marketing Ballistite', 1889–1890, *Vulcan,* Vol. 2 (2014), p. 43.
[13]Alfred Nobel, 'Improvements in the Manufacture of Explosives', English Patent No. 1471, 28 December 1888 (Complete Specification).
[14]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* p. 251 & p. 254.

both compositions, and due to the non-ballistic efficiencies of their grains at that time, the differences in ballistic results were minute. Cordite's ballistic efficiency advantage would only be realised later, by the extrusion of cylindrical grains with inner perforations, which were especially useful in higher calibres. Nobel in understanding this Ballistite flaw, was also trying to remain within the competition. His 2 August 1889 update to his 1888 British patent, submitted also in parallel in Italy, proposed to create perpendicular perforations in the sheets or carpets, coming out of the Ballistite process and which were then rolled into the cartridges.[15] It appears this was an attempt to compensate for the lack of ballistic efficiency. During gun combustion, the very small diameter perforations allow the flame to enter inside the cartridge. As propellant combustion progresses the outer surfaces of the sheet is ablated producing less gas and lower pressures in the combustion chamber and at the projectile base, pushing it more slowly. This is partially compensated by the increase of inner perforation surfaces and diameters due to flame ablation. In the Cordite extrusion, granular cylinders, each with one large inner perforation, could be easily made into a tube, or into cylinders with seven or more small perforations. On this point, one article has recently proposed that such perforated sheets were sent to France by Nobel from his Italian Avigliana plant, sometime in mid-1889.[16] At that time, the French military were also undertaking tests and the samples seem to have been intended for the French 90mm cannon.[17] Nobel continued in improving the efficiency of his propellant. In his 1896 international patents he proposed what would later become commonplace in small arms, the coating of the propellant grains with slower burning materials.[18]

Some of the Ballistite samples received from Nobel in 1888 were, as was customary, examined at high storage temperatures. They were found to release the camphor, which potentially could change Ballistite's ballistic performance over time. Under the terms of the test programme Abel and Dewar, were allowed to make changes to candidates' formulations, and they created an experimental powder without camphor. This required significant differences to the Ballistite production process, formulation and shapes, and was soon labelled Cordite. The first Abel and Dewar provisional patent of 2 April 1889, was submitted in Britain and without royalties, and began with what seems unusual for a patent, by denouncing the recent addition of camphor to Blasting Gelatine, to create a propellant and so pointing indirectly at Ballistite – since

[15]R. Schuck & H. Sohlman, *The Life of Alfred Nobel,* (London: Heinemann, 1929), p. 274.
[16] Yoel Bergman, Alfred Nobel, Aniline and Diphenylamine, p.59.
[17] Yoel Bergman, 'Fair Chance and not a Blunt Refusal: New Understandings on Nobel, France, and Ballistite in 1889', *Vulcan,* Vol. 5 (2017), pp.31,33-34.
[18]Alfred Nobel, 'An Improved Manufacture of Explosives', English Patent No. 27197, 30 August 1897 (Approved posthumously).

Nobel claimed in his 1888, patent, that Ballistite resembled Blasting Gelatine.[19] The same denouncement was soon found in their Swiss Cordite patent of June 1889.[20] Unlike in Britain, the Abel and Dewar patents filed abroad did expect royalties.[21] Such criticism of camphor was warranted, as by mid-1889 Nobel had removed camphor from Ballistite, claiming later that other governments with which he worked had asked him to do so. He also made other significant changes, especially in the initial mixing process, and this pointed to the prematurity of his 1888 patents.[22] Abel, being aware of Nobel's intention to make changes in early April 1889, claimed that such changes resulted from the British Explosives Committee's criticism. Since Cordite's shape and production stages were very different, it became in the long run, much more useful for various calibres, both in Britain and abroad. Cordite could be created with less energetic compositions than Ballistite, thus reducing barrel erosion and producing more ballistically efficient grain shapes. Ballistite was eventually mostly reserved for use in mortars, which are less affected by barrel erosion. One example for such flexibility was in the lowering of Cordite's nitroglycerine content after finding that Cordite had created too much cannon barrel erosion during the Boer War.

Some in the British Parliament and press, felt that Cordite was really a fake Ballistite and that Abel and Dewar had abused Nobel's knowledge in their quest for Cordite and quest for personal gain through the overseas patents. Nobel's company in Britain filed a lawsuit claiming patent infringement. The 1894 lawsuit and two subsequent appeals by Nobel ended in failure due to a crucial legal point, and one which might seem to the public to be a minor technical point, namely Cordite's use of a different, insoluble form of nitrocellulose. This difference, although claimed in the trial to have stemmed from Cordite's integrity needs, could also have been derived from a process necessity. Nevertheless, this emphasis on nitrocellulose differences at the trial much obscured other, more meaningful, technological considerations in the manufacture of Cordite.

Between late 1887 and early 1889 Nobel had submitted his first Ballistite patents in France, Britain, Italy, and Spain.[23] In the 1894 British trial, Nobel said that these initial patents were intended to protect his innovative nitroglycerine-based propellant and allow early entry to the market while protecting it from being blocked by others. He

[19]Frederic A. Abel and James Dewar, 'An Improvement in the Manufacture of Explosives', English Patent No. 5614, 2 April 1889 (Provisional Specification).
[20]Frederic A. Abel and James Dewar, *'Perfectionnement dans Les Munitions de Guerre'*, Swiss Patent No. 1189, 25 June 1889.
[21]Mathew C. Ford, '*The British Army and the politics of rifle development, 1880 to 1986',* Ph.D. dissertation. (King's College, 2008), p. 86.
[22]Bergman, Alfred Nobel, Aniline and Diphenylamine, pp. 61-64.
[23]Ibid., p. 61.

expected that royalties would be paid to him by governments who adopted or adapted his discovery. For this reason, he had paid less attention to patents details.[24] Such a move can explain why what we would now consider to be major patent aspects were not sufficiently detailed in his early applications. Despite this Nobel's biographers have praised Ballistite's utility from the mixing of two powerful explosives to deliver the less powerful Ballistite propellant. Yet, as written elsewhere, where propellants are concerned, the chemical makeup alone was not enough. Concerns were raised by different governments regarding process safety when using nitroglycerine (by France and Russia), long term storage stability (Britain), barrel erosion (France), and the ballistic advantage of Ballistite over Poudre B (France).[25] In France, despite concerns over barrel erosion, Ballistite was considered in 1889 for the Lebel rifle, but the results seem not to have been better than the French smokeless Poudre B – a possible reason for its rejection that has not previously been recognised in the literature on this topic.[26]

By early 1889 Abel and Dewar, disappointed with the Ballistite's camphor issue, had begun work to improve the formulation. When the British government adopted and began to produce Cordite in the early 1890s, Nobel's British company became concerned at losing future income and filed the 1894 lawsuit.[27] It was soon compensated by taking part in Cordite production.[28] A 1923 report, marking the fiftieth anniversary of Nobel's establishment of the Ardeer factory in Scotland, noted that in 1898 Ardeer was producing Cordite mixtures (or pastes) in large quantities for further processing into final product at the government plant at Waltham Abbey.[29]

As a background to justifying Abel and Dewar's technological reasons as the primary motive and profits as the secondary motive, we will first review the ethical and legal aspects of the story, which won a large part of researchers' attention, based on the recent work by John Williams, Mathew Ford, and Seymour Mauskopf.

Ethical Criticisms

These can be found in contemporary accusations made against Abel and Dewar by the press and key figures, both before and during the trial. In their understanding, Nobel had been asked in late 1888 to send samples to the Committee, which soon decided

[24]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* p. 313.
[25]Bergman, 'Nobel's Russian Connection', pp. 49-51.
[26]Yoel Bergman, 'Fair Chance and not a Blunt Refusal', pp. 32-36.
[27]Clive Trebilcock, 'A Special Relationship - Government, Rearmament, and the Cordite Firms', *Economic History Review,* Vol. 19 (1966), p. 368.
[28]R. Schuck and H. Sohlman, *The Life of Alfred Nobel*, p. 123.
[29]T. Taylor, *Report on Ardeer Factory - An Outline of its History, 1873-1923,* (Scotland: Nobel's Explosives Co., Ltd., Ardeer factory, Stevenson, Ayrshire, 1923), p. 22.

to improve upon them, eventually culminating in Abel and Dewar's own Cordite patents in Britain and abroad. Some believed Nobel to have been abused, by having been invited to support the tests by submitting samples and commercially sensitive technical information which was then used by Abel and Dewar to create Cordite.[30]

Abel and Dewar already had a reputation before the trial of being very interested in monetary gain from consulting and patents. Their quick move to personally patent Cordite not long after their asking Nobel for samples, while made in their official capacity seemed to underscore a quest for profit. Another accusation was made by the inventor Hiram Maxim, who claimed to have proposed to the Committee a powder similar to Cordite and made before Cordite had been patented. He suggested that Abel and Dewar had blocked others in advancing their own propellants.[31]

Part of the reasons for the ethical scandal can be understood as a repeat of a pattern set before by Abel. In 1862 an Austrian patent for producing nitrocellulose was first registered in Britain by the Baron Von Lenk, a pioneer in the use of Guncotton as an explosive and propellant in Austria. In his 1865 patent as a War Office employee, Abel filed an improvement patent, at a time when government employees were not officially allowed to file personal patents. He added a final purification step that helped to partly resolve the stability problem.[32] Abel did not notify the War Office of his patent, but instead sold it to a Guncotton factory in Stowmarket, Suffolk, which had previously employed Lenk's process but was dissatisfied with it following an explosion. Soon after the patent's issue Abel campaigned against imported explosives based on nitroglycerines (i.e., Dynamite), and the Shultze powder produced in Germany, a combination of wood derived nitrocellulose mixed with salts and intended for sportsmen. He claimed they were both unsafe. Yet Abel's purification step and claim that his nitrocellulose was safe did not prevent the explosion of some ten tons of Guncotton at Stowmarket in the summer of 1871 which killed tens of people. Following the accident, and public criticism of Abel, the government became aware of his patent and forced Abel to sell it. Williams even suggests that the government was equally unaware of the Abel and Dewar Cordite patents filed in continental Europe in 1889.[33]

Despite the Stowmarket accident, Abel's process was accepted as state-of-the-art. For example, a French navy report of 1880 indicates that 100 tons of nitrocellulose were ordered from Stowmarket in 1875, and 35 tons in 1877 to be produced by the Moulin-Blanc plant in France. The French navy said both nitrocelluloses had been produced

[30]Trebilcock, 'A Special Relationship', p. 376.
[31]Ford, *The British Army,* p. 86.
[32]Frederick Abel, **'**Purification of Nitrocellulose', English Patent, No. 1102 (1865).
[33]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* pp. 89-190.

by the Abel process. Stowmarket also supported the Moulin Blanc engineers.[34] Paul Vieille, the inventor of Poudre B indicated in an 1886 report that the nitrocellulose in Poudre B was made by the Abel process. He reviewed the storage history of nitrocellulose stored in France for more than 10 years and concluded that it was stable enough and, for this reason, Poudre B would also be stable in long term storage.[35] This turned out to be incorrect due to early 1890s storage explosions in France, which led to the introduction of an unsuitable stabilizer in the mid-1890s. In the case of nitrocellulose, Abel's patent improved a foreign patent in chemical stability, and in Cordite, improved the ballistic stability and performance of Ballistite. At the same time, he secured for himself profit opportunities e.g. Stowmarket was paying him royalties for his Guncotton process by the mid-1860s while the Cordite patents submitted in continental Europe were intended to have the same result. Profit and scandal issues asides, one could say that his changes to the foreign patents had much improved the quality and performance of British armaments.

