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Cover picture: 18th/19th century gold trophy head depicting a decapitated high status enemy made in the state of Asante, in present-day Ghana. Bought by Sir Richard Wallace from Garrard & Co. Ltd, the Crown Jeweller in London, in 1874. See p.39 of this issue for the background to this sale.

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EDITORIAL*

We are using this editorial as the first public announcement that we will be standing down as co-editors at the end of March 2024. We have hugely enjoyed working with the British Commission for British History to develop a global journal which builds bridges between academia and the wider public. However, by March 2024, we will have been in post for five years and there will have been twenty-seven issues of the journal published since its launch in 2014, of which we will have co-edited more than half (fifteen to be precise). It is rare for journal editors to be in post longer than this time and given other pressures on our time in our careers, we feel that it is time to pass the work on to new people. The BCMH will be appointing new editors in due course and we are look forward to working with the Commission on a thorough handover.

A crucial part of our approach to the journal has been to ensure that it produces a wide range of material which truly reflects the diversity of military history, both in terms of the authors themselves and the way in which we have broadly defined the subject area. We started to do that by immediately expanding our Editorial Advisory Board and wanted to make a clear statement of intent by having women as a slight majority of the Board. Few history journals, let alone those in military history, can make that claim.

We have made some progress in achieving our goal, but we are certainly not there yet. Men still make up the vast majority of submissions and that has an impact on what we can publish. We have proactively contacted potential authors with some success, but building such connections needs continued work and we very much hope that the next editors will continue to do this.

For now, we would like to thank all who have helped us by submitting and reviewing work, and advised us on how to develop the journal. We would like to thank our Managing Editors, who have worked both tirelessly and enthusiastically. We look forward to reading future issues edited by others and the journal's future development. For now, we hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we have. It focuses on the social and cultural histories of modern warfare, from the application of the rules of war, to the soldier-tourist to the afterlife of objects taken in war.

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'Wanted Dead or Alive': The Outlaw in Modern War

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ABSTRACT
This article examines a little noticed prohibition on outlawry contained in some military manuals on the laws of war and asks where it came from. It establishes that it is not contained in a treaty or in customary law but originated in the Lieber Code published in 1863 by the U.S. Government. By following the development of the prohibition and other restrictions on the methods of combat, it identifies an overlap with treaty restrictions on perfidy but also that modern allusions to enemies as outlaws 'Wanted Dead or Alive' continue in some concerning ways.

Introduction

> I want him – hell, I want – I want justice, and there's an old poster out West…'Wanted: Dead or Alive'[1]

President Bush called for the bringing in of Osama bin Laden 'Dead or Alive' in an interview following the 9/11 attacks and the US coalition's military deployment to Afghanistan. President Trump has also said something similar about the operation that resulted in the death of the ISIS leader al-Baghdadi in October 2019, and in the following year there were reports that Russia had offered bounties for the killing of US and British troops in Afghanistan.[2] This article considers the implications of such

*Dr David Bicknell is a visiting research fellow at Kings College London, UK.
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[1]President George W. Bush in an interview with CNN on 21 December 2001 cited in Gary D. Solis, *The International Law of Armed Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 48.
[2]In a speech by President Trump to police chiefs in Chicago as reported by CBS News 29 October 2019, the President said 'I would say all the time, they would walk into my office, "sir we killed this leader at a level, this leader at…" I said I never heard of him, I want al-Baghdadi, that's the only one I know now, I want al-Baghdadi, get him, and they got him'; Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, 'Russia Secretly

statements in the light of a little discussed prohibition against outlawry contained in a number of national military manuals on the laws of war.[3] The prohibition seems at first sight an old-fashioned concept. In ordinary usage, an outlaw is defined as a person who has broken the law and has evaded or escaped from custody but historically it could also mean a person who, having done so, could be killed rather than captured.[4] More generally, the term may invoke images of Robin Hood or President Bush's cowboys in the Wild West rather than soldiers and the practice of modern warfare. The concept of outlawry in warfare is troubling too in that it seems to cut across established ideas of the soldier as a public enemy, that is a person who fights for his or her country and may be targeted as a combatant but, if captured, is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war.[5] How then did the prohibition come about and why is it of concern today?

The article is divided into four parts. It begins by explaining the various prohibitions against outlawry and where they may be found. It then traces the origin of the prohibition to a section entitled 'Assassination' in the Lieber Code - a military code produced in the American Civil War. The third part examines the history of the prohibition as the laws of war were developed and the final part considers why the prohibition has been overlooked in treaties and sources of customary law and whether its relative invisibility is a cause for concern.

The Prohibition on Outlawry

The laws of war are part of international law and are drawn from a limited number of sources, in particular treaties and customary law.[6] When considering outlawry and the sources of the laws of war, the first observation is then that there is no express prohibition on outlawry in an international treaty (which includes the 1907 Hague Convention IV and the 1949 Geneva Conventions) in which states have agreed to the rules comprised in the laws of war. The existence of a rule under customary law is

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Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says', *New York Times*, 26 June 2020; Guardian staff, 'Outrage mounts over report Russia offered bounties to Afghanistan militants for killing US soldiers', *The Guardian*, 27 June 2020.

[3]This article generally uses the term 'laws of war' rather than the related but distinguishable terms 'the law of armed conflict' and 'international humanitarian law' as it is historically more accurate for much of the period covered. However, for these purposes, the distinctions between the terms are not significant.

[4]See, for example, the Oxford Reference on-line definition of an Outlaw: 'A person who has broken the law, especially one who remains at large or is a fugitive'. It then refers to David Hey (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Local and Family History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) which adds the historical element of killing with impunity.

[5]Solis, *The Law of Armed Conflict*, p. 47.

[6]Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993, Art. 38.

more difficult to determine as it may be recorded in judgments of international courts and other tribunals, or cited in military manuals or other works. Rules of customary international law arise from the existence of a practice among states showing the performance or prohibition of acts covered by the rule and *opinio juris* – that is the belief of a state that what is being done (or not done) is required as a matter of law. Once established, customary rules are binding on all states. In 2005 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published the results of its Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (the ICRC Customary Law Study) that sought to establish what are the customary rules of international humanitarian law – the laws of war as they are called here.[7] The ICRC also publishes an on-line database that contains details of military manuals and lists military practice by some 192 states and former states which was used as part of the materials in the study.[8] There are 161 rules recorded by the ICRC in its Customary Law Study but the prohibition on outlawry is not one of them.[9] It is mentioned in the notes to Rule 65: 'Perfidy. Killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy is prohibited' under cross-references to the older version of the rule against perfidy known as 'treacherous killing'. The notes, which the ICRC has said do not have the status of customary law, indicate that there are versions of the prohibition on outlawry recorded in the military manuals of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States.[10] The overlap between the various manuals is perhaps not surprising as military lawyers from the Commonwealth countries cooperate with each other and with the US on matters of military law.[11] By contrast, the prohibition does not appear in the

[7]International Committee of the Red Cross, *Customary International Humanitarian Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[8] ICRC Customary Law Database, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. Accessed 6 September 2023.

[9]Whether military manuals are a conclusive source of customary law was disputed in correspondence between US Government lawyers and the ICRC in relation to the methodology of the ICRC's *Customary International Humanitarian Law Study* (2005). See Dennis Mandsager, 'U.S. Joint letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study', *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 46, Iss. 3, (May 2007), pp. 511-531.

[10]Despite the position taken by the ICRC, one leading practitioner has suggested that the notes to Rule 65 would justify in themselves making rules against assassination and outlawry – see William J. Fenrick, 'Methods of Land Warfare' in Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), *Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict,* (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 261.

[11]Chatham House, Meeting Summary, 'The US and the Laws of War', Summary of the International Law Discussion Group meeting held at Chatham House on

current German manual that, along with the British and US manuals, is one of the most highly regarded.[12]

The UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, the official publication by the British Government on the subject (the British Manual), contains the most comprehensive version of the prohibition on outlawry. In a section entitled 'Outlawry' it states:

> 5.14 The proscription or outlawing or the putting of a price on the head of an enemy individual or any offer for an enemy 'dead or alive' is prohibited.
>
> 5.14.1 The prohibition extends to offers of rewards for the killing or wounding of all enemies, or of a class of enemy persons, such as officers. On the other hand, offers of rewards for the capture unharmed of enemy personnel generally or of particular enemy personnel would be lawful.[13]

As can be seen, there are four different prohibitions grouped together under this provision: outlawry (as a specific term); proscription; putting a price on an enemy's head; and offers for an enemy 'dead or alive'. Since the publication of the ICRC Customary Law Study in 2005, the United States has produced a new military manual on the laws of war (the US Manual) and the provisions on outlawry in it were changed from the version noted by the ICRC.[14] The current US Manual contains a section entitled 'Prohibition on Offering Rewards for Enemy Persons Dead or Alive' with a footnote referring to the previous edition of US Manual as authority for the provision.[15] However, it omits a reference to assassination and 'outlawry' as a specific term that were contained in the previous version and was current when President Bush made his comment on bin Laden.[16]

Monday, 21 February 2011, p. 5, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/il210211summary.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2023). The speaker at the meeting was W. Hays Parks.

[12]Bundeswehr, Grp DvZentraleBw, *Humanitaïes Vo̊lkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch* [International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict – Manual], ZDv15/2, 2013.

[13]UK Ministry of Defence, *The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 62.

[14]US Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, (Department of Defense, June 2015). It was updated again in 2016.

[15]*Ibid*., p. 310.

[16]The prohibition on assassination was contained in the previous editions of the US Manual (1956 and 1976 revision), §31 and the British Manual - UK Ministry of Defence, *Manual of Military Law, Part III – The Law of War on Land*, (London: Her Majesty's

There is no further definition of the term 'outlawry' or proscription given in the military manuals. What is meant by 'outlawry' is considered further below but proscription is more straightforward. It can be traced back to the Roman practice of listing the names of persons who were deprived of their rights and for whom rewards would be given for their return, dead or alive.[17] It seems to overlap, therefore, with the other parts of the prohibition and some military manuals only contain rules that prohibit the putting of a price on the head of an enemy individual or any offer for an enemy 'dead or alive'.

A survey of texts on the laws of war also shows little evidence of a specific rule against outlawry or its variants as it is not mentioned in the overwhelming majority of texts reviewed, including some of the leading textbooks on the subject.[18] However, it has been noted in a number of books and articles which have focussed on perfidy, a connection which will be considered further below.[19] The prohibition against outlawry as stated in the 2004 British Manual is not attributed to a particular treaty or other source of law but, by tracing the provision back through earlier editions, it can be seen to derive from two sources. The first is General Orders, No. 100, 'Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field', published by the US War Department in 1863 which is widely accepted as the first modern code of the laws of

Stationary Office, 1958), §115. It was also omitted from the current British Manual when it was updated in 2004.

[17]Luca Gervasoni, *Assassination in Times of Armed Conflict: A Clash of Theory and Practice*, (PhD Thesis, University of Milan – Bicocca, 2016), p. 229.

[18]The current texts that were found to contain the rule are Solis, *The Law of Armed Conflict*, p. 48; A.P.V. Rogers, *Law on the Battlefield,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 46; and Fenwick, 'Methods', p. 261. Examples of leading textbooks that did not contain it included: Ingrid Detter, *The Law of War,* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2013); Dieter Fleck (ed.), *The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Leslie C. Green, *The contemporary law of armed conflict,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

[19]Recent articles which associate outlawry with perfidy include: Rain Liivoja, 'Chivalry without a Horse: Military Honour and the Modern Law of Armed Conflict' in Rain Liivoja and Andres Saumets (eds), *The Law of Armed Conflict: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,* (Tartu University Press, 2012), pp. 89-90; Sean Watts, 'Law-of-War Perfidy', *Military Law Review*, Vol. 219 (March, 2014), pp. 106-175, p. 171; Manuel Galvis Martínez, 'Betrayal in War: Rules and Trends on Seeking Collaboration under IHL', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 25, Issue 1, Spring 2020, pp. 81–99, pp. 89-91.

war (General Order 100).[20] The order is often referred to as the 'Lieber Code' after Dr Francis Lieber who produced the main draft of the code prior to its review and publication by the US Government. The second source is a book on the laws of war which was produced at the request of the British War Office by Col. J. E. Edmunds and Professor Lassa Oppenheim in 1912.[21]

Origins of the Prohibition on Outlawry

General Order 100 contains an article on outlawry under the heading 'Assassination':

> Art 148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such intentional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.

The association between assassination and outlawry is the subject of some controversy, particularly in the United States where assassination by US state agents is prohibited by a US Presidential Order.[22] W. Hays Parks, a former US Army lawyer and chair of the US Department of Defense working group on the 2015 US Manual, tried to distinguish between assassination and lawful killing in war by suggesting that the scope of assassination that is prohibited for military purposes is limited to the prohibition on outlawry.[23] Hays Park's interpretation relies on the title of the section in which the article appears but, if the origin of the prohibition in the Lieber Code is examined, the meaning of it becomes clearer. Lieber had suggested the writing of a code of the laws of war to General Halleck, the Commanding General of the Union Army, and in December 1862 he was appointed to an Army board that was instructed to draw up a code. In February 1863 he produced a printed draft and submitted it to the board for review. In the draft code, there was a fuller section containing two

[20]US War Department, Adjutant General's Office, *General Orders, No. 100*, 'Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States, in the Field', (Washington: GPO, 1863).

[21]Col. J.E. Edmonds and L. Oppenheim, *Land Warfare*, (London: HMSO, 1912).

[22]The ban was first issued by U.S. President Gerald Ford as Executive Order 11905 on 19 February 1976 and has since been reissued.

[23]W. Hays Parks, 'Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination', *The Army Lawyer*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204, December 1989, pp. 4-9, p. 5.

articles. The first article was very similar to the final version but the second article offered a further explanation for the prohibition:

> ASSASSINATION.
>
> Art 96...
>
> Art 97. The American people, as all civilized nations, look with horror upon rewards for the assassination of any enemies, as relapses into the disgraceful courses of savage times.
>
> The assassination of a prisoner of war, is a murder of the blackest kind, and if it takes place, in consequence of a reward or not, and remains unpunished by the hostile government, the Law of War authorizes the most impressive retaliation, so that the repetition of a crime most dangerous to civilization, may be prevented, and a downward course into barbarity may be arrested.[24]

This section was, however, edited – presumably by the Board as Lieber had made no changes to it – so that the first article was supplemented by a final sentence that 'Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism' and the second article was deleted.[25] The second article made it clearer, however, that it was the summary killing without trial of captured soldiers for crimes that they were alleged to have committed that was abhorrent and it appears that Lieber uses the word 'assassination' as a descriptive word that also contains a sense of moral repugnance before categorising the practice legally as the crime of murder. The wording of Article 148 of General Order 100 then indicates that it was the proclaiming of outlaws and their killing without trial that was offensive. Article 148 is also notable for its strong condemnatory tone and its origins appear to be based in the context of the outlawing of several Union Generals for a number of alleged breaches of the laws of war.[26] Among their 'crimes', from the

[24]Francis Lieber, *A Code for the Government of Armies in the Field*, (New York: 1863 – reprinted by Amazon, 2018), p. 32.

[25]The Huntington Library, San Marino, California (*HEH*), The Francis Lieber Papers, LI 182A, 'Inter-leaved copy of "A Code for the Government of Armies in the Field" marked-up with comments by Lieber (undated, circa March 1863)', p. 23. There is a further draft in the collection of Lieber's papers but Articles 96 and 97 are the same as cited above except for their numbering and the replacement of the word 'disgraceful' with 'dark' in the third line of Article 97. Access to documents in The Francis Lieber Papers was kindly made available to the author by The Huntington Library.

[26]John Fabian Witt, *Lincoln's Code,* (New York: Free Press, 2013), p. 244.

perspective of the Confederacy, was the recruitment and arming of black soldiers.[27] This was viewed as an incitement to servile insurrection in the Confederacy and the procedure by which they were outlawed was, in each case, a proclamation of the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis.

Despite the condemnatory language of the article in General Order 100, Lieber was not always consistent in his approach to outlaws. In a letter to General Halleck following a Union Army operation to secure the Mississippi River in August 1863, he expressed his expectation that there would be 'prowling assassins along the banks, firing on passengers from behind the levees' and said that 'these lawless prowlers…must be treated as out-laws'.[28] Although General Order 100 had been published three months earlier, he did not refer to it and based this view on his earlier paper entitled 'Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War' which he had written in 1862 to advise the Union Army on how to treat Confederate soldiers or civilians carrying out irregular warfare.[29] In the paper he had distinguished between 'Guerrillas' and 'irregulars'. He argued that guerrillas who engaged in a fair fight in open warfare should be treated in the same way as 'free corps' and 'partisans' and made prisoners of war if captured. However, irregulars operating near the lines or against the occupying army were, he said, like bushwackers, assassins, brigands and spies, and could not expect to be treated as combatants. He pronounced that death was the acknowledged punishment for a brigand but left the actual treatment and punishment of irregulars for the US Government to decide. General Order 100 had then provided that 'armed prowlers' were not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war but did not go so far as to prescribe the death penalty as it did in certain other cases, such as troops who gave no quarter to the enemy.[30] In his letter, however, Lieber seems to be implying that the prowlers could be denied quarter or, if captured, executed for their crimes rather than being proclaimed as outlaws by the authorities.

There are very few other references to outlawry in a proclamatory sense in America before, during or after the Civil War other than the outlawing by the Union of Confederate guerrillas such as Quantrill's Raiders, a Confederate guerrilla force led by William Quantrill operating around Missouri and Kansas, in 1862.[31] When the term

[27]*Ibid*.
[28]HEH, The Francis Lieber Papers, LI 1808, 'Letter from Dr. Francis Lieber to General Halleck', 2 August 1863.
[29]Francis Lieber, *Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War,* (Washington, 1862).
[30]*General Order 100*, 1863, Arts 84 and 66 respectively.
[31]Graham Seal, *The Outlaw Legend: A Cultural Tradition in Britain, America and Australia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 85.

'outlawry' is used in relation to the United States, it generally has a more descriptive sense of a person who is living outside of the law by robbery and murder, such as Jesse James. He had been part of Quantrill's Raiders and carried out a series of robberies and murders after the Civil War. A reward was offered for him and he was shot and killed by another gang-member, but his killer was pardoned for murder by the Governor of Missouri.[32] The legal distinction is not surprising given that the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution requires due process of law and had its origins in England in Magna Carta. Magna Carta had provided that 'No free man shall be arrested…or outlawed or exiled or in any way victimised, neither will we attack him or send anyone to attack him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land'.[33] This article of Magna Carta is perhaps one of its most famous and seems to have been directed against arbitrary action by the Crown.[34] As the law developed, particular stress was laid on the importance of the reference in Magna Carta to *lex terrae* – literally, 'the law of the land' or as later translated, 'due process of law'.[35] It does appear, however, that outlawry existed in America prior to the end of the Revolutionary War.[36] This may have been derived from English common law or Attainder, a legal process associated with outlawry, both of which were then prohibited by the US Constitution.

Outlawry & Development of the Laws of War

After General Order 100 was published, Lieber sought to have it distributed as widely as possible among academic acquaintances, politicians and diplomats in Europe as he promoted the idea that it should be used for other national codes. This coincided with a period of military expansion in Europe and General Order 100 was used as the basis for the attempts to formalise the laws of war that accompanied the expansion. In particular, Johann Bluntschli, a friend of Lieber's who was professor of law at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, used the code as a source for his own work on the laws of war, *Das moderne Kriegsrecht der civilisirten Staten* ('The Modern Law of War

[32]*Ibid*., pp. 80-92.
[33]J.C. Holt, *Magna Carta*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 461.
[34]*Ibid*., p. 327.
[35]Library of Congress, Constitution Annotated: Analysis and Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, 'Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment', https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-5/#:~:text=No%20person%20shall%20be%20held,the%20same%20offence%20to%20be. Accessed 7 June 2023).
[36]Capt. George L. Coil, 'War Crimes of the American Revolution', *Military Law Review*, Vol. 82 (1978), pp. 171-198, p. 185.

of Civilised States') which was published in 1866.[37] It was also used for a military code of the Prussian army in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and then for a draft of a treaty to govern the means and methods of land warfare put forward by the Russian delegation to the Brussels Conference in 1874.[38] Although the conference ended without a formal treaty, the Brussels Declaration that was issued at its end contained a draft set of regulations that contained three important articles on the methods of warfare – treacherous killing, the killing of prisoners and the giving of quarter, that were to form the basis of provisions on the conduct of hostilities in later treaties. There was, however, no express provision on assassination or outlawry. The draft regulations were in turn taken up by the Institute of International Law and used as the basis for a model code published in 1880 known as the Oxford Manual.[39] The manual was rather different in content from the Brussels Declaration but Article 8 contained a prohibition on treacherous killing and used as examples keeping assassins in pay or feigning to surrender. It made no mention of outlawry. It also met with no greater approval than the Brussels Declaration as it was rejected by the major European states and adopted only by Argentina.[40] A later international conference at The Hague in 1899, however, led to a treaty, Hague Convention II, that contained a set of regulations based on the Brussels Declaration (1899 Hague Convention II) and included a similar article on the methods of war:

> Article 23. Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially prohibited -…
> (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army;
> (c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
> (d) To declare that no quarter will be given;[41]

There was no provision on outlawry. The new international treaty required states to produce their own 'Instructions' based on the regulations and this led to the

[37]Johan Bluntschli, *Das moderne Kriegsrecht der civilisirten Staten* [The Modern Law of War of Civilised States], (Nördlingen: C.H. Beck, 1866), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011640428. Accessed 7 June 2023.
[38]Karma Nabulsi, *Traditions of War, Occupation, Resistance and the Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 5.
[39]D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds), *The Laws of Armed Conflicts*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers, 1988), pp. 36-48.
[40]Nabulsi, *Traditions of War*, p. 9.
[41]Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899 (*1899 Hague Regulations*), Art. 23.

production of a series of important military manuals and other texts around the start of the twentieth century. It is these manuals that provide the main examples of the prohibition on outlawry. In 1904, at the request of the British War Office, Erskine Holland, professor of international law at Oxford University, produced a commentary on the 1899 Hague Convention II that included a provision on assassination and outlawry derived from Article 23(b). It stated:

> …it is especially prohibited:-
> Assassination.
> (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.
> This includes not only assassination of individuals, but also, by implication, any offer for an individual "dead or alive".[42]

Apart from the examples provided from the American Civil War, it is difficult to find examples of outlawry being used as state practice in war in the late nineteenth century when the laws of war were being codified. However, two cases of outlawry are recorded as having arisen in British colonial wars in Africa around the turn of the twentieth century. On 17 April 1906, Professor Holland, the author of the British War Office's commentary on the 1899 Hague Convention II, wrote to *The Times* newspaper in London in response to a news report of a proclamation made by the Natal Government in South Africa offering a reward for Bambaata, a Zulu tribal leader, 'dead or alive'. He commented that such a proclamation was contrary to the customs of warfare, whether against foreign enemies or rebels. He cited Article 23(b) of the 1899 Hague Regulations on the prohibition against treacherous killing and said that it reflected a well-established rule of the law of nations. He also mentioned another case in Sudan that had preceded the 1899 Hague Convention in which an offer had been made for a Dervish leader dead or alive but the offer had been cancelled and disavowed by the British Government.[43] After the publications, a question was asked in the House of Commons on 2 May 1906 about the declaration against Bambaata in Natal and Winston Churchill confirmed on behalf of the Government that the offer of £500 for him had been withdrawn by the Natal Government.[44]

The Hague Conference of 1899 was followed by another in 1907 and a similar treaty, 1907 Hague Convention IV, that attached another set of regulations (1907 Hague

[42]T.E. Holland, *The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1899*, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1904), p. 29.
[43]T.E. Holland, *Letters to "The Times" upon War and Neutrality*, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1914), p. 74.
[44]House of Commons, Record of Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 156, 26 Apr. – 10 May 1906, p. 551.

Regulations) that contained the same Article 23 as the 1899 Hague Convention II except for a small change to the rule against killing or wounding those that had surrendered.[45] J.M. Spraight, a leading writer at the time, said that the regulations represented the nearest approach to a complete code of the law of war at that time and, again, there was no reference to outlawry.[46] In compliance with another requirement to produce national regulations based on the treaty, further manuals were produced. The British War Office instructed Holland to produce another commentary and it contained the same prohibition on assassination as the 1904 commentary.[47] However, in 1912 the War Office published a new commentary by Col J.E. Edmonds and Professor Lassa Oppenheim. It contained the following provisions in a section entitled 'The Means of Carrying on War by Force, Section 1A – Killing and Disabling the Enemy Combatants':

> §46 Assassination. Assassination, and the killing and wounding by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army, are not lawful acts of war, and the perpetrator of such an act has no claim to be treated as a combatant, but should be put on trial as a war criminal. Measures should be taken to prevent such an act from being successful in case information with regard to it is forthcoming.
>
> §47 Outlawry. As a consequence of the prohibition of assassination, the proscription, or outlawing of any enemy, or the putting a price on an enemy's head, or any offer for an enemy 'dead or alive' is not permitted.

It also contained provisions on 'Quarter' (§48) and 'Killing of surrendered combatants' (§50).[48] The 1912 commentary was then inserted wholesale as the chapter on the laws of war in the 1914 edition of the British Manual and is the other main source of the prohibition on outlawry.

In 1914 the US Army produced its first military manual, it was also its first official publication on the laws of war since the Lieber Code.[49] The manual was in a new form but nonetheless it stated that '[i]t will be found that everything vital contained in […the

[45]Convention IV (1907) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Art. 23.
[46]J.M. Spraight, *War Rights on Land*, (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1911), pp. 6-8.
[47]T.E. Holland, *The Laws of War on Land*, (London: Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 43.
[48]Edmonds and Oppenheim, *Land Warfare*, p. 24.
[49]The Lieber Code was reissued by the U.S. War Department in 1898 in connection with the Spanish-American War and an insurrection in the Philippines.

Lieber Code] has been incorporated in this manual'.[50] It set out the rule against treacherous killing from Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations and then added a provision précising the prohibition on outlawry in the Lieber Code and footnotes referring to its other sources as being the works by Holland and Oppenheim and a manual by Jacomet - a contemporary French writer.[51]

The 1914 British and American manuals mark the culmination of the international process prior to the First World War that established the substance of the prohibitions on outlawry. The British reissued their manual with minor amendments in 1929 and 1940. The US also updated their manual in 1940 with a revised section on assassination and outlawry that cited Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations on treacherous killing as the basis of the prohibitions.

Towards the end of the Second World War a more difficult case of would-be outlawry occurred when the British were considering how they should deal with the Nazi leaders after the war.[52] The British Cabinet had been considering how to deal with Nazi war crimes since 1942 and had held various discussions with the US and Russian Governments. In October 1943 the three Allies issued the Moscow Declaration which stated that, following any armistice, German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who were responsible for atrocities would be sent back to the countries where the atrocities were committed to be judged and punished there. However, the Declaration reserved a separate category of major Nazi war criminals from this policy and stated that they would be punished by joint decision of the Allies.[53] Following the Moscow Declaration, the British War Cabinet met again to consider the treatment of the major war criminals.[54] The Cabinet members were provided with a memorandum from the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in which he suggested that a list of 50 to 100 major war criminals be drawn up by the thirty-two United Nations, a phrase that was used to refer to the states on the Allied side. They would then be declared 'world outlaws' and killed without trial on falling into the hands of the Armed Forces.[55] Some Cabinet members objected to this and no decision was made. The memorandum was subsequently redrafted several times for discussion but by April 1945 a decision was

[50]US War Department, *Rules of Land Warfare,* (Washington, 1914), p. 7.
[51]Lt Robert Jacomet, *Les Lois de La Guerre Continentale* [The Laws of Continental War], (Paris, 1913).
[52]Leon Friedman (ed.), *Law of War: A Documentary History*, Vol. 1, (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 778.
[53]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA), CAB 121/422, Cabinet Papers, 'Telegram From Moscow to Foreign Office', 29 October 1943; and CAB 66/42/46, 'Cabinet Papers, Memorandum', 9 November 1943.
[54]TNA, CAB 65/36, 'Cabinet Papers, War Cabinet Minutes', 10 November 1943.
[55]TNA, CAB 66/42/46, 'Cabinet Papers, Memorandum', 9 November 1943.

urgently required. The War Cabinet met on 12 April 1945 to discuss a further memorandum setting out a proposal developed by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon, in discussion with President Roosevelt's personal representative, Judge Rosenman.[56] Lord Simon proposed a documentary arraignment of the Nazi leaders following which they would be given the opportunity to appear before a tribunal but, if they refused to recognize the tribunal, 'extreme measures' would be taken against them. The discussion in Cabinet, however, returned to the position that the Nazi leaders should be treated as outlaws and executed if no ally wanted them. The Prime Minister said that he had wanted all Nations to declare them outlaws but it was too late for that.[57] He proposed that the Government should protect themselves by asking Parliament to pass an Act of Attainder which would declare that the Nazi leaders named in the Act were 'world outlaws' and would authorize the summary execution of those that came into British hands.[58] Attainder was originally an English common law procedure by which a person's title to land and goods were forfeit to the Crown and it took effect against outlaws.[59] A Bill of Attainder was a medieval law procedure which enabled Parliament to make judgment on a person without a trial in a court. It was used in 1660 against the regicides of King Charles I and last used in 1746 in an Act which attainted forty-seven men for their part in the Jacobite uprising.[60] The controversy over the procedure is then part of the background to the prohibition of Bills of Attainder in the US Constitution. Nonetheless, despite the lack of use of attainder for two centuries, the Cabinet approved the proposal to outlaw the Nazi leaders. However, after further discussion among the Allies at San Francisco in the following month, the British finally agreed to the holding of war crimes trials for them.[61] The Cabinet's decision is an interesting example as the Cabinet clearly knew that the summary killing of the Nazi leaders would be unlawful but there is no record of a discussion of the prohibition on outlawry under the laws of war.[62]

Following the Second World War, major revisions of the laws of war were agreed through the 1949 Geneva Conventions but, apart from two minor provisions, the Conventions do not deal with the law of combat itself as the 1907 Hague Regulations

[56]TNA, CAB 65/50/6, 'Cabinet Papers, War Cabinet Minutes – Conclusion', 12 April 1945.
[57]TNA, CAB 195/3/18, 'Cabinet Papers, Cabinet Secretary notes', 12 April 1945.
[58]TNA, CAB 65/50/6, 'Cabinet Papers, War Cabinet Minutes – Conclusion', 12 April 1945, p. 263.
[59]*Halsbury's Laws of England*, 5th edn, Vol. 79, (London: LexisNexis, 2015), §838n[1].
[60]*Ibid*., Vol. 24, §643.
[61]Friedman, *Law of War*, p. 778.
[62]The criminal procedure for outlawry was formally abolished in England in 1938 - T.R.F. Butler and M. Garsia, *Archbold's Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases*, 31st edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1943), p. 98.

had done.[63] One of their major changes, however, was to extend the coverage of the laws of war to 'conflicts not of an international character' through Article 3 of each Convention – the so-called 'Convention in miniature'.[64] Previously the international treaties on the laws of war had applied only to wars between states. Article 3 contained judicial guarantees for the fair trial of civilians and of combatants who are *hors de combat* who fall into the hands of an enemy, and these have subsequently been extended in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The 1949 Geneva Conventions once again necessitated a major updating of military manuals. The US Manual was revised in 1956 and the revisions dealt mainly with the updates for the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The article on assassination and outlawry was again based on reference to Article 23 of the Hague Regulations 1907 on treacherous killing.[65] The revised British Manual was produced in 1957 and contained a revised provision on assassination that characterized killings by enemy agents and partisans as unlawful assassination.[66] It also altered the reasoning behind the prohibition on outlawry from treacherous killing to the denial of quarter.[67]

In 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirmed and supplemented the Conventions with measures intended to reinforce their application in international and non-international armed conflicts.[68] The Additional Protocols are also the last general treaties to have covered the conduct of hostilities. Again, there was no mention of outlawry and none in the 1998 Rome Convention which sets out the categories of war crime that are within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. However, the rule against treacherous killing was updated, expanded and renamed in Article 37 of Additional Protocol I as a prohibition on perfidy. Apparently, the word 'Perfidy' was thought more modern or more appropriate than 'treacherous killing. This was not a new idea as it had been objected to in the negotiations over the 1899 Hague Convention II but the English word 'treachery' had been kept as it was the equivalent of the German *Meuchelmord* ('murder by

[63]Michael A. Meyer and Hilaire McCoubrey (eds), *Reflections on Law and Armed Conflicts. The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the Late Professor Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper OBE,* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 88.
[64]David Turns, 'The Law of Armed Conflict' in Malcolm Evans (ed.), *International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 845. The reference is quoting Jean Pictet.
[65]US Manual, 1956, §31.
[66]British Manual, 1958, §115.
[67]*Ibid*., §116.
[68]Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.

treachery').[69] The article on perfidy sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples of perfidy that have a common requirement for a breach of good faith.[70] However, outlawry is not among them. The United Kingdom ratified the Additional Protocols in 1998 and the British Manual was fully revised in a 'comprehensive' tri-service update published in 2004 which encompassed the changes. It contains the provision on outlawry set out previously and a paragraph stating that there is no rule against assassination.[71] The United States is not a party to the 1977 Additional Protocols and so did not have to revise its manual to reflect them but it did produce a new multi-service manual in 2015. This removed the prohibition on assassination and outlawry as a specific term whilst maintaining the prohibition on putting a price on an enemy's head or declaring an enemy wanted 'dead or alive'.

In the case of potential modern examples, the reference to Osama bin Laden being 'Wanted: Dead or Alive' has already been mentioned. During operations in Iraq, there were also reports on the BBC on 8 April 2003 that rewards of £3,000 were being offered for the killing of British soldiers.[72] A more difficult issue arises from the packs of 'Iraqi Most Wanted Playing Cards' issued in 2003 by US Central Command, copies of which are still widely available on the internet.[73] Each card has a photograph of the wanted person with their name and position together with a playing card suit and value – for example Saddam Hussain was described as the President and appeared on the Ace of Spades. However, the playing cards and other offers of rewards for information would not appear to breach the prohibition against outlawry unless the use of the term 'Wanted' within its context were thought to carry an inherent implication that it meant 'Wanted: Dead or Alive'.[74] Currently, the US Government is still offering large rewards for information leading to the location of various alleged members of al-Qaeda, ISIS and other groups that are 'Wanted' – a phrase which the *Express* online news in Britain has indeed interpreted as 'Wanted: Dead or Alive' although the offers do not say that.[75]

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[69]Joseph R. Baker and Henry G. Crocker, *The Law of Land Warfare concerning The Rights and Duties of Belligerents as Existing on August 1, 1914,* (Washington: GPO, 1919), p. 124.

[70]Nils Melzer, *Targeted Killing in International Law,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 372.

[71]British Manual, 2004, p. 62.

[72]Rogers has suggested that this is either to be seen as a case of assassination or more likely outlawry - Rogers, *Law on the Battlefield*, p. 46.

[73]https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1013029. Accessed 7 September 2023.

[74]Martínez considers the issue of offering economic rewards for killing combatants more generally in his article, 'Betrayal in War', pp. 96-97.

[75]www.rewardsforjustice.net. Accessed 7 September 2023, and Tom Batchelor and Alix Culbertson, 'Wanted DEAD or alive: The FOUR men we need to STOP to put

Current Status of Prohibition on Outlawry

As has been seen, references to the prohibition on outlawry have been somewhat scarce in the laws of war: it has not been included expressly in any international treaty or in the ICRC's extensive Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, but it has been referred to consistently in some military manuals, and in some academic writing as being caught within the meaning of treacherous killing. In more modern academic writing, it has also been seen as an example of perfidy. There may be a number of reasons for this absence from treaties and the ICRC's study some of which may be historical or technical matters of law but they do, nonetheless, give some cause for concern.

The history of the development of the laws of war on the conduct of hostilities show a remarkable continuity from the publication of General Order 100 in 1863 to the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. This arose from the use of General Order 100 as the basis for the draft code considered at the Brussels Conference in 1874 and the Oxford Manual published in 1880. The draft code for the Brussels Conference was then re-used as the basis for the Hague Regulations in 1899 and the 1899 Hague Regulations for the 1907 Hague Regulations. Nonetheless, the prohibition on outlawry contained in General Order 100 was not included in any of these. There was a general concern that provisions that were known at the time which were not included in the treaties might be tainted by their omission and considered as not being binding. This was in part the reason for the inclusion of the so-called Martens clause in the treaties which was intended to keep open the argument that there was customary law beyond that codified by the treaties. It is now widely accepted that this is the case even if some of the individual content of it included in the ICRC's study is disputed.[76]

There does not seem to be any record of why the prohibition on outlawry was not included in the draft code discussed at Brussels in 1874 and the later version adopted

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an end to ISIS', *Express*, London, 30 November 2015, https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/599387/World-most-wanted-terrorists-seven-men-50m-bounty. Accessed 7 September 2023.