The public discovery that Abel and Dewar submitted Cordite patents abroad resulted in a political scandal in Britain as they had supposedly revealed British achievements to foreigners.[36] Robert William Hanbury, Member of Parliament for Preston, and a watchdog of all armament questions, was vocal in criticising their patriotism and ethics. The War Office sprang to their defence and established the 'Cordite Scandal' as one independent of personalities but deeply rooted in the department's system of innovation by committee.[37] Nevertheless, Lord Rosebury's Liberal Government was forced out of office in 1895, due in part it is said, to War Office mismanagement, which among other outcomes had given rise to the Cordite Scandal.[38]

The Legal Aspects

These stem mostly from the 1894 trial and from Nobel's subsequent appeals. The trial aroused interest due to the intricate strategies of both sides, and the conflict between the real actors, Nobel on one side and Abel and Dewar on the other. It also became influential on British patent law by emphasising a new legal importance for precision in the writing of patents. Nobel's lawyers argued that the 1888 Ballistite patent was a revolutionary master patent covering future small variants, such as the later Cordite. The judge believed that the core issue was how exact were the claims in the 1888 patent. Much of the trial was devoted to textual analysis, especially on whether a key ingredient, the insoluble tri-nitrocellulose type used in Cordite was covered by

[34]Yoel Bergman, 'The Moulin Blanc Nitrocellulose Plant in France - Process and Improvements in the 1880's and early 1890's', *ICON,* Vol. 13 (2007), pp. 24-25.
[35]Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[36]John Williams, *The History of Explosives*, p .294.
[37]Trebilcock, 'A Special Relationship', p. 376.
[38]Ford, *The British Army,* p. 85.

Ballistite, which prescribed use of soluble di-nitrocellulose. Nobel's experts argued that the differences between the two were scientifically blurred.

In a change made to the July 1889 cordite patent Abel and Dewar indicated that with theirs was an insoluble process, with a consistent dough for extrusion obtained, and it also emphasised that the insoluble was different from the soluble process. Such emphasis seems to have been made to distinguish Cordite from Ballistite, perhaps in view of a future lawsuit. In the trial, the reason for changing to insoluble was explained by Abel and Dewar as being due to an early observation that the soluble nitrocellulose did not hold the nitroglycerine strongly enough at low temperatures.[39] This author believes the change to a less soluble nitrocellulose may have also been driven by process requirements. An insoluble process was needed because when soluble nitrocellulose is mixed with solvents and liquid nitroglycerine, a dough is obtained that is too soft for extrusion. The French Poudre B process, similar to Cordite, also used an insoluble process.

The court ruled that the insoluble process was not covered by the Ballistite patent. Nobel lost the case on this ground and failed again in two appeals on the same issue, the last one ending in the House of Lords in 1895. The production process differences in Cordite raised by Abel and Dewar in the trial received less importance. Although the judge had agreed that the processes were not identical, it was the material question that mattered.[40]

The Personal Aspects

Historic and problematic relations existed between Abel and Nobel and merit examination, since they might have prompted Abel to invent Cordite in response to their previous scientific competition. Soon after his nitrocellulose patent issuance in the 1860s, Abel advised British legislators in the late 1860s and early 1870s only to use Dynamite under technical limitations due to the presence of nitroglycerine. One likely reason for the advice was the advancement in use of his improved nitrocellulose as an explosive. At that time this was its only use. Prestige could have also played a part when, in 1867, Abel took out a patent for an explosive named Glyoxiline, which resembled Nobel's future Blasting Gelatine. Abel's was based on mixing nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose, but failed commercially. Nobel's major success with the nitroglycerine-based Dynamite from the 1860s, would have been problematic for Abel as a result. The mid-1870s success of Nobel's Blasting Gelatine would have been even more annoying. Here, Nobel succeeded with an explosive based on nitrocellulose and

[40]Seymour Mauskopf, 'Nobel's Explosives Company, Limited v. Anderson (1894)', in Jose Bellido ed., *Landmark Cases in Intellectual Property Law,* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 128 & pp.132-133.

nitroglycerine, whereas Abel had failed. One testimony to his feelings comes from the Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry of 29 July 1883, where Abel was quoted as saying that he had been in 1867 on the verge of preparing what became one of Mr Nobel's greatest triumphs, the remarkable explosive agent, Blasting Gelatine.[41] Thus, Ballistite weaknesses in late 1888 and the need for a British smokeless propellant may have created an opportunity for Abel to demonstrate his inventive superiority. Prestige can therefore be considered another motive,

The Technological Aspects

It is plausible to assume that Abel and Dewar had only Ballistite at hand in late 1888, as a long developed and gun-tested, smokeless formulation. The forming of the Committee back in mid-1888 to examine candidates from the industry, suggests that smokeless development was either lacking or in its first phase for the British military.

In late 1888, the two sides worked together on improving Ballistite ballistic performance. Ballistite samples were test fired, sometimes in Nobel's presence and he made improvements. By early January 1889, his samples met the ballistic requirements for a military rifle.

But things then became problematic. The samples received at the end of 1888 had a strong smell of camphor. This material was needed in Ballistite to facilitate dissolution between nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose and to reduce Ballistite's energy. Abel and Dewar exposed the Ballistite samples to high temperatures to check its behaviour. Under these conditions it was found that camphor volatised out of the formulation. This had the potential over time to change the nominal ballistic performance after high temperature storage as found on warships. Nobel, who seemed confused, said that the samples were made in a hurry and promised to resolve the problems.[42] In the British context, the Ballistite acceptance tests provided important knowledge, in the positive and negative sense, helping Cordite. Obviously, Nobel and others felt that he was being used, yet they overlooked the technical reasons for Ballistite rejection. Much of this would have been prevented if all three had worked for the same organisation, for instance the War Office, and without differing organisational loyalty and commercial aims. Nobel would have been the initiator of a new formulation with Abel and Dewar his colleagues, correcting inherent errors in production and formulation, and all would have ended happily with Cordite. Such an ideal project was found in France during 1884-1886 in the invention and adoption of the first military smokeless powder, Poudre B. The scientists, engineers, and field testers all worked directly for the French government.

[41]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* p. 102, p. 169, pp. 176-177

Nobel's tests to meet British requirements based on trial and error, resemble his tests in France in mid-1889. Through Nobel's high level political connections, the Minster of War was persuaded to test Ballistite in the Lebel rifle, which was already performing extremely well with Poudre B. The field tests seemed to produce unimpressive results and the Ministry of War had soon sent suggestions to improve the samples that had been sent. Subsequent improvements if made, do not seem to have helped.[43] Several months after the final rejection, Nobel, in his 31 August 1890 letter to the Russian Minister of War on the status of ballistite in European countries, accused the 'inertia' of the French State engineers as the reason.[44] He also wrote that Cordite was a forgery, while better ballistic results were found with Ballistite.[45] His stated disappointments from France and Britain, may have been caused by his commercial displeasure at losing income, and from anger for being rejected as an inventor, who had had previous worldwide successes. The letter reveals difficulties in being accepted in Germany and Russia and other, smaller countries, while championing the acceptance of Ballistite by the Italian government. Here it is logical to assume that Italy took Ballistite because its development and production were not yet well established.

After being presented with the camphor issue, in late 1888, Nobel seems to have been little convinced that camphor needed to be removed. Evidence can be found in an early 1889 visit by a British committee member who visited Nobel's laboratory in France. He reported to the committee in late March 1889 that the Ballistite formulation and process were still being changed, and camphor was still present (6%).[46] He also found that traces of the stabiliser aniline had been added.[47] In addition, in his first US submission in the same month, March, Nobel still kept camphor.[48] Dropping the camphor is first found in the July 1889 German patent where Nobel

[43]Bergman, 'Fair Chance and not a Blunt Refusal', pp. 33-34.
[44]Bergman, 'Nobel's Russian Connection', pp. 48.
[45]Ibid., p. 54. Note that the said article was the first to discover Nobel's connection with Russia on the Ballistite issue and this was included in a recent biography on Nobel. In Sweden.
[46]J. S. Rowlinson, *Sir James Dewar, 1842-1923: A Ruthless Chemist (Science, Technology and Culture, 1700-1945)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 62.
[47]As a personal note, in the author's 2012 article, using indirect evidence, it was proposed that aniline was first to be used in Ballistite, prior to diphenylamine, which was previously indicated by one historian as the first to be introduced in Ballistite in the German July 1889 patent. The author's recent discovery of this visit is direct proof for the estimation, Bergman, 'Alfred Nobel, Aniline and Diphenylamine', pp. 64-67.
[48]Alfred Nobel, 'Celluloidal Explosive and Process of Making the Same', US Patent No. 456,508, 21 July 1889 (first filed on 22 March 1889).

even criticised the use of camphor, thus repeating Abel and Dewar's criticism.[49] When cross-examined in the 1894 trial, Nobel said that he had removed camphor due to the demands of British officials and those of other governments.[50] Thus, Abel and Dewar were not the only ones to criticise camphor, and this adds scientific credibility to their judgment.

Both had also claimed that Ballistite was more likely to chemically decompose, compared to Cordite when stored at elevated temperatures, although the exact test date was not found. Nobel did add a chemical stabiliser, officially diphenylamine, and changed the production process significantly in his July 1889 German patent. More changes in his 20 July 20 1889 application to update his 1888 Italian patent were made in both the process and in the formulations. Here he continued changing the initial mixing steps and the recommended ratios of new ingredients, while making the patent an almost precise and detailed manufacturing procedure, because he was due to sign a production contract with the Italian government within a month. In contrast to the German patent issued on the same month of July 1889, he allowed similar stabilisers to diphenylamine, and the recommended stabiliser percentage was a little lower.[51]

The British Committee was empowered to modify and improve the candidates' samples when it was appointed in 1888. In addition, from 1883, government employees were allowed to submit patents in their own names.[52] These likely facilitated the improvements of Ballistite thus bringing about the Cordite patent. By late March 1889 Abel and Dewar had already prepared and tested their initial samples of Cordite, without camphor, and with a different mixing process, and with an extrusion step, that produced cords – hence the name Cordite. These changes had already appeared in the April 1889 first provisional patent. Soon after, on 22 July 1889, they submitted another provisional patent where they changed the soluble nitrocellulose required by Ballistite to a non-soluble type.[53] On the same day, they submitted a second provisional patent, describing details of the technical side of manufacturing. Here, joining Abel and Dewar as the applicants, was Dr William Anderson, the Head of Government Ordnance factories.[54]

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[49]Alfred Nobel, *'Verfahren zur Darstellung von zu Schiefspulver geeigneter Sprenggelatine'*, German patent No. 51471, approved July 3, 1889.
[50]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* p. 313.
[51]Bergman, 'Alfred Nobel, Aniline and Diphenylamine', pp. 63-66.
[52]Mauskopf, 'Nobel's Explosives', p. 124.
[53]Frederic A. Abel and James Dewar, 'An Improvement in the Manufacture of Explosives', English Patent No. 11664, 22 July 1889 (Provisional Specification).
[54]Frederic A. Abel, William Anderson, and James Dewar, 'Process and Apparatus for of the Manufacture of Explosives in the Form of Wires or Rods and for Forming the

Nobel soon learned about Cordite but was assured that Ballistite was still being considered. By August 1889, the two sides split, due to disagreements over the patenting of Cordite abroad and on business rights.[55]

It would be fair to say that Cordite and Ballistite patents, were being updated and corrected by the two sides and in parallel until July-August 1889, each becoming more suitable for manufacture and use. But Nobel, contrary to his claim in the 1894 trial that his 1888 Ballistite patent was a master patent, was actually demonstrating through his various technological corrections of mid-1889 that it was deficient in key areas.

The decision to patent Cordite in early 1889, was technologically driven with any profit motives, if they existed, hidden.

The Stated Technological Reasons for Cordite

The first official reason given for the creation of Cordite was objection to the inclusion of camphor. It was openly stated in the provisional patent of 2 April 1889 that Abel and Dewar claimed to have developed Cordite by modifying Nobel's 1875 British patent for Blasting Gelatine. Although the 2 April 1889 patent was withheld from the public until 1892, the same camphor criticism was found in the Swiss patent of 25 June 1889 so Nobel was probably aware of it. They criticised the addition of volatile camphor to Blasting Gelatine to make it a propellant (meaning Ballistite), and wrote that in place of it, they had added non-volatile hydrocarbons, at first tannin and later petroleum jelly. Here, they seem to have taken advantage of Nobel's claim in his 1888 Ballistite patent that Ballistite resembles Blasting Gelatine, with new substances added (as camphor) to obtain Ballistite.[56] So, their criticism may have also implied that Nobel wrongly changed Blasting Gelatine, while they were making significant changes. The 2 April 1889 patent stated that:

> It has been proposed to add to the ingredients of blasting gelatine bodies of an inert kind, such as camphor, in order to lessen the rapidity of the combustion, and thus render the explosive available for propulsive purposes, but, if such inert matter added is of volatile character or otherwise liable to change in quantity or condition, the quality of the explosive of which it forms a part is not sufficiently permanent to be relied on for storage or use. Our invention relates to means of treating blasting gelatine, whether it be simple or compounded with

same into Cartridges**'**, English Patent No. 11667, 22 July 1889 (Provisional Specification).

[55]Mauskopf, 'Nobel's Explosives', p. 125.

[56]Alfred Nobel, Improvements in the Manufacture of Explosives, English Patent No. 1471, 28 December 1888, Complete Specification).

substances which are sometimes added to it such as nitrates of hydrocarbons of a non-volatile character.[57]

The second reason can be found in Abel's 6 April 1889 report to the Committee, which was made several days after his 2 April 1889 submission to the War Office of his initial Cordite patent. He noted that Nobel was in the process of updating his Ballistite patents.[58] He noted that the planned changes were a product of the Committee's advice, when Nobel's propellant was tested in Britain. It would have become awkward for Britain to be obliged to pay royalties on Nobel's improved Ballistite after he had been helped by British scientists. Abel's argument may also have been intended convince the government to adopt Cordite. One of Nobel's updated British patents appears on 14 March 1889, proposing different solvents in the pre-mixing process for making a form of Ballistite for use in mines. This may have been brought to Abel's knowledge. Note that Nobel continued updating the 1888 patent, with another appearing in Britain on 5 June 1889, cancelling the former patent's required use of solvents in the pre-mixing of nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose. [59]

Cordite Development and Differences with Ballistite

The initial Cordite provisional patent of April 1889 stated that the Cordite mixing process and basic ingredients followed Nobel's Blasting Gelatine patent of 1875 in Britain, which basically contained nitroglycerine and soluble nitrocellulose as in Ballistite. Abel himself took out a patent in the 1860s that mixed nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose to obtain an explosive. Besides the legal advantage of not adopting the Ballistite mixing, both may have also resorted to the Gelatine mixing since Ballistite mixing was new and unconventional. In the Ballistite mixing stage, a mixture of nitroglycerine (liquid), nitrocellulose (a fluffy fibre), and the waxy camphor was put between two hot rollers at some 80°C.[60] After a few minutes, a corny, plastic-like, hard and brittle 'carpet' came out of the rollers, to be cut later into small flakes, ribbons, or left as sheets. The mixture on the rollers had a tendency to catch fire. An accident took place at Nobel's Torino plant in early 1890 during production of hundreds of tons for the Italian government, and stopped production there for several months, it may have resulted from a fire of the carpet on the hot rollers.[61] In the Cordite mixing process, as in Blasting Gelatine, nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine were first mixed with organic solvents such as acetone, to provide a safe way to process

[57]Frederic A. Abel and James Dewar, 'An Improvement in the Manufacture of Explosives for Ammunition', English Patent No.5614, 2 April 1889 (Provisional Specification).
[58]John Williams, *The History of Explosives,* p. 248.
[59]Schuck and Sohlman, The *Life of Alfred Nobel*, pp. 273- 274.
[60]Alfred Nobel, English patent 1471 (Complete Specification 28 December 1888).
[61]Bergman, 'Nobel's Russian Connection', p. 57.

the jelly or dough, which was pressed in the next stage by extrusion - another important difference to Ballistite. After extrusion and drying, the extruded cordite rods were collected in bundles or cut into tiny cylinders and loaded into cartridges. At the turn of the century, Germany adopted a similar process to Cordite for its naval guns.[62]

Having relied on Blasting Gelatine, the Committee was concerned on infringing the 1875 patent. In late 1889, it was assured officially that Britain would not have to pay royalties for the patent as it was due to expire at the end of 1889. As a renewal condition, Nobel would have to agree to no royalties when used by Britain. On the other hand, the Committee was confident that Cordite did not infringe the Ballistite patent.

The Cordite Profit Motive

As discussed earlier the Government requirement for the Committee to furnish a British military smokeless propellant, was genuine. The need was expected to be fulfilled quickly as other major European powers were already making headway in replacing black powder with smokeless propellant. Having much less experience with smokeless propellants, Abel and Dewar first relied on Ballistite but soon became sceptical because of its long-term stability due to the use of camphor. This emphasis on camphor might seem to have been an excuse for their own making and patenting Cordite, but their observation was scientifically valid, and was made openly. The move to upgrade Ballistite and create Cordite, was almost a natural imperative, given their pressing task and scientific ability. They not only removed camphor but created a more advanced and safer manufacturing process. This move to Cordite, at a time of high-level government expectations and known problems with Ballistite, must have been the primary motive. Abel and Dewar's aim for profits was likely to have been more opportunistic in nature, given Abel's previous pattern of work. Abel and Dewar were not expecting profits for themselves in Britain, to which, as official employees they were not entitled. The profits abroad, although promising, were a rather far-away expectation due to competition with Nobel. It was not like the immediate reward that Abel had received for his late 1860s Guncotton patent.

Conclusion

The problems with Ballistite and high level government expectation for a British smokeless propellant were the primary motives for the development of Cordite, and Abel and Dewar's arguments for the technical superiority of Cordite were valid. Any profit seeking on their part was opportunistic, and secondary to their meeting the national defence requirement.

[62] Yoel Bergman, *Development and Production of Smokeless Military Propellants in France,* p. 168.

Abel and Dewar's decisions to proceed with Cordite, and with extrusion playing a major role were both successful with Cordite's ingredients, shapes and manufacturing process differences to those of Ballistite making Nobel's claim of patent infringement at best questionable.

The Women Who Watched the Waves: The Women's Air Raid Defense Organisation in World War II Hawaii

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ABSTRACT
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, a small group of women in Honolulu formed the WARD, the Women's Air Raid Defense organisation. The WARD by working with the US military and dedicating itself to the aerial defence of the Hawaiian Islands released men for combat duty in the Pacific. Using primary source material held by the War Depository Archives at the University of Hawaii, this note seeks to highlight this largely unknown organisation and examine the contributions of American and Hawaiian women to the military defence of Hawaii – an aspect of American history that has been all-but-forgotten.