[76]The first formulation of the Martens clause is in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II. It states that '[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience'. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899. Preamble.

at The Hague in 1899. It might be possible to speculate, however, on a legal reason for this. General Order 100 has always been seen as something of a hybrid in its application to war and civil wars. It was said by Leiber to reflect the existing laws of war but there were some provisions that were clearly the creature of the American Civil War and the prohibition may have been seen as one of them.[77] In the late nineteenth century, the laws of war applied to war between states and did not apply to civil wars until they reached a status called belligerency. It could be argued that 'outlawry' in the strict sense of the term is, by its legal nature, a concept that can apply only to civil war. This is because outlawry as a legal concept is an exception to the law of a State created by a sovereign body that has the power to do so. In the case of England, this was originally the Crown and later Parliament but there is no sovereign body in the international system that has the power to create an exception to the laws of war. It may be, therefore, that outlawry was considered to be a matter for States and technically as a legal matter outside of the scope of the laws of war as they existed at that time.

If the exclusion was deliberate, it would not, however, account for the recurring appearance of the consideration of outlawry in the British and US military manuals. In their case, though, the justification for the inclusion of outlawry changed from manual to manual and from edition to edition. In the early British Manuals it was attributed to the prohibition on treacherous killing but the sources for the first British Manual also included General Order 100. The first US Manual to be produced then included in its sources both General Order 100 and the British Manual. After the Second World War, the justification in the British Manual changed to being based on the prohibition on the order that no quarter be given. The prohibition on treacherous killing has now largely been replaced by a prohibition on perfidy and modern writers have attributed the prohibition on outlawry to it. The concern with this trend is that it perpetuates the invisibility of the probation on outlawry and increases reliance on the military manuals that still include it. As has been seen, the prohibition on assassination has now disappeared from the British Manual and the US Manual and the reference to the term 'outlawry' has been removed from the US Manual even though the prohibitions of putting a price on an enemy's head remains.

Outside of military manuals, increasingly the persistence of the prohibition on outlawry relies on an understanding of the prohibition of perfidy and this could be problematic for two reasons. First, the essence of perfidy is that 'there is a deliberate claim to legal protection for hostile purposes'.[78] This can be seen in the examples of perfidy that include feigning surrender or falsely using protected symbols such as the

[77]For example, Lieber added Section X to the draft code specifically to deal with civil wars and it includes Article 157 which concerns treachery in the United States.
[78]Liivoja, 'Chivalry without a horse', p. 87.

Red Cross or Red Crescent, and it is not obvious that this is the case with outlawry. In some ways, it is the opposite where it involves a declaration that an enemy is not to be given lawful protection upon surrender or capture. This then becomes more serious if, as one writer put it, 'few legal advisers would interpret perfidy wider than the codified protection'.[79] It might even be argued that the absence of outlawry from the ICRC Customary Law Study and the limited sources for it in military manuals are grounds for it not being considered to be customary law. This would, however, probably be a step too far as it is difficult to see how outlawry as such would not fall within one of the existing protections against not giving quarter, perfidy or treacherous killing, or the provisions requiring a fair trial. In that case, the concern really lies around the allusion to the outlaw 'Wanted Dead or Alive', whether deliberate or not, and that the relative invisibility of the prohibition can and perhaps does lead to inadvertent references or misunderstandings.

Conclusions

The prohibition on outlawry is then the product of the Lieber Code. Its origins lay in the particular circumstances of the American Civil War and the outlawing of several Union Generals by proclamation of the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis. Outside of the Lieber Code, outlawry appeared in military manuals by association with the prohibitions against treacherous killing contained in the regulations attached to 1899 Hague Convention II and the 1907 Hague Convention IV. These were expressed to include the prohibition of outlawry or proscription as such, putting a price on a person's head or declaring then 'Wanted: Dead or Alive'. However, the prohibitions themselves were not adopted by any treaty. In particular, the prohibition in the Lieber Code was known at the time of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions but was not included in their respective regulations and it was also not included in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or their 1977 Additional Protocols, when, in each case, the states involved were seeking to agree which rules did exist as a matter of international law. Furthermore, the prohibition was not identified as customary law in the ICRC Customary Law Study in 2005. However, this does not mean that acts that would be the consequence of outlawry are lawful as they may breach the particular prohibitions that exist against perfidy, the declaring of no quarter and the killing of prisoners of war or the procedural guarantees embedded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary law. In other words, the law may address some aspects of outlawry if the modern rules are examined closely enough but it leaves other aspects more ambiguous, particularly the prohibitions on putting a price on a person's head and declaring a person 'Wanted: Dead or Alive'. By including these, the approach of the UK Manual and the US Manual is an important reminder of what is required in practice and helps to avoid any uncertainty or misunderstanding, such as that from the British press over the Iraqi Playing Cards.

[79]Watts, 'Law of War Perfidy', p. 160.

'Ashantee Loot is Unique': British Military Culture and the Taking of Objects in the Third Anglo-Asante War, 1873-1874

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ABSTRACT
There exists a popular perception that all objects collected as a result of British military action in imperial settings can be termed 'loot' or 'plunder'. This article argues otherwise and demonstrates that for British officers serving in the Third Anglo-Asante War (1873-1874) there existed a shared understanding of the legitimate and illegitimate ways objects could be acquired, with specific terms used to describe both practices. Furthermore, it highlights how objects acquired during the war were considered, displayed and interpreted in British institutions, centring the importance of setting in determining the object's significance and meaning to different groups of people.

On 10 March 1874 Lieutenant Henry Wood of the 10th (Prince of Wales Own) Royal Hussars attended an audience at Windsor Castle to present the official news of the British victory over the Kingdom of Asante in West Africa.[1] He brought with him gifts to the royal family from Sir Garnet Wolseley, the commander of the British expeditionary force. While the Prince of Wales was presented with an elaborate wooden stool finished with ornate silverwork which had been taken from the royal palace at Kumasi, Queen Victoria received the state umbrella of the King of Asante,

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The quotation in the title is taken from Frederick Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie, a diary of the Ashantee Expedition,* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1874), p. 376.

[1]In the 1870s the English spelling of this kingdom was commonly written as 'Ashantee' or 'Ashanti'. For the purpose of this paper, the modern spelling 'Asante' will be used; furthermore, the Asante capital will be spelled 'Kumasi' rather than the nineteenth-century anglicised spelling 'Coomassie', and the king of Asante will be referred to as 'Kofi Karikari' rather than the nineteenth-century phonetic spelling 'Coffee Calcallee'.

the *Asantehene* Kofi Karikari. The umbrella was around seven feet in diameter, made of sections of black and red velvet trimmed with gold, and had a number of charms attached, some of leather and cloth and another being a severed lion's paw. The umbrella was 'not for use, to keep off rain or sunshine…but it is an emblem of pomp and dignity, held over the king's head on all ceremonial occasions'.[2] The taking of this object and its presentation to the queen was an emphatic statement demonstrating that power and authority over the Asante people had been transferred from the *Asantehene* to the British monarch. Over the following weeks, as the members of the British expedition arrived home to a hero's welcome, they brought with them thousands of other Asante objects which currently reside in public and private collections across the country.

Objects acquired through the exertion of British military power abroad, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have been known by a variety of often indiscriminately applied terms.[3] Loot, plunder, prize, souvenirs, trophies, booty and spoil are all examples which have been used, sometimes interchangeably, despite there often being subtle – albeit ill-defined – differences in their meanings to contemporary military practitioners. Recently, scholars have started to unpick the cultures and conventions surrounding the taking of objects during military expeditions. Henrietta Lidchi and Stuart Allan demonstrated that in terms of collecting practices the British army should not been seen as a 'monolithic entity'; rather, it was an agglomeration of different regimental cultures and traditions, with formal and informal rules and customs, that shaped its soldiers' attitudes to the acquisition of objects.[4] These practices could change over time and location, could be sanctioned and unsanctioned, and were contingent on 'a degree of collective and individual agency among the officer class'.[5] Nicole Hartwell showed that during the Indian Uprising of 1857-58 there was a shared understanding within the British military establishment that trophies which were seen to symbolise victory could be distinguished from those objects taken during moments of unsanctioned looting.[6] Furthermore, Katrina Hill concluded that during the Second Opium War in China in 1860 objects were 'collected' in three distinct ways – the taking of trophies and prize on the battlefield, looting government and civilian targets, and purchasing goods from merchants, but acknowledges that the

[2]'Coffee Calcallee's Umbrella', *Illustrated London News*, 21 March 1874, p. 278.
[3]Edward Spiers, 'Spoils of War: Custom and Practice' in Henrietta Lidchi and Stuart Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils: Perspectives on Military Collections and the British Empire,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), p. 19.
[4]Henrietta Lidchi and Stuart Allan, 'Introduction', in Lidchi and Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils,* pp. 5-6.
[5]Lidchi and Allan, 'Introduction', p. 6.
[6]Nicole Hartwell, 'Framing Colonial War Loot: The 'captured' *spolia opima* of Kunwar Singh', *Journal of the History of Collections,* 34, 2 (July 2022), pp. 287-302.

'boundaries between modes of acquisition were not always clear'.[7] Indeed, in China, property which was deemed to be looted could be confiscated from individual soldiers by British senior officers so that it could then be sold back to the men at a prize auction, where individuals competed to buy objects with the accumulated proceeds proportionately divided among the officers and men. This process, whereby unsanctioned and disorganised 'plundering' by individuals was banned in favour of the formal acquisition of 'prize', was repeated in both the Maqdala Expedition of 1867 and the Third Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874.[8]

Inasmuch as published academic research has refocussed attention on the nature of British military collecting across the empire, museum curators too have started to examine their collections to better understand both their own institution's historic engagement with colonialism and to inform how objects acquired during military expeditions should be appropriately interpreted.[9] A landmark exhibition held at the National War Museum of Scotland between November 2020 and January 2024 entitled 'Legacies of Empire' examined military collecting practices, studied the objects acquired, and ascertained how those objects came to be part of museum collections.[10] The exhibition presented the opinion that instead of considering all material obtained in imperial expeditions as simply being 'loot', each object should be considered in its own right to determine which could be classified as souvenirs, gifts, prize, trophies or plunder. It was a timely intervention as British museums face increased calls to decolonize their collections and repatriate objects to their place of origin.[11] Indeed, as

[7] Katie Hill, 'Collecting on Campaign: British Soldiers in China during the Opium Wars', *Journal of the History of Collections*, 25, 2 (2013), p. 228.

[8]Spiers, 'Spoils of War', p. 25. A recent paper has refocussed attention on the inclusion of members of staff from the British Museum on the Maqdala Expedition, see: Lucia Patrizio Gunning and Debbie Challis, 'Planned Plunder: the British Museum and the 1868 Maqdala Expedition', *Historical Journal* (2023), online, https://www-cambridge-org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/core/journals/historical-journal/article/planned-plunder-the-british-museum-and-the-1868-maqdala-expedition/3109780C72D6A3E24D6B5A5387B6087C. Accessed 25 January 2023.

[9]National Museums Scotland has recently completed a research project entitled 'Baggage and Belonging: Military Collections and the British Empire' and are currently examining their collections acquired in Ethiopia. The National Army Museum has begun a project examining their collections with a connection to India.

[10]Patrick Watt, 'Exhibition Review: Legacies of Empire', *Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research,* 99, 4 (Winter, 2021), pp. 442-446.

[11]The issue is wide ranging, however for Asante objects see: Gertrude A. M. Eyifa-Dzidzienyo and Samuel N. Nkumbaan, 'Looted and Illegally Acquired African Objects in European Museums: Issues of Restitution and Repatriation in Ghana', *Contemporary Journal of African Studies,* 7, 2 (2020), pp. 84-96; Anon, 'V&A Asante Loans: A Prelude

Lidchi asserted, colonial collecting is perceived in the popular imagination as being solely comprised of 'illicit acts of appropriation' by 'imperious governments…vengeful armies…and greedy soldiers'.[12] 'Legacies of Empire' concluded by advocating for further analysis of objects collected during Britain's military expeditions; this article is a response to that call. Here, evidence from personal accounts and material culture is used to present a case study of collecting practices during the Third Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874. In doing so, it follows the themes of 'Legacies of Empire': the first section focuses on the different ways that objects were acquired by both military men and the civilians attached to the expedition, and the second section studies the objects' afterlives, examining what happened once they passed into British hands and institutions.

Collecting On Campaign: Taking Objects from Asante

The West African Asante Empire was founded around a centre of power at Kumasi in 1695 by Akan-speaking peoples who were pushed together by a period of war and disruption on the Gold Coast in the preceding fifteen years.[13] Over the following two centuries the Asante empire grew in military and economic power, subsuming nearby kingdoms and trading with local, regional and European powers to become 'a highly advanced state', by the mid-eighteenth century.[14] Underpinning their status was access to gold. The Asante used slave labour to work gold mines and by the 1750s controlled virtually all the production of gold in the region.[15] While much of this gold was held as capital in the form of dust and nuggets, some was worked into elaborate pieces of art, many of which made up the Asante state regalia. As Ryan Patterson noted, the Asante Empire was, in the nineteenth century, 'economically successful, administratively centralised, militarily powerful and geographically vast, encompassing much of modern-day Ghana, Togo, Benin and Ivory Coast'.[16]

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to Full Restitution?', Returning Heritage, online, 24 September 2022, https://www.returningheritage.com/v-a-asante-loans-a-prelude-to-full-restitution. Accessed 30 December 2022. Furthermore, the place of origin of objects can also be problematic to ascertain; as empires, like that of the Asante, broke down and new states were created in their place, competing claims have sometimes arisen.

[12]Henrietta Lidchi, 'Afterword: Material Reckonings with Military Histories', in Lidchi and Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils,* p. 273.

[13]Toby Green, *A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution,* (London: Penguin, 2019), p. 297.

[14]Jarvis L. Hargrove, *The Political Economy of the Interior Gold Coast: the Asante and the Era of Legitimate Trading, 1807-1875,* (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2015), p. 47.

[15]Green, *A Fistful of Shells*, p. 300.

[16]Ryan Patterson, 'The Third Anglo-Asante War, 1873-1874', in S. M. Miller, *Queen Victoria's Wars: British Military Campaigns, 1857-1902,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 106.

The British Empire established trading posts on the coastal region to the south of Asante in 1672, although British authority did not extend far beyond the walls of their forts into the African interior.[17] By the 1860s, many of the small kingdoms situated between the coast and the Pra River in the north, and the Tano and Volta rivers on the west and east, respectively, were under informal British protection, albeit there were frequent misunderstandings over what that meant in practice.[18] Furthermore, the Dutch also maintained forts along the same coast and the spheres of influence were ambiguous and ill-defined. Formal relations with the Asante were established in 1817 and they were, for the most part, cordial, notwithstanding periods of violence between 1823-1831, the First Anglo-Asante War, and 1863-1864, the Second Anglo-Asante War. The Dutch fort at Elmina on the Gold Coast had always paid a tribute to the Asante Empire but when this fort passed to British control in 1867 payment stopped. Worried that the British would unite coastal states against them, the Asante invaded the protectorate in 1872, and in doing so created the context for the British invasion the following year.

The course of the war has been well described elsewhere, so only a brief overview will be given here.[19] In 1873, the British government ordered that an expedition to Asante be mounted under the command of Sir Garnet Wolseley. A combined British and African force first raided along the coast burning towns deemed hostile before the Asante responded by attacking a British outpost at Abrakampa. While some British officers were despatched to lead African troops in decoy invasions, the main force led by Wolseley crossed the Pra River and marched on the capital Kumasi. Preparation had been thorough; the Royal Engineers had advanced ahead of the main force and had created a series of camps and a network of communications. Transport was provided by thousands of Fante auxiliaries who carried supplies up and down the lines of communication. Progress was swift; on 30 January 1874 British forces reached Amoafo where the Asante had prepared their main line of defence. The following day saw battle and an overwhelming British victory as the infantry, led by the 42nd (Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot, charged following a brief artillery barrage. The disparity in firepower meant that while the British forces lost only four men killed, the Asante

[17]W. D. McIntyre, 'British Policy in West Africa: the Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4', *Historical Journal,* 5, 1 (1962), p. 20.
[18]McIntyre, 'British Policy in West Africa', pp. 20-21.
[19]See, for example, Henry Brackenbury, *The Ashantee War, A Narrative: Prepared from the Official Documents by Permission of Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley,* (London: Blackwoods, 1874); Edward M. Spiers, *The Victorian Soldier in Africa,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 20-34; Patterson, 'Third Anglo-Asante War', pp. 106-25.

suffered between 800 and 1600 dead.[20] Four days later, after capturing a succession of villages including Ordasu and Bekwa, British troops entered and occupied Kumasi. Aware of their imminent arrival, the *Asantehene* and his royal household left the city. British forces spent two days in Kumasi before Wolseley gave orders for his men to withdraw and march back to the coast, burning the city as they left. On 13 February, Wolseley signed a peace treaty with the Asante who agreed to renounce their right of tribute from the protectorate states, withdraw their forces, and allow free trade between the coastal kingdoms and Asante.[21]

The taking of objects during military expeditions appealed to soldiers of all ranks and backgrounds and was motivated by competing and conflicting factors including opportunism, natural curiosity, a desire for a physical memento to remember a difficult situation or exotic location, personal desire for financial gain, and orders to gain reparations from a defeated enemy.[22] Analysis of written sources and museum collections reveals that there were six main ways that members of the British expedition to Asante obtained objects: confiscating materiel from the enemy; collecting souvenirs; gathering prize to be sold at auction; plundering; being presented with an indemnity; and receiving gifts from allies.

Edward Spiers asserted that 'the right of a soldier to retain anything seized at the point of the bayonet' was an established custom in the British army.[23] In practical terms, the soldiers' first experience of taking objects in Asante was the stockpiling of weapons and materiel to deny their use to the enemy. After the capture of the village of Borborassi, Colonel John MacLeod of the Highlanders, noted that fifty-three muskets and twelve kegs of gunpowder had been taken from the village and were destroyed by the Naval Brigade attached to the expedition.[24] A similar scene occurred when troops of the 2nd West India Regiment and locally-recruited Fante soldiers attacked an Asante camp near Iscabio.[25] The process of destroying key war materiel to prevent it from assisting the enemy was an accepted convention rooted in military logic.[26] In the context of the Asante campaign, it proved to be a sensible course of action as once British forces moved from a village it invariably fell to the Asante once more, who

[20]Patterson, 'Third Anglo-Asante War', p. 121.
[21]Patterson, 'Third Anglo-Asante War', p. 123.
[22]Spiers, 'Spoils of War', p. 34.
[23]Spiers, 'Spoils of War', p. 20.
[24]Colonel John MacLeod to Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 30 January 1874, in Henry M. Stanley, *Coomassie: The Story of the Campaign in Africa, 1873-4,* (London: Sampson Low, 1896), p. 152.
[25]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War*, i, p. 239.
[26]It has been shown that this also occurred in the Indian Uprising in 1857-58. See Hartwell, 'Framing Colonial War Loot', p. 295.

then used it as a base to mount attacks on the British rear-guard. Furthermore, this was an accepted practice according to the contemporary rules of war and lacks the controversy of other means of taking objects.

In the moments after a battle, some soldiers acquired what could be considered to be 'campaign souvenirs' from the villages they had captured. After the Highlanders had spent seven hours in close-quarter combat in the jungle around Amoafo, they were relieved of duty and allowed to 'go and hunt' for souvenirs in the village.[27] Here, Lieutenant Mackay Scobie took a wooden chair, Private Fullarton Boyd took a small wooden stool, and an unknown soldier of the regiment took a wooden drum.[28] The presence of two wooden stools and two wooden chairs in the Royal Green Jackets Museum suggests that the 2nd Rifle Brigade also took objects around this time after their duty was done. Furthermore, Lieutenant Deane of the Naval Brigade took a brass lamp after the action at Adobiassi, and Captain Alfred Rait of the Royal Artillery took a state umbrella and a wooden chair which he believed to be 'the King of Becqua's throne'.[29] These objects were easy to find. Captain Henry Brackenbury, Wolseley's military secretary, noted that after the action at Amoafo: 'The ground was covered with traces of [the Asante soldiers'] flight. Umbrellas and war-chairs of their chiefs, drums, muskets, killed and wounded covered the whole way'.[30] A similar scene was found after the capture of the village of Bekwa where British soldiers found themselves 'trampling over the relics of property which the fugitives had abandoned'.[31] There may have been a practical purpose in soldiers taking some objects. When Major Duncan Macpherson of the Highlanders was wounded in the leg and neck at Amoafo he was laid to rest on 'a bedstead removed from a chief's house'.[32] Over the course of the action, other wounded officers joined Macpherson, including Lieutenant George Cumberland of the same regiment. The journalist Frederick Boyle of the *Daily Telegraph* observed that Cumberland, 'too hard hit for much conversation', sat on 'a notable chair, all carved wood and brazen knobs'.[33] Indeed, Cumberland may have

[27]William Winwood Reade, *The Story of the Ashantee Campaign,* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1874), p. 314.

[28]The stool acquired by Boyd is currently held by Glasgow Museums with the reference number 1886.1 and the drum is in the collection of National Museums Scotland with the reference number M.1930.903. The chair taken by Scobie remained in family hands until it was destroyed by woodworm (letter from Ronald Scobie to the author, 1 November 2021).

[29]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, p. 322 & p. 355.

[30]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War*, ii, p. 215.

[31]Henry M. Stanley, *Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of Two Campaigns in Africa,* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1874), p. 211.

[32]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, p. 335.

[33]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, p. 335.

given this chair to Macpherson at a later point, as Macpherson's brother donated a 'chair taken at Amoaful (sic), and brought home by Duncan Macpherson' to the Naval and Military Exhibition held at the Royal Scottish Academy in Edinburgh in 1889.[34] The taking of objects viewed as souvenirs was, then, permitted by the army hierarchy, widespread after different actions and undertaken by men of different units, suggesting that it was a broadly accepted practice and part of a wider shared understanding of British military culture during the campaign.

If the taking of souvenirs by individual soldiers was deemed to be a legitimate, if disorganised, practice, then the organised taking of property by the British state was also viewed by soldiers as legitimate practice at the end of the conflict. Indeed, as Edward Spiers noted, while all objects taken in war technically belonged to the Crown, the army had express permission to regulate their sale and apportion the profits once specific items had been set aside for the royal family.[35] In January 1874, prior to beginning his march from the coast into Asante, Wolseley gave orders that the taking of 'plunder' was expressly forbidden with regimental officers responsible for keeping their men together in occupied villages or camps to prevent them dispersing to seek plunder or destroying property.[36] Transgressors would be severely punished; indeed, a Fante soldier was hanged at Kumasi when being found in possession of what was deemed to be stolen property.[37] Captain Henry Brackenbury found that during the brief occupation of Kumasi 'the troops refrained, with the most admirable self-control, from spoliation or plunder'.[38] Another staff officer, Lieutenant Frederick Maurice, noted that if the 'spirit of plunder' was allowed to break loose perfectly behaved soldiers would quickly lose their discipline'.[39] In both Brackenbury's and Maurice's accounts, 'plunder' is a word not only consistently used with negative connotations, but is loaded with racial undertones. In the Third Anglo-Asante War, plundering was something done only by black African troops. Interestingly, while both authors make reference to the Asante soldiers plundering during their advance to the coast in 1872, Brackenbury also referred to the actions of Britain's African allies in those terms. Thus, at Anasmadie, Hausa troops advanced too far as 'the temptation to plunder

[34]Anon., *Catalogue of the Naval and Military Exhibition, historical, technical and artistic, held in the Royal Scottish Academy Galleries, Edinburgh,* (Edinburgh: Frank Murray, 1889), p. 245.
[35]Spiers, 'Spoils of War', pp. 19-20.
[36]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* i, p. 366.
[37]The most severe punishment appears to have been reserved for Britain's African allies; the author has seen no evidence to suggest that British soldiers received any form of corporal or capital punishment for plundering during the campaign.
[38]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* ii, p. 247.
[39]John Frederick Maurice, *The Ashanti War: A Popular Narrative* (London: Henry King, 1874), p. 374.

overcame them'; soldiers from Accra were found 'loitering…where they intended to come up to share plunder'; and men from Ahwounah had gone on the offensive with the desire to 'destroy and plunder the entire place'.[40] For British staff officers involved in this campaign, plundering was an undesirable and unsanctioned act which resulted from a lack of discipline and, in the words of Henry Brackenbury, '[did] not appeal to the instincts of a true soldier'.[41]

This is not to suggest that British soldiers left Kumasi empty handed. As King Kofi Karikari refused to deal with the British, Wolseley ordered that prize agents be elected to examine the property found in the royal palace with a view to securing the most valuable items which would later be sold at auction and the proceeds distributed amongst the expeditionary force. This was an accepted practice among British army officers and had taken place since at least the late eighteenth century but was only formally enshrined in military doctrine by Wolseley himself in 1886.[42] Among the prize agents were Captain Redvers Buller, the intelligence officer on the staff, Captain Henry Dugdale of the Rifle Brigade and Lieutenant Maclean of the Naval Brigade, who were assisted by Andooa, the leader of the Elmina people, and Marie-Joseph Bonnat, a French trader who had been captured by the Asante in 1869.[43] The prize agents worked within some well-defined parameters: they were only given permission to remove as much material as could be carried by thirty Fante labourers and they had only one night to sift through the material in the palace.[44] This resulted in many things being destroyed when the palace was demolished. The British were, however, not the only people to take objects from Kumasi; the war correspondent Henry Stanley lamented that the lack of guards placed at the palace on the night of 4-5 February allowed the Asante to return and take 'the most valuable plunder' including the *Asantehene's* golden stool, and the *aya kese* basin, the most prized possession of the Asante people.[45] Furthermore, despite Wolseley's ban on plunder, objects worth over £3000 were confiscated from Fante soldiers as they tried to return south of the Pra River, much more than the £2000 raised from the sale of the objects taken from Kumasi by the prize agents.[46]

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[40]Maurice, *Ashanti War*, p. 108; Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* i, p. 271, pp.385-386 & p. 400.

[41]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War,* ii, p. 238.

[42]Spiers, 'Spoils of War', p. 20.

[43]Unfortunately, Buller's war journal makes no reference to his work on the prize committee. See Devon Archives and Local Studies Service, 2065M-2/SS5.

[44]Brackenbury, *The Ashanti War*, ii, p. 240.

[45]Stanley, *Coomassie and Magdala*, p. 230. The *aya kese* is now in the collections of the National Army Museum (hereinafter NAM) in London, being taken during a subsequent British expedition to Asante.

[46]Maurice, *The Ashanti War*, p. 375.

The souvenirs taken after the actions at Amoafo, Adobiassi and Bekwa and the prize taken at Kumasi were considered by the British military establishment to have been acquired legitimately. For them, the soldiers had risked their lives and deserved a reward. However, the civilians who accompanied the expedition also acquired objects, although the terminology they used to describe them differed from that used by the soldiers. After stopping for lunch following the action at Amoafo, William Winwood Reade sent his assistant Edward Lake 'to "loot" for curiosities' and at the same time Frederick Boyle of the *Daily Telegraph* noted that 'our servants looted and brought us their plunder'.[47] Analysis of their accounts of the campaign shows that the war correspondents viewed the taking of objects as a desirable and normal occurrence. Once at Kumasi, some of the correspondents took the opportunity to visit the palace where they found 'valuable, curious and worthless things heaped together in every room'.[48] Melton Prior's account deserves particular attention. He entered the king's bedroom first, even before the prize agents:

> By the side of [the Queen's] bed were a pair of slippers with beautiful gold buckles. I could not resist examining them; then an idea came into my head that one would make a handsome brooch for my wife in England, so it did not take me long to remove it from the slipper. Then I thought, if I take only one it will be missed, so I had better take the other, and nobody will know there were any at all.[49]

As he wandered around the other rooms of the palace, Prior removed other objects which were small enough to be concealed in his pockets. Later that day Wolseley gathered the war correspondents together and placed them on their honour that they would not remove anything from the palace and Prior 'very reluctantly gave the necessary assurances' but did not admit that he had already taken objects and made no attempt to return them.[50] He was, then, acutely aware that he was committing theft and acting contrary to the commanding officer's orders. However, in their own opinion, the war correspondents viewed the taking of objects as 'a harmless recreation, which it is mere pedantry to forbid'.[51]

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[47]Reade, *The Story of the Ashantee Campaign*, p. 313; Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, p. 323.
[48]Stanley, *Coomassie to Magdala*, p. 234.
[49]Melton Prior, *Campaigns of a War Correspondent,* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), p. 25.
[50]Prior, *Campaigns*, p. 25.
[51]Reade, *Ashantee Campaign*, p. 313.

On the return march from Kumasi an order was issued that 'private spoils' acquired during the campaign were to be produced before the prize agents.[52] Those present were given the possibility of buying back their souvenirs at a fixed price or handing them over to the prize agents to be sold at auction. This practice had been witnessed by Wolseley in China in 1860, when British officers were ordered to hand in objects they had taken from the Yuanmingyuan Palace so they could be sold and the proceeds divided proportionately among the whole force, as the non-commissioned officers and men had not had an opportunity to obtain objects themselves.[53] However, as he knew, this practice relied on officers' honesty in voluntarily giving up objects; indeed, in China, Wolseley himself failed to comply with orders to turn in an object he had acquired, keeping a valuable miniature painting he had been given by a French officer who had looted it from the palace. While most soldiers and journalists in Asante did hand in the objects they had collected, at least one war correspondent refused. Melton Prior thought it was 'rather hard lines' that he was to be deprived of his newly-acquired property so placed everything in a hammock, covered it and lay on it feigning illness to avoid the searches being carried out; as he later recalled, 'many others had to give up a lot of valuable and very interesting curios'.[54] For the most part, it seems that the British were eager to confiscate items made from gold which would fetch the greatest price either through private sale or at auction, going as far as bringing a gold assayer from Elmina to set prices for the objects. This focus on confiscating gold may explain why so many wooden objects – drums, chairs and stools, especially – are found in military museum collections today. And as the examples of both China and Asante show, the purpose of taking of a prize was not only to secure trophies from a defeated enemy, but to ensure that the money subsequently raised from their sale was evenly distributed to the lower ranks who had fewer opportunities to obtain objects on expeditions.

A further group of objects was obtained by British soldiers at Fomena on 13 February. As part of the peace settlement the British demanded the payment of an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold from Kofi Karikari as recompense for 'the expenses he has occasioned to Her Majesty by the late war'.[55] The settlement required the Asante to present 1000 ounces of gold immediately, with other instalments to be delivered as

[52]Maurice, *The Ashanti War*, p. 375.
[53]Garnet J. Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier's Life,* (London: Constable, 1903), ii, p. 78.
[54]Prior, *Campaigns*, p. 29.
[55]'Treaty of Peace between Wolseley and Saibee Enquie, acting on behalf of King Kofi Kakari', in Ian F. W. Beckett (ed.), *Wolseley and Ashanti: The Asante War Journal and Correspondence of Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1873-1874,* (Stroud: History Press for the Army Records Society, 2009), p. 399.

and when the British government demanded.[56] In the shade of a mess hut at Fomena, a delegation of seven Asante officials laid out the gold on a white sheet; it consisted of 'gold plates and figures, nuggets, bracelets, knobs, masks, bells, jaw-bones, and fragments of skulls, plaques [and] bosses'.[57] While Wolseley thought the government should 'throw the amount into the prize fund', the indemnity was treated differently to the prize, and, rather than being sold at auction at the Cape Coast, the golden objects presented at Fomena were sent back to Britain.[58] Incidentally, the 1000 ounces of gold presented at Fomena was the only instalment the Asante ever gave to the British.

The final way British soldiers obtained objects was through the receipt of gifts. There is only material evidence of one such cultural exchange. In the collections of the National Army Museum in London are two objects which were supposedly presented to Colonel Evelyn Wood by an African leader, Prince Charles Bonny, whose kingdom was located in what is now Nigeria. The first object is a pill box and the second is an ammunition belt known as an *ntoa* made of animal hide containing space for eight cartridges, gunpowder and several small knives.[59] Throughout the war the Bonny people were allied to the British and supplied 160 men for the expedition against the Asante, serving in a battalion commanded by Evelyn Wood.[60] Wood was not overly impressed with the behaviour of the troops from Bonny, later recalling that they 'had no special aptitude for war' and lamenting that he had to spend four hours in front of Ordasu entreating them to advance.[61] However, it seems that Prince Charles sought to solidify his alliance with the British by presenting gifts to his commanding officer, a process which was repeated in social interactions across the British empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This section has shown the different processes whereby military and civilian members of the British expedition to Asante in 1873-1874 obtained objects. While many individual soldiers sought to acquire a 'campaign souvenir' to mark their time fighting

[56]Wolseley's original request was for 5000 ounces as the initial payment but the Asante claimed they could not raise that amount in a short time, and the treaty was amended to 1000 ounces.
[57]Maurice, *Ashanti War*, p. 374.
[58]Beckett, *Wolseley and Ashanti*, p. 395, Wolseley's Journal entry, 13 February 1874.
[59]National Army Museum, NAM.1965-07-31-1; NAM.1965-10-151. For a brief discussion of the *ntoa* see Alastair Massie, 'Community Consultation and the shaping of the National Army Museum's Insight Gallery', in Lidchi and Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils,* pp. 237-40.
[60]Patterson, 'Third Anglo-Asante War, 1873-74', p. 113.
[61]Evelyn Wood, *From Midshipman to Field Marshal,* (London: Methuen, 1906), 2 vols, i, p. 279.

in Africa, the British army as an institution resorted to the more formal means of taking 'prize' and collecting an 'indemnity'. Other objects were received as gifts. For the staff officers attached to this expedition these terms had clear meanings: souvenirs were viewed favourably as 'little innocent articles costing a few pence or a few shillings' which reminded soldiers of their experiences; prize and indemnity were viewed as a means of providing a fair financial share to men without the means to obtain their own 'spoils'; and 'plunder' referred to stolen property taken during clear lapses of military discipline and deemed unworthy of British troops.[62] These same linguistic parameters were not shared by the civilians who accompanied the expedition. For the British journalists in Asante, looting and plundering was viewed in the same terms as the taking of souvenirs and was spoken of as a thoroughly normalised, if not expected practice.

Afterlives: Asante Objects in British Collections

At 10.30am on Monday, 23 February 1874, the prize objects taken from the palace at Kumasi, those given up by members of the expedition at Wolseley's request, and the items confiscated from Fante carriers were offered to the highest bidder in the palaver-hall of the Cape Castle. Frederick Boyle of the *Daily Telegraph* described the scene in the following terms:

> …the long centre table was covered as thickly as it could bear with jewellery and gold. On a side table stood the king's plate. Against a broad screen hung swords and cartouche belts of leopard skin, and canes of huge silver heads, and calabashes bound in gold and silver, and embossed brass pans. Beneath lay the stools so placed that their fine silver bosses and adornments could be seen in one glittering display. Under the tables a miscellany of odds and ends were piled. At the other end of the room cloths and silks were disposed, neatly wrapped and labelled, one on another, hundreds of them…it is easy to make a fine display of things tastefully coloured. And gold is always pretty.[63]

By the time the auction began, the three British infantry battalions which had accompanied the expedition – the 23rd (Royal Welch Fusiliers) and the 42nd (The Royal Highland) Regiments of Foot, and the 2nd Regiment The Rifle Brigade – had embarked onto transport ships for the journey back to Britain. This meant that the majority of the British regimental personnel had departed prior to the prize auction with those Europeans present at the sale being largely limited to staff officers, members of the Royal Navy, journalists and colonial officials. However, the largest group of visitors to the prize sale were men and women from Fante and the Gold Coast who bid primarily

[62]Maurice, *Ashanti War*, p. 375.
[63]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, pp. 377-79.

on textiles and Aggrey beads.[64] This ensured that many objects taken from Kumasi remained in West Africa. The agency of local populations is often overlooked in examining collecting practices associated to British military action, however, that Fante soldiers carried away more objects of monetary value from Kumasi than Europeans, coupled with the prominence of African bidders at the prize auction, adds a further dimension to the processes through which objects were dispersed following their acquisition.