Introduction

Early in the morning of 7 December 1941, the Opana mobile radar unit near Kahuku, the northernmost point on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, registered a large aerial contact, which was 'completely out of the ordinary'. The two radar operators stationed there tracked the contact, which was around 130 miles north of Oahu, and telephoned the Information Centre at Fort Shafter to report it. Fort Shafter knew that a flight of Army B-17 bombers was due in that morning from California, and assuming that the contact was these planes, told the two operators to forget about it. The operators acknowledged, and once the contact signal disappeared they shut down the radar unit and awaited breakfast. The radar contact, however, was not the expected B-17s, rather, it was the first wave of Japanese carrier-based aircraft that would go on forty-five minutes later to begin the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor. The SCR 270 radar technology had performed admirably, providing a timely warning of the approach

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1652

of the aerial attackers. Though there had been a functioning aircraft warning system in place in Hawaii since September 1941, the system was in its infancy and was far from functioning efficiently. Problems with it included the major issue of not being able to identify plotted flights as friend or foe by any other method than looking at flight plans made available to the plotters by the various military commands. This was a far from fool-proof system. In addition, on the morning of 7 December 1941, the plotters in the Information Centre had left, as it was their first day off in a month. Had the centre been manned twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, as was the Dowding System in the UK, it is possible that information on that morning's incoming Japanese might have reached US military commanders with enough time for fighter defences to be scrambled to intercept it. The lack of a consistently functioning, efficient fighter defence system which could process and utilise the data it provided proved fatal.[1] By mid-1942 this situation had been rectified, and the Women's Air Raid Defense (WARD) organisation was working efficiently and successfully as an integral part of the improved aircraft warning system in Hawaii. Though many American women played a significant role in the US war effort, 'few women had the opportunity to participate in military operations that directly affected the defense of U.S. territory'.[2] Omitted from popular telling of the story of the US war in the Pacific, and for the most part hidden from history, is the WARD, and their unusual contribution to the defence of a US territory surrounded by the enemy. They are the subject of this research note.[3]

On Christmas Day 1941, Executive Order 9063 was approved, replacing male Signal Corps personnel at the Oahu Information Centre with locally recruited women. This decision was influenced by the extremely successful work of the UK's Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) within the Dowding System in place in 1940 during the Battle of Britain. The WARD was specifically designed to release American men for combat duty.[4] Though the WARD was technically a civilian organisation, it served under the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of the Unites States Army, and in June 1943 was detached from the Signal Corps to become the WARD unit of the 17 Fighter Command.[5] Following the Executive Order, Una Walker, an influential and long-serving Red Cross volunteer, was asked to provide the names of twenty trustworthy, suitable potential recruits, childless and between the ages of

[1]University of Hawai'i War Depository (hereinafter UHWD), Box 2, File 1.6, 'Radar Notes'.
[2]Chenoweth, Candace A. and A. Kam Napier, *Shuffleboard Pilots,* (Arizona: Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 1991), p. 19.
[3]The Hawaiian Islands were a US territory until granted statehood in 1959.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid., p. 21.

twenty and thirty-four, for this secretive work.[6] This she did, and when the number of women required increased, the option to join the WARD was extended to military wives and women from the US mainland. Security was tight and the women were not told what they would be doing – only that it would be critical secret work for the Army, and though civilians, they would be considered officers so that in the event of capture they might be treated according to international law regarding prisoners of war.

The WARD operated from the Information Center at Fort Shafter, collecting, co-ordinating, interpreting, analysing and disseminating their findings to all the military services. These American women were 'assisting in the creation of a unified air defense of the Hawaiian Islands'.[7] Training at the military requisitioned Iolani Palace in Honolulu, they learned to 'plot' using hypothetical radar reports from one of the six radar stations around Oahu. A radar operator, or an 'Oscar', as they were known, would telephone through a report of a fake radar contact 'picked up' by his station, which the trainee would receive via a headset. She would be standing beside a large table, which was covered with a map of the Hawaiian Islands divided into a grid pattern. Using 'implements like shuffleboard sticks', the WARD plotter – called a 'Rascal' – would then place a small plastic marker on the map-board to indicate the location and status of the radar contact.[8] As the radar operator updated her with real-time information on the movements of the 'bogey' aircraft, the Rascal would move the counter across the map. The information provided, usually at least bearing, altitude, speed and size, was called a 'track'. The raw information provided by radar was not at that time usable for aircraft direction purposes and had to undergo a process called 'filtering'. WARD filterers carried this out by analysing, grouping and making sense of the data for the plotters. A balcony above the table was manned by military personnel, who were able to see below them a real-time report of all aircraft reported by radar in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. If a track could not be identified as a friendly contact, they could scramble US fighter defences to intercept it, visually identify it and if it was determined to be an enemy aircraft, shoot it down. On 1 February 1942, 104 members of the WARD moved into Fort Shafter, codenamed 'Lizard', and took over duty around the clock. Radar stations and WARD units were also established on Maui, Hawaii and Kauai, as part of an 'inter-island network' watching the skies for signs of unwelcome intruders.[9] The WARD women worked hard to conceal what they were

[6]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File no. A1992:001 5.16.
[7]Chenoweth and Napier (1991), p. 1.
[8]*Sunsetter's Gazette, Newsletter of the Seventh Fighter Command Association, USAAF-World War II*, February 2003, xxi: 1, p. 1.
[9]UHWD, Box 2, File 1.4, 'WARD Maui Unit'. WARD served on Maui from 30 July 1942) and on Hawai'i (the 'big island') and Kauai from August 1942.

doing from the local population, including their own families, hiding even the location of their work by being dropped off away from the plotting centres.[10]

There were numerous instances where WARD members were involved behind the scenes in the conduct of the war. Some were in minor actions such as that on 5 March 1942. A WARD member, Jean Fraser, received a radar contact from Opana, and plotted the positions of two Japanese flying boats as they approached Oahu from the west. In a 'flurry of excitement', the WARD personnel on duty 'jolted to attention', keeping up with the plot as the Army Air and Signal Corps and Navy officers on the balcony above fired questions at them urgently.[11] The planes, it transpired, were attempting to carry out surveillance of Pearl Harbor, and were looking for US aircraft carriers, which they had been instructed to bomb if spotted. As their positions were plotted, air raid sirens were sounded, and US fighter defences were scrambled. Though nothing much came of this incident, it was proof that the Japanese could still launch raids on Hawaii. It did however, provide evidence that the Japanese could no longer do so with the element of surprise – the early warning system worked efficiently, and the WARD plotted and successfully vectored in fighters on the enemy.

WARD personnel were also engaged in major actions – most notably, the Battle of Midway. This was a naval battle, and the fact that women did not serve with the navy until after it had taken place, means the story of Midway is almost always told with little to no mention of women. Our new knowledge of the existence of the WARD, should alter this. After the attack on Oahu on 5 March, the US military began to prepare for a major confrontation with the Imperial Japanese Navy. This was a very busy time for the WARD, who knew exactly what was at stake. Jean Fraser says,

> … you could tell when these were routine missions, but girls realized that battles were upcoming when the fleet and planes all went out. We felt very much a part of the battles in the Pacific, and the place buzzed when news came back via returnees or from things we read or knew first-hand from our work. Wake Island had been captured in December 1941 and we feared for Midway. We knew if Midway fell, we'd be next.[12]

WARD members were briefed and warned that should the Japanese push into Hawaiian waters, they would be on their own, and were expected to remain at their posts with fire-fighting equipment if necessary. All overnight passes were cancelled, and those who had volunteered for first aid weren't allowed to leave Fort Shafter without special permission. WARD Kathy Cooper remembers that 'if special flights

[10]Ibid.
[11]Chenoweth and Napier (1991), p. 43.
[12]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File no. W1992:001, 3.05.

were coming in from Midway, we frequently worked without observing our usual relief time'.[13] The women often went hours without using the bathroom or accessing refreshments, so critically important was their work to the defence of the islands. Once the Battle was underway, WARD members plotted furiously, helping to guide US bombers, often damaged and carrying injured men, back to blacked-out airfields using ultra-high frequency radio, assisting with the battle, helping to conserve and economise resources and manpower, and ultimately saving lives. WARD Lornahope Kuhlman De Clue cites this as her 'most exciting time' in the WARD. For part of the time she worked on the plotting table, and then moved to the radio receiving station to take the radio calls that provided the information to be plotted. "I felt I… was involved in what was the turning point in the battle against the Japanese", she says.[14] Nell White Larsen plotted from a desk above the huge map, keeping a record of the movements as they happened. "The happiest time was being on shift when the news came in that we had won the Battle of Midway. The Air Force officers threw their hats in the air and I never experienced greater rejoicing".[15]

Though the omission of the WARD from almost all academic and popular cultural study of the Pacific War and the American experience is lamentable, it is also understandable. The WARD was, by necessity, a secret organisation, and as with most secret and intelligence entities, access to primary source records on their histories can be very difficult. Such difficulties arise for a number of reasons. Wartime fear of invasion – a very real prospect in Hawaii – often prevented records from being kept in the first place, as they could not be captured and used by the enemy if they did not exist. When records were kept, they could lack detail, for the same reason. Post-war weeding led to the permanent loss of some records, and others still remain sealed and secret.

Where women in intelligence are concerned, the situation can be especially difficult when their work with military and intelligence organisations was, and is, often misunderstood. What appeared to be mundane clerical work was often vital intelligence collection, and what looked like menial communications work was actually the critical dissemination of intelligence. A combination of this misunderstanding, the resulting omission of women from records, and a misleading nomenclature resulted in a fear of admitting that women were doing such work in case it upset the social order. This meant that the WARD, and women like them, were frequently relegated to the outer margins of history - where they remained for decades.

[13]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File no. W1992:001 3.04.
[14]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File 5.11.
[15]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File W1992: 001

THE WOMEN'S AIR RAID DEFENSE ORGANISATION – HAWAII

This research note was written following the author's time spent in Hawaii, conducting research into the Joint Intelligence Centre Pacific Ocean Area. During the course of this research, the author came across several boxes of records in the University of Hawaii's War Records Depository, a local archive documenting life in Hawaii during the Second World War. In April 1943 the Hawaii Territorial Legislature passed a joint resolution designating the University of Hawaii (UH) as the official depository of material related to Hawaii's part in the war. The archive received and contains a mixture of sources, ranging from personal accounts and correspondence to photographs and scrapbooks – many of which are quite personal. While the US National Archives may hold official documents on the WARD, such records can never provide a detailed explanation of who the WARD members were, what they did, their subjective experiences or the implications of their work. Among the sources in the UH War Records Depository are a number of transcripts of interviews carried out with WARD members. These are extremely valuable, and sadly, do not yet appear to have been used in any academic research. Their value is multi-faceted. They offer unique insight into a highly irregular organisation, and into the lives of women working with the military on Hawaii's front lines to defend against enemy action. The narrative of the war in the Pacific is one that is usually lacking in any mention of women. Occasionally, the US women's military services are mentioned briefly, as are the US Army and Navy Nurse Corps, the latter being a point of mild fascination due to a number of nurses being taken as prisoners of war by the Japanese in Guam and the Philippines. In the story of the war in the Pacific, however, women rarely make an appearance. These records show that this omission is not warranted, and the WARD organisation is a rare and interesting example of women being directly involved in famous battles in the Pacific War.

An understanding of the WARD is significant, in that it poses a novel contribution to various fields of historical study. In terms of military intelligence, the usual point of focus of most studies of Midway is the importance of codebreaking, and Joe Rochefort and his team's achievements which are widely and rightly heralded as a major factor in American victory in this battle. The provision of a real-time battle picture, however, is arguably also very important, just as it was critical during the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. The British system, on which the WARD was modelled, was able to use intercepted German radio communications but found it was no substitute for real-time information, which could only be provided by radar technology and the Dowding System's personnel then processing and disseminating it. As well as posing an important novel contribution to the narrative of the Battle of Midway and the Pacific War, the experiences and stories of these women also present a new dimension to the study of US women and war. Rosie the Riveter and her sisters all over the US, both civilian and military, are famous for supporting the US war effort, many of them in a typically 'female' fashion, as clerical workers, medical personnel, and most from

behind desks far from the front lines.[16] The WARD, however, served in an area vulnerable to attack, tracking ships and planes as they went into battle, participating peripherally in attacks and supplying commanders with real-time pictures of the military situation that they could use for battle direction purposes and assisting with training exercises for the military invasion forces that would take back the Pacific. Around eight hundred women served with the WARD, some of them doing so in the knowledge that their husbands were part of these forces.[17]

It is also interesting to consider the emotional reactions of WARD women during their work. One of the main causes for concern for military and the government regarding placing women in roles where they were technically involved in battlefield operations was that they might become hysterical or emotionally overwhelmed. The author of this research note has investigated this with the case of the WAAF in the UK, and with the Women's Royal Naval Service and the US Navy women's reserve in her MPhil and PhD theses respectively. In all of these cases, as with the case of the WARD, it appears to be true that women did experience emotional reactions, but that their ability to continue doing their jobs effectively was not impaired by such experiences. Nancy West, for example, continued to operate effectively as a WARD plotter after the death of her husband on the *USS Enterprise*, and Kathleen Hamlin worked efficiently with the WARD and throughout the war in the knowledge that her husband was a Japanese prisoner of war following the sinking of his vessel, the *USS Houston* in 1942. This appears to be a pattern – Fluff Ford, for example, plotted out the flight of her husband as he headed for Midway – he never returned, but she continued to work in the WARD. The personal nature of the WARD interviews offers the possibility of an interesting contribution to the social and cultural history of women and war, including reasons for joining the organisation, emotional reactions to the work and the subjective experiences of women in front-line areas during wartime.

In 1945, Brigadier General Howard Davidson sent a letter to WARD Chief Supervisor Catherine Coonley in which he wrote, 'I have seen many fighter controls, have several under me now, but the one in Honolulu manned by the WARDs is the best I have seen', and 'You and your girls can take great pride in the fact that… you maintained the best Air Raid Defense system in the world.'[18]

[16]The now famous image of 'Rosie the Riveter' was a propaganda poster imploring women to take up work in industry and manufacturing, to aid the US war machine. Honey, Maureen, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda during World War II* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984).
[17]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD.
[18]UHWD, Box 2 of 2, WARD, File W1992:001 5.6.

Chief Supervisor Coonley had every reason to be proud. The WARD had performed a 'vital function in the Aircraft Warning set-up' in Hawaii and was an 'integral part of Fighter Command' there.[19]

The WARD have done a fascinating and moving job in telling their story in the interview records within the UH's War Records Depository, but more work is justified, not only to bring that story forward, but also give the WARD and its women the recognition of their service that they deserve.

[19]UHWD, Box 2, File 1.3, 'WARD Hawai'i Unit'.

Barry Strauss, *The War that made the Roman Empire: Antony, Cleopatra, and Octavian at Actium*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022. xii + 350 pp. ISBN 978-1982116675 (hardback). Price $30.00 USD.

In an expansive and robust book, Barry Strauss elegantly dissects and examines the romance and boys' own stories of the turn of the millennium. He approaches the tough exercise of unravelling many of the stories that have been obscured, forgotten, or downright invented (thank you Mr Shakespeare) and provides the reader with an well researched and entertaining tome. Similar to a Roman Consul marrying an Egyptian Queen, the marriage of entertainment to historical retelling is one fraught with difficulty. Strauss walks through this relationship deftly.

Pay special attention to the title of this book, *The War that made the Roman Empire: Antony, Cleopatra, and Octavian at Actium*. This is not a drab book solely analysing the minutiae of a naval engagement, but instead should be viewed as an exposition of Augustus's life, about how he was able to set himself up for success, and how this resulted in the transformation of a messy Republic into a grand Empire. Actium was important and would fit well in the pantheon of Hollywood productions alongside Waterloo or Dunkirk. However, when viewed alongside the other engagements of this period, such as vengeance at Philippi, the coup at Paraetonnium, the endgame at Alexandria, or even the return of the Parthian eagles in 20BC it is one jigsaw piece in a remarkable series of events. It is also a series of events that could not have happened without Augustus's ally: Marcus Agrippa. Only as this strong duo was the strategic mastermind and their elite military advisor able to surmount unexpected adversities time and again. That this was Augustus and Marcus Agrippa rather than Cleopatra and Mark Anthony is the subject with which Strauss wrestles.

Strauss sets the scene by introducing the main characters and the backdrop they exist in. This provides an excellent window into the humanity and motives that drive Augustus, Mark Antony, Cleopatra, and Marcus Agrippa throughout this remarkable period of history. It also provides a glimpse of the difficulty of the work of a historian, and one Strauss does not ignore. History is famously written by the victor and this period of history is no different. The task of identifying what is sexism, slander or indeed righteous praise is made harder by the romanticism we associate with Augustus as well as the mysticism of Cleopatra. The romanticism surrounding Augustus is of course not an accident, but the intended consequence of his legacy. Strauss points out the obvious pitfalls where source material should be viewed with a bit of seasoning such as Plutarch's description of Antony's depression, as well as underlining very valid and important interpretations of the source material, such as dissecting Agrippa's vital victory over Bogud at Methone. It is this human insight that is so valid in this book.

Throughout Strauss's history it is clear that the relationships Augustus maintains play a huge part in his success and ability to cement his continuation of Julius Caesar's legacy. This ability for diplomacy and strategic foresight is juxtaposed by Strauss against that of Mark Antony and Cleopatra. In particular Strauss does an excellent job at identifying what drives Cleopatra's motivations. The parallels of what she is attempting to achieve in the continuation of the Ptolemaic line, and recognition of her offspring is clearly similar to what drives Augustus (and indeed that search for legacy is not unique in history). What makes it interesting is the other players in this game. Mark Antony may have been treated cruelly by history, and Strauss identifies how the vaunted reputation and skillset he had in military matters was superior to that of Augustus. However, Strauss also shows Antony's remarkable naivety post-Actium as his position becomes more vulnerable and more untenable. This clear re-evaluation of Antony's competence is contrasted with the expertise demonstrated by the actual main character at Actium and the important events afterwards: Marcus Agrippa. Hindsight and 'what ifs' are lazy tools in history but one naturally wonders what may have been if Mark Antony and Cleopatra had secured his loyalty.

What more could we have asked for from this book? Very little really. This reviewer would have appreciated greater analysis of the remarkable logistical efforts that Augustus seemingly undertook with practised regularity. The criss-crossing of the Mediterraneum, from Actium to Samos and back to Italy, the coordination in Egypt during the endgame or congregating the fleets that were key to Actium itself. Perhaps though, this is more deserving of another in depth view of which Strauss would be perfectly placed to explore. Equally, it has to be said Augustus was fortunate in three places – not just in how he was able to manipulate events and who his allies were but also in his longevity. That the founder of the new Empire was able to solidify his image, legacy and divinity meant he was able to achieve what Cleopatra was unable to. He secured his line of succession through compromise and earned loyalty. Cleopatra's decision to flee the Battle of Actium was her best ploy at achieving this. The chain of events that meant we didn't end up with a Ptolemy ruling both Rome and Egypt utilising Caesar's name is perfectly concluded by Strauss.

This excellent book is a fitting tribute to how Augustus, with the key allyship of Agrippa, was able to consign the Egyptian Queen and 'he with whom I fought the war' (*Res Gestae Divi Augusti*) to Shakespeare's stage.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1653

Anne Curry and Rémy Ambühl, *A Soldier's Chronicle of the Hundred Years War: College of Arms Manuscript M9*. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2022. xv + 480 pp. ISBN: 978-1843846192 (hardback.). Price £95.00.

The so-called 'Lancastrian' phase of the Hundred Years War saw England become increasingly entangled in the affairs of France and its neighbours. Within popular memory, the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 has been immortalised as one of Henry V's greatest victories. However, in reality it was the king's subsequent campaigns in Normandy, coupled with his careful management of the Burgundian alliance, that saw him break the back of French resistance and force humiliating terms upon Charles VI at Troyes in 1420. Nevertheless, within the space of a few years, England's gains had been thrown into sharp reverse. Henry V died in 1422, leaving a nine-month-old infant to inherit the dual-monarchy; Scottish manpower gave the French the muscle they needed to push the English back while the deterioration of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance eventually sealed the fate of England's continental empire. *A Soldiers' Chronicle,* drawn from College of Arms manuscript M9, offers an invaluable window into this formative period in English and French history. This book contains the original text reproduced in full, along with a modern English translation, and supported with a very detailed commentary. This previously unpublished chronicle is unique in many ways. It is the only known 'English' chronicle to have been written in French; moreover, it was written by two soldiers in English service, Peter Basset (an Englishman) and Christopher Hanson (described as a German) for their commander, Sir John Fastolf. In terms of content, the source offers a detailed account of English military operations in France from Agincourt in 1415 to the siege of Orléans in 1429. Notably, it provides a particularly detailed report on the English conquest of Maine post-1424. The edition also contains lists naming over seven hundred individuals who participated in various battles, sieges, and campaigns: over half of those listed are Scottish and French and the editors have argued that the compilers had a detailed knowledge of Franco-Scottish military affairs in this period.