Sir Garnet Wolseley bought a number of objects at the prize sale after being given a private tour on the evening of 22 February where he was able to 'examine the loot'.[65] After finding a number of interesting items, he despatched one of his staff officers to bid on his behalf but the officer soon found himself priced out. Wolseley had set his heart on a bronze group of fifty figures depicting the *Asantehene* being carried in state but his bid of £16 was far exceeded by the winning bid of £100.[66] Instead, he settled for a battered old English coffee pot which belonged to Kofi Karikari, a golden rattle from the palace nursery, wooden stools to give as presents, a hat supposedly worn by the *Asantehene* at Ordasu, and some other gifts for his wife, including Aggrey beads.[67] Furthermore, Wolseley's staff officers bought Kofi Karikari's sword and presented it to him as a gift. These objects joined others that he acquired on different colonial expeditions including a sketchbook of pen, ink and watercolour drawings by the artist Dong Guo which Wolseley 'found' in the Yuanmingyuan Palace in Beijing in 1860; a kulah khud helmet 'taken' from Sudan in 1885; and a knife made of bone, red leather, white snakeskin, and silver which he 'brought back' from the Nile Expedition in 1884.[68] Wolseley viewed these objects as legitimately acquired, harmless souvenirs of a life's soldiering; the exception being the miniature painting he had refused to give up in China in 1860, which he described as 'the only bit of loot I possess'.[69]

The prize auction realised a sum of around £3000. The inflated prices ensured that few officers came away with more than a handful of objects. One who did was Prince Leonid Vyazemsky, who had attached himself to Wolseley's headquarters on 16 February with letters of introduction from the Duke of Cambridge. It was Vyazemsky

[64]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, p. 377.
[65]Beckett, *Wolseley and Ashanti*, p. 403, Wolseley's Journal, 22 February 1874.
[66]Beckett, *Wolseley and Ashanti*, p. 406, Wolseley to Louisa Wolseley, 25-26 February 1874.
[67]Beckett, *Wolseley and Ashanti*, p. 406-7, Wolseley to Louisa Wolseley, 25-26 February 1874.
[68]Wolseley's collection is held by the National Army Museum (NAM). The terms of acquisition are those used on the NAM's website www.nam.ac.uk. Accessed 31 January 2023.
[69]Wolseley, *Story of a Soldier's Life*, ii, p. 78.

who outbid Wolseley for the group of fifty golden Asante figures and he supplemented this by purchasing a golden-handled sword, among other items. Some officers chose to speculate, buying objects at prices above their value in the hope that they would realise more on their return to Britain. This may have been what prompted Dr James Clutterbuck, the surgeon-major of the Highlanders, to pay £114 for a bracelet comprised of golden ornaments and Aggrey beads.[70] Other officers sought out gifts. Wolseley spent £20 on a silver goblet which he presented to Commodore Sir William Hewett, the naval commander in West Africa, 'as a remembrance of our march to Coomassie'.[71] Furthermore, he gifted the *Asantehene's* hat to his friend Alexander Holmes. Gifting of objects bought at the prize auction continued back in England; Captain John Hawley Glover, who had raised a force of Hausa soldiers for the war, visited a merchant named Charles Leigh Clare in Manchester soon after his arrival from West Africa and brought with him a wooden chair as a gift for Clare's wife, Elizabeth.[72]

By the end of March 1874, the majority of soldiers and civilians had returned to Britain; with them came chests of unsold prize, gold indemnity, gifts from allies, plunder and campaign souvenirs. While many objects were retained by individuals, the remainder of the prize and indemnity was bought by the jeweller Garrard & Co. for the sum of £11,000 in early April. Later that month, they were placed on public display in London's Haymarket ahead of their sale at auction. Here, they were exhibited not as trophies of a victorious campaign but as commodities to be bought. Contemporary newspaper reports opined that some of the objects were unsuitable for private collections and would be 'more fitly suited to a museum or public institution'.[73] Several museums sent representatives to view and buy objects which reside today in Britain's public collections as tangible examples of Britain's former imperial power.

Henrietta Lidchi noted that popular perceptions of material acquired in non-European settings and housed in British museums tend to reduce all objects to the status of illegally appropriated 'loot', or as John Mack termed them, 'abducted objects'.[74] However, the setting in which the objects are displayed and the type of institution that exhibits them changes how they can be seen. The Royal Regiment of Artillery has in their collection a golden mask in the shape of a ram's head which was taken as prize

[70]Boyle, *Through Fanteeland to Coomassie*, pp. 379-85.
[71]Beckett, *Wolseley and Ashanti*, p. 407, Wolseley to Louisa Wolseley, 25-26 February 1874.
[72]'The Return of Captain Glover', *The Standard*, 6 April 1874, p. 3.
[73]'Trophies from Ashantee', *Evening Standard & Echo*, 20 April 1874, p. 4.
[74]Lidchi, 'Material Reckonings', p. 273; John Mack, 'The Agency of Objects: A Contrasting Choreography of Flags, Military Booty and Skulls from late nineteenth-century Africa', in Lidchi and Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils*, pp. 39-59.

from Kumasi and sold at the auction. That object forms part of the officers' mess, an exclusive space where regimental culture is propagated and the officers bond over a shared history.[75] Soon after it entered the mess, the officers of the Royal Artillery commissioned an elaborate tripod stand depicting African figures, transforming the ram's head into a regimental possession which simultaneously marked their involvement in the war and performed a ceremonial role within the mess. Indeed, for the Royal Regiment of Artillery, this is not an object to be displayed in a public institution; rather it is 'private property' which has become part of the fabric of the regiment.[76]

The addition of the tripod attributes trophy status to the object, intending to permanently alter its materiality and transform it into a symbol of victory.[77] Another way this was undertaken was through the use of inscriptions. On 14 May 1874, Brigadier Sir Archibald Alison, who had commanded the British infantry in the war, presented a carved wooden stool to the City Industrial Museum in Glasgow. The stool – now held by Glasgow Museums – had been the possession of Afua Kobi, the *Asantehemaa*, or queen mother. Prior to its donation, it had been modified with the addition of the words 'Taken from Royal Palace (Coomassie) Feb. 4th 1874', written in red paint along the base, presumably at Alison's request.[78] As Nicole Hartwell has shown, the practice of inscribing objects is 'embedded in British military tradition', however the inscriptions themselves 'have the power to be misleading'.[79] This may well be the case with this stool. The inscription conjures the image of Alison searching the Kumasi palace for a souvenir and personally 'taking' the stool, however contemporary sources reveal that immediately prior to entering Kumasi, Alison, who had lost an arm fifteen years earlier in India, had stumbled and fallen underneath his mule into a swamp filled with human remains, from which he was only saved from drowning by his staff.[80] It is difficult to imagine this man then proceeding immediately

[75]Nicole Hartwell and Charles Kirke, 'The Officers' Mess: An Anthropology and History of the Military Interior', in Lidchi and Allan (eds), *Dividing the Spoils*, pp. 106-27.
[76]Martin Bailey, 'The V&A likely to return looted Asante gold treasures to Ghana', *The Art Newspaper* online, 12 September 2022, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2022/09/12/va-raises-real-prospect-of-return-of-asante-treasures-to-ghana. Accessed 13 February 2023.
[77]Lidchi and Allan, 'Introduction', p. 5.
[78]Glasgow Museums, 1874.22, http://collections.glasgowmuseums.com/mwebcgi/mweb?request=record;id=128873;type=101. Accessed 2 February 2023. The author thanks Patricia Allan of Glasgow Museums for allowing access to the object file for this stool.
[79]Hartwell, 'Framing Colonial War Loot', p. 292.
[80]Stanley, *Coomassie and Magdala*, pp. 222-223.

to search for a souvenir. Rather, it is more likely that this high-status stool, probably found in the royal apartments, was taken from Kumasi as part of the prize and bought by Alison at the auction at Cape Coast. Other objects were similarly modified; an *ntumpane* drum donated to the Scottish National Naval and Military Museum in 1930 has a carved inscription that informs us that it was 'taken by the 42nd Highlanders' and the box containing a knife presented by Lieutenant William Knox to Prince Alfred has an inscribed silver plaque declaring that it was 'taken from King Kofi Karikari, King of Ashanti, at the capture of Kumasi'.[81] The inscriptions overwrite their earlier histories, define them solely as military objects and materially tie them to the overwhelming defeat of the Asante. However, they must be treated with caution. Inscriptions like those mentioned here indicate that the objects were obtained though one of the myriad processes soldiers could acquire things on campaign, rather than an admission of illegal appropriation.

Military museums perform a different function to the officers' mess and they acquire and display their objects in different ways. In the first place, regimental museums can be seen as an integral part of the regiment itself, linking current soldiers with those who went before them, promoting a shared identity and fostering *esprit de corps*.[82] The Royal Green Jackets (Rifles) Museum in Winchester holds twelve objects which they describe as being 'taken' from Asante; all of which were donated in the last twenty years. These objects appear to be a mixture of soldiers' souvenirs – objects with a low monetary value including two wooden chairs and two stools – and others possibly purchased at the prize auction, including a brass plate, silver dagger and necklace decorated with green glass. Alternatively, they may have been plundered by individual soldiers when the 2 Rifle Brigade were ordered to guard Kumasi palace. In the setting of a regimental museum, these objects are viewed solely through an imperial lens. Here, they are symbols of victory, of the exertion of British military power, and of the regiment's prowess in battle.

National military museums also display and interpret objects acquired in Asante. The National War Museum of Scotland, part of National Museums Scotland (NMS), have in their collection a carved, silver-mounted gourd obtained by Lieutenant Andrew Wauchope of the Highlanders, which was donated by his family in 1931.[83] Wauchope was seconded to Russell's Regiment of Hausa, Mumford and Sierra Leonean soldiers, and he was severely wounded at Amoafo. The gourd was mounted in silver and engraved with the words 'Coomassie 1874' on one side and 'A.G.W. 1893' on the other, modifications which mark it as a trophy object, although not in a triumphant

[81]National Museums Scotland, M.1930.903; Royal Collection Trust, RCIN 70496.
[82]Louise Tythacott, 'Trophies of War: Representing "Summer Palace" Loot in Military Museums in the UK', *Museum & Society* 13.4 (2015), p. 470.
[83]National Museums Scotland, M.1931.730.

sense. It is on display in the museum's 'Highland Soldier' gallery alongside others which examine the experiences of renowned Highland regiments in the nineteenth century, a time when Highland soldiers were considered as the military spearhead of empire. Like those in regimental museums, it is only considered as a military object, its earlier history, cultural significance and original meaning unaddressed, its importance to the museum deriving solely from its acquisition by a Highland soldier.

Garnet Wolseley's collection of objects was donated to the Royal United Services Institution Museum after his death and were incorporated into the National Army Museum's (NAM) collection in the 1960s. As 'the flagship museum of the British Army', NAM is 'dedicated to preserving the Army's history and communicating its role in society, past and present, to the general public'.[84] Between 2017 and 2022 Asante objects were displayed to the public in the 'West Africa' case of the 'Insight' gallery, where objects that relate to Britain's colonial past were presented with interpretations that link them to the current British army's operations overseas, in this case interventions and peacekeeping in Sierra Leone.[85] There, the *ntoa* belt given by Prince Charles Bonny to Redvers Buller sat alongside objects obtained on other expeditions to Asante, including a war horn taken in 1824 and the *aya kese* bowl taken from the royal mausoleum at Bantama in 1896. In this gallery, African voices were included; a preparatory workshop invited members of the Ghanaian community to examine and interpret the objects themselves, and their perceptions were included in the gallery. In the setting of a military museum, this was a unique interpretation, albeit one which was not without its critics; the historian Andrew Roberts commented in 2017 that the NAM is now 'obsessed with making us feel post-colonial guilt' when it should be concentrating on displaying the uniforms, medals and memorabilia of the heroic British army.[86] And it seems that a return to this more traditional approach is in the offing, with Roberts writing in 2022 that the museum's new management would return to the principles of the original charter from 1960, including the opening of the new 'Global Role' gallery 'which tells the Army's worldwide story from an evidence-based, objective perspective' rather than what he termed the 'political correctness' and 'wokery' of the past five years.[87] It is clear that arguments over the supposedly 'correct' way to exhibit and interpret these objects show no signs of abating.

[84]Massie, 'Community Consultation', p. 229.
[85]Massie, 'Community Consultation', p. 232. The 'Insight' Gallery at NAM no longer exists, having been replaced in 2022 by the 'Formation' Gallery.
[86]Andrew Roberts, 'The newly refurbished National Army Museum is full of inaccuracies and post-colonial guilt', *The Spectator*, online, 2 June 2017 www.spectator.co.uk/article/national-army-museum. Accessed 14 February 2023.
[87]Andrew Roberts, 'The Triumph of the National Army Museum', *The Spectator*, online, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-triumph-of-the-national-army-museum/. Accessed 14 February 2023.

Asante objects are also displayed in non-military museums. The British Museum, the Pitt-Rivers Museum, the Wallace Collection, the Victoria & Albert Museum and others have among their collections objects which were acquired in 1873-1874. Instead of being the wooden objects of cultural significance commonly found in military museums, these national institutions' collections are largely comprised of golden objects taken by the prize committee or presented as part of the indemnity. The Wallace Collection in London holds eighteen objects bought from Garrard & Co. in 1874 by their founder, Sir Richard Wallace. Curators have worked hard to research the objects' original uses and significance and they communicate their findings in a number of engaging ways, including in a freely downloadable information pack aimed at secondary school educators teaching the history of Africa and the British Empire.[88] The Department of World Cultures at National Museums Scotland holds a number of Asante objects bought from Garrard & Co. by its forerunner the Royal Scottish Museum, including an embossed sheet of gold formerly used as an amulet case. These objects, a part of the Asante indemnity, are displayed alongside others from Asia and the Americas in the 'Inspired by Nature' gallery, which seeks to examine 'the way humanity has engaged, emotionally, spiritually, religiously and culturally with nature through art'.[89] In this context, they are presented as examples of elaborate African gold working rather than as military objects. However, several objects from the World Cultures galleries were included in the 'Legacies of Empire' exhibition at the National War Museum of Scotland where they were displayed alongside others taken as 'loot and prize' from military campaigns in India and Africa. These objects exhibit what Henrietta Lidchi termed 'transcultural roles, identities and histories', with particular aspects of their past emphasised depending on setting and interpretation.[90]

Conclusion

This article set out to examine British collecting practices during the Third Anglo-Asante War and to explore how objects taken from Asante have been treated once they passed into British hands. Its findings show that there were a number of ways soldiers and civilians could acquire objects, ranging from those deemed to be legitimate in the eyes of the British forces such as collecting prize or indemnity, or those that were explicitly banned such as plundering. The collecting of campaign souvenirs was encouraged, as long as the objects the soldiers took were of low monetary value. The primary rationale behind this was not to deprive the Asante of objects of cultural

[88]Anon, 'Asante Gold and the Wallace Collection', The Wallace Collection online, https://www.wallacecollection.org/documents/552/Asante_Gold_TN__latest_1.pdf. Accessed 14 February 2023.

[89] NMS online, https://www.nms.ac.uk/national-museum-of-scotland/things-to-see-and-do/explore-the-galleries/world-cultures/. Accessed 6 February 2023.

[90]Lidchi, 'Material Reckonings', p. 274.

significance but was motivated by a desire for all soldiers to receive a fair share of the victory through the sale of high-status objects at the prize auction. Tangentially, it has highlighted the agency of African communities in acquiring objects themselves from their defeated enemies, both through 'plunder' and from the prize auction. Most crucially, it has highlighted that in this campaign there existed a shared understanding among British officers of what could be taken and in what context, an understanding that was not shared by civilian members of the expedition. This is not to suggest that the soldiers' attitudes extended beyond the specific circumstances found in Asante in 1874, however, it opens up future avenues for research into the British army's culture of taking objects on military expeditions.

The way these objects were treated by the British after they were taken differed. Some objects were raised to trophy status through their modification or inscription, others were not. Some were immediately donated or acquired by museums, others remained in private hands for generations. Most importantly, the setting in which the objects are currently situated profoundly alters their meaning. In regimental museums and messes objects taken in Asante became part of the fabric of the regiment, an indelible link between generations of soldiers, emphasising their prowess in battle and materially reflecting their part in victory. For other museums, the meanings change. As we have seen, Asante souvenirs, prize, gifts and indemnity have been used to tell the story of the Highland soldier in the British empire, to link nineteenth century expeditions with the current operations of the British army, and to highlight the prowess of West African goldsmiths. And yet, for many descendants of the Asante, these 'abducted objects' can still accurately be described as 'loot' or 'plunder' whose loss is still keenly felt. These objects mean different things to different people in different contexts and, as 'Legacies of Empire' has shown, it is the responsibility of curators, academics and members of indigenous communities to come together to better understand the processes involved in the taking of objects such as these and their subsequent display in British institutions.

‘They got it all wrong!’ – Victorian War Fiction and the First World War

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Abstract
Beginning with George Tomkyns Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking, invasion novels became a regular feature of late Victorian and Edwardian popular fiction. The article takes a closer look at the depiction of war in these texts from a military history point of view; it argues that they were not so far from reality as to render them useless to the military historian. Rather, they can be used to provide insights into how the authors and their audience thought about the great war that many expected to come within their lifetime.

Introduction – The Big Push

The plan was a sound one, at least to those who had come up with it. More than 200,000 soldiers had been concentrated for a decisive push on a small front. After an intense bombardment they were to be hurled against the enemy lines to achieve an initial breakthrough. Mobile forces were then ready to exploit this breakthrough, and strategic success would be the eventual result, with the enemy who had so brazenly invaded the country being finally driven out.

However, it was not to be. The artillery had pounded the enemy positions for a prolonged period of time, and when the men left their starting line in the early hours, much of their approach was covered by a dense haze. Yet soon they were met by a hailstorm of machine gun and rifle fire, and within barely half an hour, 15,000 men lay dead or wounded on the battlefield. Even so, the attackers still pressed on, and by sheer weight of numbers they were just about to enter the enemy trenches, when a flanking counterattack finally broke the assault. By mid-afternoon, the retreating infantry had reached their starting line again, and casualties already amounted to 30,000 or more in dead and wounded. A follow-

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> up attack by those forces originally assigned to exploiting the breakthrough achieved nothing apart from further adding to the body-count. Although the defenders had also suffered heavy losses, at the end of the day the attacking force was utterly spent and incapable of further operations, having suffered close to 50.000 casualties.[1]

What sounds like a slightly garbled version of one of the big Western Front battles in the First World War in fact happened almost two decades earlier – or rather, it never happened at all. The 'Battle of Stralsund', where a German army tried in vain to destroy a bridgehead formed by a combined British-American army, is one of the key events in Louis Tracy's 1896 *The Final War*, a truly epic tale about Britain – and eventually, the United States as well – fighting an alliance of France, Germany and Russia during the closing years of the nineteenth century. It had all the ingredients that at the time made for quite a successful novel: a plot of global dimensions with the three continental powers conspiring to topple Britain from its position and to seize most of its colonial empire; heroes of admirably quirkiness, like a bicycle factory owner who turned his company staff into a volunteer cycle battalion, or a major leading the Worthing Volunteer Reserve in a final, desperate bayonet charge directly into the surf against French naval infantry trying to force a landing; some romance between resourceful officers and ladies eager to take part in the great effort by following in the footsteps of Florence Nightingale; a German emperor being captured in a daring cavalry raid before finally coming to his wits and switching sides; the Czar together with his whole family blown to pieces in the Kremlin by anarchists; and finally a happy ending seeing the foes either come to their senses or succumb to the might of the combined Anglo-American forces, with the end of the war ushering in a new era of global peace and prosperity. *The Final War*, dedicated to 'Private Thomas Atkins', was first published as a weekly serial in issues 284 (28 December) to 315 (1 August) of *Pearson's Weekly*, with Tracy partly making things along as the weeks passed by, before being published in book form in the same year.[2]

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[1]Louis Tracy, *The Final War. A Story of the Great Betrayal* (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1896), pp. 232-236

[2]Tracy, *The Final War*, p. v. As *The Final War* turned out to be a success, Tracy followed it with yet another story about evil invaders (this time a coalition of France and Germany) eventually being driven out by British pluck; *The Invaders: A Story of British's Peril* ran from 10 March to 11 August 1900 in *Pearson's Weekly*; it was published as a novel in the following year (Louis Tracy, *The Invaders. A Story of Britain's Peril* (London: C. A. Pearson)); while in both cases the circulation of the novels is difficult to determine with any precision, *Pearson's Weekly* reached a wide audience with well over a million copies sold in1897 (Howard Cox and Simon Mowatt, *Revolutions from Grub Street. A History of Magazine Publishing in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 30.).

Apart from his commercial success, one might wonder where exactly the significance of Louis Tracy's novel lies for the military historian – or whether there is any significance at all in the first place. Looking slightly beyond Tracy himself reveals that he was far from being the only one writing about how a future war might turn out in the decades before the First World War. In fact, it was something of a fashion at the time, and one that has a firmly identifiable starting point. Ever since George Tomkyns Chesney had published his vision of a successful invasion of Britain by an unnamed invader in 1871 (whose soldiers spoke German and had steamrollered France the year before, so that anyone could have a good guess at whom Chesney had actually in mind), texts about future conflicts were produced at an astonishing rate, resulting in a large number of essays, short stories, novelettes, novels and dramas hitting the market between 1871 and the outbreak of the First World War.[3] They often had Britain threatened with or even suffering from an invasion, the enemy depending on the political climate of the day. Thus, by the late 1870s and early 1880s Britain was supposed to find itself in conflict with France or Russia, regularly caused by colonial differences and foreign ambitions of toppling Britain from its hegemonial position; only after the turn of the century did Germany appear again as a likely enemy with increasing frequency.[4]

[3]George Tomkyns Chesney, *The Battle of Dorking. Reminiscences of a Volunteer* (Edinburgh/London: William Blackwood, 1871); see Roger T. Stearn, 'Chesney, Sir George Tomkyns', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography online edition https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5231 accessed 2 November 2023; a detailed description of both Chesney's work and his impact on contemporary political debate and literary production can be found in I.F. Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War 1763 – 1984* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 30-46; Chesney's *The battle of Dorking* turned out to be a great success, with more than 100,000 copies sold (Christian R. Melby, 'Empire and Nation in British Future-War and Invasion-Scare Fiction, 1871–1914', *The Historical Journal* 63 (2020), pp. 389-410, pp. 389-390). Chesney, *Battle of Dorking*, p. 7; a French translation published in the same year left little room for imagination by changing the subtitle in a not entirely subtle way: George Tomkyns Chesney, *Bataille de Dorking. Invasion des Prussiens en Angleterre. Préface par Charles Yriarte* (Paris: Henri Plon, 1871).

[4]Texts covering future conflicts between Britain and other major powers were also published as contributions to discussions on military reforms which in the late 1860s and early 1870s focussed mostly on the army, while the years preceding the Naval Defence Act of 1889 saw a significant uptick in naval-themed publications (one of which (Anonymous, *The Battle Off Worthing or Why the Invaders Never Got To Dorking* (London: The Literary Society, 1887)) directly referred to Chesney's original 1871 novel, testifying to its continuing importance even more than 15 years after its initial publication).

Usually most of these texts are seen as part of the then emerging genre of science fiction, and as such they have attracted scholarly attention in the past. They have also been analysed with regard to the development of fiction in general and of wider issues like the impact of technology on society and how literature of the time dealt with it.[5] Most importantly, I. F. Clarke laid down the foundation for any future research into these texts in a number of seminal studies.[6] However, his 1966 'census' with 321 texts for the period up to 1914 is still the most recent list of relevant texts available,[7] which shows that research into them has been far from exhaustive; an earlier list also composed by I.F. Clarke included a significantly wider range of future fiction material.[8] Indeed, historians in general and military historians in particular have paid fairly little attention to them, which is slightly unfortunate as some of the texts can yield valuable evidence on what significant parts of pre-war society may have expected from a future war.[9]

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[5]Antulio J. Echevarria, I*magining Future War. The West's Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to Come, 1880–1914* (Westport: Praeger Securities International, 2007)., Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War*, 64-106; for other approaches to – usually a selection of – these texts see Duncan Bell, *Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Ailise Bulfin, *Gothic Invasions: Imperialism, War and Fin-de-Siècle Popular Fiction* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2018).

[6] I.F. Clarke, *The Great War with Germany, 1890-1914. Fictions and Fantasies of the War-to-come*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997); Clarke 1997, I.F. Clarke. 1995. *The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914. Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still-to-come*, (Syracuse/NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War*; I.F. Clarke, *The Tale of the Future. From the Beginning to the Present Day*, (London: Library Association, 1961).

[7]Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War*, pp. 227-249; for an example of a text that escaped Clarke's attention see Rev. Thomas Berney, *The Battle of the Channel Tunnel and Dover Castle and Forts* (Norwich, 1882).

[8]Clarke, *Tale of the Future*, pp. 19-129.

[9]Notable exceptions include Melby, *Empire and Nation*, taking a closer look at the psychological impact of invasion novel texts and putting some of them into the context of British late Victorian political culture; Danny Laurie-Fletcher, *British Invasion and Spy Literature*, 1871–1918 (Cham: Palgrave McMillan, 2019), in particular pp. 31-96, focussing on the connection between invasion novels and the pre-WW1 spy scares; and Norman Longmate, *Island Fortress. The Defence of Great Britain 1603-1945* (New York: Pimlico, 2001), concentrating on texts covering invasions; for other aspects of the genre see for example A. Michael Matin, 'The Creativity of War Planners: Armed Forces Professionals and the Pre-1914 British Invasion-Scare Genre', *English Literary History* 78 (2011), pp. 801-831; Iain Boyd Whyte, 'Anglo-German Conflict in Popular

The present article will take a closer look at these war fiction texts from a military history perspective and concentrate on three main points. The first is that within the large number of texts published between 1871 and 1914 covering a future war in some way or another, a distinct corpus of 'political war fiction' texts, for want of a better term, can be identified, which are materially different from 'standard' science fiction texts. Although there were significant areas of overlap – Louis Tracy's *The Final War* would probably fall into one of these areas – political war fiction texts generally raised different issues and had quite different intentions as compared to science fiction texts. As a consequence, the second point is that the corpus of late Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction texts as defined above represents a legitimate, useful, and indeed important source particularly for the military historian researching how pre-First World War society thought about future war. Analysing this corpus results leads to a third point – political war fiction texts offer quite a *specific* picture of the nature of future war. This war was one of mass armies on a battlefield where technology had a significant – and, one has to add, altogether unpleasant – impact.

Most interpreters have argued in the past that war fiction authors had a vision of future war based on past conflicts which the First World War would ultimately prove to be utterly wrong. Yet comparing war as described in war fiction with the actual experience of war before and during the early years of the First World War suggests otherwise – in fact, taking a closer look at how war is described in war fiction texts will show that in many respects they did not fall far from the mark. In conclusion, an analysis of the corpus of late Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction suggests that the First World War – at least initially – cannot have held little in the way of surprises for both the military decision makers and for significant parts of the general public.

War Fiction is not Science Fiction – the corpus of future war texts

As the raw numbers given above show, late Victorian and Edwardian writers were quite interested in 'future war', resulting not only in a significant number of texts, but also in a large variety.[10] Some of these were of a very general nature, some – like one of the most famous of it, H. G. Wells's 1897 *War of the Worlds* – clearly science fiction.

Fiction 1870-1914', in: Fred Bridgham (ed.), *The First World War and a Clash of Cultures* (Rochester: Camden House, 2006), pp. 43-99; David A. T. Stafford, 'Spies and Gentlemen: The Birth of the British Spy Novel, 1893-1914', *Victorian Studies* 24 (1981), pp. 489-509.

[10]Unfortunately, in many cases, particularly when it comes to shorter texts and pamphlets, publication numbers are nearly impossible to come by; it is probably fair to assume that the great variety characterizing these texts also extended to their circulation, which will have ranged from a few hundred for a small pamphlet to hundreds of thousands for a novel serialized in a major magazine or newspaper.

Texts on future wars could be found in different genres, resulting in pieces of greatly differing length or character, from essays and short stories to full-length novels or even theatrical plays. This variety was matched by a comparable diversity in the personal backgrounds of the authors, which ranged from officers on active service like Vice Admiral Philip Howard Colomb, one of the foremost navy theoreticians of the time, or gunnery specialist Sydney Marrow Eardley-Wilmot, to journalists like Fred T. Jane, historians like William Laird Clowes and 'true' literary men like Louis Tracy.[11] Authors could also use pseudonyms, which in some cases could be rather peculiar; while some of these had an obvious meaning like 'Cassandra', others may have had their roots in service nicknames, as was apparently the case with Sydney Eardley Wilmot, who published the first edition of his second war fiction text under the pseudonym 'Searchlight', a nickname he had probably gained when readying his first independent command, HMS *Dolphin*, for sea.[12] In all, around two-thirds of the texts were published under real names, the remaining third being more or less evenly divided among texts published anonymously and texts published under pseudonyms.

Closer inspection, however, shows that within this wide array of texts a fairly distinct group can be made out. These texts were inspired by a specific military or political issue under discussion at the time of their publication, and it is this direct connection to the politics of the time that science fiction texts, for example, lack. To put it slightly differently, as they were obviously often seen by their authors as instruments with which to sway public opinion into one or another direction, the texts were part of the political process of the time, which science fiction was not. 'Political war fiction' would therefore appear to be a fairly fitting description for these texts.[13]

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[11]Philip Colomb et al., *The Great War of 189–,* (London: Heinemann, 1893); Sidney Eardley-Wilmot, *The Next Naval War,* (London: Edward Stanford, 1894); Fred T. Jane, *Blake of the "Rattlesnake" or The Man Who Saved England. A Story of Torpedo Warfare in 189–,* (London: Tower Publishing, 1895); William Laird Clowes, *The Captain of the "Mary Rose". A Tale of To-morrow,* (London: Tower Publishing 1892).

[12]Cassandra (pseud.), *The Channel Tunnel; or, England's ruin* (London: William Clowes, 1876); the text covers a German invasion of Britain through the Channel tunnel in the immediate aftermath of a second Franco-German war; Searchlight (pseud.), *The Battle of the North Sea in 1914,* (London: Hugh Rees, 1912). The second edition was published under his name in 1913; Sydney Eardley-Wilmot, *An Admiral's Memories. Sixty-Five Years Afloat and Ashore* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1920), pp. 71-79

[13]An anonymous review of Eardley-Wilmot, *Next Naval War* (*Army and Navy Gazette*, July 7 1894, p. 559) noted the book was 'of a type with which <we> have now become very familiar, and if it help [sic] to stir public attention in the navy will serve a useful purpose'; evidently, while individual texts may have seen only small publication runs, sufficient material was floating around at any given time to justify the familiarity mentioned by the reviewer.

Perhaps the most obvious sign for such a text and its intention to influence public and, if possible, official opinion could be found in prefaces or introductory remarks; these could include notes by the most eminent military men of the day like the endorsement of William Le Queux' works by the last Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, Frederick Sleigh Roberts.[14] Even without such 'almost-official' sanctioning, texts could be quite explicit, as already the opening words of Chesney's 1871 novel show:

> You ask me to tell you, my grand-children, something about my own share in the great events that happened fifty years ago. 'Tis sad work turning back to that bitter page in our history, but you may, perhaps, take profit in your new homes from the lesson it teaches. For us in England, it came too late. And yet we had plenty of warnings, if we had only made use of them.[15]

While political war fiction is thus fairly easy to identify, there are nevertheless areas of overlap with 'regular' fiction, and in particular with science fiction. While texts like Chesney's 1871 *The Battle of Dorking* or William Le Queux' 1894 *The Great War in England of 1897* have always been the reaction to a political or military issue under discussion at the time, authors could also, as in the case of for example Louis Tracy, aim more generally at strengthening the moral fibre of the nation. Although it still owed its existence to the political climate of the mid 1890s, Tracy's *Final War* thus belongs into a grey area of overlap between political war fiction and 'regular' war fiction; waters are muddled further by the appearance of an element of highly advanced technology in Tracy's novel fitting more to a science fiction text – the so-called 'electric rifle', a standard Lee-Metford fitted with a Victorian version of a target designator requiring the soldier to carry a big battery pack on his back.[16]

Sometimes, certain science fiction elements could indeed creep into political future war texts, in the shape of untried, not-yet-introduced or even outright fantastic technology. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the 'tunnel scare' publications expanding on the perceived dangers a Channel Tunnel would present for the security of the United Kingdom. The operations of the Anglo-French Submarine Railway Company in 1881 caused several texts to appear in 1882, like the anonymous

[14]Le Queux, *The Great War in England in 1897,* (London: Tower Publishing, 1894), p. 5 and Le Queux, *The Invasion of 1910 with a full account of the siege of Londo,n* (London: MacMillan, 1906), p. I; both were initially published as serials, the former in *Answer*, the latter in *Daily Mail;* while it is doubtful that *The Invasion of 1910* sold a million copies, as Le Queux later claimed (Melby, *Empire and Nation*, p. 390), both texts certainly saw a wide circulation.

[15]Chesney, *Battle of Dorking*, p. 5.

[16]Tracy, *Final War*, pp. 325-333.

publications *The Seizure of the Channel Tunnel*, *The Channel Tunnel: A Poem* and *The Story of the Channel Tunnel*, as well as T.A. Guthrie's *The Seizure of the Channel Tunnel*, with texts associated with that topic appearing as late as 1901.[17] Other examples include the appearance of flying machines in whatever shape, size or function in many texts. Thus, in Colomb's 1893 *The Great War of 189–* a Russian airship operates against Varna, aiming 'at terrorising the inhabitants by a cruel and wanton destruction of property', while in W. Le Queux' *The Great War in England of 1897* published a year later another Russian airship is prevented from raining destruction onto Edinburgh only by the timely arrival of a Scottish inventor and his 'pneumatic dynamite gun', a contraption evidently suitable for taking an airship down from a distance.[18]

Whereas flying machines appeared well before their technological feasibility in the real world, and while a Channel Tunnel would most probably have exceeded the capabilities of late Victorian and Edwardian engineers considerably, in both cases texts can be classified as political war fiction. Aircraft, as long as they were not a requirement for the plot – which would open the road to texts like H. G. Wells' 1908 *War in the Air* or Jules Vernes' 1886 *Robur-le-Conquérant*, were merely a colourful detail in an otherwise believable scenario of a 'modern' war, while a tunnel under the Channel may in reality have been out of reach for late Victorian and Edwardian engineers, but was at the time widely seen as something perfectly possible.

Just like war fiction in general, political war fiction is characterized by great diversity of author and genre. It is however possible to give the corpus of late Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction texts some semblance of order. Going by the content, it is possible to distinguish at least three main groups: First of all, there are texts covering future war in a very general way. They are usually of considerable length and not infrequently look beyond what happens on the battlefield, offering some political background to the events. A second group of texts concentrates on a single event, be it an invasion or a battle, and gives only the briefest of sketches of what led to the event and what happened afterwards. Many of the texts covering an enemy invasion in Britain fall into this category, including Cheyney's 1871 *The Battle of Dorking,* in which the author never even mentioned the nationality of the invader let alone covers in any detail the chain of events which had led to their invasion, or Howard Lester's 1888 *The Taking of Dover,* focussing on the French capture of the 'key to the realm' as related by the French military governor of the place in a letter to his son, a young officer

[17]Jeremy Wilson/Jerome Spick, *Eurotunnel: The Illustrated Journey,* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 14-21. See e.g. Max Pemberton, *Pro Patria* (Toronto: The Copp Clark Co., 1901), a wild tale of a British traitor helping the French to secretly build a tunnel under the Channel.

[18]Colomb, *Great War of 189–*, pp. 228-234; Colomb, *Great War of 189–*, p. 229; Le Queux, *Great War in England*, p. 248-255.

studying at the military academy of St Cyr.[19] A third group of texts concentrates on a single piece of technology – usually a weapons system – and describes its impact on modern warfare. Examples include texts focussing on the impact of the torpedo on naval warfare and on the capabilities of the submarine.[20] Obviously, these distinctions get blurred easily, and there is a great deal of overlap; texts like Le Queux' 1894 *Great War in England of 1897* on the one hand describe the full course of the war, but are not outrageously talkative on the political background of the military conflict, while William Laird Clowes' 1892 *The Captain of the Mary Rose* offers more than a mere account of the fate of the warship and gives, albeit sketchily, an account of the whole war.

Finally, one peculiarity of these texts is worthy of a small note: some of them correspond with each other, a phenomenon most easily observable with Chesney's 1871 *The Battle of Dorking*, which inspired several different works either offering more background information on the war in which the battle was supposed to take place or continuing the story where Chesney had left it, sometimes turning it from a story about a British defeat to one where defeat is averted and the invader eventually beaten.[21] War fiction texts written as 'answers' to other war fiction texts, either supporting them or sketching out a different scenario, are an additional testimony to their role in the public discussion of political and military matters.

The future war – gentlemanly pastime or industrialised horror?

While the great variety in texts and scenarios naturally results in a great variety of wars, ranging from fairly brief naval affairs to invasions followed by intense fighting in

[19]Horace Frank Lester, *The Taking of Dover* (Bristol: J.W. Arrowsmith, 1888); Lester was the youngest son of major general who died in India in July 1858 while in command of a Bombay army division (*Allen's Indian Mail*, August 19, 1858, p. 704; *The Times*, October 13, 1896, p. 1).