The book contains several chapters which locate M9 within its historical, literary, and linguistic contexts. The introduction provides a succinct overview of the manuscript's history and notes how the text was viewed as a key source by historians during the Tudor and Stuart periods. The first two chapters reconstruct (where evidence permits) the careers of Basset and Hanson but also considers the roles of Fastolf's secretary, William Worcester, and Luket Nantron, a Parisian scribe in Fastolf's service, in compiling the manuscript. Several subsequent chapters explore the textual history

of the manuscript in detail. Chapter 4 examines the use of French in the text and pays close attention to the role of Luket Nantron in compiling the text. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore the afterlife of the text. As noted, M9 was used by Tudor and Stuart historians: it was an important source text for Edward Hall's *Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancastre and Yorke,* published in 1548. The chapters examine how M9 found its way into the College of Arms and consider how the text influenced Hall's work as well as later Tudor commentators such as Raphael Holinshed. Chapter 3 delves into how the practice of warfare is depicted in the text. The text of M9 bears close comparison with other contemporary chronicles: although grand strategy, tactics, and logistics receive passing mention, particular attention is devoted to the idea of courage, both individual and collective. In addition, the text has a strong nationalistic tone whereby the English are, unsurprisingly, portrayed in a largely positive light. Intriguingly, unlike other chronicles, M9 has little to say on the growing importance of gunpowder – in fact, the authors of the manuscript had nothing but contempt for these weapons!

Overall, this is a hugely impressive piece of textual scholarship and should attract a readership from several different audiences. On an obvious level, this edition will be essential reading to anyone interested in the Lancastrian phase of the Hundred Years War. It should also be an important source for scholars working on Franco-Scottish military links and will also appeal to students of medieval warfare more generally. On another level, this book will also be of interest to literary and textual scholars and should also be of interest to historians of emotion.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1654

Marc Van Alphen, Jan Hoffenaar, Alen Lemmers, and Christiaan Van Der Spek, *Military Power and the Dutch Republic: War, Trade and the Balance of Power in Europe 1648-1813*, translated by Paul Arblaster & Lee Preedy. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2021. 549 pp. full colour + 17 Maps. ISBN: 978-9087283650 (hardback). Price €89.00.

This book has been published in co-operation with the Netherlands Institute of Military History and was first published Dutch in 2019 as *Krijgsmacht en handelsgeest.*

Om het machtsevenwicht in Europa (1648-1813).[1] The work is a welcome addition to the English canon on the subject. This is a very impressive large format book, filled with full colour maps, illustrations, and images. The book is divided into two sections. The first is chronological and covers Political-Military Operations 1648-1813 with four chapters covering Looking Seaward (1648-1689), Facing Territorial Threats (1649-1748), The Republic as a Second-Class Power (1748-1795), and The Gradual Loss of Independence (1795-1813). The second section is thematical, Organisation, Finances, Tactics, Personnel and Society 1648-1813, with a further four chapters on Organisation and Finances, Military Action, Soldiers and Sailors, and Civilians and the Military. Although each of the chapters has a different author, the work has a coherent structure and feel which is both easy to read from cover to cover and also to 'dip into' for specific information. There is also an extensive bibliography along with a detailed index.

The first section gives a detailed account of military interventions and conflicts of the Dutch army and navy. As well as covering the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Dutch involvement in the Glorious Revolution the first chapter covers less well wars such as the Münster War of 1665-66. Due to the period of the book, individual engagements are covered in what could be described as extended overviews, but the authors do cover all the salient points. The second chapter covers almost 60 years from the Nine Years War to the War of the Austrian Succession. The third chapter covers the period between 1748 and 1795 where the power and prestige waned. This chapter highlights one of the main strengths of this volume, the detail of the Dutch republic when not at its height or engaged. It covers well-known wars and engagements including anti-corsair patrols by the Dutch navy in the late 1770s as well as the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The last chapter looks at the period between 1795 and 1813 covering the limitations of Dutch control over the events of the period and the effectiveness of the Dutch military in action. As with all the other chapters, the inclusion of maps, illustrations, and images successfully add to the text and the readers experience.

The second, thematic, section starts with looking into the organisation and finances of the Dutch military system (chapter 5) and goes into detail regarding recruitment, pay, fleet construction, and naval recruitment. The inclusion of tables allows for the comparison of information in a clear format. It shows the strengths and weaknesses of the republic as a fiscal-military state and while there are works that cover this in greater depth (Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State 1588-1795*, 2015), this chapter holds a great deal of information. Chapter 6, military action, covers details of logistics, military and naval technology as well as information on sieges and

[1]Marc van Alphen, Jan Hoffenaar, Alan Lemmers and Christiaan van der Spek, *Krijgsmacht en handelsgeest. Om het machtsevenwicht in Europa (1648-1813)*, (Uitgever: Boom Amsterdam, 2019)

fortifications. It also covers information of unit sizes, leadership and troop quality. Chapter seven covers the experience of soldiers and sailors and has excellent sections on backgrounds and the motivation both officers and common soldiers and sailors. The chapter goes into the detail of both life at sea for common sailors as well garrison life for soldiers. Chapter eight covers the relations between civilian society and the military, making the valid point that the military does not operate within a vacuum. The chapter opens up with details of the criminality of soldiers, but also the numbers of soldiers marrying into the civilian population. The chapter confirms that army and navy had a large presence in large parts of the country and had significant impact on local communities and industry.

The format of this book works exceedingly well and results in an impressive usable text that will be of use to anyone interested in the military history of the Netherlands between 1648 and 1813. Where this book excels is in its use of Dutch sources that are not normally available to non-Dutch speakers. The authors and translators need to be commended for producing an informative work that would benefit both military and social historians

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1655

Heather Jones, *For King and Country: The British Monarchy and the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Xiii + 576pp. ISBN 978-1108429368 (hardback). Price £29.99.

In this very impressive work Heather Jones examines the 'social and cultural functions' of the British monarchy during the Great War. One function, performed especially in the events leading up to the war, was to provide a (sometimes less than ideal) channel of communication between the British government and other European states. During the first two years of the conflict, the Crown's major function was to support military mobilization by encouraging the voluntary enlistment of soldiers and by strengthening their resolve and courage. At the same time, and increasingly over the course of the war, the monarchy was used as a source of motivation for the unprecedented war participation of the wider civilian British population. In the final years of the war and subsequently, the socially constructed role of the king became that of conciliator – sharing the collective grief that consumed the population and holding the country

together as divisions and tensions escalated, most of all labour unrest and the struggle over Irish independence.

Jones's interest is primarily in the status and cultural power of the monarchy. She contends that the conscious and unconscious strategy for performing its functions consisted primarily of reconfiguring the traditional role of the monarchy. In her view tradition was to some extent invented but was mostly revived and adapted to 'modern' processes. These 'modern' processes included more egalitarian and democratic beliefs, less respect for traditional hierarchies, and advances in science and medicine, but also structural and technological changes, the most important of which was the arrival of 'total war', that is, the unprecedented military mobilization of the British state and society.

The tradition that was adapted for meeting these pressures on which she places the most explanatory weight was the 'sacralisation' of the monarchy, by which she means that a more modern version of the belief in the divine power of the monarchy was constructed by generating reverence toward certain royal activities. The king and queen followed or instituted various religious practices from the very first years of the war. Even more to the point, royal visits to wounded soldiers were imagined as modern versions of the royal gaze and touch. In 1922 a personal visit of George V to war cemeteries on the Continent was referred to as a 'pilgrimage'.

Military mobilization was promoted by creating a modern version of the Medieval royal military leader or warrior. George V wore his military uniform throughout the war; he was photographed working in a tent at Buckingham Palace; and he carried out a large number of troop inspections, including six on the Western Front during the conflict. Two of his sons participated in the war effort. Albert, the future George VI, served in the Royal Navy and fought in the Battle of Jutland although his participation after 1916 was limited owing to ill-health. The yearning of his elder brother David, the Prince of Wales and future Edward VIII, to assume the role of an ordinary soldier and to share their risks – though impeded by the authorities – was well received by many soldiers and in the press, thus helping to reinforce the royal military image that was being constructed. And, of course, war service was imaged as a duty to 'King and country'. Throughout the book, Jones repeatedly calls our attention to the social construction of a personal relationship between the king and the average soldier.

George V and Queen Mary adopted a more parsimonious lifestyle during the Great War, eating more frugally, abstaining from alcohol, and giving up grandiose pastimes. They also visited hospitals and middle- or working-class communities more frequently than had previous monarchs. These and other similar practices served to accommodate more egalitarian beliefs in British society, to demonstrate their sympathy with the hardships of the general population, and to avoid living in high style

while their subjects made enormous sacrifices. In addition, the numerous hospital visits were obviously spurred by the vast number of casualties of total war and by the enormous increase in medical facilities for their care.

None of this meant lowering the status of the monarchy in the British social hierarchy. As Jones notes, the functional effectiveness of expanding contact with subjects depended on maintaining the position of the monarchy at the pinnacle of this hierarchy. While some conventional taboos were broken, traditional norms of interaction between the royals and subjects were for the most part maintained. Efforts to accommodate more egalitarian beliefs were framed as a reconstruction of the longstanding claim to legitimation by monarchies that all subjects were equally subordinate to the king.

While forced to accept the limitations of its constitutional powers, the British monarchy expanded its direct cultural power over the population, a power that arguably became greater than the direct cultural power of any other state institution. This was certainly the case during the reorganisation of the British Empire during and after the Great War. This cultural power should not be exaggerated. George V's efforts to act as mediator during the Irish War of Independence did not prevent the creation of a separate Irish government or the political division of the island. Yet it was not a complete failure. Indeed, whereas the link between the British government and most of Ireland was virtually severed, the link between the British crown and the new Irish Free State was maintained in attenuated form until 1937.

In any case, Jones firmly believes that the British monarchy not only survived but actually became stronger during the reign of George V. She does not deny the existence of a measure of anti-monarchism during the war, especially after the Russian Revolution and during the growing war weariness of the population. But she maintains that the evidence of anti-monarchism in Britain is very limited, in contrast with the all-too-real anti-monarchism in Ireland. She believes that the British public bought into the constructed image of George V and the myth that the British monarchy and its democratic institutions were superior to the institutions and cultures of other countries. She insists, however, that this myth cannot be dismissed as immanent arrogance. 'Myths succeed best', she contends, 'where they address a social function'.

For King and Country advances our understanding of the way in which institutions can be reconfigured to meet new social and political pressures. It makes a significant contribution to the large literature on the evolution of institutions. Thus, its relevance is not limited to the Great War and the British monarchy, substantial and worthwhile as her contribution to these subjects certainly is.

In some places she seems to accept what she elsewhere treats as myth, but her wonderfully written and engaging book is an outstanding piece of scholarship.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1656

Ronan McGreevy, *Great Hatred: The Assassination of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson MP*. London: Faber & Faber, 2022. xxii + 442pp. ISBN 978-0571372805 (hardback). Price £20.