[20]Torpedo boat attacks feature quite prominently, mainly in naval themed texts, see e.g. Clowes, *Captain of the Mary Rose*, pp. 66-102; as for submarine warfare, in George Griffith, 'The Raid of Le Vengeur', in: *Pearson's Magazine*, February 1901, 178-188 (also not in Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War*), a French submarine attacks British ships in the Solent and is then hunted down by a British destroyer in what is possibly the earliest detailed description of a submarine hunt.

[21]Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War*, pp. 228-229 lists no fewer than eight further texts alone which were published in 1871 and had 'the Battle of Dorking' in their title; several more directly interact with *The Battle of Dorking*, see e.g. Anonymous ('J. W. M.'), *The Siege of London. Reminiscences of "Another Volunteer"* (London: Robert Hardwicke), where Chesney's work is described as an "old woman's story" (Anonymous, *Siege*, p. 3); examples for texts referring to *The Battle of Dorking* can be found as late as 1887, see Anonymous, *Battle off Worthing*.

England to full-blown conflicts on a global scale, five general themes can be identified, which, in some way or another, surface in most war fiction texts – technology, destruction, casualties, totality and change. Taken together, they form a fairly specific picture of future war and its main characteristics as seen by the authors of the texts in question.

Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of the future war described in Victorian and Edwardian war fiction is its reliance on technology. While individuals could still play a key role in events, and while there was still room in future war for personal heroics, future war was at the same time assumed to be dominated by the results of the dramatic technological progress during the latter half of the 19th century. Accordingly, armies fought with repeating or even magazine rifles, machine guns and breech-loading rifled field artillery. There was still a place for bayonet charges and cold steel, but in general battles were decided by winning the firefight. While from a post-World War I perspective this emphasis on firepower might appear to be self-evident given the technology of the time, it is important to bear in mind that even in the first decade of the 20th century tactical thinking still put great emphasis on close combat and bayonet charges.[22] Technology not only had a profound effect on firepower, armies also employed modern means of communication, searchlights were used for illuminating the battlefield and trains played a key role in army logistics. Aircraft, either in the shape of balloons or of airships, already featured in pre-1900 war fiction, as did means of fighting them; it should be noted however that in most cases – of war fiction at least, which is a notable difference to science fiction that could be much more optimistic about it – their capabilities were still somewhat limited. [23]

[22]Among the more striking examples is the following example taken from a study on the principles of modern warfare by the later Maréchal Foch: 'Les lauriers de la victoire flottent à la pointe des baionettes ennemies. C'est là qu'il faut aller les prendre, les conquérir par une lutte corps à corps, si on les veut' (Ferdinand Foch, *Des principes de la guerre : conférences faites à l'École supérieure de guerre* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1903), pp. 320-321).

[23]Perhaps the most ingenuous example is William R. Booth's 1909 silent movie *The Airship Destroyer*, in which a fleet of airships tries to invade England but is stopped by an inventor and his 'aerial torpedo', essentially a surface-to-air missile (see Simon Baker, 'Airship Destroyer, The (1909)', *BFI screeenonline*, http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/id/1019305/ Accessed 2 November 2023).

Figure 1: The bombardment of Varna by a Russian airship (Colomb, *Great War of 189–*, p. i)

The description of war at sea also tended to concentrate on new technology like the torpedo or the submarine, or on the relative merits of new warship designs as opposed to old ones. It is interesting to note that, while every now and then admirals appeared who were described as gifted tacticians, naval engagements were mostly a test of technology rather than of tactical abilities.[24] As a whole, the dominance of

[24]A well-known example for the dichotomy between 'traditional' naval values and the interaction with modern technology is the famous case of Kipling's poem *The Ballad of the Clampherdown*, which was originally published as a satirical reaction to a four-part article in St James's Gazette (Anonymous, 'The Incubus of the Navy, parts I-IV', *St James's Gazette*, March 15, 1890, pp. 3-4; March 18, 1890, pp. 3-4; March 19, 1890, pp. 3-4; March 24, 1890, pp.3-4); the anonymous author severely questioned the choice of two 16.25in BL (Breach Loading) guns ('monster' or 'juggernaut' guns as they were called in the article) as the main armament for HMS Benbow, and criticized the general

technology in the various narratives had an interesting side-effect in that it levelled differences in national character. English soldiers and seamen might have been 'worth five of any other people in the world', as Louis Tracy once put it, but as operators of technology they usually differed little in competence, courage, and organization from their French or German or Russian counterparts.[25]



Figure 2: British torpedo boats attacking Russian vessels (Jane, *Blake*, opposite p. 150)

Closely connected with technology are two other highly important themes that run through nearly all of the war fiction texts and basically describe the effect of a war dominated by modern technology. The first one is destruction. While it does not take much of an intellect to predict that war will eventually result in destruction, it is

trend towards ever heavier artillery and a perceived neglect of the 'human factor' going along with it: 'unless we maintain, as we have maintained in the past, the superiority of the human factor, our springs, our wheels, our boilers, our dynamos, and our hydraulic gear will avail us nothing in the hour of need' (Anonymous, 'The Incubus of the Navy, part III', *St James's Gazette*, 19 March 1890, p. 4); curiously, this 'human factor' does not feature prominently in naval war fiction literature.

[25]Anonymous ('P. W.'), 'The Man Who Wrote "The Final War"', in: *Pearson's Weekly*, 20 March 1897, p. 583.

interesting to note both the scale that repeatedly comes up in the war fiction texts and the fact that it is often the destruction of civilian infrastructure and property authors dwell on in particular. To give an example, Le Queux' *Great War of England in 1897* is a veritable orgy of destruction seeing port cities shelled without mercy, major city centres laid waste by intense fighting in the streets and the heart of London all but destroyed by French artillery firing from positions around the Greenwich observatory.[26] While the scale of destruction is not mirrored in all war fiction texts, some elements occur frequently, like the coastal city which, after refusing to pay ransom, is indiscriminately shelled, or the city centre that is destroyed by fighting for barricades.[27] Also, plunder and pillage often took a significant toll in texts dealing with invasions that were either initially or totally successful. Here, light Cossack cavalry units in particular were repeatedly depicted as 'Muscovite hordes' laying waste to the countryside.[28]

Figure 3: Fighting for Barricades in Manchester (Le Queux, *Great War*, opposite p. 222)

[26]See eg Le Queux, *Great War*, pp. 284-298.
[27]See eg Le Queux, *Great War*, pp. 150-161.
[28]See eg Le Queux, *Great War*, pp. 65-69; see in particular p. 67: 'The soldiers of the Tsar, savage and inhuman, showed no mercy to the weak and unprotected'.

The other theme directly connected to technology and its effect on modern war is casualties. Especially in the case of texts covering not only a single event but a whole war, authors often do not shy away from describing the effect of modern firepower on the battlefield. The 'Battle of Stralsund' mentioned at the beginning of this article is a good case in point, others are offered for example by Le Queux, who often gives fairly precise numbers. In a battle for the city of Birmingham described in *The Great War in Britain in 1897*, the British army loses 20,000 men in dead and wounded out of a total of 50,000 against 42,000 men out of a total of 150,000 Russian attackers, this all taking place over the course of a single day.[29] Putting these figures into a historical context shows that they are considerable, but not in an unbelievable way.[30] Rather, they are related to the size of the forces engaged on both sides, which in turn were significant, but not totally out of the world. The raw numbers in many war fiction texts may not always have been completely correct, but they were still believable, adding to the image of modern war bringing about not only considerable destruction but also mass casualties. The trend to associate modern warfare with large numbers of casualties was not limited to land warfare. At sea, engagements tended to result not only in heavy casualties among crews but also in a great number of ships sunk. Again, while the late nineteenth century had limited experience in large scale naval warfare, the results were entirely within what was possible and indeed expected from battles between large fleets of modern warships. Besides casualties among combatants on land and at sea, civilian losses were also frequently mentioned – and they, too, were considerable.[31] The shelling of port cities was expected to result in significant casualties, with communities being given an hour or less to pay ransom unable to evacuate their citizens; the same was the case with cities that were the scene of street fighting.

[29]Le Queux, *Great War*, pp. 150-54

[30]For comparison, the Battle of Le Mans during the War of 1870/71 saw the Prussian Second Army with about 73,000 men inflict a decisive defeat onto the Army of the Loire; while the Prussians lost around 3,500 men, French losses amounted to nearly 25,000 in dead and wounded, with up to 50,000 deserting in the aftermath of the battle (see Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 292-293.).

[31]In the nearly 30 years between the Battle of Lissa in 1866 and the Battle of the Yalu River in 1894 no major naval engagement took place; as a result the major navies of the time had to face the challenge of technological progress with almost no practical experience.



Figure 4: French artillery shelling the centre of London (Le Queux, *Great War*, p. 292)

The fourth theme frequently recurring in war fiction texts is totality. Future war, as it was understood by the authors of those texts dealing with large-scale conflict, was on the one hand affecting society as a whole both through the direct effects of fighting – it caused destruction and civilian casualties on a large scale – and through the effects of measures targeted at society as a whole. Charles Gleig's 1898 *When All Men Starve* provides a good example in that it focuses on the dreadful results of the Royal Navy failing to keep open the shipping lines to Britain, which eventually result in a bread crisis and hunger riots in London.[32] On the other hand, war was also described as an undertaking in which society as a whole had a part in, ranging from women employed in auxiliary services to civilians taking up arms in defence of their homes – but one should add only their homes. It is worthy of note that civilians in arms as opposed to reservists or volunteers of all kinds, rarely if ever are depicted as forming anything resembling units. While it is never clearly stated, and while there are some texts

[32]Charles Gleig, *When All Men Starve. Showing how England hazarded her naval supremacy, and the horrors which followed the interruption of her food supply* (New York/London: John Lane, 1898); it ends with a dystopian vision of a revolutionary mob plundering London, finally setting fire to Buckingham Palace.

mentioning guerrilla warfare after a successful invasion, the British civilian in arms is usually not meant to be a *franctireur*, but rather an individual guarding his home and his family.[33]

LEAGUE OF DEFENDERS.

CITIZENS OF LONDON AND LOYAL PATRIOTS.

The hour has come to show your strength, and to wreak your vengeance.

TO-NIGHT, OCT. 4, AT 10 P.M., rise, and strike your blow for freedom.

A MILLION MEN are with Lord Byfield, already within striking distance of London; a million follow them, and yet another million are ready in South London.

RISE, FEARLESS AND STERN. Let "England for Englishmen" be your battle-cry, and avenge the blood of your wives and your children.

AVENGE THIS INSULT TO YOUR NATION.

REMEMBER: TEN O'CLOCK TO-NIGHT!

Figure 5: Proclamation by the 'League of Defenders' (Le Queux, *Invasion*, p. 507)

Finally, a fifth theme deserves mentioning: change. Many of the texts, again particularly those dealing with wars in their entirety, thought it perfectly plausible for future war to result in more than just a redrawing of borders, the payment of reparations or the exchange of colonies. Instead, war could result in the total dismantling of empires, as the British Empire was repeatedly in texts warning against a reduction in defence capabilities, the fall of dynasties such as the Romanoffs in Tracy's *The Final War*, and even the total extinction of states as in the anonymous 1885 *The Fall Of The Great*

[33]See for example the William Le Queux, *The Invasion of 1910* (London: MacMillan, 1910), where the London branch of the "League of Defenders", a volunteer organization formed after a German invasion, stages a rising in a German-occupied London (Le Queux, *Invasion*, pp. 495-519).

Republic, where the United States are dissolved and the individual states reduced to colonies.[34] War could thus change the world in which the readership of war fiction texts lived quite dramatically, yet in order to achieve its intended effect it still had to be believable, at least up to a point.

In all, the picture of future war conveyed by late Victorian and Edwardian war fiction is fairly clear and consistent: A war between European powers was likely to be more than only a localized conflict, technology would have a major impact on it causing widespread destruction and large numbers of casualties, and it could bring about events dramatically changing the fate of those taking part in it. Even if a significant number of texts end on a positive note, with British pluck – sometimes with outside assistance – eventually prevailing against the invader, most of them depict war as a bloody mess. Given the intention of many texts, this does not come as a surprise, as they wanted to show the audience in detail as graphic as possible the result of what their authors perceived to be misguided policy, but the detail had, of course, to be plausible, reflecting how an audience might already think about a future war.

Fiction versus reality – political war fiction texts and the pre-WW1 experience of war

Comparing the nature of war as described in the political war fiction texts with the actual experience of war during the decades before the outbreak of the First World War produces a fairly obvious result: the texts fit perfectly to how military decision makers – and, presumably, significant parts of the public – thought about the next, 'modern' war. While technology did not always develop in the way assumed in war fiction texts – no-one entered The First World War with searchlight-equipped bolt-action rifles and backpack batteries – it is particularly the Russo-Japanese War that is easily comparable to those texts covering a full war, and it fits entirely to the way war is described in political future war texts; in fact, a narrative of that war could just as well be a war fiction novel. Political War fiction novels, to put it slightly differently, depicted war entirely in accordance with the expectation and the experience of the readership.

Not that one should expect otherwise. On the one hand, authors who started working on a political war fiction text were, even if their initial inspiration had been a specific political or military issue, invariably drawn to the actual experience of war for background research, or – in case they were military men – they had been brought up professionally with that experience in the first place. Information was available in abundance, as not only were conflicts covered more than sufficiently by the press, but

[34]Tracy, *Final War*, pp. 342-353; Sir Henry Standish Coverdale (pseud.), *The Fall of the Great Republic* (1886-88), (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1885); for a brief discussion of similar texts see Melby, *Empire and Nation*, pp. 405-406.

many of the discussions on the development of weapon systems, tactics or strategy took place in readily accessible publications throughout the nineteenth century.[35] Thus it was not only possible to access raw information about conflicts like the Franco-Prussian war by consulting newspapers, but also to access various different professional analyses in the different military journals of the time.

Any description of hypothetical conflicts was therefore quite naturally modelled on the most recent conflict, and as a result, during the years immediately following the Franco-Prussian War that conflict served as a model for most wars described in fuller detail in the war fiction texts – with certain chains of events from the 'real world' finding their way directly into war fiction literature, as for example the establishment of a Paris commune as a result of French defeat on the battlefield and an ensuing siege occurring quite frequently.[36]

The other equally obvious reason for political war fiction being very close to the actual expectation of war lies with its intended function. As it was meant to influence public opinion in a particular way, it had to present scenarios that were both directly connected to the issue at hand and were believable in a general way, at least up to a certain point. A novel like Clowes' *The Captain of the Mary Rose* offered a specific opinion on what was actually quite a narrow issue – the respective qualities of French and British warship designs – but stayed very close to actual reality by not introducing a new bit of technology but rather a design that at the time was under construction for a South American navy but did not fit to Admiralty ship design policies.[37] While the reader might have had some nagging doubts whether it would have really been as easy to obtain a letter of marque in the 1890s as it was for the captain of the *Mary Rose* – let alone, as a private person, get the opportunity to acquire ammunition for the ship's main battery of four 9.2in BL guns, in a country involved in a major war at

[35]The Russo-Japanese War is one of the first modern conflicts covered to a considerable extent by combat photography, i.e. pictures taken during combat (as opposed to post-combat photography which was already well-established by the time of the American Civil War), and several illustrated histories were published during or immediately after the conflict; see e.g. James H. Hare, *A Photographic Record of the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1905).

[36]See e.g. Tracy, *Final War*, p. 320: *For a time it seemed that Paris would be true to her traditions, and hold each street as a barricade, and each house as a fort*.

[37]In Clowes' *The Captain of the Mary Rose*, for which Fred T. Jane acted as some sort of technical advisor and provided an illustration for the book, the fictitious cruiser 'Mary Rose' is modelled extremely closely on the La Seyne-built warship *Capitán Prat*, which was at the time favourably compared to the similar-sized British *Admiral* class ships; on these and their complex design history see Norman Friedman, *British Battleships of the Victorian Era* (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2018), pp. 187-197.

sea – the actual battles at sea were entirely plausible in set-up (if not in outcome), as they had to be. Political war fiction could only ever work if it were as close to reality – or rather the perception thereof – as possible.

Conclusion – They got it all wrong, or did they?

Late Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction still enjoys a mixed reputation at best. Partly this is due to the fact that many texts like Louis Tracy's *Final War* exhibit an unbelievable level of jingoism. Tracy for example closes his *Final War* on a decidedly optimistic note, which was more likely to endear him to readers of the closing years of the nineteenth century than to those of the third decade of the twenty first:

> England and America – their destiny is to order and rule the world, to give it peace and freedom, to bestow upon it prosperity and happiness, to fulfil the responsibilities of an all-devouring people; wisely to discern and generously to bestow. This vision – far-off it may be – already dawns; and in the glory of its celestial light is the peace of nations.[38]

Moreover, while some examples of war fiction are of considerable quality, many others are typical pamphlets of the time, often displaying little literary ambition while often focussing on a single issue. Some also show signs of rapid production either as a reaction to an earlier text or a contribution to a contemporary political discussion. In short, the majority of these texts do not tend to make for particularly exciting reading.

Apart from their general character, there are two other reasons why political war fiction texts do not exactly loom large in the study of pre-First World War history: they are often lumped together with science fiction texts which are usually accredited with little value as a source for the historian, and by and large their prognostic power is rated fairly low. They are supposed to have painted a picture of future war as something in which individual courage could still overcome technology, and they by and large failed to accurately predict the impact of technology and industrialization on war.[39]

Looking closer at the corpus of Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction, however, has shown that it is quite distinct from science fiction, and, even more importantly, that the general picture of war that emerges from these texts not only fits closely to

[38]Tracy, *Final War*, p. 372; on the whole Bell's characterization of *The Final War* as a text 'blending xenophobia with a celebratory affirmation of rigid gender and class distinctions … populated … with wooden British stereotype' (Bell, *Dreamworlds*, p. 228) is not really off the mark.

[39]See e.g. Clarke, *Great War with Germany*, p. 5 (*They failed lamentably to foresee how that war* [i.e. the war of the future] *would be fought*) and pp. 7-8.

how contemporaries *thought* about war in the decades preceding the First World War but both the depiction of future war in literature and the actual experience of modern warfare before the First World War also match closely what actually *happened* during the war, at least in its initial stages. Perhaps the most important exception is the actual length of the conflict – future wars tended to be no longer than a year at most. Whether it was really a widespread notion among authors of war fiction that the next war was to make an end to war is debatable. Although the phrase 'war to end war', which is usually attributed to H. G. Wells, is already found with Louis Tracy, most of the texts discussed here concentrate on the conflicts and their immediate results.[40]

To put it rather pointedly, far from getting it 'all wrong', the authors of Victorian and Edwardian political war fiction in fact got most of the key things right, and this was far from an outstanding or even surprising achievement. The European experience of modern war during the conflicts preceding the First World War had not only given military decision makers a very precise idea about the next war, but these experiences had also been widely disseminated through books and newspapers. Anyone planning to write a piece of war fiction during the decades before the outbreak of the First World War had only to take to the newspaper reports from one of the many conflicts of the time for his background information. War fiction could and did serve different purposes, from attempting to influence the political debate on a very specific issue to a general strengthening of the moral fibre of the nation in the spirit of Louis Tracy, who wrote *The Final War* because he 'thought it was time that the bull should turn and give them [Britain's enemies] a taste of his horns, and let them know who was their master'.[41] About the rather unpleasant nature of future war most of the texts were in agreement – while William Le Queux's use of the phrase 'blown to atoms' in his *The Great War in Britain in 1897* may appear slightly peculiar, the frequent description of what happened on the battlefield as 'slaughter' was shared by many texts discussing future war.[42]

Those flying to the colours on all sides in 1914 may not have imagined the war to last for four years. They were, however, certainly not unaware of the fact that in modern

[40]H. G. Wells, *The War That Will End War* (London: Frank & Cecil Palmer, 1914). Tracy stated in an 1897 interview: *One Sunday Afternoon I discussed the matter with an old friend, and the idea of the romance was thought out: a great war to be the end of all war* (*Pearson's Weekly,* 1897, p. 115).
[41]*Pearson's Weekly* 1897, p. 115.
[42]In all, in Le Queux' *Great War in England*, 'blown to atoms' is used 17 times, most often for describing the effects of artillery fire. The verb '(to) slaughter' appears in various phrases 27 times, or almost as often as the more generic verb '(to) fire (on)'.

war, as William Tecumseh Sherman once famously put it, 'even success the most brilliant is over dead and mangled bodies' – and lots of them.[43]

[43]Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman. Soldier, Realist, American* (Boston: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1929), p. 402.

On Their Way Home: The Role of Aachen in the Exchange and Repatriation of British and German Prisoners of War during the First World War

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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the role that Aachen, the western most German city located close to the Netherlands, played during the exchange and repatriation of British and German military prisoners of war from 1914 to 1918. It is argued that Aachen served as an important staging post. British prisoners were assembled in the city, medically examined, and, depending on the examination result, allowed to leave Germany across the border to the neutral Netherlands. The analysis contributes to the historiography by illuminating the neglected role that Aachen played during the exchange and repatriation process.

Introduction

On 4 August 1914, the British Empire declared war against Germany. That evening, Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, was sitting in the drawing room of his embassy in Berlin when a mob threw cobble stones through the window. The ambassador eventually had to leave Germany. 'Aside…from some insulting gestures and jeering by the crowds which thronged the platforms…, the ambassador's long and tedious journey to the Dutch frontier was without incident.'[1]

Prince Lichnowsky, his German counterpart in London, experienced a more civilised farewell. 'Our departure was put through in a thoroughly dignified, quiet way…A special train took us to Harwich…I was treated like a departing sovereign.'[2] Britain

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v9i3.1738
[1]James W. Garner, *International Law and the World War,* (London: Longmans, 1920), p. 41.
[2]Ibid,. Prince Karl Max von Lichnowsky cited on p. 44.

and Germany exchanged many more of their nationals during the war after this first exchange of their most senior emissaries.

This paper focuses on the exchange and repatriation of British and German military prisoners of war (POWs) during the First World War. It analyses the role that Aachen, the western most German city bordering the neutral Netherlands, played in this process. The Netherlands served as a transit country for POWs. It will be argued that Aachen played a critical role as a staging post.

Within this paper the following terms will be used:

> Exchange is defined as 'the transfer of prisoners of war between belligerents as the result of bargaining, each being concerned in obtaining the best terms for himself'.[3]
>
> Repatriation is understood as 'transfers of prisoners…, where the grounds for the transfer are generally humanitarian, and there is no question of equality of numbers'.[4]
>
> Internment, 'the transfer of prisoners of war to neutral countries on account of sickness or length of captivity falls within none of these definitions. They were…held…by the neutral Power on behalf of the captor' until the end of the war.[5]

Historiography

In light of more than eight million military and five million civilian casualties, it is surprising that historical scholarship has only recently paid serious attention to the war's eight to nine million POWs.[6] The topic only began to attract scholarly attention in the 1990s.[7] As the First World War's historiographical emphasis shifted away from the grand diplomatic and military narratives towards cultural history, 'human beings

[3]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 106/1451, Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War, September 1920, p. 63.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid.; Susanne Wolf, *Guarded Neutrality: Diplomacy and Internment in the Netherlands during the First World War,* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 16.
[6]Ian Kershaw, 'War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe', *Contemporary European History*, 14, 1 (2005), pp. 107–23, p. 109; Heather Jones, 'Prisoners of War', in Jay M. Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War. Vol. 2,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 266-90, p. 269.
[7]Jay M. Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 28.

[were] once again [placed] at the centre of historical developments'.[8] Accordingly, the internment of POWs and civilians has become the subject of historical research.[9] A new generation of historians are investigating the social and cultural dimensions of the war, themes of memory, identity and the destinies of individuals.[10]

Key themes within British POW historiography include violence, the internment of civilians and escape. Jones offers a comparative, transnational and influential account of violence against POWs on the Western Front and in its staging areas.[11] Stibbe and Oltmer focus on the internment of civilian POWs and their forced employment in Germany.[12] Nachtigal discusses the treatment of POWs by Britain and the United States.[13] The escape narrative also features very prominently in the historiography. '[E]scapes remained a fundamental part of captivity mythology and later memoirs; aspiring to escape, allowed prisoners, confined in the domesticated, uniformly male, home front camp to project a sense of agency and masculinity'.[14] While the act of becoming a POW was associated with cowardice, escape stories carried adventurous and courageous connotations, which facilitated their inclusion into the victorious narrative of the First World War.[15] They also cast POWs in a positive light even though only a minority of escape attempts succeeded.[16] What the British literature is missing is a discussion of the exchange and repatriation of British and German POWs during the war – and the role that Aachen played within this context.

Significant themes within German POW historiography include prisoners taken on the eastern front, forced labour and the prisoner camp system. The focus on Russian POWs appears to be due to Germany taking more prisoners in the East than were

[8]Matthew Stibbe, 'Introduction: Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration during the First World War', Immigrants & Minorities, 26, 1–2 (2008b), pp. 1–18, p. 6.
[9]Alan R. Kramer, 'Recent Historiography of the First World War: (Part I)', *Journal of Modern European History*, 12, 1 (2014a), pp. 5-27, p. 16.
[10]Winter and Prost, *The Great War in History*, pp. 25-26; Jay M. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Winter and Prost, *The Great War in History*, p. 205.
[11]Heather Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1920,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[12]Kramer, 'Recent Historiography (Part I)', p. 21.
[13]Reinhard Nachtigal, 'The Repatriation and Reception of Returning Prisoners of War, 1918-22', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 26, 1-2 (2008), pp. 157-84, p. 175.
[14]Heather Jones, 'A Missing Paradigm? Military Captivity and the Prisoner of War, 1914-18', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 26, 1-2 (2008a), pp. 19-48, p. 25.
[15]Jones, *Prisoners of War*, p. 277; Jeffrey S. Reznick, 'Oliver Wilkinson. British Prisoners of War in First World War Germany', *American Historical Review*, 124, 1 (2019), p. 333.
[16]Jones, 'A Missing Paradigm?', p. 25.

taken in the West, five million two hundred thousand versus one million five hundred thousand, respectively.[17] Nachtigal focuses on captivity in the East by discussing the Russian violations of international law that led to the mass death of POWs during the construction of the Murmansk railway.[18] Forced labour is also Rawe's focus, who investigates the employment of various societal groups, including POWs, as the German economy became increasingly reliant on additional labour during the war.[19]

According to Speed, the fact that Germany entered into agreements with Britain and France to regulate the exchange of POWs provides evidence for Germany's commitment to the humane treatment of prisoners in line with the 'liberal tradition of captivity'.[20] Oltmer and Hinz contribute to the historiography with an investigation of the German prison camp system.[21] The German historiography does not contain either an analysis of the exchange and repatriation of German and British POWs or the role played by Aachen.

The legal foundations

The revolution in warfare represented by the First World War exposed the shortcomings of the international legal order pertaining to POWs and led Germany and the United Kingdom to conclude bilateral agreements for the internment and repatriation of their prisoners in 1917 and 1918. Prior to 1914, the Geneva and Hague Conventions were the only major legal works relating to POWs.[22] While POWs had been taken *en masse* during the Franco-Prussian War, the First World War 'marked the advent of mass industrialised, militarised captivity' on a much larger scale.[23] Approximately eight and a half million soldiers were captured, and no country was prepared for the number of prisoners taken..[24] This lack of preparedness was particularly evident at the beginning of the hostilities, when military and political elites

[17]Nachtigal, 'The Repatriation and Reception', pp. 159-60.
[18]Reinhard Nachtigal, *Kriegsgefangenschaft an der Ostfront 1914 bis 1918: Literaturbericht zu einem neuen Forschungsfeld,* (Frankfurt/ Main [u.a.]: P. Lang, 2005).
[19]Kai Rawe, *"…wir werden sie schon zur Arbeit bringen!": Ausländerbeschäftigung und Zwangsarbeit im Ruhrkohlenbergbau während des Ersten Weltkrieges,* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2005); Gregor Schöllgen and Friedrich Kießling, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus,* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), p. 200.
[20]Richard B. Speed, *Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity,* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 7.
[21]Jochen Oltmer, *Kriegsgefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs,* (Paderborn; Munich [u.a.]: Schöningh, 2006); Uta Hinz, *Gefangen im Großen Krieg: Kriegsgefangenschaft in Deutschland, 1914-1921,* (Essen: Klartext, 2006).
[22]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 5.
[23]Jones, *Prisoners of War*, p. 268.
[24]Jones, 'A Missing Paradigm?', p. 20.

still expected a swift victory, so it seemed there was no need to build the infrastructure required for handling tens of thousands of prisoners. Reality showed that the Hague Conventions were insufficient to regulate the growing numbers of captured soldiers. Hence, the belligerents needed to conclude complementary bilateral agreements. These specified the treatment, internment and exchange of prisoners and compensated for the shortcomings in the Hague Conventions.[25]

The historiography references two Anglo-German agreements concluded in 1917 and 1918 but neglects a third.[26] Primary sources indicate that Germany and Britain must have entered into negotiations about POW matters as early as 1914. The "Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War", published by the War Office in 1920, covers the activities of the Directorate from August 1914 to February 1920. It presents a detailed synopsis of POW matters that have arisen during the war and includes the 1917 and 1918 agreements. It also contains a reference to '[a]n agreement for the mutual repatriation of incapacitated officers and men…concluded in January, 1915'.[27] Feltman is one of only a few scholars who have referenced it.[28] As the report notes, 'a very harsh schedule of disabilities was adopted', which determined whether POWs were eligible for exchange and this schedule also reappeared in the subsequent bilateral agreements.[29] The severity of this schedule might explain why the agreement had relatively little impact and was neglected, although there are additional indications that Britain and Germany maintained an ongoing dialogue on POW matters. On 17 March 1915, Germany consented to a British proposal 'to adopt a scheme for the reciprocal inspection of prison camps by representatives of neutral governments'.[30] Finally, the *Aachener Anzeiger*, one of Aachen's daily newspapers, refers to the Anglo-German negotiations on the exchange of their prisoners in its edition of 1 July 1915 and notes that the city was expecting the arrival of 'exchange prisoners'.[31] This analysis will return to this topic later.

[25]Jones, *Prisoners of War*, p. 272.
[26]Brian Feltman, *The Stigma of Surrender: German Prisoners, British Captors, and Manhood in the Great War and Beyond,* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 68-9.
[27]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 68.
[28]Maartje M. Abbenhuis, *The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918,* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p. 109; Brian Feltman, 'Tolerance As a Crime?: The British Treatment of German Prisoners of War on the Western Front, 1914-1918', *War in History*, 17, 4 (2010), pp. 435-58, p. 441.
[29]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 68.
[30]Garner, *International Law (vol. 2),* p. 6.
[31]'Der Zoologische Garten in Erwartung der Austauschgefangenen', *Aachener Anzeiger*, 1 July 1915, p. 1, https://zeitpunkt.nrw/ulbbn/periodical/zoom/6745894.

The 1917 Anglo-German agreement on POW matters represented a breakthrough, and Lord Newton and Lieutenant-General Belfield were the primary British actors. Newton served as the Controller of the Prisoners of War Department and also held the position of Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.[32] In theory, the Controller was supposed to represent the British government on POW matters on behalf of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[33] In practice, Newton struggled to impose his authority on the other Departments of State that were involved in POW affairs, such as the Admiralty, the War Office and the Colonial Office.[34] As a result, controversial matters had to be referred to the War Cabinet for decision.[35] Lieutenant-General Belfield, the Director of Prisoners of War at the War Office, accompanied Lord Newton on his trip to The Hague to discuss POW matters in 1917. Newton describes the genesis of his first encounter with the enemy as follows:

> June, 1917. I had heard from various sources that the Germans were anxious to discuss prisoner questions with us at The Hague, and in view of continual delays, disputes and threats of retaliation on both sides, was much disposed to try the experiment of personal contact.[36]

Negotiating with the adversary while fighting him on the battlefield was always going to be a political balancing act.

The 'Agreement between the British and German Governments concerning Combatant and Civilian Prisoners of War', concluded at The Hague on 2 July 1917 and signed by Newton and Belfield, included several paragraphs on the internment, exchange and repatriation of POWs.[37] In the preamble, the 'Netherlands Government declare[d] their readiness to intern…a number of German and British combatant or civilian prisoners of war, not exceeding 16,000'.[38] Paragraph 3 on the 'New Schedules of Disabilities' for repatriation and internment held that '[n]ew and more lenient schedules of disabilities shall be drawn up for guidance in choosing combatant

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(The *Zoologische Garten* is expecting the exchange prisoners.) Accessed 6 September 2022.

[32]Thomas W. L., 2nd Baron Newton, *Retrospection,* (London: John Murray, 1941), p. 255; Ibid., p. 264.

[33]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 7.

[34]Ibid., p. 5.

[35]Newton, p. 219.

[36]Ibid., p. 236.

[37]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 92.

[38]Ibid.

prisoners of war'.[39] The reference to new schedules implies the existence of previous ones. Arguably, such a non-lenient schedule was drawn up in the context of the Anglo-German agreement for the exchange of the most severely wounded prisoners, concluded in 1915. Paragraph 4 of the 1917 Hague agreement, on 'Barbed Wire Disease', for the first time acknowledged the depression that POWs might suffer due to an extended stay in captivity. It held that those 'who have been at least 18 months in captivity…shall for the future be recognized as suitable for internment in Switzerland or other neutral country'.[40] The benefits of the agreement in general and this paragraph in particular only applied to officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Accordingly, paragraph 11 stipulates that '[a]ll officers and non-commissioned officers…so soon as they have been in captivity at least 18 months, shall…be interned in Switzerland or other neutral country'.[41] This wording reflected and extended the privileged treatment that officers had historically enjoyed in captivity.

Switzerland also set an example for the Netherlands in terms of interning POWs.[42] Swiss internment was characterised by '[a] warm welcome and generosity'.[43] Interned POWs were not perceived as enemies and were not imprisoned.[44] As the Dutch were keen to learn from the Swiss experience of POW internment and exchange, they even sent a senior officer 'on a fact-finding mission to Bern'.[45]

Paragraph 7 on the examination of POWs, who might qualify to benefit from the arrangement, was particularly important. It stated that

> [c]ommissions, composed of two medical officers of a neutral State and *three medical officers of the captor State*, shall proceed to examine the prisoners, who have been *recommended for internment by the camp medical officers of the captor State* after having made a thorough examination according to the new schedule of disabilities for internment [own emphasis].[46]

This paragraph implied that British POWs would not be presented to the medical commission for a decision as to whether they could leave Germany unless they had

[39]Ibid., p. 93.
[40]Ibid.
[41]Ibid., p. 94.
[42]Wolf, *Guarded Neutrality*, p. 147, p. 150.
[43]Susan Barton, *Internment in Switzerland during the First World War,* (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic), p. 6.
[44]Ibid., p. 8.
[45]Wolf, *Guarded Neutrality*, p. 153.
[46]Ibid., p. 93.

first been referred by German camp medical officers. If the German doctors thought the POWs qualified, they would send them to the medical commission, which would examine them and take the final decision. Importantly, this medical commission sat at Aachen.

The contentious issues with this arrangement soon became apparent. The British side complained that the German camp medical staff were biased in their pre-selection. In a letter from Major-General Sir J. Hanbury Williams of the Prisoners of War Department from 6 March 1918 to Sir Walter Townley at The Hague regarding the examination of British POWs eligible for internment under paragraph 7, the general states: '[u]nder the present system the preliminary examination is entirely in the hands of the German doctors and there is no chance of any man reaching the Aachen Commission except on the recommendation of the Germans'.[47] The explicit reference to the 'Aachen Commission' underlines the centrality of Aachen as a staging post in the POW exchange and repatriation process[48] The War Office acknowledged these issues in a letter written on 8 April 1918. However, it stated that the arrangement was without any alternative. It would be logistically impossible for medical commissions to examine every POW. Neither would it be practical for POWs to ask to present themselves before these medical commissions.[49] By 1917, there were already too many of them for this to have been possible.

The implementation of paragraph 7 of the Anglo-German agreement concluded in 1917 resulted in accusations between Germany and Britain, which the agreement of 1918 sought to remedy. The War Office believed that paragraph 7 was applied 'far more conscientiously in this country than in Germany'.[50] Unsurprisingly, Germany disputed that view. In a note dated 23 July 1918, Germany accused Britain of violating the 1917 agreement. 'The sick are not being examined in the English camps in a manner prescribed by paragraph 7'.[51] Furthermore, 'English doctors have frequently classified as eligible for internment cases which have been pronounced by the Dutch members of the [Medical] Commission as eligible for repatriation [original emphasis].'[52] The British side vehemently rejected these allegations.[53] The accusatory tone of these

[47]TNA FO 383/412 - Letter, 6 March 1918, from Major General J. Hanbury Williams, Director, British Prisoners of War Department, to Sir Walter Townley.
[48]Ibid.
[49]TNA FO 383/412 - Letter, 8 April 1918, from the War Office to the Secretary, Prisoners-of-War Department.
[50]Ibid.
[51]TNA FO 383/412 - Memorandum No. 15, 23 July 1918, on the Exchange of the Sick presented to the British Delegates by the German delegation at The Hague.
[52]Ibid.
[53]Ibid.

statements illustrates that the atmosphere between both parties had become tense. Lord Newton noted that 'difficulties in connection with prisoners-of-war questions began to accumulate' in the spring of 1918.[54] These included food scarcity, delayed exchanges and alleged cruelties.[55] 'The Germans were already clamouring for another meeting at The Hague in order to discuss matters', he wrote.[56] Contextually, the German spring offensive of 1918 had resulted in many prisoners being taken.[57] Food shortages were acute not least because of the Allied blockade since August 1914.[58] The second Anglo-German conference began on 8 June 1918 at The Hague against this background.[59] Larger delegations, the charged atmosphere and mutual accusations about the implementation of paragraph 7 resulted in disappointing outcomes.[60] 'Ultimately a patched-up agreement was signed' on 14 July 1918 but not ratified until November 1918, as it had become conceivable that the war was going to end and 'that in any case the prisoners would be liberated shortly'.[61] Under the Armistice, the Allies insisted on immediate and unconditional release of all their prisoners, while exempting themselves from any obligation to release German prisoners.

Aachen as a Staging Post

The importance of Aachen as a staging post for POW exchanges resulted from the existence of an exchange station in the city. An undated registration card, entitled '*Austausch-Station* Konstanz [*sic*] Aachen' (exchange station Aachen), provides evidence for its presence (see Figure 1).[62]

This document indicates that Captain William Wagstaff of the Bedfordshire Regiment, born on 23 June 1888 in London, was wounded on 26 August 1914 and imprisoned at Holzminden POW camp. At the bottom is a blank space for medical notes. It can be assumed that this section was reserved for the Aachen Commission, which had the final say on whether POWs would be able to leave Germany. The secondary literature

[54]Newton, p. 255.
[55]Ibid.
[56]Ibid.
[57]Ian Kershaw, *To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949,* (London: Penguin Books, 2016), p. 60.
[58]*Der Erste Weltkrieg: eine europäische Katastrophe*, ed. by Bruno Cabanes, Anne Duménil and Birgit Lamerz-Beckschäfer, Schriftenreihe / Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 1300, (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013), p. 118.
[59]Newton, p. 256.
[60]Ibid., pp. 257–60.
[61]Ibid., p. 260; Ibid., p. 263.
[62]The Imperial War Museum, London (hereinafter IWM), LBY K.07/347, *Austausch-Station* Aachen.

describes Aachen as the city 'through which all British prisoners being repatriated to England or neutral Holland would pass'.[63]



Lazarett-Stat.

Lfde. Nr. Krankenbuch Nr.

Austausch-Station ~~Konstanz~~ Aachen

1. Familienname: Wagstaff Religion: ~~evgl.~~ kath.
2. Vorname: William Nation: Engl.
3. Dienstgrad: Hauptmann
   Aktiver Diensteintritt: 20. IX. 1908. The Bedfordshire
   Nr. des aktiven Regiments: ~~XIX~~ Regiment.
4. Nr. des gegenwärtigen Regiments: The Bedfordshire Regt.
   Kompagnie: D
5. Geburtstag: 23. 6. 88
   Geburtsort: London
   Kreis: London
6. Aufenthaltsort vor Ankunft in ~~Konstanz~~ Aachen: Holzminden
7. Verwundung oder Krankheit: Wunde im linken Unterschenkel
   Tag der Verwundung: 26. 8. '14
8. Beruf: Offizier
9. Wohnort vor dem Kriege: Mullingar. Co. Westmeath. Ireland
10. Wohnort der Eltern (oder wenn verheiratet) der Frau: Lt. Wagstaff, Leighton Buzzard Bedfordshire.

Aerztliche Bemerkung:

Zugang am: Abgang am:

nach:

Form. Nr 6.

Es sind die Fragen 1—10 auszufüllen.

Figure 1: Aachen Station registration Card (IWM LBY K.07/347)

[63]Philip D. Chinnery, *The Kaiser's First POWs,* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2018), p. 74.

Captain Charles Stanley Johnson's ship was torpedoed by a German submarine off the coast of Italy. He arrived in Aachen on 24 June 1918 and noted,

> Here we found about 180 other officers who had come from different camps. We expected to be here for one night and then proceed to Holland. Only a party of 8 was sent to Holland, the remainder staying in the camp for 7 weeks.[64]

Captain Johnson's reference to a 'camp' suggests the existence of a holding facility for the exchange of prisoners where they were held while they were waiting for the decision on whether they would be able to leave Germany. John Halissey, a British private, is said to have conducted a concert in the city, presumably for POWs.[65] The presence of a British private suggests that it was not just officers and NCOs, who passed through the city, but also other ranks, who may have been officers' servants.

The exchanges via the Netherlands were preceded and inspired by French, German and British POW exchanges via Konstanz after Switzerland had also concluded agreements with the belligerent parties 'on the transfer of sick and wounded prisoners from prison camps in Germany, France and Britain'.[66] France and Germany began exchanging invalid prisoners in March 1915.[67] The success of the Swiss-Franco-German POW exchange agreement led Britain to pursue a similar arrangement regarding the transfer and internment of invalid POWs in early February 1916, which was implemented in May 1916.[68] British POWs entered Switzerland via Konstanz.[69] The Konstanz exchanges served as a role model for those via Aachen. This is illustrated by the crossing out of 'Konstanz' and the handwritten insertion of 'Aachen' on the registration card (see Figure 1).[70]

The military and civilian authorities played an important role in organising the POW exchanges. The main local military actor and most senior medical officer was *Reservelazarettdirektor* Jaeger. The Aachen city archives contain several letters, which he exchanged with the civilian administration, on POW matters in general and their accommodation in particular. In a letter written on 25 November 1915 and addressed to the mayor, Jaeger announces that exchange prisoners (*inter alia* one English officer

[64]IWM Document. 13319 - Private Papers of Captain C S Johnson, p. 39.
[65]Oliver Wilkinson, *British Prisoners of War in First World War Germany,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 207.
[66]Barton, *Internment*, p. 6.
[67]Speed, *Prisoners*, p. 34.
[68]Barton, *Internment*, p. 19; Ibid., p. 17, p. 53.
[69]Ibid., p. 24.
[70]Ibid., p. 25.

and eighty-seven English other rank prisoners) will be arriving 'again'.[71] This letter provides evidence that British soldiers passed through Aachen long before the conclusion of the Anglo-German exchange agreements in 1917 and 1918. The reference to 'other rank' prisoners is intriguing. It suggests that the agreement, which regulated the exchange of POWs in 1915, might not have been limited to officers and NCOs, in contrast to the subsequent ones. Jaeger asked the mayor to make the *Lochnergarten* available to accommodate English exchange prisoners. The facility served primarily as a recreational home for convalescent German soldiers. The *Reservelazarettdirektor* also noted that the British POWs would leave Aachen on 4 December 1915 to travel to Vlissingen on the Dutch coast.[72] From there, it can be assumed they sailed back to Britain.

German POWs coming from England travelled in the opposite direction. Aachen was the first city they came to after leaving the Netherlands. The first record of repatriated Germans is an article entitled 'Returned from England', published on 28 August 1915 in the *Aachener Anzeiger*.[73] It notes that 'some German warriors' returned 'again' from England.[74] This reference suggests that this was not the first exchange. The first German exchange prisoners returned in June 1915, as noted above. The article furthermore specifies that three hundred Englishmen were sent to England in exchange for twenty-two Germans, who 'stepped over the threshold of their home in Aachen'.[75] They arrived on a hospital train from Vlissingen. This reference to the Dutch coastal town in German primary sources corroborates its important role in the POW exchange process. Vlissingen is also mentioned in British primary sources and is referred to there as "Flushing". The article mentions that the hospital train that ran between both cities had a maximum capacity of two hundred and fifty beds. Many train journeys must have taken place to transport German and British POWs back and forth.

While the exchanges were progressing, the war began to impact the provision of food to the civilian population of Aachen. American newspapers described the precautions that were taken regarding the supply of bread to prevent shortages. '[T]he imperial,

[71] *Stadtarchiv*, Aachen (StaAC), 5703 - Letter, 25 November 1915, from *Reserve Lazarett Direktor* Professor Dr. Jaeger, *Generaloberarzt*, to 1.) *den Herrn Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Aachen z.H. des Herrn Bürgermeister Bacciocco*, 2.) Professor Dr. Hertwig.
[72] Ibid.
[73] 'Aus England zurückgekehrt', *Aachener Anzeiger*, 28 August 1915, p. 2, https://zeitpunkt.nrw/ulbbn/periodical/zoom/6746374. Accessed 18 September 2022.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

royal and municipal authorities have established strict regulations...'.[76] A local pastor described the act of being economical with bread as the patriotic contribution of women and children to the national war effort.[77] The desire to help the state became imperative.[78] Saving bread became a patriotic duty.

The Red Cross played an important role in catering for German and British prisoners during their stay. Primary sources describe the activities of a wartime *Verpflegungsstation* (bar) run by the Red Cross outside Aachen central station and detail who passed through *en route* to the Netherlands. The records held in the city archives list the number of enemy POWs attended to at the central station on a daily, monthly and annual basis from 1914 to 1918. However, they do not contain references to British POWs during the period from 4 September 1914 to 16 August 1915.[79] Only two 'English prisoners' are explicitly mentioned in the entry on 17 August 1915. No more are referred to as of this date until 13 May 1917.[80] They are missing the three hundred Englishmen, who were repatriated to England, as noted in the article in the *Aachener Anzeiger* from 28 August 1915. This suggests that the records of the Red Cross *Verpflegungsstation* are inaccurate. As they must have passed through Aachen they should have been recorded by the Red Cross at the central station. Alternatively, they might have left the city from *Aachen-West*, which is a smaller station for which no records seem to exist.

The files cover the period from 17 May 1917 to 13 November 1918 and clearly illustrate the impact of the Anglo-German exchange agreements on Aachen. They also underline the central role played by the city in the POW exchange and repatriation process.[81] Approximately sixteen thousand 'English prisoners' are recorded as having

[76]James O'Donnell Bennett, 'Simple Fare Now Pride of German Housewives: Rigorousness of System Worst Hardship of War Bread, Which Used To Be a Delicacy – Preachers Use Saving as Texts for Sermon', *New York Tribune*, 20 April 1915, p. 2, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/batches/dlc_quinn_ver01/data/sn83030214/00206531885/1915042001/0424.pdf. Accessed 18 September 2022.

[77] James O'Donnell Bennett, 'Germany's War Bread System', *The Wheeling Intelligencer*, 20 April 1915, p. 11, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/batches/wvu_cornwell_ver01/data/sn86092536/00414186373/1915042001/0249.pdf. Accessed 18 September 2022.

[78]Ibid.

[79]StaAC, Acc 1932/32a - (1) *Hauptbahnhof* Aachen. 4. September 1914 -16. Aug. 1915. (Central station Aachen.)

[80]StaAC, Acc 1932/32a - (2) *Hauptbahnhof* Aachen. *Tagebuch für Verpflegungsstelle Rote* [*sic*] *Kreuz*, Aachen *Hauptbahnhof, Bahnsteig IV*. 17. Aug. 1915 -13. Mai 1917. (Diary of the Red Cross bar at Aachen central station, platform 4.)

[81]StaAC, Acc 1932/32a - (3) *Hauptbahnhof* Aachen. 17. Mai 1917 -13. November 1918.

passed through during this time. All of whom arrived before the negotiations on the 1918 agreement had even begun. As expected, the number of British POWs passing through Aachen on their way home increased after the conclusion of the Anglo-German exchange agreement in 1917. Notably, only fourteen prisoners are explicitly referred to as officers. In reality, many more officer prisoners can be expected to have come to Aachen under the terms of the 1917 agreement. In light of the number of POWs, Jones's contention that the bilateral agreements were generally ineffective seems difficult to uphold.[82]

The main place in Aachen where many exchange prisoners were accommodated was the *Lochnergarten*. This facility played an important role in the exchange process and is located close to the two railway stations at which the British POWs arrived, *Aachen Hauptbahnhof* (central station) and *Aachen-West*. The *Lochnergarten* was made available to the military hospital administration in mid-June 1915. It was intended to be used by 'wounded German and British exchange prisoners' with the city's agreement.[83] However, it also served as a *Kriegerheim* (warriors' home) for convalescent German soldiers. This dual role led to tensions between the civilian and military authorities.

The military medical administration, represented by *Reservelazarettdirektor* Jaeger, primarily intended to use the *Lochnergarten* for exchange prisoners in line with the Geneva Convention, according to which enemy soldiers should be treated with the same level of care as one's own troops. The civilian administration, represented by the mayor, insisted on it being used by recovering German soldiers. When the facility was used by exchange prisoners, it could not be used by recovering German soldiers and vice versa. Interestingly, its capacity of two hundred and fifty beds matches the number of beds on the hospital train that travelled between Aachen and Vlissingen.[84] The report of a visit by the American Consul, Henry C.A. Damm, to British POWs at Aachen provides an independent and objective description of the *Lochnergarten* and its use.[85] The United States represented British interests in Germany, and German interests in Britain, until it entered the war in April 1917.[86] Visits to POW camps were routinely undertaken to verify that POWs were adequately treated and to build trust

[82]Jones, *A Missing Paradigm?*, p. 26.
[83]StaAC, Altablage 5704, p. 116.
[84]StaAC, C643K - *Die Vereine vom Roten Kreuz Aachen-Stadt im Weltkriege 1914/1915: Im Auftrage des Haupt-Ausschusses der Vereine vom Roten Kreuz Aachen-Stadt, Herausgegeben von Dr. H. Schweitzer*, no page numbers. (The Red Cross Charities of Aachen during the World War 1914/1915: Commissioned by the Main Committee of the Red Cross Charities of Aachen, edited by Dr. H. Schweitzer.)
[85]TNA CO 323/693 - Report, 24 August 1915, from Henry C.A. Damm to The Honourable James W. Gerard, American Ambassador, Berlin.
[86]Garner, *International Law (vol. 1)*, pp. 45, p. 53.

between the belligerents. About three hundred British POWs left for Holland on 24 August 1915. It can be assumed that these were the same three hundred prisoners who were described in the article that was published on 27 August 1915 and referred to above. Before returning to England, they stayed at the *Lochnergarten*, 'a large airy building with extensive grounds, and the British soldiers were given the use of the entire establishment'.[87] Damm's report further notes that '[t]he German prisoners of war released by Great Britain will arrive here in a few days', which underlines the importance of the *Lochnergarten* for the exchange of British and German prisoners.[88] The Consul's report was also covered in the *Aberdeen Daily Journal*, a Scottish newspaper, on 19 October 1915.[89] While the *Lochnergarten* was not explicitly mentioned, it was referred to in the article, which also confirmed that the prisoners were treated well. The publication of this article illustrates that the exchange of German and British POWs via Aachen was public knowledge.

The senior regional military command of the army corps district that Aachen belonged to rejected the mayor's view that the interests of German wounded soldiers should take precedence over the *Lochnergarten's* use by British POWs. 'On the contrary, the exchange of wounded POWs is a matter of significant political importance', it stated.[90] This correspondence highlights the relevance of the *Lochnergarten* for the exchange and repatriation process and the sensitivity around its use.

The *Lochnergarten* also served an important propagandistic purpose in the context of the positive reception of returning German prisoners. As discussed, the first German soldiers arrived in Aachen on 30 June 1915. The mayor was notified about their arrival on 20 June 1915. A celebratory reception at *Aachen-West* station was organised for the two hundred and fifty former prisoners. Local newspapers covered the event extensively. The overall tone of the article published in the *Aachener Anzeiger*, which marked the occasion of the returning German invalids, is one of a hero's welcome. It notes that the *Lochnergarten* was draped with flags, laurels and a bust of Wilhelm II. to celebrate their homecoming.[91] The article describes the facility as a big hall with 'very clean beds' that are aligned with 'military precision'.[92] It appears that no propagandistic

[87]TNA CO 323/693 - Report, 24 August 1915, from Henry C.A. Damm.
[88]Ibid.
'American Consular Report', *The Aberdeen Daily Journal*, 19 October 1915, p. 6, https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000576/19151019/059/0006. Accessed 11 September 2022.
[90]StaAC, 5703 - Letter, 10 Februar 1916, from *Generalleutnant* von Hepke, *Stellvertr. Generalkommando des VIII. A. - K.*, to *Herrn Oberbürgermeister*, p. 144. (Letter from Lieutenant-General von Hepke, regional military command, addressed to the mayor.)
[91]*Aachener Anzeiger*, 1 July 1915, p. 1.
[92]Ibid.; Ibid.

effort was spared to mark the occasion of the invalids' return. In this context, an article published on 28 August 1915 in the *Aachener Anzeiger* claims that their sacrifice was not in vain.[93] The speech at *Aachen-West* station by the commanding general of the local garrison indicates the propagandistic value inherent in the prisoners' return:

> You are returning as heroes. Your homeland welcomes you with pride and gratitude. With a deep sense of gratitude for everything that you have done for your fatherland and for everything that you have suffered through while serving your country. Rest assured that you will receive any available form of medical treatment and government support in abundance. You have kept your soldierly oath.[94]

As German prisoners arrived in Germany, their British counterparts hoped to travel in the opposite direction. In order to do so, they first had to submit themselves to the examination and decision of the Aachen Commission. As noted earlier the Aachen Commission had the authority to send a British POW home based on the 1917 agreement. It was composed of two medical officers of a neutral state, the Netherlands and three medical officers of the captor state, Germany. This arrangement highlights the pivotal role that Aachen played in the exchange process. Several primary sources provide evidence for the gatekeeper role of the Aachen Commission. Captain Charles Stanley Johnson, the naval officer referred to above, kept notes of his time as a prisoner. He recorded that the German doctor at Aachen refused to pass British POWs in March 1918 following their medical examination in line with paragraph 7 of the 1917 agreement.[95] According to another officer, Captain H.K. Ward,

> the present system [of exchanging POWs] leaves too big a loop hole [*sic*] for the German dishonesty… [A] purely German Medical Committee sitting at Aachen… [decides whether] a man is allowed to proceed to England. As far as I know there is no appeal against the decision of the Aachen Committee.[96]

The reference to a 'purely German' medical board neglects the presence of the two neutral medical officers on the Aachen Commission. Their omission by Captain Ward suggests that they might not have had a noticeable impact.

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[93]*Aachener Anzeiger*, 28 August 1915, p. 2.
[94]Ibid.
[95]IWM Documents. 13319 - *Private Papers of Captain C S Johnson*, p. 38.
[96]TNA FO 383/412 - Statement by Captain H.K. Ward, R.A.M.C., regarding the working of the Swiss Commission in Germany, made to the Government Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War, 14 March 1918.

The Prisoners of War Department was aware of the shortcomings of paragraph 7 of the 1917 agreement. A departmental file entitled 'Examination of British prisoners by the Dutch Medical Commission at Aachen' dated 25 March 1918 with handwritten notes on it is instructive. One comment reads: '[t]he arrangement is an absolutely rotten one. The worst cases among our men…are not getting home, and the Germans are concealing the cases of which they are most ashamed'.[97] Lord Newton concurred but saw no alternative to the arrangement,

> It is quite true that the arrangement is unsatisfactory and gives the Huns unlimited opportunity for brutality. But on the other hand, how can the [Dutch] Commission go everywhere, especially in view of the enormous increase in the number of prisoners? N. 26.3.18.[98]

Lord Newton must have been alluding to the impact of Operation *Michael*, the German spring offensive, which had started five days earlier on 21 March 1918.[99] The Aachen Commission would become more important as a result of the number of prisoners that would be taken during this offensive.

The doctors at Aachen frequently refused to pass British POWs on medical grounds. There were also instances when prisoners were used as bargaining chips and were held up in the city.[100] When the 'St. Denis' sailed from Flushing to Tilbury on 25 May 1916, it left with only ninety-five wounded men but no officers on board. However, there were meant to be one hundred and twenty British invalids on board, including four officers. The officers and NCOs were held back at Aachen because they might be employed to train new recruits. Lord Newton had received a message on 25 May 1916 at about 2.30am stating that 'all the British prisoners were detained at Aachen, and that the matter was extremely urgent'.[101] He instructed the crew of the 'St. Denis' to detain the German officers and NCOs, who had already sailed to Flushing for exchange. However, they had disembarked the day before. When Sir Edward Grey asked the United States to enquire about the reason for the detention of the four officers, he was informed that they had been removed from the hospital train at Aachen.[102] Other records of the Prisoners of War Department suggest that Germany

[97]TNA, FO 383/412 - File No. 54276, 25 March 1918, entitled 'Examination of British prisoners by the Dutch Medical Commission at Aachen'.
[98]Ibid.
[99]Cabanes *et al.*, p. 340.
[100]Jones, *Prisoners of War*, p. 266.
[101]TNA, FO 383/148 - File No. 99389, entitled 'Return of British incapacitated prisoners'.
[102]TNA, FO 383/148 - Letter, 25 May 1916, from Alan Johnstone, British Legation at The Hague, to Sir Edward Grey.

withheld British POWs, who had already been cleared by the Aachen Commission, to put pressure on the British government because it suspected Britain of moving German prisoners around the country to prevent them from being exchanged.[103]

While Britain denied these allegations, there is evidence that the British government did use POWs to put pressure on Germany.[104] The transfer of several German officers interned at Donington Hall, a large house in Leicestershire, was delayed due to 'the omission of the German Government to transfer British officers and non-commissioned officers in accordance with the [1917] Agreement', according to a letter from the War Office addressed to the Prisoners of War Department dated 16 October 1918.[105] The 'Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War', written by the War Office, also notes that Britain retained about one thousand four hundred German officers 'pending the performance by the German Government of their obligations under the Armistice'.[106]

It is clear that both sides used prisoners as bargaining chips.

Approximately seven thousand eight hundred German invalids crossed Dutch territory from England to Germany between December 1915 and November 1918. Four thousand seven hundred British prisoners travelled in the opposite direction facilitated by the Dutch Red Cross.[107] Overall, 'the Dutch interned approximately 4,500 German and 6,000 British POWs [during the war]'. This was well below the 16,000 set at the British-German conference' in 1917 and suggests that the practical impact of the agreement was indeed not as significant as it could have been.[108]

The means of transport that was available to move prisoners between Germany and Britain presented an inherent obstacle to the full implementation of the 1917 agreement. '[T]he [German] U-boat campaigns, the existence of mines, and the British blockade made any sea-bound journey…potentially life threatening'.[109] In January 1917, Germany alleged that Britain had used its hospital ships for military purposes in

[103]TNA, FO 383/412 - File No. 11397, 19 August 1918, entitled 'Internment in Holland of British P/W'.
[104]TNA, FO 383/412 - Letter, 17 August 1918, from the War Office to the Secretary, Prisoners of War Department.
[105]TNA, FO 383/411 - Letter, 16 October 1918, from the War Office to the Secretary, Prisoners of War Department.
[106]TNA, WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 79.
[107]Abbenhuis, p. 109.
[108]Ibid., p. 110.
[109]Ibid., p. 127.

violation of the Hague Convention.[110] Germany declared a maritime zone around Britain within which it would attack enemy hospital ships.[111] An unrestricted submarine warfare campaign also began in February 1917.[112] By threatening to attack hospital ships, Germany violated the Hague Convention on maritime warfare, which conferred an 'immunity on hospital ships and their staffs as well as upon ships engaged in the transportation of the wounded'.[113] As a result, British ships ceased to transport prisoners across the Channel.[114] Dutch paddle steamers were still able to operate between Britain and the Netherlands but transport capacity had decreased.[115] In a personal note on 30 March 1917, Lord Newton acknowledged the threat posed by German submarines.[116] He was also confused by the inherently contradictory German position. Germany stated that ships could not be used for the transfer of English and German POWs after the end of April 1918 between Boston, Lincolnshire and Rotterdam because safe passage could not be assured.[117] Newton described the dilemma as follows: 'But if the sailings stop at the end of next month, I wonder how the Huns expect that their 18 months men will ever get to Holland. N. 12.3.18.'[118]

Seemingly, unrestricted submarine warfare took precedence over the exchange of POWs.

British prisoners, who returned to England, were initially welcomed as positively as their German counterparts. After having left Aachen in 1918, Private Ranner, who has been discussed above, arrived at Boston. '[W]e were taken on tugs down the river to Boston, and were greatly cheered by people who lined the Banks [*sic*] all the way down.'[119] He then travelled to London, where an enthusiastic reception awaited the former prisoners,

> [A]s the train drew in…the uproar started. Whistles blowing, hooters sounding and the shouts of children outside the gates of St. Pancras… I and another chap

[110]Garner, *International Law (vol. 1)*, p. 508.
[111]Ibid., pp. 508-09.
[112]Cabanes *et al.*, p. 247.
[113]Garner, *International Law (vol. 1)*, p. 497.
[114]TNA WO 106/1451 - *Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War*, p. 67.
[115]Ibid.
[116]Newton, p. 234.
[117]TNA FO 383/412 - Telegram No. 696, 15 February 1918, entitled 'Very Urgent. Your telegram No. 99 and my telegram No. 628. Following from Dutch Minister. Begins.'.
[118]TNA FO 383/412 - File No. 44481, 11 March 1918, entitled 'Internment of prisoners in neutral country [*sic*] (para. 7)'.
[119]IWM Documents.12065 - Private Papers of H.C. Ranner, p. 14.

> were driven through the crowd of people and children who were still yelling and throwing cigarettes and chocolates into the car as we passed.[120]

This example suggests that British former POWs were welcomed in a similarly positive way as their German counterparts, who had arrived at Aachen station to a hero's welcome. Private Ranner even received a welcome letter from King George V.[121] The positive reception that he and the German POWs experienced does not suggest that the loyalty and patriotism of returning POWs was questioned by either side, as Nachtigal notes.[122] However, Stibbe argues that having been a POW carried a social stigma at home.[123] Wilkinson also suggests that POWs were marginalised within the post-war discourse, as they were neither 'among the heroic dead…[nor did they appear as] successful warriors'.[124] The same applied to former German POWs.[125] Overall, POWs were low down in the 'commemorative pecking order'.[126]

Whether the Anglo-German agreement of 1917 had an impact depends on the perspective of the observer. The agreement had a significant impact for each German and British prisoner that benefited from it. Conversely, having made arrangements for the exchange of prisoners in the thousands could also be described as insignificant given the much higher numbers of prisoners held by each side. This view appears to dominate in the historiography. Stibbe agrees with Jones:

> by November 1918 the number of prisoners who had actually benefited from these [Anglo-German] arrangements was pitifully small, and progress towards implementation was painfully slow'.[127]

Abbenhuis concurs and points out that the number of German and British prisoners that were interned in the Netherlands was 'well below the 16,000 set at the British-German conference' in 1917. Undoubtedly the German submarine campaign represented an obstacle to the potential exchange of more prisoners given its threat to ship transport, even for hospital ships. The records from the Red Cross station at Aachen provide evidence that thousands of British prisoners passed through the city

[120]Ibid., p. 15.
[121]Ibid. (no page number).
[122]Nachtigal, *Kriegsgefangenschaft an der Ostfront*, p. 178.
[123]Stibbe, *Introduction*, p. 13.
[124]Wilkinson, *British Prisoners of War*, p. 280.
[125]Feltman, *Stigma of Surrender*, p. 165.
[126]Iris Rachamimov, *POWs and the Great War: Captivity on the Eastern Front,* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), p. 227.
[127]Matthew Stibbe, 'Civilian Internment and Civilian Internees in Europe, 1914-20', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 26, 1-2 (2008), pp. 49-81, p. 70.

on their way to Britain from 1914 to 1918. The agreement clearly did impact them. Being overly dismissive of it seems unwarranted when viewed from the perspective of the '16,000 or 17,000 [prisoners, who had] either [been] repatriated or interned in neutral countries in the course of the war', as Lord Newton pointed out in a debate in the House of Lords in March 1919.[128]

In a twist of fate, one of the exchanged POWs was Lieutenant Goschen, the son of the former British Ambassador. He had been wounded and captured at the beginning of the war. James W. Gerard, the American Ambassador, intervened personally with senior German government officials to secure his repatriation, which the British press reported on in November 1915.[129]

Conclusion

This paper has analysed the neglected role that Aachen played in the process of exchanging and repatriating German and British military POWs during the First World War. Bordering the neutral Netherlands, Aachen undoubtedly served as an important staging post.

The Aachen Medical Commission decided whether British POWs were eligible to leave the country and travel over the border to the neutral Netherlands, and while there were disagreements on its impartiality, some sixteen thousand British POWs did pass through the city on their way home based on the two treaties concluded between Britain and Germany.

The historiography has not previously analysed the central role played by Aachen in the POW exchange and repatriation process. Moreover, it has also largely neglected to investigate the manner in which British POWs were treated in the city during their captivity and whether some of them might have tried to escape. Such matters could be the subject of further research.

[128]TNA FO 383/499 - File No. 3326, 10 March 1919, entitled 'Search for Missing', House of Lords, Hansard, Prisoners of War debate in Lords Chamber, The Controller of the Prisoners of War Department (Lord Newton), 6 March 1919, p. 570.
[129]James W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany,* (The Project Gutenberg EBook, 2015), pp. 85-6, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7238. Accessed 11 September 2022.; 'Lieutenant Goschen', *Sheffield Evening Telegraph*, 27 November 1915, p. 5, www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000276/19151127/098/0005. Accessed 11 September 2022.

The Battle of Jutland and the teaching of naval warfare at the French Army's higher war school in Paris,1920-21

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ABSTRACT
The French Army promoted and practiced inter-service familiarity in advanced professional studies carried out at its well-established higher war school in Paris that reopened immediately after the First World War. As part of the curriculum, naval officers lectured to army officers on naval tactics and strategy with a strong historical focus. This activity involved early teaching by one of the French Navy's leading original thinkers in the interwar period. Recent war experience against the Germans provided rich content for those lectures. The naval battle of Jutland was one case given particular consideration. A mimeographed typescript copy of the original lectures indicates that the French showed interest in a sea encounter with which they were only tangentially involved.

Introduction

After the First World War, the French Army (*Armée française*) reopened its higher war school (*École supérieure de guerre*) which since 1876 had educated competitively selected officers for staff and higher command positions, in a two-year programme. Although inspired originally by Imperial Germany's war college (*Kriegsakademie*), the French equivalent developed independently and compared favourably with the curriculum and teaching at the similarly reopened British army staff college at Camberley.[1] At these professional military education (PME) institutions, inter-service

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v9i3.1739
[1]Iain Alexander Farquharson, "A High Brow Scheme to Mess People About': Missed Opportunities to Reform Staff Training in the British Army, 1919-1939', PhD thesis, Brunel University, London, 2021, p. 82; Brian Bond; *The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914*, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972); Joseph Moretz, *Thinking Wisely,*

relations with their respective navies received attention through dedicated lectures and joint exercises.

Inclusion of the French Navy (*Marine nationale*) at the French Army's higher war school had been a longstanding feature since establishment of a naval chair filled by an officer from the naval service when Lieutenant (*Lieutenant de vaisseau*) Robert Degouy was first appointed by Major-General Joseph de Miribel in June 1888.[2] Study of naval tactics and strategy progressed over the years to include the latest developments and ideas in the French and foreign navies, with emphasis on cooperation with the army. In the early interwar years, a commitment to maintaining naval instruction as an elective course for army officers, with a fixed number of lecture hours, was renewed at the higher war school.

The receptiveness amongst army officers to instruction in naval affairs remains much harder to gauge. Armies and navies possessed different traditions, cultural milieus, organisation, ranks and pathways to promotion, and modes of operating and fighting. The French Army's regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps that encompassed functional combat arms and support branches were distinct from the arsenals, depots, dockyards, squadrons, and fleets in the French Navy. In many respects, the army and navy were two worlds apart. The need for promoting common language and understanding across the services was, therefore, imperative. British naval officer and historian John Creswell observed, 'if all commanders and staff officers continue to be educated, as they are now, to understand the problems, capabilities and limitations of the other Service; there need be no fear of falling short of the best results attainable when they are called on to co-operate.'[3] The naval lectures furnished at the higher war school in Paris sought to bridge, in some measure, that familiarity for the army officers attending.

In general, the content and instructors delivering the lectures adopted a detached perspective that viewed naval operations and the Battle of Jutland specifically from that of a numerically inferior navy dominated by a much larger army. Emerging as a weakened victor power from the world war, France balanced continental and

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Planning Boldly: The Higher Education and Training of Royal Navy Officers, 1919-39, (Solihull: Helion, 2014), p. 59; Edward Smalley, 'Qualified, but unprepared: Training for War at the Staff College in the 1930s', *British Journal for Military History*, 2, 1, (November 2015), p. 58, https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/638/760 [accessed 24 October 2023].

[2]*Annuaire de l'Armée française*, (1889), p. 688; 'Military Studies in France', *Acton Gazette*, (16 June 1888); *Lieutenant de vaisseau* R. Degouy, *Étude sur les opérations combines des armées de terre et de mer*, (Paris: Librairie militaire de L. Boudoin et cie, 1888).

[3]Captain John Creswell, RN, *Generals and Admirals: The Story of Amphibious Command*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p. 188.

maritime circumstances in assessing the recent past and formulating a naval policy for building a fleet with a view to the future.[4] The higher war school provided a safe and non-discriminating forum for professional officers like Commander (*Capitaine de frégate*) Raoul Castex to express and advance critical ideas grounded in careful reading of history from the perspective of a lesser continental maritime power that invoked some controversy and condemnation from France's closest ally. The curriculum taught at the French Army's higher war school still overwhelmingly catered to an army audience and military matters of material interest. That naval tactics and strategy received some measure of attention is surprising enough, but that the army's higher war school became the focal-point for such questioning and reassessment is indeed significant in terms of original thinking, and drawing lessons from the wartime naval experience.

Why then a French interest in the Battle of Jutland? Although the *Marine nationale* missed the most significant major fleet action during the First World War due to the deployment of its main fleet in the Mediterranean, the naval battle held a certain fascination for army and naval officers alike. It was well known, mainly for its missed opportunities and at the time, indecisive result. Beyond the details of the sea battle itself and the forces involved, naval lectures at the higher war school emphasised Imperial Germany's choice of a submarine warfare campaign. During the interwar period, Castex eventually synthesised the precepts of both the *Jeune École* and Mahan schools that were already prevalent in the French Navy into a coherent theory of strategy and naval warfare. The 152 pages of lectures on the naval battle of Jutland delivered by Lieutenant-Commander (*Capitaine de corvette*) Édouard Richard to army officers attending Promotion 41 (1919-21) at the Paris higher war school (Figure 1) illustrate efforts to produce army officers with at least a modicum of knowledge of naval warfare.

[4]Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, 'French Naval Strategy: A Naval Power in a Continental Environment', ed., N.A.M. Roger, *Naval Power in the Twentieth Century*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), pp. 61-62.



Figure 1: Front cover of Alfred Édouard Richard's lectures on the naval battle of Jutland, marked secret.[5]

Professional French Naval Commentary on the German War at Sea

The *Marine nationale* entered and finished the First World War in a materially substandard state which severely restricted how it could deploy and what it could do operationally. French warship construction that had begun under a 1912 naval law, with planned expenditures projected out to 1920, was largely left undone.[6] During the war, priority for employment of labour in naval arsenals, shipyards, and maritime-related industrial concerns was given over to shell production and armaments manufacture for the army. Following the *Entente Cordiale* it was agreed that French battleships, like the *Paris* commissioned in 1914 (Figure 2), and armoured cruisers would be concentrated in the Mediterranean naval army (*Armée navale*). The zone of northern armed forces (*Zone des armées du Nord*) involved mostly maintenance of mine barrages, coastal defence, patrol work, and escort duties by destroyers and

[5]*École supérieure de guerre. La bataille navale du Jutland – Conférences de M. le Capitaine de corvette breveté Richard de l'État-Major Général de la Marine, 41e Promotion 1920-21*, original document in author's possession; Surviving copies can also be found at selected non-lending European defence libraries and an English translation in The National Archives, Kew (hereinafter TNA), ADM 203/68; All translations from the original French in this document and other sources are by the author.

[6]Ray Walser, *France's Search for a Battle Fleet: Naval Policy and Naval Power 1898-1914*, (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1992), p. 210.

smaller warships.[7] Consequently, French participation in naval operations against the heavy units of the German fleet before, during, and after the Battle of Jutland was limited. That left the British Grand Fleet, under Admiral John Jellicoe's command, the primary contender on the Allied side in this theatre of operations.[8]



Figure 2: The Courbet-class dreadnought *Paris* spent most of the First World War in the Mediterranean with the 1st *Armée navale* and continued active service in the *Marine nationale* throughout the 1920s.[9]

[7]*Capitaine de vaisseau de resérve* A. Thomazi, *La marine française dans la Grande guerre 1914-1918*: *La Guerre navale dans la zone des armées du Nord*, (Paris: Payot, 1925); Olivier Gomez, '« Tranchées mouvantes… »: vivre et combattre sur les torpilleurs et contre-torpilleurs de la Zone des armées du Nord', *Revue d'histoire maritime*, 20, (2015), pp. 43-64.