On 22 June 1922 Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson unveiled a memorial at Liverpool Street Station in London to Great Southern and Western Railway men who had died in the Great War. Soon afterwards he was shot dead on the doorstep of his Belgravia home. The two assassins, who were chased through the streets by a baying crowd and wounding two policemen and a civilian before being apprehended, were members of the London Irish Republican Army (IRA). Ronan McGreevy's book explores this sensational killing and its wider ramifications for Ireland in 1922.

Two days after Wilson's large and widely attended state funeral, the provisional government of the Irish Free State ordered that fire be opened (with artillery supplied from London) on opponents of the recently-signed Anglo-Irish Treaty, then encamped in the Four Courts in Dublin. The British government, which blamed the Four Courts faction for Wilson's killing, had demanded action though the provisional government was also motivated by events in Dublin, not least in avoiding the impression of being led by London. A different spark would likely have been found elsewhere eventually, but Wilson's death certainly hastened the outbreak of civil war in Ireland.

Following his lively description of the events of 22 June, McGreevy provides a wide-ranging survey of Wilson's family background and military career. From a middling Protestant gentry family in Currygrane, County Longford, Wilson failed the Sandhurst entrance exam three times and the exam for Woolwich twice, but entered the army through the Longford Militia and proved himself a capable officer. He ended the Great War as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The Wilsons were staunchly unionist, but not unpopular landlords in a majority nationalist community and Wilson's brother Jemmy, who remained in Longford, even earned grudging respect from local republicans. Henry Wilson's own unionism was uncompromising, and he considered the Irish unsuitable for self-government.

As an advisor on insurgency in Ireland, Wilson favoured firm and open military action against the Irish Republican Army, baulking at covert assassinations and reprisals ('If these men ought to be murdered, the Government ought to murder them'). The Anglo-Irish Treaty that followed was, for Wilson, an 'abject surrender to murderers'. An 'imperialist above all', as McGreevy describes him, Wilson saw secession in southern Ireland as a step towards the loss of the British Empire. His public pronouncements on Irish policy ultimately contributed to his death.

One theme that emerges from the book is the complexities of allegiance and identity. Wilson, though born into a southern Irish unionist family, declared himself an Ulsterman by lineage and saw no contradiction between his Irishness and his imperialism. The men who pulled the trigger on Wilson, Reginald Dunne and Joseph O'Sullivan, were London-born (privately educated) Irish republicans. Both were veterans of the Great War. The most original chapters in the book draw on testimonies and recently released pension applications from republican contemporaries to paint a picture of Dunne and O'Sullivan, their world, and their demise. Dunne, a veteran of the Irish Guards, has left us with much a greater written record and makes for an interesting and complex character. Described by McGreevy as possessing the 'worldview of an English Catholic intellectual, not an Irish revolutionary', he was widely read, devoutly Catholic, and could mentally recite classical music from memory. Born in London into an Irish immigrant family from a long Fenian tradition, O'Sullivan (the 'silent partner') was one of six brothers to join the British armed forces after 1914. He lost a leg at Passchendaele in 1917.

Shortly after retiring from military life in February 1922, Wilson was elected unopposed as MP for North Down and acted as a security advisor to government in the new Northern Ireland. Notwithstanding a tendency to militancy in his public rhetoric (he could be more circumspect in private correspondence), McGreevy suggests that Wilson was unfairly associated with the actions of the paramilitary Ulster Special Constabulary and blamed for draconian Special Powers legislation introduced by the Belfast government. Wilson had already been damned in republican eyes in 1920 for his role in blocking the passage to Dublin of the body of Terence McSwiney, who had died in Brixton on hunger strike, and also blamed for calling for the execution of eighteen-year-old Kevin Barry. Privately, he had opposed the latter. In a notorious letter to the prime minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig, published in the press after his election as an MP, Wilson called for the reconquest of southern Ireland. McGreevy writes that this and his support for the northern government was to the detriment of his reputation and 'eventually cost him his life' (p. 120).

One of the burning questions surrounding Wilson's killing is on the responsibility for the order to carry out the assassination. It is a question for which McGreevy ultimately

– and perhaps unsurprisingly – fails to provide a definitive answer. At a meeting at a pub in Holborn the day before, Reginald Dunne was said to have declared that he would 'do something'. This perhaps suggests the killing was, as is most commonly suggested, carried out on the initiative of the killers. Their guilt was, though, never in question and – ultimately half-hearted – plans to rescue the two men were hatched and aborted alongside a public campaign for clemency. Dunne and O'Sullivan were executed on 10 August 1922.

McGreevy's study builds on the late Keith Jeffery's masterful biography of Wilson, drawing effectively on British and Irish newspapers and newly released archival material. Long passages of background material will, however, offer relatively little that is new to scholars of the period. Some of this – a discussion of republican assassinations going back to 1798 in Chapter 7, for instance – may even feel a little superfluous to the casual reader. But, on the whole, this is a well-written, engaging, and handsomely produced book. While we may never be able to fully attribute responsibility for the decision to shoot Wilson, *Great Hatred* is a timely reminder of its wider significance.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1657

Bastiaan Willems, *Violence in Defeat: The Wehrmacht on German Soil, 1944-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Xvii + 348pp. 4 maps + 27 illustrations. ISBN 978-1108479721(hardback). Price £29.99.

When looking at the Eastern Front towards the end of the Second World War, specifically at how German civilians suffered once the front line crossed the German frontier, most work focuses on the Red Army's actions and little else. Since there were many atrocities committed by Red Army soldiers following the suffering forced upon them by the Nazi invaders, they are the easy target for the majority of the blame when considering acts of violence against the German populace. For the longest time the actions of the retreating Wehrmacht, full of battered and traumatised soldiers who were numbed to the war of extermination between the opposing ideals of National Socialism and Communism, were not examined in depth. The actions of Nazi Party officials and their policies up to and during the invasion of Germany have similarly often escaped scrutiny.

Violence in Defeat seeks to change this narrative and restore agency to the Wehrmacht with their violent actions examined and the truth of their conduct brought to light. Violent actions not only against the advancing Soviets but against the people they were meant to protect. It would be impossible to encompass the entirety of Eastern Germany during the final months of the Second World War. With the actions of all the key actors involved, there is simply too much material for a single in-depth study. Willems overcomes this by looking at one section of the Eastern Front, East Prussia, from the Summer of 1944 until its capture in 1945. Through this study, Willems aims to change the perception of the Wehrmacht and its conduct when dealing with the German people. He demonstrates how the war hardened the common solider against brutality and oppression, and shows how Wehrmacht policy and actions closely resembled actions against Soviet citizens in the earlier years of the war. Willems also illustrates the ways in which the decisions of the Nazi local elite translated into violence against the community as well as brutal oppression.

The sources used in *Violence in Defeat* are wide ranging and extensive, using many primary sources such as records from the Wehrmacht, the Nazi Party as well as diaries and memoirs sourced from the general populace in East Prussia. The amount of archival material used in the study is impressive due to the fact, as Willems also identifies, that the archives from East Prussia which were relevant to the time are fractured, destroyed or simply lost. Although there have been efforts to remedy this in recent years, it is still a problem for studying a topic such as this.

The study has several chapters detailing the topic of the war on German soil, starting with the run up to the Wehrmacht retreating into the German frontier in 1944. The study first details East Prussian life up to 1944, their role in the overall German war effort as well as the effect of 'Total War' on the East Prussians as the War progressed. The study then progresses to look at the changing perceptions of the East Prussian populace as war inched ever closer to their borders and at war's hardening nature and its numbing effect on Wehrmacht soldiers by the time they re-entered Germany. The idea of a '*Festung*' or 'Fortress City' and what the strategy behind it as well as what life was like in these front-line cities is discussed, with the clashes between Army and Party officials over who had higher authority being a common theme. The study then looks into the evacuation policy in East Prussia, often last minute and hectic due to the Nazi Party being unwilling to evacuate civilians. The studies look into the efforts involved from overland refugee movements to the evacuation by sea from cut off cities like Konigsberg. The final chapter details the horror of military law in place in East Prussia and the harsh punishments handed out such as summary executions by military and party tribunals. The study also notes the radicalisation through the use of these laws and how it seemed to get more brutal as the war went on. The conclusion wraps up with an examination of the mark the Wehrmacht left on the German wartime

community and how public perceptions of the army changed because of the brutality in the last year of the war.

Violence in Defeat is a tremendously useful study because few others look into this aspect of war on German soil, highlighting German on German violence and making it stand apart from the more widely covered Soviet on German violence, or the widespread racist violence already present. One weakness is that it only focuses on East Prussia and doesn't include other parts of Germany effected by the same issues, however, this might well be necessary due to the sheer scope of the conflict.

Violence in Defeat is an impressively researched study and would be a great aid for military historians looking into conditions on the Eastern Front in the final year of the war, as well as looking into how an army traumatised by years of brutality and merciless war acted towards its own people once it was back on home soil. Historians studying the German Home Front, as well as *Volkssturm* actions on the Eastern Front, would benefit greatly from looking into Willems' study as these topics are covered in great detail.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1658

Peter Caddick-Adams, *Fire and Steel: The End of World War Two in the West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Bibliography, Index, xxxv + 464 pp, 6 maps. ISBN: 978-0190601867 (hardback). Price £30.40.

This is the third and final volume of the author's magisterial narrative history of the last year of the war in the West, and it offers a useful corrective to popular perceptions that from early 1945 the conflict 'was all over bar the shouting'. Large parts of the German armed forces were ready, indeed eager, to fight for their homeland as it was assailed from West and East by Allied forces. This volume concentrates on the West and the western allies struggle to bring the war to an end. The final hundred days of the war were momentous and challenging, and Caddick-Adams reminds us that the Rhine offered a formidable obstacle for the Allied armies seeking to get into the heart of Nazi Germany. For the tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians the outcome of the war, and their personal futures, hung in the balance until the last possible moment.

Caddick-Adams brilliantly captures the growing unreality of the war as the sense of an imminent end to the war collided with the uncovering of forced labour and concentration camps, the diehard fanaticism of the SS, and the willingness of the regime to see Germany consumed in a *Götterdämmerung* of party, state and people.