[8]Mike Farquharson-Roberts, *A History of the Royal Navy – World War I*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris and Co., 2014); David K. Brown, *The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922*, (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2010); Jellicoe became First Sea Lord at the Admiralty in November 1916, where he was overly preoccupied by the threat and tribulations of German submarines. Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, *The Crisis of the Naval War*, (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1921).

[9]*Marine*, vol. 3, June 1938-February 1939, scrapbook in author's possession; John Jordan and Philippe Caresse, *French Battleships of World War One*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017); Jean Moulin, 'France La Marine Nationale', eds., Vincent P. O'Hara, W. David Dickson, and Richard Worth, *To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), p. 69.

The Battle of Jutland attracted notable contemporary comment in Paris. Olivier Guihéneuc's straightforward factual recounting was the first attempt in French to assess the naval battle's significance, within the limits of wartime censorship: 'The Battle of Jutland is therefore a beautiful, indisputable victory for the British fleet, a glorious victory certainly, which dealt a disastrous blow to the enemy and greatly reduced its means to do harm, but which did not entirely reduce it to impotence: Germany still has a 'fleet-in-being'.'[10] Contemporary claims that the major sea battle in the North Sea was a win for the Allies, or at least a draw, received some backing.[11] Retired Rear-Admiral Robert Degouy, a regular contributor to the *Revue des deux mondes*, offered that the numerical and gunnery advantages favoured the British, so much so, that the German High Seas Fleet was unwilling to take risks and retired back to port: 'Obviously, the battle of 31 May did not definitely decide the pre-eminence of the British fleet in pitched battle. We are well aware that this was due to the circumstances particularly favourable for the weaker of the two parties, circumstances which are not found twice in the same war.'[12] The German admiral commanding decided when to accept or refuse combat, preferring instead preservation of irreplaceable capital ships and continuation of a fleet-in-being strategy. Based on his previous teaching at the higher war school, Degouy knew that though indecisive, the naval battle's outcome caused the respective sides to reassess their strategies toward 'moral maneuver', one of the French admiral's favourite catchphrases.[13] Other naval professional overviews concentrated on perceived tactical implications and stressed the impact of new technologies on naval combat between fleets, which made another battle like Jutland remote.[14]

Immediate post-war analysis of Jutland by French naval professionals extended this opinion. Rear-Admiral René Daveluy, well-known for his earlier published writings on naval strategy, tactics, and organisation, presented a broad historical narrative, grounded in a keen appreciation of theory, of the naval war against Imperial Germany

[10]Olivier Guihéneuc, *La bataille navale du Jutland 31 mai 1916*, (Paris: Perrin, 1917), p. 210.

[11]Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, *Jutland 1916: Death in the Grey Waters*, (London: Cassell, 2003), pp. 417-425; V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland: The German Perspective*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

[12]*Contre-amiral* Degouy, *La guerre navale & l'offensive*, (Paris: Librairie Chapelot, 1917), p. 255.

[13]Jean-Noël Grandhomme, 'Du pompon à la plume: l'amiral Degouy, commentateur de la guerre et de la « paix d'inquiétude », 1914-1919', *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 227, 3, (2007), p. 60.

[14]*Capitaine de frégate* de Parseval, *La bataille navale du Jutland (31 mai 1916)*, (Paris: Payot, 1919), pp. 141-156; *Capitaine de frégate* J. Vaschalde, *Les leçons de la guerre: Marine et guerre navale*, (Paris: Masson & cie, 1920), pp. 88-96.

in his two-volume *Maritime Action during the Anti-German War*. A section on the Battle of Jutland stressed the enduring contest between accurate penetrating gunfire and protective armour as well as the effect that torpedoes with longer effective range had on dispositions and engagements.[15] Although superior in numbers of torpedo-carrying boats, the Germans achieved little success in pressing home attacks in the face of British counter-maneuver.[16] A central premise behind the Jeune École's favouring of torpedo attacks by smaller warships thus came into question. At least one French naval professional writing in 1920 still favoured day and night actions with torpedoes over gunnery.[17] Of course, the submarine was the stealthiest means to fire torpedoes against massed surface ships, and *the Marine nationale* had significant numbers of them, although mostly for defensive purposes.

Lieutenant Jacques Amet solicited a preface letter from Vice-Admiral Lacaze for his own writing (Figure 3):

> The high seas fleets, for their part, played no less a useful role, by blockading the ports of our enemies, who had to give up trying to conquer the mastery of the sea. This was an essential condition for the use of these great maritime nations, the loss of which was bound to cause them to give up the fight. The Germans understood this well, and the Battle of Jutland, long prepared, marks a capital hour by the supreme effort attempted to open a way to the oceans which is essential to the life of peoples.[18]

[15]*Contre-amiral* Daveluy, *L'Action Maritime pendant la guerre anti-germanique*, vol. I (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1920), pp. 136-140.
[16]*Service historique de la Défense* (SHD), Vincennes, *Lieutenant de vaisseau* R. Leloup, *Opérations des forces légères et des torpilleurs à la bataille du Jutland*, École supérieure de guerre navale, Promotion 1921; *Contre-amiral* Lepotier, *Les derniers torpilleurs*, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1969), pp. 74-76; John Brooks, 'British Destroyers at Jutland: Torpedo Tactics in Theory and Action', *British Journal for Military History*, 3, 3, (2017), pp. 36-38. https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/757 [accessed 24 October 2023].
[17]*Lieutenant de vaisseau* A. Jeannin, *Les bâtiments de surface dans la guerre navale,* (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1920), pp. 10-11; John Brooks, *Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
[18]*Lieutenant de vaisseau* Jacques Amet, *Le Jutland: Bataille navale du 31 mai 1916*, (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1923), pp. 8-9; Edward Breck book review Jacques Amet, 'Le Jutland: bataille navale du 31 mai 1916', *American Historical Review*, 29, 2, (January 1924), pp. 335-337.

Figure 3: Vice-Admiral Lucien Lacaze, France's Minister of Marine (October 1915-August 1917)[19]

From Lacaze's perspective, Jutland was less important than the steady work that the warships of the *Marine nationale* performed in countering German submarines over the course of the war and the utter lack of regard for the wartime navy by the French polity.[20] As a result, the French Navy finished the First World War in a worse condition than when it started, due to some notable losses and a lack of replacement

[19]*Section photographique de l'Armée*, photograph in author's possession; Jean-Philippe Zanco, *Dictionnaire des ministres de la marine 1689-1958*, (Paris: Éditions SPM, 2011), pp. 538-540.

[20]Martin Motte, 'Une surprenante surprise: les U-boote dans la Grande Guerre', *Stratégique*, 106, 2, (2014), p. 57.

shipbuilding. Amet's own brother was lost as an ensign on the armoured cruiser *Léon Gambetta* sunk by an Austrian submarine on 27 April 1915, to whom he dedicated his study of the naval battle.[21] The book, divided into three parts, explained general considerations of naval tactics, the episodes and encounters of the battling fleets, as well as the resulting indecisiveness and some critical tactical errors. Amet lamented the posture adopted by Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet:

> Defensive and non-offensive spirit, which considers only strength of numbers capable of ensuring Victory, leaves one satisfied if the adversary leaves the battlefield, without worrying about the price paid for this half-victory, without having tried to make the enemy pay dearly for his ardor, nor to deprive him of the means of attempting a new assault. Such a tactic applied on land would have made it very difficult for us to drive the Germans out of France.[22]

According to his analogy between naval and land warfare, the Grand Fleet's task was left undone. Memoirs from duelling senior officers and treatment in official histories would leave the debate over Jutland unsettled.[23] It was therefore an interesting topic in a PME setting for discussion by army officers, as it could be seen from many angles, not purely naval ones.

Students and the Curriculum at the Higher War School

When the *École supérieure de guerre* resumed its programmes in Paris in November 1919, a new senior leadership brought a sense of seriousness and purposefulness to the provision of advanced officer education in the French Army. The position of commandant went to General Marie Eugène Debeney (Figure 4). Debeney was previously a professor of applied tactics (infantry) at the pre-war school, and was considered a protégé of Marshal Philippe Pétain, whom he served under as a chief-of-staff in 1917. He commanded the French First Army in the final battles and offensives of the war, coordinating closely with General Henry Rawlinson and the British Fourth Army at Amiens, and in Allied military operations against the Hindenburg defensive

[21]Matt Perry, 'Vive La France: Death at Sea, the French Navy and the Great War', *French History*, 26, 3, (2012), p. 345; Stephen S. Roberts, *French Warships in the Age of Steam 1859-1914: Design, Construction, Careers and Fates*, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Seaforth, 2021), p. 366.

[22]Amet, *Le Jutland*, p. 114.

[23] Moretz, *Thinking Wisely, Planning Boldly*, pp. 42-43; John Brooks, *The Battle of Jutland*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. xvii; Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*, (London: John Murray, 1996); Keith Yates, *Flawed Victory: Jutland 1916*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 257-269.

line.[24] Debeney therefore combined practical experience of higher command, an inclination for offensive action, and strong ideas about the type of officers needed to conduct the modern forms of warfare.

Figure 4: General Marie Eugène Debeney, commandant *École supérieure de guerre* (November 1919-January 1924), Chief of the General Staff (February 1924-January 1930)[25]

In a 1920 article entitled *The Officer*, General Debeney wrote:

[24]Elizabeth Greenhalgh, *The French Army and the First World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 324-328; Robert A. Doughty, *Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 498-499.
[25]*L'Illustration* print, in author's possession.

> Education intended to train officers is therefore given first and foremost by the very framework of their existence in terms of social values. He is, in addition, developed and invigorated by a purely professional education intended to train the officer, whatever his branch of arms, in the dual role of leader and instructor. It is to this professional education above all else that applies the experiences of war.[26]



Figure 5: The commandant's visiting card from the higher war school.[27]

The winning ways of 1918 were codified into French military doctrine. During his time at the higher war school (Figure 5), Debeney participated in a commission to produce the landmark *Provisional Instruction on the Tactical Employment of Large Units*, which underpinned the French Army's thinking during this period.[28] After the February 1924 death of General Edmond Buat, Debeney became the Chief of the General Staff, and served at the top of the army for the rest of the decade. Under Debeney's earnest direction, the higher war school educated officers selected for the first promotion classes after the First World War.

Promotion 41 (1919-21) marked a full return to the usual two-year programme. A shortened Promotion 40 (1919-20), which had been halted half-way through 1914,

[26]*Général* Debeney, 'L'officier', *Revue des deux mondes*, 57, 1, (1 May 1920), p. 25; Debeney was an engineer officer by background, but he commanded infantry formations. Faris R. Kirkland, 'Governmental Policy and Combat Effectiveness: France 1920-1940', *Armed Forces and Society*, 18, 2, (Winter 1992), p. 178.

[27]Original card in author's possession.

[28]SHD, *Ministère de la guerre*, *L'instruction provisoire sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1923); Robert J. Young, 'Preparations for Defeat: French war doctrine in the inter-war period', *Journal of European Studies*, 2, (1972), pp. 160-161.

started concurrently on 4 November 1919, and comprised of those officers still alive after the war.[29] Admission to the higher war school was by competitive examination, from which successful candidates were ranked by placement.

Infantry	56
Artillery	24
Cavalry	8
Engineers	1
Colonial infantry	2
Colonial artillery	1
Total French Admissions	**92**
Foreign officers[30]	28

Table 1: Table for admissions of officers to Promotion 41 *École supérieure de guerre*.[31]

Roughly half the officers attending Promotion 41 were infantry, a little less than a quarter artillery, some cavalry, and a few others (Table 1). The colonial infantry and artillery were closely associated with the French Navy. A sizeable number of officers also came from other foreign countries to study at the higher war school. The language of instruction remained French, although courses in English and German were offered. The United States Marine Corps later sent its officers to the higher war school in Paris, although none joined in the 1919-21 years.[32] Four United States Army officers with wartime service in France also attended and advanced later to higher rank: Lieutenant-General Raymond Wheeler, Colonel Charles Lull, Colonel Charles Martin, and Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Budd.[33] Georges Lescornez from Belgium and Jan

[29]*Bulletin trimestriel de l'Association des amis de l'école supérieure de guerre*, 91, 3, (1981), p. 11; Claude Franc, '120 ans d'École supérieure de Guerre (2/2): 1920-1992', *Revue défense nationale*, 818, (March 2019), p. 78.

[30]Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Japan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and Yugoslavia were represented.

[31]*Journal officiel de la République française*, 196, (22 July 1919), pp. 7580-7582.

[32]Donald F. Bittner, 'Foreign Military Officer Training in Reverse: U.S. Marine Corps Officers in the French Professional Military Education System in the Interwar Years', *Journal of Military History*, 57, 3, (July 1993), p. 486.

[33]The Trustees of Reservations Archives and Research Center, Sharon, Massachusetts, Arthur D. Budd papers, series VI, box 6, file 1, Major A.D. Budd, Infantry, 'Report on École supérieure de guerre, at Paris', 27 June 1922; Wheeler was Louis Mountbatten's deputy supreme commander (American general working for British admiral) in the South East Asia Command (SEAC) during the Second World War. Hoover Institution

Sadowski from Poland also attended and reached the rank of general in their respective armed forces. France sent military missions to Poland, Romania, and other allied countries, which reserved spots at the higher war school in Paris for promising officers.

Studies at the higher war school followed a scheduled routine. The main building possessed two large lecture halls with the latest audio-visual aids, and were each able to hold 120 persons; one room was reserved for each of the Promotion courses underway at any given time.[34] Officers were also organised into smaller individual groups consisting of ten French officers and typically three or four foreign officers, who met in classrooms for discussions, wargames, consideration of tactical schemes, and problems posed by professors and instructors. Students stayed with the same class group for the entire two years, getting to know each other well. The day started with forty-five minutes of compulsory horse-riding up to four times per week.[35] Lectures were an hour long, usually in the morning, and the afternoons were devoted to group work, preparatory reading, or assignment writing. Officers were assessed on their professional and academic performance with final examinations held at the end of the programme on all taught subjects.

Naval content in the curriculum at the higher war school formed only a small portion in an otherwise busy programme comprising more than 200 lectures in total. Resident military faculty professors and assistants delivered the Core Courses, which received the overwhelming number of instructional hours across both years (Table 2). As General Debeney noted,

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Library and Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, California, Raymond Albert Wheeler papers, box 11, file 50, letter, Mountbatten to Speck, 23 September 1945.

[34]"The 'Ecole Superieure De Guerre,' Paris', *RUSI Journal*, 70, 477, (February 1925), pp. 1-7.

[35]Lieutenant-Colonel G. Guy Waterhouse, 'Notes on the École Supérieure de Guerre, Paris', *Army Quarterly*, 8, (July 1924), p. 325; General Henri Bonnal, an infantry officer, military historian, and zealous equestrian, had first made horse-riding mandatory during his time commanding the higher war school, as a form of physical exercise, team-building practice, and requisite skill for any staff officer; officers were prohibited from show jumping due to too many injuries. Commandant Bonnal, *Équitation*, (Paris: Librairie militaire de L. Baudoin et cie, 1890); Fencing was another popular semi-compulsory sport and the school's outdoor playing field used for hockey and other ball games. The relative age and fitness levels of the students led to much over-exertion and 'walking wounded' during school days, besides good stories that added to the constant general banter in the classroom typical of the military environment.

> take care during the first year at the school to limit the work of officers to the in-depth study of procedures specific to each weapon - infantry, artillery, aviation, cavalry, signals; then, during the second year focus specifically on the combination of all these weapons together, and you will have created a flexible thinker eminently suited to form the qualities, I do not say ever sufficient, but necessary for good judgment and decision in a practical sense.[36]

Mandatory Core Courses
General tactics and staff duties
Military history
Applied infantry tactics
Applied artillery tactics
Applied cavalry tactics
Fortification, engineering, and telegraphy equipment
Aeronautics service
Munition and armaments manufacture
Horse riding
English language
German language
Secondary Elective Courses
Sanitation and health
Administration
Applied naval tactics and strategy

Table 2: Subject courses on the two-year programme at the higher war school.[37]

Instructors and lecturers brought in from outside the higher war school customarily delivered the Elective Courses in either of the two years. Applied naval tactics and strategy, one of those electives, received a total of nine instructional hours in the second year. When the French Navy's higher naval school (*École supérieure de marine*) became active again in January 1920, General Debeney established good relations with its director, Rear-Admiral Jean Ratyé, and arranged for the exchange of instructors, such as Commander Georges Laurent.[38] The higher naval school was restructured to

[36]*Général* Debeney, 'L'école supérieure de guerre', *Revue de deux mondes*, 37, 1, (1 January 1927), p. 91.
[37]*Annuaire officiel de l'Armée française*, (1920/1921), p. 1294.
[38]Rémi Monaque, 'L'enseignement interarmées à l'École de guerre navale avant la Second Guerre mondiale', *Revue historique des armées*, 198, (March 1995), p. 118; *Vice-amiral* Ratyé, 'L'École de Guerre navale', *La Revue maritime*, 61, (January 1925), pp. 6-

become the naval war school (*École de guerre navale*) in May 1921. Compared to the 120 army officers attending the two-year Promotion 41, fifteen naval officers spent twelve months on the higher naval school's Promotion 1920-21, including one foreign officer from Brazil.

In the second year of Promotion 41, the naval lectures at the higher war school were delivered by knowledgeable naval officers invited from the French Navy's central service and naval general staff (*État-major general de la Marine*), and included a set of three covering the Battle of Jutland. The focus on subjects corresponded with what Debeney as commandant deemed necessary for facilitating active learning amongst the army officers.

Sober assessments of an indecisive naval battle

General Debeney made a point of finding the best subject matter experts available to lecture at the higher war school and they followed a common pedagogical approach. Pairing of Jutland with general lectures on naval warfare accorded with Debeney's preference for 'concrete cases' that allowed officers to work through a historical event or operational situation on their own terms, and then subject their analysis and deductions to in-depth criticism and reflection from instructors which involved 'the officers quickly analysing a situation, finding as many a practical solution quickly, and pursuing with conviction execution.'[39]

The purpose was not to accumulate general knowledge, but to train officers to assess and ponder a tactical or operational problem toward decision. Some army officers certainly had friends or relatives, typically fathers, brothers, uncles, or cousins, in the navy, which allowed them to talk with some authority in relation to the general knowledge level present in the higher war school classes, though rarely enough to hold strong opinions on the intricacies of naval tactics and strategy.[40] For many attending army officers, this time was their first real in-depth exposure to navies and naval matters, in the same way that they learned about the combat arms outside their

7; Laurent was Ratyé's assistant director and professor of strategy and naval tactics at the higher naval school in 1920-21. *Annuaire de la Marine*, (1921), p. 915.

[39]Debeney, 'L'école supérieure de guerre', pp. 90-91; The historical method was not universally liked. Henri Nichel, 'Pour l'enseignement de l'organisation à l'École supériere de guerre', *Revue militaire française*, 92, 7, (1 January 1922), pp. 209-210.

[40]In some families with military ties or middle-class origins, one or more siblings joined the army, while others entered the navy or pursued professions like engineering, law, and medicine. Ronald Chalmers Hood III, *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), pp. 22-26.

own service branch. The provided instruction was meant to be broadening with new content.

Debeney sought out instructors well-versed in the topical field of study as well as possessing some measure of relatable field service experience. Lieutenant-Commander Édouard Richard, the officer assigned to deliver the Battle of Jutland lectures, commanded a torpedo boat and a gunboat during the war, finished the abbreviated Promotion 1920 at the higher naval school, and served as a detached officer with the French Navy's historical service and then in the naval general staff's 3e bureau – operations (EMG 3).[41] He was subsequently deputy chief of the military cabinet under Senator Flaminius Raiberti, Minister of Marine (January 1922-January 1924), and eventually attained the rank of vice-admiral in 1939. Commander Raoul Castex, the other naval officer, was chief of the historical service and archives, having served in various staff and operational wartime roles.[42] He authored several books before the war dealing with the naval general staff (1908), military ideas in the navy to the eighteenth-century from de Rutyer to Suffren (1911), commerce warfare and convoy (1912), and the policy, strategy, and tactics behind the 1781 naval battle at La Praya (1912). Castex had attended the truncated Promotion 1913-14 at the *École supérieure de marine*.[43] He was the designated naval lecturer at the higher war school during Promotion 41 and a constant face in naval uniform for the army officers, whom were there to learn and to some extent be entertained. The material was meant to get them thinking, as Debeney hoped, to become critical generalist staff officers and future commanders in the French and foreign armies.

Richard's opening lecture on Jutland described the geography, the comparative numbers, types, and fighting strength of the British and German fleets, and the premises on which they were deployed according to modes of operating, and the

[41]*Annuaire de la Marine*, (1922), p. 53; Étienne Taillemite, *Dictionnaire des marins français*, (Paris: Tallandier, 2002), pp. 448-449; *Contre-amiral* Rémi Monaque, *L'école de guerre navale*, (Vincennes: Service historique de la Marine, 1995), p. 384.

[42]*Annuaire de la Marine*, (1921), p. 55; Jean Martinant de Préneuf, 'Neptune et Clio: Le Service historique de la Marine 1919-1974', *Revue historique des armées*, 216, (September 1999), pp. 6-9; In contrast to journals and notes kept during the war, Castex's personal papers mostly miss this period as the historical service's chief and lecturer at the army and navy higher war schools, though one box contains Washington conference materials. SHD, GG2 125, Admiral Raoul Castex.

[43]Chris Madsen, 'Attendance at the École Supérieure de Marine in Paris from 1900 to 1914', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 108, 2, (May 2022), p. 238; Wartime duties also left a book unfinished on combined arms in the naval context using much historical illustration. *Amiral* Castex, ed., Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *La liaison des armes sur mer*, (Paris: Economica, 1991).

personalities of the admirals commanding the respective navies. The second lecture expounded on the movements and dispositions in the build-up to the naval battle, through distinct chronological phases. The decision-making of the commanders with the communications received and information available at any point in time was especially emphasised. The third lecture gave a detailed account of the engagement of the main fleets, and the turn away of the main body of the German High Seas Fleet. The focus was again primarily on the actions and decisions of responsible admirals and commanding officers, in particular the perceived cautiousness of Admiral Jellicoe. The army officers learned the basic difference between a battleship and a destroyer, and related command in the naval context to more familiar land milieus. For an army imbued with the offensive, the indecisive result of the naval battle was bewildering.

Richard drew out for his army audience the broader strategic implications of this missed opportunity from the French perspective:

> Militarily, can we say that from the Battle of Jutland there was a clear winner or loser? No. Obviously, considered from the general strategic point of view, this battle constituted a type of indecisive action, without influence on the development and final outcome of operations. The destruction of the German fleet would have had great morale, political, and military consequences. Without even insisting on the effect of morale breakdown, perhaps indirectly that would have been produced amongst our enemies; it would have enabled us to deprive the Germans control of the Baltic, which they retained until the end.[44]

Therefore, Jutland was of interest mostly in the negative, and to show the consequences of not pushing offensively, as the Royal Navy had done so successfully in the past (many times against the French Navy). The German fleet lived to see another day, with the Great War finally decided on land and by blockade.

Castex was even more unmoved about the Battle of Jutland's relevance in his 1920-21 naval tactics lectures at the higher war school, focused mainly on submarine warfare and the liaison of arms. The brief engagement between the rival battle fleets warranted only a brief mention and he instead focussed on the German plans for the use of submarines before, during, and after the battle.[45] The indecisiveness of Jutland was

[44] *La bataille navale du Jutland – Conférences*, pp. 146-151; *Capitaine de corvette* É. Richard, 'Réflexions sur la bataille du Jutland', *La Revue maritime*, 7, (July 1920), pp. 1-30, 192-216.

[45] *École supérieure de guerre, Tactique navale: Nouveaux aspects de la liaison des Armes – A propos de la Guerre sous-marine allemande*, *Capitaine de frégate Castex*, 1920-21, pp. 197-198, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9610376q?rk=2145;2 [accessed 24 October 2023].

more important for its effect on the German submarine campaign against commerce, which like warfare on land continued unabated.

Army officers learned that the submarine was a potent weapon that was used effectively in an offensive manner to sink shipping and seek out the warships of the Allied fleets. Imperial Germany resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare that followed no legal rules of visit and search, to maximise Allied losses at sea and cut off vital supply routes. That strategy brought the United States into the war and tipped the balance on the land fronts by bringing to France large numbers of fresh trained troops in General John Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).[46] Castex drew the connections to the indecisive result at Jutland back to his main themes:

> The enemy realised only too late that in order to ensure the success of their submarines, the Allied Grand Fleet had to be annihilated by some means, and they missed every opportunity for this reason.
>
> The U-turn of the German fleet on the day of the Battle of Jutland, to name but one, definitely sealed the fate of the submarine war. In terms of liaison of arms, the weakest party on the surface, or turn-tail in this theatre, could not hope to be victorious by limiting itself to acting from below.
>
> This monumental error by the enemy is the fundamental and real cause of the failure of submarine warfare. It was enough to fix many shortcomings among the Allies. In war, everyone makes mistakes; the winner is often the only one who has committed the fewest. The key is not to make mistakes 'that cause the enterprise to be lost', as Admiral Suffren said, and neglecting liaison of arms is one of those.[47]

For Castex, the fleet-in-being strategy pursued by the Germans hindered effective coordination between surface and underwater forces. Attacks on commerce alone could not win the war at sea, although German progress on the technical and construction sides was impressive, especially compared to French efforts.

Accordingly, the French Navy sought and obtained a sizeable share of submarines, torpedoes, diesel engines, and stocks of stores and spares as reparations under the

[46]*École supérieure de guerre*, *L'effort américain pendant la grande guerre – Conférence faite aux officiers de l'École supérieure de guerre, le 7 Janvier 1920*, pp. 39-44, original document in author's possession; Meighan McCrae, *Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Council and War Planning, 1917-1918*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 140-142.
[47]Castex, *Tactique navale*, pp. 213-214.

Treaty of Versailles, including some of the latest cruising and higher surface speed U-boats.[48] Castex held that Germany's prosecution of submarine warfare was basically sound, and furthermore commended itself to another continental power like France if faced with waging a major conflict against a superior navy. The mixed squadrons of ex-German submarines and existing French submarines provided an interim capability until France could embark on building larger numbers of newer designs based on wartime experience and imported technical know-how (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Nighttime view of crew lined-up on the French submarine *Daphné* (Q-108), commissioned in 1916, with the *Gustave Zédé* (GZ) alongside and *Dupuy de Lôme* (DL) behind.[49]

As a first step, Adolphe Landry, Minister of Marine (January 1920-January 1921), added twelve submarines to the existing 1920 naval construction programme initiated by his predecessor, Georges Leygues, while the stated eventual goal was at least 100.[50]

[48]*Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual* (1920-1), p. 52; Henri Le Masson, *Du Nautilus (1800) au Redoutable*, (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1969), pp. 255-258; Aidan Dodson and Serena Cant, *Spoils of War: The Fate of Enemy Fleets after the Two World Wars*, (Barnsley: Seaforth, 2020), p. 24.

[49]Photograph in author's possession; Henri Le Masson, *Les sous-marins français: des origins (1863) à nos jours*, (Brest and Paris: Éditions de la Cité, 1980), p. 146.

[50]Zanco, *Dictionnaire des ministres de la marine*, p. 346; *Capitaine de frégate* Le Peu, 'Le sous-marin en France au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale', *Revue historique des armées*, 3, (1990), p. 28; *Ministère de la marine*, *Projet de loi présenté à la Chambre des Députes portant fixation du Budget général de l'exercice 1920*, (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1920); Étienne Taillemite, 'Georges Leygues 1917-1933: Une politique maritime pour la France', *Revue historique des armées*, 201, (December 1995), pp. 33-

Submarines fulfilled defensive and offensive purposes in the *Marine nationale*, close-to and far away from French shores.

The Castex Affair & British Concerns

Though merely professional opinions, Castex's teachings at the *École supérieure de guerre* evoked controversy as the French government negotiated naval limitations and pondered future naval construction programmes. The lectures were serialised under the title *Synthesis of Submarine Warfare* across four issues of *La Revue maritime*, a revamped professional periodical published by the French Navy's historical service and edited by Castex.[51] During discussions about putting wider restrictions onto submarines, a British delegate to the Washington conference on armaments limitations and First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lee of Fareham, quoted directly from one of Castex's articles to make the claim that France held ulterior motives for using submarines in a similar manner to the Germans against the commerce of Great Britain and the Royal Navy.[52] French officials were quick to point out that Castex's views were strictly personal, having no bearing on the formal policies of either the French government or the *Marine nationale*. In fact, they found the whole suggestion quite preposterous and a disheartening dispute amongst two supposed allies, since Lord Lee stubbornly refused to retract his assertions.[53] Diplomatically in Washington, the British favoured abolishing submarines outright, while the French wanted to possess large numbers of them.[54] Something had been lost in the translation between French and English, Lord Lee's critics maintained, that led to this misunderstanding.

34; Chalmers Hood, 'The French Navy and Parliament between the Wars', *International History Review*, 6, 3, (1984), p. 389.

[51]*Capitaine de frégate* R. Castex, 'Synthèse de la guerre sous-marine', *La Revue maritime*, 1st semester, (1920), pp. 1-29, 161-184, 305-326, 478-503; republished in first half of *Synthèse de la guerre sous-marine: de Pontchartrain à Tirpitz*, (Paris: Challamel, 1920); Martin Motte, 'L'après-grand guerre dans *La Revue maritime*, 1920-1923', ed., Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *L'évolution de la pensée navale VI*, (Paris: Economica, 1997), pp. 144-150.

[52]*Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 652-662; 'France Uneasy', *Western Morning News*, (31 December 1921).

[53]'Sharp Exchanges. Lively debate on submarine issue', *Pall Mall Gazette*, (1 February 1922); 'A Point of Honour. France and the Submarine. Naval Expert Misquoted', *The Times* (London), (6 February 1922); 'France and the Submarine. Lord Lee's Error', *Evening Mail* (London), (8 February 1922).

[54]Joel Blatt, 'France and the Washington Conference', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 4, 3, (1993), p. 205.

Castex's teaching positions and writings conferred him with some influence, but as yet little beyond the confines of the PME institutions in France's army and navy. In 1920-21, Castex lectured at the higher naval school on staff organisation and duties, far different subject matter than the second-year naval lectures at the higher war school:

> The aim of the staff course is to define the rules of organisation and aiding operating mechanisms placed at various levels of command, when they operate in the current service, and especially when they may act in wartime.[55]

Rear-Admiral Ratyé corroborated that another resident faculty member, Commander Laurent, was responsible for teaching naval tactics and strategy at the higher naval school, whose course content was substantially different to Castex's lectures to the army. More so than the army officers, naval officers attending the *Marine nationale*'s Promotion courses pushed back against some of Castex's historical interpretations and ideas as conflicting with both their own and with prevailing opinion in the navy. In July 1921, Castex had left Paris to become chief-of-staff to Rear-Admiral Maxime Raphaël Le Vavasseur in the Second Battleship Division of the Mediterranean squadron.

Personally, Castex and his fellow naval officers at Toulon were bemused by the attention given in London to his published higher war school lectures. Lord Lee sparred with the *Times* newspaper over the accuracy of reports on his original dispute with Castex, and according to its editor, Wickham Steed, crossed over into misrepresentation.[56] The *Times* curtly refused to publish a letter received from Lord Lee in response. Arthur Balfour rose in the House of Commons on 23 February 1922 to clarify that Castex was entitled to view unrestricted submarine warfare as a preferred method of warfare, just not explicitly against Great Britain.[57] France formally

[55]*Ministère de la Marine*, *École Supérieure de la Marine*, *Etat-Major. Conférences de M. le Capitaine de frégate Castex*, vol. 1, 1921, p. 3, original document (2 volumes) in author's possession; The previous year 1920 lectures are held in military libraries at Brest, Cherbourg, and Toulon, SHD.

[56]'A Point of Honour. Captain Castex and Lord Lee', *The Times* (London), (20 February 1922); 'Challenge by Lord Lee', *Aberdeen Daily Journal*, (18 February 1922); Lord Lee offered to contribute £100 to a local London hospital if found to be wrong about Castex. 'Captain Castex. Lord Lee and the 'Times'', *Westminster Gazette*, (18 February 1922); 'France and Submarines. Lord Lee and the Castex article', *Civil and Military Gazette*, (21 February 1922).

[57]'Submarine War. Mr. Balfour on Captain Castex's Outburst', *Daily News* (London), (24 February 1922); 'Castex Castigated', *Hull Daily Mail*, (24 February 1922); 'France and Submarines', *The Scotsman*, (24 February 1922); Christopher M. Bell, *The Royal*

was a military ally and its land army an important counter to Germany on the continent.

Although forced to accept a building holiday on battleships, strict tonnage limits on cruisers and aircraft carriers, and a parity ratio with Italy during the Washington Treaty negotiations, France ensured there were neither size nor quantity limitations placed on the construction of submarines and destroyers. The elected Chamber of Deputies in Paris finally ratified the Washington Treaty in July 1923 and authorised increased funding commitments towards the building of up to 124,000 tonnes of submarines (naval authorities asked for 96,000 tonnes).[58] The result was all the more surprising since the French government was in retrenchment concerning most matters of national defence. The nine-boat Requin-class were improved French copies of German wartime designs, eminently suited to conducting ocean-going operations against maritime commerce.[59] They naturally concerned the British, until the French Navy turned its attention to fleet submarines, larger destroyers, and modern cruisers in the remainder of the decade. Signifying the ties between the French Army and *Marine nationale*, one of those cruisers was named after Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a former military professor and commandant at the higher war school. Disquiet over results from the Washington conference and Castex's lectures at the higher war school cast a shadow over the intent of interwar French naval strategy and already guarded relations with the British.[60]

The uproar did not impair Castex's intellectual pursuits or advancement to the highest rank of admiral. He subsequently developed his ideas on strategy and naval warfare

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Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), chap. 1.

[58]John Jordan, 'French Submarine Development Between the Wars', ed., Robert Gardiner, *Warship 1991*, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1991), p. 62; *Capitaine de vaisseau de resérve* Claude Huan, *Les sous-marins français 1918-1945*, (Bourg-en-Bresse: Marines Édition, 2004), p. 24; Nabil Erouihane, 'La 'construction des armes navales' en France de 1871 à 1961: naissance et restructuration d'un système politico-industriel', PhD thesis, Université Michel de Montaigne, Bordeaux, 2020, p. 610.

[59]Paul E. Fontenoy, *Submarines: An Illustrated History of Their Impact*, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2007), p. 24; Thierry d'Arbonneau, ed., *L'encyclopédie des sous-marins français*, vol. 2, *D'une guerre à l'autre*, (Paris: SPE-Barthélémy, 2011).

[60]Anthony Clayton, 'Growing Respect: The Royal Navy and the Marine Nationale, 1918-39', eds., Martin S. Alexander and William J. Philpott, *Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 29; George E. Melton, *From Versailles to Mers El-Kébir: The Promise of Anglo-French Naval Cooperation, 1919-1940*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 7; A. Pearce Higgins, 'Naval Strategy. Submarines and the Fleet', *The Times* (London), (27 December 1922).

during two periods as director of the naval war school and director of a national defence college of advanced studies (*Collège des hautes études de défense nationale*) that was established in August 1936. His lecturing found expression in the published five-volume *Strategic Theories*, a ponderous synthesis of history and theory drawing upon French and foreign examples.[61] He reconciled the historical and materiel schools that had influenced the *Marine nationale*'s development up to the First World War and immediately afterwards. According to his biographer, Castex's writings and deep intellectual knowledge elevated discourse surrounding the place of armies and navies in France's defence as a nation.[62] Arguably, Admiral Castex stands out as an original French military thinker during the interwar period, starting from his early lecturing at the higher war school in 1920-21.

Armies and Navies

To be effective in war and peace, armies and navies have long encouraged working collaboratively and gaining familiarity of each other's acknowledged differences in organisation, culture, and *modus operandi*. Some higher PME institutions dedicated to delivering advanced studies institutionalised inter-service cooperation in their curriculum and teaching. The French Army possessed a reputation for including instruction in naval tactics and strategy at its higher war school. After the First World War, France was a country consumed by domestic and foreign policy concerns surrounding security, reparations, and war debt.[63] In this challenging environment, leadership at the reopened higher war school sought to learn from the experience of the war and instill in officers an ability to assess and think through complex operational problems. The Battle of Jutland, the historical case lectured on Promotion 41 during 1920-21, met the criteria of an interesting and known event surrounded by controversy, and an event with broader strategic implications, from which to distill professional knowledge and understanding.