In many ways, from the standpoint of academic history, this is a story that we are more than on nodding terms with, but it is the strength of the author's writing that he brings it alive in a particularly visceral and clever way, so that we feel it and engage with it in a profound and insightful way. This is intelligent history that engages the reader emotionally and intellectually, including a rather charming sense of the author crafting the narrative, and whose expertise is evident on every page. Most military history takes few prisoners in throwing around military terms and unit details ('abbreviations' and 'military algebra' as Caddick-Adams labels them) but this volume is exemplary in going out of its way to educate and guide the reader before the narrative unfolds. His personal knowledge of the battlefield adds a further layer of authority to his analysis of the events of almost 80 years ago.

So how, beyond breaking the fourth wall and engaging the reader directly, does Caddick-Adams craft his narrative? Firstly, there is the depth of his research. My first 'wow' came with the list of sources – both primary and secondary. The last months of the war offer a large historical canvas to fill but the author has more than equipped himself with the materials to fill it in with marvellous levels of detail. At one point I was intrigued by a minor comment about the volume of papers being burnt at the I.G. Farben Haus in Frankfurt in 1945. Checking the footnote, I was pleased to find that Caddick-Adams had provided to no less than three separate sources should I wish to follow it up. His vignettes of particular engagements are similarly backed by multiple references to a range of different sources which allow him to comment on the action from a variety of levels and perspectives. It is compelling – it is authoritative – it is clever. And significantly Caddick-Adams maintains this depth of detail as he charts the war from the perspective of a variety of hierarchical levels: from the average infantryman in the foxhole, the General in his command vehicle and the *Führer* in his bunker. Caddick-Adams carries through the potential complexities of shifting through these levels with a dexterity and sureness which most of us can only envy. It is a lengthy narrative, but he guides the reader gently and expertly, providing signposts and connections as the Allied armies push deeper into the heart of Germany.

Six maps and numerous photographs add to the utility and attractiveness of a book aimed at the general reader of the Second World War, which offers those of us in the trade some exemplary lessons in writing, structure and engagement of the reader. This is a big book, but great value for money. It is a worthy final tome in the end of war trilogy by a researcher and writer at the top of his game.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1659

Serhii Plokhy, *Nuclear Folly: A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. London: Allen Lane, 2021. Notes, Bibliography, Index, 464pp. + 17 Plates. ISBN 978-0241454732 (hardcover). Price £25.

On 27 February this year, the Reuters news agency reported that President Vladimir Putin had put Russia's nuclear deterrent on high alert 'in the face of a barrage of Western reprisals for the invasion of Ukraine'. Whilst many commentators saw this as dangerous rhetoric rather than a statement of intent, for others it invoked memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It is now sixty years since this dramatic nuclear stand-off between the great Cold War powers brought the world to the brink of a global catastrophe. President John F Kennedy's famous 'turn back the ships' ultimatum – issued to the Soviet Union's Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, as a last resort – was a moment of high-drama which still resonates with people today. The historiography of the Cuban Missile Crisis is voluminous and tends to coalesce around an analysis of Kennedy's thought processes and decision-making as he moved towards this final act of brinkmanship. This is partly because of the easy access to archival material and first-hand accounts in North America and, until recently, a deficit of source material from the former-Soviet Union. There is also a continued fascination with a young President whose potential was dashed by his assassination in December 1963. More recent publications such as Michael Dobbs' book *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of War* (Cornerstone, 2008) which drew on Soviet as well as American accounts have broadened the discussion. And, in this, his latest book, Cold War scholar Serhii Plokhy has used a rich source of Ukrainian sources to go even further – bringing fresh insights and an alternative view to the whole topic.

The book runs through the events leading up to and including the Cuban Missile Crisis in chronological order, examining the escalating tensions and the interplay between key decision makers and advisors. Whilst the unfolding drama on the island of Cuba takes centre stage, the crisis is appropriately contextualised in that the author explores other factors which influenced decision at the time. The placement of nuclear missiles in Turkey by the USA was a particular concern for the leadership of the Soviet Union who considered themselves to be at a disadvantage because of the perceived imbalance in intercontinental nuclear missile capability. Khrushchev was keen to

nurture the communist revolution in Cuba (the first in the western hemisphere) keeping the Americans and Chinese at bay, and President Castro, Cuba's revolutionary leader, was convinced that the Americans were looking to invade – an intent to do so having been demonstrated, albeit unsuccessfully, during the Bay of Pigs operation. As for Kennedy, he was extremely exercised about the threat to Berlin. If the Soviet Union closed the supply-corridor running through East German territory, then the situation could quickly escalate – becoming a major confrontation between the two super-powers. Kennedy was also cognizant of the need to 'look strong and decisive' in the eyes of America's domestic media. Unlike his two main protagonists, he had a fickle electorate to consider.

Of course, the logic underpinning these various strategic imperatives was not necessarily understood by the respective parties at the time. This is hardly surprising given the difficulties that the US and Soviet leaders and officials had in communicating with each other. Official messages could take up to twenty-four hours to be passed from one leader to another and informal leaks could be open to misinterpretation. Ambiguities in command led to disjointed decision making on the Soviet side leaving a degree of uncertainty about what actions had been sanctioned and which ones had not. This was not helped by Castro's bellicose approach or the fact that Soviet commanders on the ground had a good deal of local discretion – even over the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion meant that very little was taken at face value and after the crisis had passed this continued to rankle – for example in the insistence that the ships taking their deadly cargoes back to Russia should be thoroughly searched below decks.

So, who does Plokhy identify as 'the winners'? The survival of Castro's communist regime points to one, the fact that NATOs missiles were removed from Turkey points to another. As for Kennedy, he played his cards well – but to posit the outcome as his personal triumph is, in the author's opinion, overly simplistic. It's also worth reflecting on the fact that at the time that the ships were forced back, missile sites had already been built on the island of Cuba and tactical nuclear weapons had already deployed – thus endowing Kennedy's 'turn back the ships' ultimatum with less significance that has hitherto been the case.

Some 80% of the Soviet missiles destined for Cuba were manufactured in Ukraine and a similar proportion of the 45,000 service personnel deployed in Cuba were from the same territory. Furthermore, the ships carrying personnel, provisions and the missiles themselves sailed from Black Sea ports like Odessa and Mykolaiv. It is this that has made the Ukrainian archives such a rich source of information. Factory records, shipping manifests and personal papers from the erstwhile KGB archives have enabled the author to complement the established bank of (mainly western) primary sources with a significant number of hitherto unseen Soviet documents and first-hand accounts.

The broadening of the context, the use of newly discovered source material and the forensic analysis of what went on in 'closed rooms' during the crisis mean that this book makes a material contribution to the readers understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition to its utility as an academic resource it is a tension filled and highly accessible narrative that is a pleasure to read.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v8i3.1660

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (July 2021)

General

The British Journal of Military History (the BJMH or Journal) welcomes the submission of articles and research notes on military history in the broadest sense, and without restriction as to period or region. The BJMH particularly welcomes papers on subjects that might not ordinarily receive much attention but which clearly show the topic has been properly researched.

The editors are keen to encourage submissions from a variety of scholars and authors, regardless of their academic background. For those papers that demonstrate great promise and significant research but are offered by authors who have yet to publish, or who need further editorial support, the editors may be able to offer mentoring to ensure an article is successfully published within the Journal.

Papers submitted to the BJMH must not have been published elsewhere. The editors are happy to consider papers that are under consideration elsewhere on the condition that the author indicates to which other journals the article has been submitted.

Authors must provide appropriate contact details including your full mailing address.

Authors should submit their article or research note manuscript, including an abstract of no more than 100 words, as an MS Word file (.docx) attached to an e-mail addressed to the BJMH Co-editors at editor@bcmh.org.uk. All submissions should be in one file only, and include the author's name, email address, and academic affiliation (if relevant), with the abstract, followed by the main text, and with any illustrations, tables or figures included within the body of the text. Authors should keep in mind that the Journal is published in A5 portrait format and any illustrations, tables or figures must be legible on this size of page.

The BJMH is a 'double blind' peer-reviewed journal, that is, communication between reviewers and authors is anonymised and is managed by the Editorial Team. All papers that the editors consider appropriate for publication will be submitted to at least two suitably qualified reviewers, chosen by the editorial team, for comment. Subsequent publication is dependent on receiving satisfactory comments from reviewers. Authors will be sent copies of the peer reviewers' comments.

Following peer review and any necessary revision by the author, papers will be edited for publication in the Journal. The editors may propose further changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression, although such changes will not be made without

consultation with the author. The editors are the final arbiters of usage, grammar, and length.

Authors should note that articles may be rejected if they do not conform to the Journal's Style Guide and/or they exceed the word count.

Also note that the Journal editors endorse the importance of thorough referencing in scholarly works. In cases where citations are incomplete or do not follow the format specified in the Style Guide throughout the submitted article, the paper **will** be returned to the author for correction before it is accepted for peer review. Note that if citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the Journal editorial team.

Authors are encouraged to supply relevant artwork (maps, charts, line drawings, and photographs) with their essays. The author is responsible for citing the sources and obtaining permission to publish any copyrighted material.

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Articles

The journal welcomes the submission of scholarly articles related to military history in the broadest sense. Articles should be a minimum of 6000 words and no more than 8000 words in length (including footnotes) and be set out according to the BJMH Style Guide.

Research Notes
The BJMH also welcomes the submission of shorter 'Research Notes'. These are pieces of research-based writing of between 1,000 and 3,000 words. These could be, for example: analysis of the significance a newly accessible document or documents; a reinterpretation of a document; or a discussion of an historical controversy drawing on new research. Note that all such pieces of work should follow the style guidelines for articles and will be peer reviewed. Note also that such pieces should not be letters, nor should they be opinion pieces which are not based on new research.

Book Reviews
The BJMH seeks to publish concise, accessible and well-informed reviews of books relevant to the topics covered by the Journal. Reviews are published as a service to the readership of the BJMH and should be of use to a potential reader in deciding whether or not to buy or read that book. The range of books reviewed by the BJMH reflects the field of military history, taken in the widest sense. Books published by academic publishers, general commercial publishers, and specialist military history imprints may all be considered for review in the Journal.

Reviews of other types of publication such as web resources may also be commissioned.

The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2021)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on, but is not identical to, the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Illustrations, Figures and Tables:

- Must be suitable for inclusion on an A5 portrait page.
- Text should not be smaller than 8 pt Gill Sans MT font.
- Should be numbered sequentially with the title below the illustration, figure or table.
- Included within the body of the text.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.
- If citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the editorial team.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
- For edited volumes: Chapter Author, 'Chapter title' in Volume Author/s (ed. or eds), *Volume title in italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year), p. # or pp. #-#.
- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.

- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL Accessed date. The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout.
- *Op cit.* should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.