That army officers at an army PME institution would learn about a single naval battle and so intently might seem curious, but the lectures validated many French

[61]Raoul Castex, *Théories stratégiques*, (Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1929-35); abridged English version Admiral Raoul Castex, intro. and trans., Eugenia Kiesling, *Strategic Theories*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994).

[62]Hervé Coutau-Begarie, *Castex: Le stratege inconnu*, (Paris: Economica, 1985), pp. 219-224; Lars Wedin, *Maritime Strategies for the XXI Century: The Contribution of Admiral Castex*, (Paris: Nuvis, 2016), pp. 108-109.

[63]Andrew Williams, 'Why don't the French do Think Tanks? France faces up to the Anglo-Saxon superpowers, 1918-1921', *Review of International Studies*, 34, (2008), p. 63; Faris Russell Kirkland, 'The French Officer Corps and the Fall of France – 1920-1940', PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1982, p. 27.

presumptions about the conduct of the war at sea and its relation to land warfare. In accord with prevailing French professional naval opinion, the Battle of Jutland was presented as a missed opportunity to deal the German High Seas Fleet a crippling blow at a particularly vital point in time for the Allied war effort. Lack of offensive spirit on the part of Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet explained the indecisive result, a common French view subscribed to by Richard, the knowledgeable naval officer delivering the set of three lectures. Jellicoe later confided to a French acquaintance:

> I have always been loath to write about the Jutland action in open as my own personal experiences are concerned. My greatest disappointment was that the misty weather and lack of information given to me, made it – together with the late hour of meeting – impossible to force a conclusion on May 31st or June 1st.[64]

The naval battle only confirmed for Castex the significance of submarine warfare as conducted by the Germans and a failure on their part in the liaison of arms, known in the army as combined arms. That teaching point assumed more importance than any insights army officers might have picked up on naval tactics and the maneuvers of fleets. Navies remained very much an oddity to many of them, accustomed as they were to fighting on land, and for which the broader professional studies at the higher war school prepared them to do. As an audience, army officers were inclined to accept whatever Castex and Richard told them during the naval lectures as subject matter experts representing a degree of professional opinion in the French Navy. The controversy subsequently sparked by Castex's publication of the lectures, while the British and French negotiated allowable naval limitations in Washington and the fate of submarines, only added to Castex's notoriety and reputation as an original thinker willing to challenge orthodoxy.

Neither was the higher war school's consideration of the Battle of Jutland a one-off in interwar French PME. Captain Ollivier Diaz de Soria revisited Jutland in lectures at the

[64]Foreign Navies collection – French Navy, letter, Jellicoe to deputy (Basses-Alpes) Jacques Stern, former marine under-secretary, 8 December 1932; Other available Battle of Jutland correspondence in Jellicoe's private papers show the British admiral's general personal approach toward the debate. British Library Manuscripts Collections, G58, Add. Ms. 49028; Nicholas Jellicoe, *Jutland: The Unfinished Battle*, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Seaforth, 2016); On the occasion of Jellicoe's death in November 1935, François Piétri, France's Minister of Marine (February 1933-June 1936), and senior naval officers paid the highest tribute to the British admiral, and Vice-Admiral Georges Durand-Viel, the Chief of the Naval Staff (March 1931-December 1936), was a pallbearer for the funeral at London's St. Paul's Cathedral. 'A Very Model of Naval Honour', *The Scotsman*, (22 November 1935); 'Impressive Scenes at Earl Jellicoe's Funeral', *Portsmouth Evening News*, (25 November 1935).

naval war school in 1935-36, and even with the benefit of greater documentation, concluded that Jellicoe was still blameworthy because:

> in the presence of the occasion which offered itself in particularly favourable circumstances, the admiral did not think he could reject for a time all his theoretical concerns, and run at the enemy that he had the means and he was in a situation to crush completely.[65]

If the judgment was critical, the French Army and the *Marine nationale* were at least in agreement. That after all was France's aim in achieving a common understanding across service-centred environments through the PME enterprise as a whole.

[65] *Capitaine de vaisseau* Diaz de Soria, *Tactique générale Séances d'Application No. 8 La Bataille du Jutland 31 May 1916*. *École de guerre navale*, session 1935-36, p. 70, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9760342j?rk=21459;2 [accessed 24 October 2023].

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Keeping the Occupiers Occupied: Leisure and Tourism in the British Rhine Army, 1918-1929

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ABSTRACT
After the ordeals of the First World War, the military occupation of the Rhineland offered members of the British Army unprecedented opportunities for travel and amusement. Posted to a region popular with British tourists before 1914, the British occupiers were encouraged, particularly by the English-language Cologne Post, to make the most of their time on the 'Romantic Rhine', even though the Army wished to limit their interactions with the German population. This article examines how travel and tourism, and particularly walking excursions, were promoted in the Rhine Army as healthy, educational alternatives to the perceived dangers of fraternisation and especially of city life in Cologne.

Introduction

Looking back on eleven years of Allied occupation on the Rhine, Captain J. H. Haygarth wrote in 1929 that, to many British servicemen, life among the defeated Germans had felt like 'a holiday after the struggles of the war'. 'The British soldier', Haygarth declared, 'after his strenuous four years in the trenches, felt that he was entitled to get out of the rigid military environment and enjoy the amenities offered by the beautiful country, and the community, on the banks of Father Rhine'.[1] Haygarth was neither the first nor the last British observer to draw such parallels between the life of the occupying forces and the habits of tourists in peacetime, nor to characterise the years of the Rhineland occupation as a time of travel, leisure and discovery in comparison to the war years. During the very first days of the British occupation of Cologne in December 1918, a correspondent for *The Times* had informed readers that 'as an officer of the conquering Army, one walks the streets of this occupied town

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[1] J.H.H[aygarth]., 'Eleven Years in Occupation', *Cologne Post & Wiesbaden Times* (henceforth *CPWT*), 3 November 1929.

much like a tourist'.[2] Seven years later, when British troops left the Cologne Zone for a smaller area of occupation around Wiesbaden, the *Western Daily Press* had reported that 'many British soldiers have regarded duty at Cologne as a sort of pleasant and instructive holiday.'[3] When the last members of the British Rhine Army evacuated the Wiesbaden bridgehead in 1929, *The Times* reflected that 'in many ways they had the time of their lives there'.[4] While there was certainly an element of propaganda in such statements, whether to acclaim the fruits of victory or to downplay the discomforts and monotony of military life, they nevertheless contain a kernel of truth. Numerous personal diaries, memoirs and press reports from this period described the occupation years as a time of adventure and cultural discovery, while the pages of the English-language newspaper published for the British occupiers, *The Cologne Post* (later *Cologne Post and Wiesbaden Times*) presented a wide range of cultural and recreational activities for the members of the occupying forces, from sightseeing trips on the Rhine steamers to hiking itineraries in the Taunus mountains. There are therefore many striking parallels and continuities between these touristic activities within the Rhine Army and the practices, preferences and itineraries of pre-war British tourists on the Rhine.[5] Given the importance of the Rhineland as a destination for British tourists in the decades before the First World War, the existence of such travel and leisure activities is not altogether surprising, yet they are only given the briefest of mentions in military, diplomatic and social histories of the Rhineland occupation.[6]

This article seeks not only to shed light on the importance of travel and leisure in the daily life of the British Rhine Army but also to situate these activities within the context of evolving approaches to issues of military discipline and the maintenance morale

[2]'The Occupation of Cologne: British Sentries in the City', *The Times*, 10 December 1918, p. 8.

[3] After Seven Years', *Western Daily Press*, 2 February 1926.

[4]'Rhineland Memories', *The Times*, 23 December 1929.

[5]Despite these obvious parallels, the fact that the presence of the British Army on the Rhine was not *primarily* motivated by a desire for recreation would exclude such activities from most scholarly definitions of tourism. Alexandre Panosso Netto, 'What is Tourism: Definitions, Theoretical Phases and Principles', in John Tribe (ed.) *Philosophical Issues in Tourism,* (Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2009), pp. 43-61.

[6]Sports and entertainments are briefly treated in David G. Williamson, *The British in Interwar Germany: The Reluctant Occupiers,* Second Edition, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), p. 17 and p. 134 and Margaret Pawley, *The Watch on the Rhine: the Military Occupation of the Rhineland* (London: IB Tauris, 2007), p.113. Marius Munz, *'Wiesbaden est Boche, et le restera.' Die alliierte Besetzung Wiesbadens nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, 1918-1930* (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2014), contains a chapter on the 'amusements' of the British in Wiesbaden after 1926.

within the British Army, which have been explored in detail in the context of the First World War but rarely extended to take into consideration the post-war Rhine Army.[7]

The amusements and distractions that were encouraged within the British Rhine Army were those that kept members of the armed forces entertained while limiting, to the greatest possible degree, any interaction between the occupiers and the local civilian population. As Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson explained in his 1921 memoir

> no one in the Rhine Army was allowed to 'fraternise' with the inhabitants, and to meet this unusual condition of military life additional facilities were afforded to officers and men for taking part in games, theatricals, concerts, day-trips on the Rhine, and other forms of recreation and amusement.[8]

While fraternisation was certainly not suppressed entirely, and measures to discourage it became increasingly relaxed during the 1920s, the vast majority of organised leisure activities on offer to the British occupiers encouraged them to keep to themselves and to discover the landscapes and cultural heritage of the Rhineland without coming into too close contact with the civilian population.[9]

An analysis of British soldiers' tourism and leisure activities in the occupied Rhineland reveals an underlying strategy not only to manage soldiers' free time by proposing healthy, respectable and educational activities but also to limit interactions between the occupying forces and the civilian population. This task often involved reviving pre-war tourist practices, such as steam-boat excursions, and appealing to images of the 'romantic Rhine' as a cultural and educational travel destination. It also involved attempts to steer the members of the Rhine Army away from the perceived dangers of alcohol and vice in the city of Cologne, the occupied area's largest urban centre, and towards more wholesome leisure activities such as cultural sightseeing and walking excursions. The *Cologne Post* (*and Wiesbaden Times*) played an important role in in

[7]See, among others, David Englander, 'Discipline and morale in the British army, 1917-1918' in John Horne, *State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 125-143; and Timothy Bowman, *The Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). On the rather volatile situation in 1918-1919 see William Butler, '"The British Soldier is no Bolshevik": The British Army, Discipline, and the Demobilisation Strikes of 1919', *Twentieth Century British History* 30, 3 (2019), pp. 321-346.

[8]William Robertson, *From Private to Field-Marshal,* (London: Constable, 1921), p. 362.

[9]On the relaxation of fraternisation rules see Keith Jeffery, '"Hut ab", "promenade with kamerade for shokolade", and the *Flying Dutchman:* British soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918-1929', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 16, 3 (2005), pp. 455-473.

promoting day trips and excursions, especially walking tours in the Rhine valley and surrounding countryside, and, in so doing, fostered an idealised image of an active, independent, curious and cultivated British soldier-tourist that could be considered a model for emulation. However, even by the *Cologne Post's* own admission, such attempts to encourage soldiers to make productive use of their free time only met with limited success.

The Occupiers as 'Tourists' on the 'Romantic Rhine'

Within broader historiographical trends towards the adoption of social and cultural approaches to histories of war and military occupation, several recent studies have drawn attention to the importance of travel experiences and even organised 'tourism' in military contexts.[10] Even during the First World War itself, there were undoubtedly times and places when, despite the conditions and obligations of military life, soldiers were able, however briefly, to discover foreign landscapes and to come into contact with civilian populations with something resembling a tourist's gaze, and possibly the aid of a guidebook or by following a sightseeing itinerary described in a military newspaper.[11] The tourist activities of the civilian and military personnel of the Interallied Rhineland occupation represent the continuation of such wartime activities on a larger scale, and their presence in Germany was an opportunity, after the trials and deprivations of wartime, to experience foreign travel in ways that had previously been accessible only to the wealthy. As the *Amaroc News*, the newspaper of the American Army of Occupation reported, the occupation had made it possible for American soldiers to experience, free of charge, forms of leisure travel 'that

[10]These include Gavin Daly, *The British Soldier in the Peninsular War: Encounters with Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Carolyn Anderson, 'Accidental tourists: Yanks in Rome, 1944–1945', *Journal of Tourism History*, 11,1 (2019), pp. 22-45; Andrew Buchanan, '"I Felt like a Tourist instead of a Soldier": The Occupying Gaze—War and Tourism in Italy, 1943–1945.' *American Quarterly* 68, 3 (2016), pp. 593-615; Bertram M. Gordon, *War Tourism: Second World War France from Defeat and Occupation to the Creation of Heritage,* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Julia S. Torrie, *German Soldiers and the Occupation of France, 1940–1944,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[11]See especially Krista Cowman, 'Touring behind the lines: British soldiers in French towns and cities during the Great War', *Urban History* 41, 1 (2014), pp. 105-123; Richard White, 'The soldier as tourist: the Australian experience of the Great War.' *War & Society*, 5, 1 (1987), pp. 63-77. Beach excursions behind the Western Front are discussed in John G. Fuller, *Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies, 1914-1918,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 83. German civilian and military wartime travel is treated in Charlotte Heymel, *Touristen an der Front: das Kriegserlebnis 1914-1918 als Reiseerfahrung in zeitgenössischen Reiseberichten,* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2007).

heretofore had only been enjoyed by the millionaire class' particularly thanks to the activities of YMCA.[12] The YMCA. organised sightseeing trips, published its own guidebook to *The Rhine and Its Legends*, and even requisitioned seven excursion steamers on the Rhine, conducting tours that included, on the outward journey, lectures on the history and legends of the Rhine, while the return journey was 'given over entirely to merrymaking' and the consumption of ice cream, doughnuts and coffee.[13] In the French-occupied area, a tourist office (*syndicat d'initiative*) ran excursions for French civilians and military personnel, and advertised walking tours, boat excursions and coach trips in the *Echo du Rhin*.[14] In the case of the British occupiers, whose tourist activities will be detailed in this article, the sense that the occupation offered an opportunity for foreign travel could only have been increased by the fact that, as the *Cologne Post and Wiesbaden Times* reminded its readers in 1927, 'before the war thousands of British tourists annually visited the beauty spots of Rhineland'.[15]

If, in the context of issues of discipline and morale within the army, the tourist activities of British military personnel on the Rhine represented a continuation and expansion of the limited wartime offerings of concert parties, organised sports and occasional sightseeing opportunities, post-war British leisure and travel on the Rhine also revived long-standing tourist practices in that region. Although British tourists had regularly travelled along the river in the age of the eighteenth-century Grand Tour, the 'Romantic Rhine' had become a popular tourist destination in its own right by the 1830s. By 1865 the entrepreneur Thomas Cook was organising ten-day guided tours of the region, by railway and steamboat, for the price of £5. Drawn to the region's 'fairy-tale' landscapes and castles, and the legends associated with them, British travellers continued to hold the region in high regard until the outbreak of the First World War.[16] Even though the Rhine had become a symbolic focus of German nationalism in the nineteenth century, British accounts tended to distinguish, both before and after the First World War, between 'two Germanies': the civilised Germany of the simple, jovial Rhinelander and the aggressive, authoritarian Germany

[12]Hortense McDonald, "'Y" Great Record', *Amaroc News*, 22 May 1919.
[13]Alfred J. Pearson, *The Rhine and its Legends: A Souvenir of the Days of the American Army of Occupation in Germany,* (Coblenz: Y.M.C.A., 1919). Young Men's Christian Association, *Summary of World War Work of the American YMCA*, (unknown place: International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations, 1920) p. 44.
[14]See for example 'Le tourisme en Rhénanie', *Echo du Rhin*, 24 July 1921 and 'Le tourisme en Rhénanie', *Echo du Rhin*, 14 September 1921.
[15]'Bummelling in the Eifel', *CPWT*, 3 June 1927.
[16]Hagen Schulz-Forberg, 'The Sorcerer's Apprentice: English Travellers and the Rhine in the Long 19th Century', *Journeys: The International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing*, 3, 2 (2002), pp. 86-110.

of the Prussian military and aristocracy.[17] The nineteenth-century image of the romantic Rhine also remained very much intact during the occupation years, and was regularly praised in the pages of the *Cologne Post,* which reminded the British occupiers to make the most of their time beside the celebrated river which,

> with its glorious scenery, its vine clad hills, its castle and ruins, […] its varied history and legends, appeals to the visitor with an irresistible force, and brings back to mind from far-away times when knights were bold.[18]

A series of similar articles in the *Cologne Post* on the history and legends of the 'romantic Rhine' *Post* were republished as the guidebook *Old Rhineland: Through an Englishman's Eyeglass* in 1929.[19] While some in the occupied Rhineland (mostly officers) may have been able to compare their experiences of life in the Occupied Area with their personal recollections of travel in the region in peacetime, the majority had never had the opportunity for foreign travel before. As an article in *The Manchester Guardian* put it in 1924, the city of Cologne had come to hold, during the post-war occupation period, 'a place of affection in the hearts of thousands of Britishers who have never heard of Baedeker, nor dreamt of spending a holiday on the continent of Europe'.[20] In this respect, military service in the British Rhine Army gave thousands of working-class men (and some women) the opportunity to discover places and revive practices that had long been popular among the British bourgeoisie. Reporting from Cologne in 1919, *The Nottingham Evening Post* described British soldiers 'in khaki "doing" the cathedral as conscientiously as the most serious seeker after culture', a scene reminiscent of the pre-war days when the British visitor 'was a tourist and it was the Germans who wore the uniforms'.[21]

Alongside the revival of the romantic images of the Rhine that had been popular before 1914, the early years of the occupation also saw the revival of something resembling the pre-1914 tourist industry in the region. In 1919 Thomas Cook & Son re-opened its Cologne branch 'for the convenience of officers, N.C.O.s and men of the army of

[17]See, among others, Seabury H. Ashmead-Bartlett, *From the Somme to the Rhine,* (London: John Lane, 1921), p. 185; Charles à Court Repington, *After the War,* (London: Constable and Company, 1922), p. 220. This question is discussed further in Tom Williams, 'Meeting the Enemy: British-German Encounters in the Occupied Rhineland after the First World War', *Angles: New Perspectives on the Anglophone World*, 10 (2020), p. 9.

[18]F.A. Berres, 'Virgo Mosella', *CPWT*, 10 July 1927.

[19]E.E. Gawthorn, *Old Rhineland: Through and Englishman's Eyeglass* (London: Hutchinson, 1929).

[20]'Cologne Cathedral', *The Manchester Guardian*, 25 April 1924.

[21]'How Tommy Spends his Time', *Nottingham Evening Post*, 11 January 1919.

occupation'.[22] Boat excursions on the Rhine, meanwhile, were organised to cater for the military and civilian members of the British occupation, following itineraries identical to those of pre-war excursionists 'through the romantic Schloss and vineyard country lying between Bonn and Boppard.'[23] In August 1919, the *Aberdeen Weekly Journal* described one such example of 'the joys of the Army of the Rhine' describing a boat trip organised for about 300 servicemen, mostly from the RAF, alongside a smaller group of female members of the WRAF. This trip on a Rhine steamer from Cologne passed through Bonn and Bad Godesberg to Remagen, where the day trippers were given the opportunity to climb up a hill to admire (and photograph),

> one of the finest views of the Rhine Valley that it is possible to have'. The weather, according to this report, was 'all that could be desired, the scenery superb, the company happy, the grub plentiful […] and everyone returned tired, but cheerful, voting their day on the Rhine one of the pleasantest they had ever spent.[24]

A similar Rhine trip was described in the *Cologne Post*, catering for Warrant Officers and Sergeants, accompanied by their wives and children: a total of 600 people. Taking in the Rhineland scenery 'as each bend in the river revealed fresh beauties', the excursion party travelled as far as Andernach, then returned to Rolandseck for a host of family-friendly activities including egg-and-spoon races, a cake guessing competition, and a hat-trimming contest.[25] In this instance the itineraries of nineteenth-century bourgeois travel on the Rhine were combined with some of the organised jollity of the English village fête or seaside resort.

This revived tourist industry did not cater only for members of the occupying forces. In May 1922 an article in *The Times* looked forward to the Rhine being 'opened up again to the holiday-maker on something like the pre-war scale' while *The Scotsman*, later that summer, presented the region as already 'crowded with travellers'.[26] The British Rhine Army may even have represented a reassuring presence, encouraging

[22]Advertisement, *Cologne Post* (henceforth *CP)*, 24 June 1919.
[23]Eric Gordon [Gedye], 'Our Recreation on the Rhine', *The Graphic*, 18 September 1922.
[24]I.J.W.B., 'An Army Trip on the Rhine', *Aberdeen Weekly Journal*, 1 August 1919.
[25]'All Aboard', *CP*, 10 August 1920. Similar outings were regularly reported on, for example: 'Sunday on the Rhine', *CP*, 20 July 1921; 'A Merry Rhine Trip', *CPWT*, 31 July 1927; Bank Holiday Outings', *CPWT*, 10 July 1927; 'Families' Rhine Trip', *CPWT*, 5 July 1928.
[26]'Holidays Abroad – Unprecedented Rush to the Continent', *The Times*, 22 May 1922; 'Through Southern Germany: Impressions and Experiences', *The Scotsman*, 7 August 1922.

the return of civilian tourism to what had previously been enemy territory, much as the presence of the British Army of occupation in 1815-1818 had given cross-Channel tourists a feeling of security in post-Napoleonic France.[27] Regular articles recounting life on the Rhine in the British press or personal recommendations by members of the Rhine Army may also have played a role in encouraging British post-war tourists to visit the region, not least because the Cologne Zone was presented an island of tranquillity compared to the neighbouring French and Belgian occupied areas, especially following the occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923.[28] Two civilian travellers, who visited the occupied Rhineland owing to personal ties to members of the occupying forces, published highly praiseworthy accounts of their travel experiences. The writer and social reformer Violet Markham, whose husband Lieutenant-Colonel James Carruthers was Chief Demobilisation Officer of the British Army of the Rhine, remarked on how civil the German population was as she 'went about Cologne, on arrival, Baedeker in hand, as any pre-war tourist might have done'.[29] The Anglo-Irish writer Katherine Tynan, whose son had been among the first soldiers to enter the Rhineland in December 1918, published both a memoir of her travels on the Rhine and an article in *The Sphere*, in August 1923, encouraging readers to take a 'holiday in the Occupied Area'.[30] In the latter article she referred to Cologne as 'incessant delight', praised the 'exquisitely clean villages with the most delicious inns' in the Eifel, reassured potential tourists that the inhabitants of the region were 'honest as the day' and declared, in sum, that 'The British Occupied Area can give the traveller most of the sensations a traveller desires'.[31] The presence of civilian tourists on the streets of Cologne and on the Rhine steamers could only have added to the 'holiday' atmosphere of the occupation. This remained the case after 1926, when the British occupying forces left the Cologne Zone for a smaller area of occupation around Wiesbaden, a spa town favoured by pre-war British travellers. An article in *the Sphere* summed up the atmosphere at Wiesbaden,

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[27]Luke Reynolds, 'There John Bull Might be Seen in all his Glory: Cross-Channel Tourism and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818', *Journal of Tourism History* 12, 2 (2020), pp. 139-155.

[28]On this view of Cologne see Robert Dell, 'Cologne under the British', *The Manchester Guardian*, 15 March 1923. On the influence of military experiences on post-war tourist destinations see 'Holidays Abroad – Unprecedented Rush to the Continent', *The Times*, 22 May 1922.

[29]Violet R. Markham, *Watching on the Rhine,* (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), p. 25.

[30]Katherine Tynan, *Life in the Occupied Area,* (London: Hutchinson, 1925). Markham and Tynan's travels are addressed in Colin Storer, 'Weimar Germany as Seen by an Englishwoman: British Women Writers and the Weimar Republic', *German Studies Review*, 32, 1 (2009), pp. 129-147.

[31]Katherine Tynan, 'A Holiday in the Occupied Area', *The Sphere*, 4 August 1923.

> Occupying […] one of the most attractive points on the Rhine, is not an unpleasant task. The large number of English visitors at this fashionable resort, in addition to His Majesty's troops, lend a certain English air to the town. British officers take tea on the Neroberg and dance at the Vierjahreszeiten [sic].[32]

Given the large number of tourist visitors to the region, the British occupiers were even encouraged to escape the 'usual Rhineland Sunday crowds' of day trippers and 'idiots' posing for photographs and to head 'off the beaten track' into the mountains of the Taunus and the Eifel or to the Moselle valley.[33] While the numerous examples above attest to the importance of the British Occupied Area as a place of military and civilian tourism, British occupiers and visitors were nevertheless encouraged to venture beyond the frontiers of their own zone to explore regions under French and Belgian occupation or even to take excursions into unoccupied Germany to such popular tourist destinations as Heidelberg, Baden-Baden, Freiburg and the Black Forest.[34]

There were therefore numerous opportunities for the members of the Rhine Army to enjoy their time in Germany as if it were some kind of holiday. This is certainly the impression one would gain from reading the *Cologne Post,* which contained regular articles describing itineraries for day trips and excursions, some of which were republished as a guidebook, *Rambles in Rhineland*, and in a handbook to accompany steamboat excursions in 1920.[35] In the summer months, the readers' letters column of the *Cologne Post* included regular enquiries and complaints relating to tourism and

[32]Harold Callender, 'Ten Years in the Rhineland', *The Sphere*, 25 August 1928.

[33]See for example 'Bummelling in the Eifel', *CPWT*, 3 June 1927; 'Gemund to Heimbach', *CP*, 26 April 1925; 'Who goes Bummeling?', *CP*, 4 June 1921; 'The Valley of the Lahn', *CP*, 17 July 1921; and F.A. Berres, '"Virgo Mosella"', *CPWT*, 10 July 1927. This kind of anti-tourist attitude, which had been a common, if paradoxical, feature of European leisure travel since the eighteenth century, is analysed in James Buzard, *The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to 'Culture' 1800-1918,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 1.

[34]See for example, 'A Bummeler Abroad', *CP*, 3, 6 and 18 August 1920; 'A visit to Coblenz', *CPWT*, 14 August 1927; 'The Beauties of Bonn', *CPWT,* 21 August 1927; 'Historical Heidelberg', *CPWT*, 5 June 1927; 'Frankfurt on Main', *CPWT*, 22 May 1927. Meanwhile, despite the presence of British forces from the Rhine Army in 1920-1922, the region of Upper Silesia, politically and economically unstable and unfamiliar to pre-war British tourists, was not presented in such a touristic light.

[35]A.G. Clarke, *Rambles in Rhineland,* (Cologne: The Cologne Post, 1920); A.G. Clarke, *Bonn to Boppard: A Handy and Compact Guide to the Rhine Trips on the R.S. Blücher by G.H.Q.,* (Cologne: The Cologne Post, 1920).

leisure activities, including a request for recommendations regarding 'a quiet spot' for 'holiday-making' in the occupied area, a query regarding overnight accommodation for 'weekenders' in Bonn, and a complaint about the fact that bottles of beer on Rhine steamers were being reserved for sergeants.[36] However, recognising the existence of such tourist activity, and its regular discussion in both the British domestic press and *The Cologne Post*, by no means implies that, for each individual British occupier on the Rhine, day-to-day life frequently (or even occasionally) matched this image. Indeed, there are suggestions that members of the occupation army felt that those at home in Britain tended to imagine their life on the Rhine as more glamorous than it really was. An account published in *The Bystander* of a conversation on the Boulogne-Cologne express train between a British lady and a British soldier returning from leave parodied this gap between expectation and reality. The soldier is told by the lady that he must be having 'a perfectly priceless time […] dancing every night with beautiful Rhine maidens', and enjoying 'all the splendid theatres, hotels and cafés of Cologne'. Preferring not to disenchant her, the soldier chooses not to mention the 'monk-like celibacy' of Army life or the fact that his job, like those of most of his fellow soldiers, 'lay in a dreary little village' and that he had only been able to sample the 'gaieties of Cologne life twice since his arrival'.[37]

Although fictionalised, this anecdote serves as a useful reminder not only that these moments of travel and 'tourism' remained relatively exceptional for most members of the Rhine Army, but also that the idea of what constituted a 'perfectly priceless time' involved not only boat excursions and romantic landscapes but also the attractions of a modern German city.

Soldiers in the City: Cologne and its Attractions

During the early years of the occupation, several articles in the British press expressed concern regarding the potential dangers and distractions confronting the members of the British occupying forces in Cologne. As a correspondent for the *Times* put it in December 1919, the young men of the Rhine Army would undoubtedly face 'long spells of unoccupied time on their hands, which might easily lead them into mischief'. Fortunately, this article continued, their free time was filled with healthy, cultured and respectable activities: 'theatres and the opera, boxing competitions and regimental football matches, dances, lending libraries, gymnasiums, and many other games and amusements'.[38] The provision of leisure activities in Cologne was therefore viewed as a means of guiding the members of the Rhine Army away from the perceived dangers of the modern city and of keeping contact with the German population to a minimum.

[36]Readers' letters column in *Cologne Post of* 22 August 1919, 1 August 1920 and 23 August 1919 respectively.
[37]E.G. [G.E.R. Gedye], 'The bystander in Occupation', *The Bystander*, 21 May 1919.
[38]'Life at Cologne: Distractions of a Young Army', *The Times*, 19 December 1919.

Noting the wide range of activities available to the British soldier in Cologne, 'from Shakespeare to "ping pong"', the *Times* reported approvingly that such activities turned the British inward on themselves, describing the Rhine Army as having 'the advantage of being entirely self-centred, preserving a fine detachment towards the life of the city'.[39] For this reason, the Empire Leave Club, which opened in Cologne in 1919, was described approvingly as 'a British oasis in the German desert'.[40] The sense that the city of Cologne presented a danger for the British soldier was also expressed by the officers of the Army of the Rhine. Looking back in 1929, Major E.E. Gawthorn reported that, in response to 'an acute problem of how to occupy the troops … every conceivable agency was pressed into service to amuse and provide instructional or recreational facilities'. Though conceding that 'exuberance of spirits gained ascendancy over good sense in a few instances' Gawthorn nevertheless insisted that, thanks to such organized leisure activities, good discipline and morale were maintained: 'the success achieved in a cosmopolitan city, which commenced to attract the worst elements of the scum of Europe, is largely due to the untiring efforts of members of those military, religious and social organizations who did work of national importance'.[41]

The creation of the *Cologne Post* newspaper followed a similar logic. When it was first published on 31 March 1919, the editors declared that its aim was not only to make the British 'feel more at home' in the Rhineland by providing a connection with news from Britain and the Empire, but also to act as a guide to life on the Rhine covering 'sports, amusements, acquisition of knowledge, what to see, where and when to see it and what it will cost you'.[42] When the newspaper published its last edition during the final days of the Wiesbaden occupation in 1929, its editor A.G. Clarke looked back with satisfaction for having successfully provided the British soldier with 'a healthy English mental environment for spending the most impressionable years of adolescence among the subtle temptations of an unwholesome German town. The risks and dangers of Cologne, Clarke noted, had been considered a threat to the morals of young British soldiers with time on their hands: 'Thousands of young soldiers had been taken from the Homeland, where they were surrounded by all the traditional inhibitions and prohibitions, and set down in a Continental town where temptations, in a most subtle way, lured lads who had a degree of leisure unknown before'.[43] As such, the newspaper was seen as a means to guide the occupying forces towards

[39]'British in Cologne: The Army's Work and Play', *The Times*, 18 March 1922.
[40]'Rhine Army's Recreations', *The Times*, 28 May 1919.
[41]Major E.E. Gawthorn, 'The British Army of the Rhine: A Retrospect', *Journal of the United Royal Service* Institution, 74 (1 Feb. 1929), p. 760.
[42]'Your Paper', *CP*, 1 April 1919.
[43]A.G. Clarke, 'Closing Down', *Cologne Post & Wiesbaden Times*, 3 November 1929

wholesome, productive uses of their free time, including cultural tourism in (and especially beyond) the city.[44]

The numerous YMCA. establishments in the Rhineland were intended to fulfil a similar function, catering to as many as 10,000 men a day in the early months of the occupation.[45] When the YMCA in Cologne was criticised in *The Times* in 1921 by the Reverend W.T. Hindley for its lack of explicit religiosity (and for providing cinemas, whist drives and dances on Sundays) the organisation's Deputy President, Sir Arthur Yapp insisted that such offerings were necessary because 'the temptations of a great city like Cologne were very great' and that 'the British public ought to be very glad that places were provided by the YMCA where men could be away from drink and vice.' Yapp added that he hoped to recruit more 'women with high ideals' to work in the YMCA establishments in order that 'men who came to their entertainments, instead of going to the beer gardens, met women of their own country'.[46] Keeping British soldiers 'out of the streets and the beer gardens' was presented as one of the great achievements of the YMCA on the Rhine, according to a later *Times* article which also noted the importance of the presence of soldiers' wives, together with, 'helpers and women from the English colonies along the Rhine', which meant that YMCA dances 'avoided the complications that might have followed visits to German dance halls'.[47] An appeal to the British public for funds in 1925 underlined the same point by including the testimony of a Lance Corporal in the Army Service Corps, who declared that 'lots of fellows in the Army have a wayward streak in them, and it is so easy here in Cologne for it to get the upper hand. The YMCA, with its attractions is a jolly good antidote for this waywardness'.[48] After the army left Cologne for Wiesbaden, Sir Arthur Yapp insisted that further financial support was needed in order to ensure that 'these young men are exposed to no less fierce temptation in Wiesbaden than in Cologne'.[49] As Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson later recalled, the YMCA, together

[44]'Father Rhine', *CPWT*, 24 July 1927.
[45]'From Cologne to Wiesbaden: Work of the Y.M.C.A.', *The Times*, 8 December 1925. On the post-war activities of the YMCA, particularly in the neighbouring American Zone, see Larry A. Grant, 'The YMCA and the U.S. Army in Post-World War I France and Germany', in Jeffrey C. Copeland and Yan Xu (eds), *The YMCA at War: Collaboration and Conflict during the World Wars* ,(Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2018), pp. 73-100.
[46]'Sunday in Cologne: Y.M.C.A. reply to criticism', *The Times,* 9 March 1921. Feeling his remarks had been misunderstood, Hindley wrote to insist that his criticism was only directed at the 'almost complete secularization' of the Y.M.C.A.'s work in Cologne: 'On the Rhine', *The Times*, 12 March 1921.
[47]'The Y.M.C.A. on the Rhine', *The Times,* 16 November 1929.
[48]'From Cologne to Wiesbaden: Work of the Y.M.C.A.', *The Times*, 8 December 1925.
[49]A.K. Yapp, 'British Troops on the Rhine: The Y.M.C.A.'s Activities', *The Times*, 1 February 1927.

with similar institutions such as the Church Army or the Men's Leave Club gave 'invaluable help' to the military authorities in limiting the degree of fraternisation between the members of the Army of the Rhine and the civilian population.[50] Similar initiatives such as the opening of three English-language cinemas and the mass booking of seats in the Opera House for members of the occupying forces were presented as wholesome, civilised diversions for men who might otherwise find that there was 'practically nowhere for them to go but to the third rate German *cabarets* and German cinema houses'.[51]

Yet, as the above references to the risks of 'waywardness', the temptations of 'drink and vice' and dangers of 'third-rate German *caberets'* might be taken to imply, members of the Army of the Rhine did not always limit themselves to such English-language establishments reserved for their use. As Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart Roddie wrote in *Peace Patrol,* his published account of the occupation years, 'opera, cabarets, café concerts, vaudeville performances, and, tucked away in darker corners, other forms of entertainment, offered a variety of distraction to the British Tommy and his officers'.[52] For example, in an account of his military service written in 1966, Ernest Lycette, who was stationed in Bergisch-Gladbach, recalled that soldiers were 'allowed night passes and short leave […] to visit the towns and places of interest and that 'of course the city of Cologne was a great attraction'. Though Lycette noted that Cologne had 'a fine Officers' Club' where soldiers on weekend leave could 'arrange rooms and meals at very reasonable rates', he nevertheless found it 'more interesting to go to the German cafés and beer gardens'. During his regular visits to Cologne, Lycette recalled, 'of course we met Frauleins [sic] at dance halls and enjoyed their company.'[53] Many other autobiographical accounts mention regular visit to German eating and drinking establishments, many of them far from 'third rate'. As Lieutenant P. Creek recalled, 'Life in Cologne, during this period, was jam for the British soldier' as 'the strict fraternising rules had been eased' and, thanks to the weakness of the German Reichsmark, 'an English shilling would enable one to have a meal at one of the better restaurants.' A particular favourite of Creek's was the Café Germania, near the cathedral, where he 'spent several very pleasant evenings' and after dinner 'listened to a violinist playing the beautiful songs of Schubert, Strauss and Brahms'.[54] Similarly,

[50]William Robertson, *From Private to Field-Marshal,* (London: Constable, 1921), p. 362.
[51]'Cologne Diversions: Providing for the Rhine Army', *The Times*, 2 April 1919.
[52]Lt-Col Stewart Roddie, *Peace Patrol,* (London: Christophers, 1932). On prostitution in occupied Cologne see Richard van Emden, 'Die Briten am Rhein: Panorama einer vergessenen Besatzung', *Geschichte in Köln*, 40, 1 (1996), pp. 47-49.
[53]Imperial War Museum (IWM) Documents 16020. Papers of Captain E. Lycette (box no 08/43/1), pp. 159-161.
[54]IWM Documents 1467. Papers of Lieutenant P. Creek, p. 66. J. Garton has suggested that Cologne became a less attractive place for the British soldier once the mark began

Lieutenant I.R.S. Harrison, who was stationed in Mechernich in 1919, around 35 miles outside Cologne, recalled making several trips into that 'magnificent city', where one could enjoy good meals of 'chicken, geese, etc' at the Dom Hotel, accompanied by 'plenty of excellent wine at a price' before spending the evening at the opera.[55] At least during such brief periods of weekend leave, the members of the Army of the Rhine were certainly able to have a good time in Cologne, making the most of the city's cultural offerings and nightlife as a peacetime tourist might have before 1914.

An Appetite for 'Bummeling': Rambles, Excursions and the Image of the Soldier-Tourist

While many British occupiers were attracted to the amusements and diversions of modern Cologne, and others rarely strayed far from their barracks or from the YMCA canteens, the *Cologne Post* went to great lengths to encourage members of the occupying forces to make the most of their time in Germany by taking day trips beyond the main urban centres to discover the landscapes and historical monuments of the Rhineland. Looking back on eleven years of occupation, A.G. Clarke explained in 1929 that the *Cologne Post* had sought to encourage young soldiers to take advantage of every opportunity for active and educational travel during their time on the Rhine:

> To live in Rhineland – with its glamour of legendary lore, its array of historic pageantry, its wealth of natural beauty, its modern social and commercial enterprise, was, we held, a "liberal education"; hence we published a long and comprehensive series of "Bummeling" articles to show the young soldier how to make use of such unprecedented opportunities for true education along these lines.[56]

In the *Cologne Post*, the word 'bummeling' (occasionally spelled 'bummelling') came to refer to precisely this kind of educational and pleasurable travel. Adopted from the German word *Bummel*, meaning a stroll, trip or ramble, it entered the day-to-day vocabulary of the British occupiers (no doubt because it sounds mildly amusing to English ears) as the term used to describe any leisurely or educational outing, adding to an increasingly rich German-influenced slang that marked out a distinctive identity for members of the occupying forces.[57] The term regularly featured in the titles of

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to recover after 1924. J. Garston, 'Armies of Occupation II: The British in Germany, 1918-1929', *History Today*, 11, 7 (July 1961), p. 486.

[55]IWM Documents 11035 Papers of Lieutenant I.R.S. Harrison (box no. P 323), p. 87.

[56]A.G. Clarke, 'Closing Down', *Cologne Post & Wiesbaden Times*, 3 November 1929.

[57]This comic-sounding term had already been adopted by Jerome K. Jerome in the title of his humorous novel (the sequel to *Three Men in a Boat*), *Three Men on the Bummel,* (London: Arrowsmith, 1900). Keith Jeffery, '"Hut ab", "promenade with kamerade for shokolade", and the *Flying Dutchman:* British soldiers in the Rhineland, 1918-1929',

articles in the *Cologne Post*, which included, to name just a few: 'Bummels in the Famous Ahr valley', 'Bummelling in the Eifel', 'Enjoyable Bummelling', 'A Bummeler abroad' and 'Who goes Bummelling?'[58] In the pages of the *Cologne Post*, the 'bummeler' figure came to represent the ideal figure of a British soldier-tourist that readers should emulate: cultured, physically fit, and eager to make productive use of any free time. The ideal soldier-tourist was also meant to learn about the places he visited: reading the travel column in the *Cologne Post*, it was claimed, could help even the most 'seasoned bummeller extract the most he can out of a bummel'.[59]

The idealised image of the 'bummeling' soldier-tourist drew heavily on earlier patterns and trends in British Rhine tourism, including the notion of a travel as an educational experience (a defining feature of the eighteenth-century Grand Tour), the celebration of a romantic image of the Rhine as a literary and cultural landscape dotted castles and steeped in legends, and the pursuit of physical health and wellbeing though pedestrian tourism or in one of the region's many spa towns.[60] The image put forward in the *Cologne Post's* numerous 'bummeler' articles was of an active, curious and cultivated British occupier, who was drawn towards the picturesque scenery and historical monuments of the region rather than towards the modern, industrial cities. The town of Trier, for example, was presented as one of great interest to 'bummelers, to whom the pomp and pageant of the past appeals' thanks to its being 'strikingly picturesque in situation and having 'facilities for charming rambles'.[61] Similarly, the walled town of Nideggen in the Eifel, where 'the visitor seems to be plunged suddenly into the medieval period' was considered an ideal destination for a 'bummel' thanks to both its historical interest and it 'romance'.[62] In contrast, readers were told that there was 'nothing to detain the bummeler' in the industrial city of Mannheim.[63] The 'bummeler' figure was presented as someone fascinated by the medieval castles and legends of the

Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 3 (2005), pp. 455-473 notes various slang terms used by the occupying forces without mentioning this example. On military slang during the First World War, including the bastardisation of French words, see Tim Cook, 'Fighting Words: Canadian Soldiers' Slang and Swearing in the Great War', *War in History* 20, 3, 2013, pp. 323-344 and Julian Walker, *Tommy French: How British First World War Soldiers Turned French into Slang,* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2021).

[58]'Bummels in the Famous Ahr Valley', *CPWT*, 19 June 1927; 'Bummelling in the Eifel', *CPWT*, 3 June 1927; Enjoyable Bummelling', *CPWT*, 10 July 1927; A Bummeler Abroad', *CP*, 3, 6 and 18 August 1920.

[59]'Who goes Bummelling?', *CPWT*, 15 May 1927.

[60]See Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence, 1860-1914,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 49-67.

[61] 'Where Caesars once bore sway", *CPWT*, 8 May 1927.

[62] What to see in Rhineland VII: Nideggen', *CP*, 21 August 1919.

[63]'A Bummeler Abroad', *CP*, 3, 6 and 18 August 1920.

'romantic Rhine' but relatively uninterested in recent developments in German history: monuments such as the Bismarck memorial in Bad Ems, the vast equestrian statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I at the *Deutsches Eck* in Coblenz or the Niederwald monument in Rüdesheim, built to commemorate German unification in 1871, are mentioned briefly and without any further comment on their significance for the history of modern German nationalism.[64] Thus, sites and landscapes are valued for their picturesque, 'timeless' character rather than for their contemporary significance, while political and economic questions of the present rarely trouble the mind of the 'bummeler'. Thus, the 'bummel' could be considered as a form of escapism, not only from the confines of the barracks and the routine of army life but also from political tensions and economic conditions of the occupation years. This vision of Rhineland tourism as an escape from the mundane present is relatively typical of its time. E.E. Gawthorn's guidebook *Old Rhineland*, as its title implies, had next to nothing to say about the region's recent history, while Malcolm Letts's travel account of 1930, *A Wayfarer on the Rhine* dismissed the present day entirely: 'Of recent events this is no place to speak. International commissions and foreign occupations are the business of treaty-makers and politicians, and most fortunately have nothing to do with wayfaring.'[65] Thus, despite A.G. Clarke's aforementioned reference to 'modern social and commercial enterprise', the education to be gained from travel was above considered to be associated with the region's more distant past.

Despite the presence of female auxiliaries in the Rhine Army, and the presence of many officers' wives and families, the 'bummeler' was almost always portrayed in the *Cologne Post* as a lone, male figure, driven by *Wanderlust* and undeterred by early mornings, long distances or steep climbs. An article in the *Cologne Post* in August 1919 set out this image of the traveller while simultaneously admonishing its readers for not living up to the ideal:

> We have priceless opportunities in the Rhineland for enriching our imagination and knowledge and at the same time keeping ourselves physically fit. Our pleasures are close at hand, but do we really make the most of them? Have we heard the call of the road, that intense longing to explore the unknown pathways, and at the close of the day to feel the joy of achievements and renewed health?[66]

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[64]'Who goes Bummelling?', *CPWT*, 15 May 1927; 'A visit to Coblenz', *CPWT*, 14 August 1927; 'Beautiful Bad Ems', *CPWT*, 12 June 1927.

[65]Malcolm Letts, *A Wayfarer on the* Rhine, (London: Methuen, 1930), p. xix. Letts's book was criticised, in fact, for being 'too much concerned with the past to the neglect of the present'. 'A Wayfarer on the Rhine', *Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art*, 19 April 1930, p. 498.

[66]'What to see in Rhineland VIII: A Ramble to Altenberg', *CP*, 22 August 1919.

This sense that the British occupiers were not making the most of their time on the Rhine was a regular reproach in the travel columns of the *Cologne Post.* An article in July 1927, for example, praised those readers who had already 'enjoyed the delights of the wonderful scenery of Father Rhine', while simultaneously criticising those who 'failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered them'. Although the Rhineland attracted tourists from all over the world, the author lamented that 'the number of present and past members of the Rhine Army who have but the haziest idea of the grandeur of the river and its surroundings must run into many thousands'.[67] Even many of those who did seize the opportunity to make outings and excursions were criticised, in a later article, for not reading up on the region's history beforehand: 'We English take much for granted and the pleasure and educative value of our excursions would be greatly enhanced if we informed ourselves of the romantic story of the places we visit'.[68] According to such logic, the ideal 'bummeler' was someone who had acquired a knowledge of regional history either by consulting the books recommended by the *Cologne Post* or simply by reading the newspaper itself. A similar article, while noting that it had been a privilege, after the strains of war, 'to enjoy a comparatively restful time by the Rhine amid fine scenery and in historic towns' considered it unfortunate that the British on the Rhine had not lived up to their nation's 'reputation of being the greatest travellers' as they had not 'gathered as much knowledge' as they should have done.[69]

In a further echo of the discourses and practices that had marked British Rhine tourism since the age of the Grand Tour, the *Cologne Post* underlined the pleasures and educational benefits of tourism as well as its positive influence on the physical and mental well-being of military personnel in order to encourage its readers to get out of their billets or barracks (or out of the beer-gardens of Cologne) and discover the sights of the region. An article in July 1924, for example, presented a fictionalised sketch of a soldier who wakes up early to take the train into the Eifel mountains, while his roommate spends the day lazing around their shared billet. He visits the ruined castle of Nideggen, discovering that 'the views to be seen from the castle windows alone are well worth the journey' and returns to his billet in the evening tired but, unlike his roommate, 'with the feeling that [his] day had not been wasted'.[70] Similarly, an article the following month encouraged readers to hike from the town of Hilgen to a nearby lake, which is described as 'a real beauty spot' and 'off the beaten track' (even though the author admits that 'thousands of civilians from Cologne seek its charms') and the physical and psychological benefits of the trip are made clear to the reader:

[67]'Father Rhine', *CPWT*, 24 July 1927.
[68]'The Wonders of Rhineland', *CPWT*, 1 July 1928.
[69]'Going Home', *CP*, 17 August 1919.
[70]E.J., 'A Rhineland Ramble', *CP*, 24 July 1919.

'we return to the plains at the close of day with the hot blood coursing through our veins and full of health, strength and vigour to labour for another season with a mind stored with precious memories.'[71] While not all articles were quite so explicit about the supposed benefits of travel, they nevertheless regularly claimed that the benefits of 'bummeling' far outweighed the costs in terms of time, effort or inconvenience. For example, even though it was a long walk from the train station, Schloss Burg near Wermelskirchen was presented as 'easy of access', and 'well worth a visit', and readers were reassured that 'the scenery will amply repay the trouble'.[72] The convent of Arenberg near Coblenz was praised in almost identical terms: 'this place is so well worth a visit that the effort to catch the early train to Coblenz is amply repaid'.[73] Similarly a trip from Wiesbaden to Frankfurt am Main, which presented additional complications since visitors were required to be in possession of a passport endorsed for a visit to unoccupied territory and to be dressed in civilian clothes, was described as 'well worth a little trouble in the matter of preliminaries'.[74] In such instances it is clear that the *Cologne Post's* travel writers were trying to anticipate, and neutralise, any possible reluctance towards active 'bummeling' on the part of the members of the Rhine Army. Whether such attempts to promote tourism were effective is difficult to judge, although the insistence of the *Cologne Post* that the British forces were not doing enough to discover the sights of the Rhineland might be interpreted as an admission that its success in this task was limited.[75]

Conclusion

The lack of certainty regarding the effectiveness of attempts to promote wholesome, educational forms of 'tourism' within the British Rhine Army is a symptom of the fact that such activities lay at the fringes of military control. Members of the Rhine Army were certainly *encouraged* to avoid the perceived dangers of the city, by making use of the army and YMCA facilities or by heading away from the urban centres on invigorating 'bummels', but evidence of quite how they used their free time inevitably remains anecdotal. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence in autobiographical recollections, in the British press, and in the pages of the *Cologne Post and Wiesbaden*

[71]G.K., 'What to see in Rhineland VI: Hilgen Lake', *CP* 19 August 1919.
[72]'What to see in Rhineland V: Schloss Burg', *CP*, 17 August 1919.
[73]'What to see in Rhineland IX: Arenberg', *CP*, 24 August 1919.
[74]'Frankfurt on Main', *CPWT*, 22 May 1927.
[75]Several contemporary sources note that members of the regular army, which remained in the Rhineland after the majority of wartime volunteers and conscripts had gone home, were relatively sedentary in their habits, living within the confines of their barracks as they might have done in India or in Aldershot. Peter Deane, 'The End of the Rhine Army', *The Contemporary Review*, 136 (1 July 1929), p. 750; E.G. [G.E.R. Gedye], ''The Regulars' in Rhineland', *The Bystander*, 14 July 1920.

Times regarding the priorities of the military authorities, namely, to keep the occupiers occupied by providing leisure facilities and opportunities for travel and sightseeing.

Three clear trends are discernible within this context. Firstly, it was suggested that the Rhineland occupation, particularly after the sacrifices and discomforts of the war years, should be considered an opportunity for British servicemen to enjoy a pleasant and educational 'holiday' in a region popular with pre-war British holidaymakers. Secondly, this 'discovery' of Germany was supposed to involve as little contact as possible with the civilian population in general and the perceived dangers of the modern city of Cologne in particular. Finally, through the promotion of healthy, educational 'bummels', the image of an ideal soldier-tourist was put forward. Active and energetic, curious and well read, this ideal British 'bummeler' was supposed to make the most of every opportunity to discover the picturesque scenery and rich cultural heritage of occupied Rhineland, but he remained largely apolitical and drawn towards the past rather than the present.

While there was clearly a military logic behind this desire to limit fraternisation and promote wholesome leisure pursuits, these trends also reflect wider cultural developments in civilian tourism in interwar Britain and Germany. When the British military authorities recommended the healthy outdoor life as an antidote to the pernicious influence of the cities they were also drawing on a long Romantic tradition which had taken on new meanings in the wake of the First World War and which led, in both countries, to renewed interest in pastoral landscapes and to the rise of outdoor and hiking movements.[76] The idea that the British and Germans supposedly shared a love of the countryside and an attachment to folklore and cultural heritage was even presented in the context of the Rhineland occupation as a sound basis for post-war reconciliation and mutual understanding.[77] However, in the German context, the rediscovery of the lore and legends of the Rhine, the critique of industrialisation, and the popularity of hiking movements such as the *Wandervögel* were all inextricably linked to wider trends in German nationalism which, though already present during the period of the Rhineland occupation, would become particularly potent during the 1930s.

In retrospect, the figure of the apolitical British 'bummeler' on the Rhine, engaged in rather similar cultural activities though seemingly untroubled by their political connotations, appears to have been rather naïve about the profound symbolic

[76]See Frank Trentman, 'Civilization and Its Discontents: English Neo-Romanticism and the Transformation of Anti-Modernism in Twentieth-Century Western Culture', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 29,4 (1994), pp. 583-625.
[77]Peter Deane, 'The End of the Rhine Army', *The Contemporary Review*, 136 (1 July 1929), p. 752.

importance of the Rhine landscape for revanchist German nationalists during the years of Interallied occupation.[78]

[78]See Peter Schöttler, *The Rhine as an Object of Historical Controversy in the Inter-War Years'*, *History Workshop Journal* 39 (1995), pp. 1-21.

Re-purposing gun based anti-aircraft systems

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ABSTRACT
Between the late 1960s and mid-1990s, American ground forces employed the Vulcan Air Defence System (VADS), for use against short range, aerial and ground targets. The VADS was mobile and comprised a radar and a six barrelled 20 mm autocannon, but this was soon found to be ineffective against fast aircraft at low altitudes. Despite being an old technology by 1982 an Israeli VADS downed a fighter jet and this is believed to be the only time in VADS operational history. This happened during the 1982 Israel – Lebanon war in the midst of intense ground combat and where the VADS helped unexpectedly. That event, the VADS withdrawal from operations in the 1990s, and their recent reappearance in use against drones are discussed.

Introduction

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War is showing the effectiveness of ground fired, man portable, anti-aircraft missiles (manpads). Armoured vehicles with rapid firing, modern anti-aircraft guns and radars, are also being reported as successful against drones. Although their original anti-fighter role was gradually replaced by more accurate, missile systems, improved radars, firing computers and automatization have all helped to provide gun-based systems with more accurate targeting – although this has not stopped the replacement trend of guns by missiles.

In the early 1960s, the US Army developed a mobile missile system, the MIM-72 Chaparral, and the gun based Vulcan Air Defence System.[1] The VADS was needed because of the Chaparral's limitations. When launched, the Chaparral guided itself by sensing the heat from the rear of the jet using infra-red homing, but at short target ranges the missile would not have time to lock on. The VADS was developed to provide a solution for that shorter-range defence. Both systems, introduced in 1969,

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[1]Vulcan has become a generic term used for a multi-barrelled gatling style cannon.

were intended to protect ground forces against low-flying jet aircraft and Soviet attack helicopters. The VADS was also intended to have a secondary direct fire role. Historically that was also the case for another anti-aircraft gun, the German 88 mm gun of the Second World War which was also very capable in the anti-tank role. But the self-propelled (mobile) and towed anti-aircraft systems of that time lacked radar and were ineffective against the fast jets and helicopters of the post war period.[2] In the 1960s Germany developed the Gepard System, which is similar to the American VADS although this uses twin 35mm cannons in place of the Vulcan gun; while the Soviets developed the ZSU-23-4 Shilka which employs four 23mm auto-cannons.

VADS Technology and Limitations: 1968-1982

The American VADS Vulcan gun and radar system was mounted on a modified M113 armoured personnel carrier (APC). Introduced in 1961, the M113 had an aluminium hull, to make it air transportable and amphibious, but this also made the VADS vulnerable to anything heavier than small arms fire.

The Vulcan gun, as originally used in US fighter-jets, comprised of six, 20 mm diameter barrels, altogether firing 3000 projectiles per minute in the direct fire role and at a higher rate against aerial targets. It is a modern version of the Gatling rotary cannon invented in the USA in 1861. Aiming is made with the help of the gunner's optical eyesight with the radar and fire computer reading the incoming speed and distance from the gunner.[3]

In 1966, there were concerns with possible North Vietnamese low altitude air strikes, that could not be countered by the high altitude HAWK surface to air missile. In response an older 40 mm anti-aircraft gun system, the M-42 Duster, was recalled into service, although this lacked a radar system. The M-42 had two 40mm guns mounted on a tank chassis. Since the air threat posed by North Vietnam never materialised, the Duster was used against ground forces and was found to be very effective in that role.

The VADS was first evaluated in action in 1968 and 1969 during the Vietnam War, but only in ground use since no aerial target ever appeared. One test determined that the VADS was superior to the Duster because of its much greater firing rate and better mobility, being more able to transverse rubber plantations and wet marshy rice paddies. Also noted were: the VADS vulnerability against mines; insufficient space for

[2]Chris Bishop, ed. *The Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II,* (New-York, Barnes & Noble,1998), pp. 160,167.

[3]*TM 9-2350-300-10 M163 VADS, Operator manual (Crew) for the Gun, Air Defence Artillery Self Propelled*, (Washington DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army,1976), p.2-117. (Digitised by Google to make it universally accessible).

ammunition; and the radar's inefficiency in locating enemy ground forces.[4] Troops, particularly impressed by its increased mobility compared to the M-42, the flat trajectory of its projectiles and the high rate of fire welcomed VADS deployment in the ground role.[5]



RIGHT FRONT VIEW

1.	20mm cannon M168	9.	Periscope M17
2.	Radar antenna (Unit 1)	10.	Trim vane
3.	Sight M61	11.	Towing eyes
4.	Mount M157	12.	Drive sprocket
5.	Chassis M741	13.	Lights
6.	Air intake grill	14.	Engine exhaust
7.	Fire extinguisher handle	15.	Exhaust grill
8.	Driver's hatch	16.	Heater exhaust

Figure 1: The VADS right frontal View[6]

[4]Albert R. Ives, Eugene B. Rishel III, *Final Report XM163 Vulcan Air Defence System AGC-64F*, (San Francisco: Department of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, 1969), pp. III-3,VI-1,D11-D13.

[5]M163 / M167 VADS Vulcan Air Defence System. (A Global Security.Org Website https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m167.htm Accessed 24 December 2022).

[6]*TM 9-2350-300-10 M163 VADS, Operator manual*, pp.1-3.

During the 1970s, the VADS was determined to be more effective against low and slow flying attack helicopters than it was against fast jet fighters. The use of VADS as a ground warfare system also became more promising due to the M-113's mobility, and since the gun had high and low angle firing capabilities, with elevation of +85 to -10 degrees, it could reach high targets which heavy machine guns and tanks guns could not.

Israeli Anti-Aircraft Gun Developments: 1969 to 1982

Between 1969 and 1970, the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition took place on the banks of the Suez Canal. Egyptian planes found there was a weak point in the Israeli aerial defence of its ground forces dug in on the east bank of the canal. Planes from the Egyptian west bank could come in low and fast, bomb Israeli forces, and quickly escape back to Egypt. The HAWK missiles employed by Israel proved to be as inefficient in this context as they had been in Vietnam. The Israeli's interim solution was to dismount 20 mm guns from old fighters and place them on Second World War vintage armoured half-track vehicles, although the arrangement lacked any radar or guidance system.

Before 1971, Israeli anti-aircraft guns, mobile and towed, came under the command of the Army while the HAWK missiles came under the Air Force. In 1971 all were united under the Air Force within a new Anti-Aircraft Command. Two years later, in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Command played an important role. At that time the Israeli Air Force took heavy losses from new Soviet mobile, surface to air missile units (SAM 6), employed by Egyptian and Syrian forces. Nevertheless, the new Anti-Aircraft Command with its guns and HAWKs, downed a considerable number of enemy planes.[7]

The 1973 War led to the arrival from the USA, of the first VADS and mobile Chaparrals. Two VADS battalions were formed, a moderate part of the total number of anti-aircraft gun-based battalions. The VAD'S firing rate and mobility were of course considerably higher than those of the double barrelled 20 mm guns on the half-tracks. Before 1982 the VADS units practiced for open terrain combat and anti-aircraft tasks and urban fighting was neither expected nor practiced, so a proper doctrine for VADS use had to be devised in the midst of the first phase of the 1982 War.

[7]Lt. Gal Winter, 'Another return of tactical anti-aircraft? The renewed need for air for the ground forces', *Between the Poles*, Volume, Vol. 37 (2022), (Website in Hebrew, translatable to English, the Dado Centre in the General Staff https://www.idf.il/79825, Accessed 19-December-2022)

Battalion 947 Preparations for War

The VADS Battalion 947 was engaged in heavy urban fighting on the coastal road in 1982 and in the first and only VADS downing of a jet plane, a MiG-21. The battalion had four VADS batteries A, B, C, D and a fifth battery, of crews with Redeye shoulder fired manpad type missiles. Each VADS battery had three sections with each section having two VADS, so each battery had six VADS. Altogether, the battalion had twenty-four VADS.[8]

The battalion commander in 1982, now Col. (Ret.) Israel Sar-El, recently recalled that he foresaw the coming of war in early 1982 and had his battalion practice intensively for four months. He also lobbied for more practice ammunition and practice grounds, and for the inclusion of his battalion, which was a part of the Air Force, in the Army's ground combat plans for war.[9] In the US, the VADS units were a part of the US Army and were integrated with the Army's ground forces.

The First Phase of the War in Lebanon

The 1982 Lebanon war began its first phase on June 5 with Israeli forces crossing the border on June 6, 1982. They moved northward on the coastal road and in parallel, northward in the more eastern, valleys and mountains. The aim was to engage with Palestinian forces, although Syrian army tank divisions and commando units had already been present in Lebanon for some years. Since Israel and Syria had a history of confrontation a clash was inevitable and expected. The joint Palestinian-Syrian resistance was intensive, especially in the coastal urban areas, leading to heavy human loss on both sides, and of local civilians. The first cease fire was made on June 13, 1982, when Israeli forces were south of the Beirut-Damascus highway and on the outskirts of Beirut.

Israeli anti-aircraft success was patchy, with the VADS downing a MiG-21, the Redeye units downing a MiG-23, and the HAWKs downing a more modern MiG-25.[10] This

[8]The choice of the 947 story is due to its MiG-21 downing which was discussed during 2021-2022 with one of its officers, Yoav Venkert, and because the 947 story had been publicised by its 1982 battalion commander.

[9]Speaking to a 2022 gathering of retired and young officers, commemorating the Anti-Aircraft Command part in 1982.

[10]M163 VADS, (Hamichlol Encyclopaedia Website in Hebrew Translatable to English https://www.hamichlol.org.il/M163_VADS, Accessed 25-December-2022); M163 VADS, (Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M163_VADS#cite_note-9, quoting Israeli air-force website, accessed 26-December 2022); Tony Cullen, Christopher F. Foss, eds. *Jane's,* p.97 (although the VADS were said there to down several planes including a Sukhoi SU-7 fighter bomber); The Heritage Centre of the Air Defense

was a small number compared to the previous 1973 Yom Kippur War. One reason was the June 9 operation by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) which had crippled the Syrian air defence system. The IAF also shot down 86 Syrian aircraft in air-to-air combat without the loss of a single IAF plane.

The Shooting Down of a Syrian Mig-21

On the first day of the ground war, Battery A of VADS Battalion 947 joined the rear of Battalion 13 of the "Golani" infantry brigade. It took only a day or two for the ground commanders to realise the potential of the VADS batteries. One example was Battery A which was a few kilometres into Lebanon on June 6 when they were met by enemy jeeps with guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG). That night, as told by Lieutenant Col. (Reserve) Yoav Venkert, a VADS section officer in Battery A had his VADS parked together with the tanks and mechanised infantry APCs in two columns, while preparing for a night stay. At dark, they were attacked by mobile enemy units. The Israeli infantry and the tanks' 0.5 inch and 0.3 inch machine guns were not adequate for this skirmish. The Golani brigade commander then instructed the VADS to move forward to accompany his frontal forces. The VADS were placed behind the leading tanks which would sustain the first anti-tank barrage after which the VADS behind would target the enemy rocket firing units. This arrangement was used because the VADS armoured personnel carriers, unlike the tanks were very vulnerable to RPGs and mortar shells. In addition, the VADS crews had to stay with their vehicle to fire back, with the gunner and the commander having to stay above the VADS top, making them even more vulnerable. In contrast, the mechanised infantry soldiers in APCs, could leave their APCs when fired upon and take ground cover. As tank protection was not always available, or effective, several VADS were hit, with the VADS crews suffering casualties.

Several of the units using the twin 20 mm guns mounted on half-tracks participated in fighting in the mountainous areas and were asked to support ground forces, in the same manner as the VADS on the coast road but were found to be far less effective.[11]

During the War and afterwards some have termed the VADS to be a 'Cinderella', helping unexpectedly, and especially so in urban combat, and Battalion 947 was highly decorated after the War.

Corps (Website in Hebrew, translatable to English http://airdefense-center.org.il/ ,Accessed 24-December-2022).

[11]Col. (Ret.) Israel Sar-El discussion with Dr. Uri Milstein on the Battalion 947 role in the fighting South of Beirut (In Hebrew in https://youtu.be/dZdWniWTwHw ,Accessed 24 December 2022).

VADS Downing of a Jet Fighter

Although the use of VADS in the ground fighting was the one most expected, the anti-aircraft role was not neglected, so one or more observers were always on the lookout for attacking aircraft. At midday on June 10, while Israeli forces were moving north towards Beirut on the coastal highway, a few kilometres south of Beirut, Battery A of 947 took part in a local and intensive battle against opposing tanks and commandos. In the midst of this action, an observer spotted three Syrian MiG-21 approaching. The first to give the firing command was Officer Yoav Venkert of the VADS section, making the initial hit on one of the planes. Soon the whole of Battery A and a neighbouring VADS battery joined in, and the plane was seen to crash into the sea. The other two aircraft turned away. The momentary use of the batteries against the Mig-21 was used by the opposing forces to target the VADS. One of their soldiers even climbed onto one of the VADS. Here can be seen a situation where the original dual purpose use of the VADS was a problem. A short while later the VADS resumed their ground mission.

The alertness of the observers was a key factor in the shooting down of the Mig-21 but no less important, were other, favourable, circumstances. One source lists the ideal circumstances for the use of VADS:

> According to the (US) Army, the Vulcan system (VADS) had very limited effectiveness. For Vulcan to be effective, the target must be hovering or flying a non-manoeuvring course towards the gun and be within a range of 1,000 meters. Vulcan provided only a low degree of suppression against manoeuvring threats.[12]

In the specific incident described above the Syrian aircraft were reportedly flying at such favourable conditions, at a range within 1000 meters, at a low altitude, on a straight course and at low angles with little manoeuvring.

The Aftermath & The Re-Appearance of VADS

Major improvements to VADS 1960s technology were made in the US and Israel after 1984, with better electronics and the addition of manpad type missiles to the VADS vehicles. But by 2010 all VADS had been retired from use.[13] The VADS Battalion 947 for example was turned from a VADS based unit to an Iron Dome unit. The Iron Dome system, co-developed with the US, was designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells.

[12]M163 / M167 VADS Vulcan Air Defence System (Global Security Org. Website)
[13]Tony Cullen, Christopher F. Foss, eds. *Jane's Land-Based Air Defence 1992-93,* (UK, Surrey, Jane's Information Group,1992, 5th Ed), pp. 97-98.

Before the current Russian-Ukrainian War, the use of so called 'suicide drones' was demonstrated in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 when Azeri drones were reported to have destroyed many Armenian anti-aircraft batteries, tanks and vehicles.[14]

This new threat has resulted in the reappearance of VADS type systems to provide ground units with a local, immediate and inexpensive defence. German Gepards have been supplied to Ukraine and are reported to be effective against Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. The Soviet era Shilka is also reported as being used by the Russians and Ukraine against ground and aerial targets.

Conclusion

During the 1982 Lebanon War the VADS units were again shown to be useful in ground combat, as had been the case in Vietnam.

The 1982 shooting down of a Mig-21 did not alter the belief that VADS was an ineffective system for defence against fast jets. But that downing did demonstrate that a less cutting-edge technology can still be useful under certain circumstances. The alertness of the VADS observers in the midst of ground fighting was essential to that owning which took place under ideal conditions for what was a piece of 1960s technology. .

Improvements to VADS were made in the US and Israel after 1984 and may have helped extend the use of the VADS, but by the 1990s had not prevented their withdrawal from service.

The recent and fairly unexpected resurgence in the use of gun based systems such as VADS against drones shows that old technology and weapons systems may find a second application not foreseen by the original designers.

[14]Lt. Gal Winter, 'Another return..'

Adam Marks, *England and the Thirty Years' War*. Leiden: Brill, 2022. xii + 218 pp. ISBN: 978-9004518766 (hardback). Price €110.00.

Between 1618 and 1648, Europe was plunged into one of its costliest and deadliest wars prior to the twentieth century. What began as a revolt over the succession of Frederick V and Elizabeth Stuart, Elector and Electress of the Palatinate, to the throne of Bohemia, would lead to their exile in the Dutch Republic and the occupation of the Palatinate by Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. It has long been acknowledged that military intervention against the Habsburgs came from the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and French. But Elizabeth, as her surname suggests, was the daughter of James VI & I and the sister of Charles I of Scotland, England, and Ireland. So where were the Brits?

Traditionally, historians have painted a picture of English military stagnation or peaceful 'halcyon days' in the lead up to Britain and Ireland's civil wars (1638-1660). While Scotland's role in the Thirty Years' War has undergone significant treatment in recent decades no one, until now, has published a full-length survey of England's role in the conflict. Adam Marks has filled this void with *England and the Thirty Years' War*: a pioneering study of prime importance in the historiography of Britain's military and foreign policy.

England and the Thirty Years' War follows an essentially geographical structure, with one thematic chapter on motivations to serve followed by chapters outlining English military service in the Dutch Republic, in the Palatinate, in Denmark, and in Sweden. This survey of English military service, based on Marks' PhD thesis, is underpinned by significant archival research undertaken in local and national archives across Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. As a result, the conclusions which Marks reaches are wholly original, illuminating, and often shocking.

In addition to the 50,000 Scots who served on the Protestant side, Marks demonstrates there were over 50,000 Englishmen levied for the Palatine, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish armies. If that number alone was not staggering enough, Marks' frequent and effective use of charts and tables shows the numerical importance of the English in individual armies. In 1624, for example, no less than 45% of the Dutch army was English (p. 50), while just under 50% of those killed or wounded at the siege of Maastricht in 1632 were English (p. 71). Perhaps Marks' most provocative argument is that the pool of soldiers who served in the Dutch Republic in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade were, in effect, England's standing army. This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees. Sir Horace Vere's and Sir John Borough's stand in the Palatinate (1621-1623), Sir Charles Morgan's redeployment to Northern Germany (1625-1629), and William, Lord Craven's transfer from Swedish to Dutch service in the early 1640s are proof positive

that the Anglo-Dutch Brigade was the centrifugal force around which all other English military commitment on the Continent moved and were a direct arm of the Stuart-British foreign agenda.

Less-than-generous readers may feel inclined to dismiss these soldiers outright by claiming they were simply either coerced men or mindless mercenaries, willing to fight for the highest bidder. However, the first chapter provides an overview of the motivations of Englishmen to serve: whether it was by coercion, latent feelings of Hispanophobia dormant since 1604, militant pan-Protestantism, or loyalty to the House of Stuart and to the ousted Elizabeth of Bohemia. Marks carefully avoids overstatement and contends that this represented a spectrum of potential motivations.

Most impressive is Marks' analysis of the war in the Palatinate in chapter three. Marks emphatically argues for the primacy of the Palatinate's recovery to the Stuart-British diplomatic agenda. In this regard, James VI & I was hardly the cowardly *Rex Pacificus* he has often been made out to be. In fact, Marks demonstrates that in 1621 both Parliament and the King were hoping to raise a 30,000-strong Royal Army to be deployed to the Palatinate (p. 97), but neither side could agree on the best methods to manage or finance it. Nonetheless, the 2,500 men under Vere *were* a royal force and were absolutely essential to the campaign and the defense of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal. This reviewer also thoroughly enjoyed the narrative of Colonel George Fleetwood's regiment in Sweden in chapter five. The archival work which outlines the strength and personnel in the regiment is nothing short of forensic and Marks deftly places the regiment's service within the wider political and military developments of the 1630s.

If there is a criticism to be made, it is that the book's narrative essentially ends in 1638 and 1639, with the destruction of William, Lord Craven's regiment at Vlotho Bridge, and the withdrawal of Fleetwood's regiment in Swedish service (pp. 166-169). Although Marks concedes that Englishmen did remain on the Continent after 1642, it appears that he is mostly convinced that the beginning of the English Civil War was largely the end of English service in the Thirty Years' War. The last ten years of the conflict were certainly not devoid of British military service on the Continent, which Marks does acknowledge (p. 180). However, the lack of any substantive discussion of those who remained in the Dutch Republic or Sweden is something of a missed opportunity.

Furthermore, though the author alludes to the veteran officer corps which returned to Britain to fight in the Civil Wars - no fewer than seven of the general staff on both sides at Edgehill were veterans of the Thirty Years' War (p. 179) - there is little discussion of the impact of these veterans on either the Royalist or Parliamentarian

war effort. This is a surprising omission, given that it was a not insubstantial feature of the author's PhD thesis. Again, the opportunity for a provocative argument that the Civil Wars were, perhaps, the 'British theatre' of the Thirty Years' War is missed. However, Marks cannot really be faulted for this. Such argument and investigation would certainly worthy of its own book-length study, and we can only hope that Marks is planning to return to these themes in future publications.

These small disagreements should not detract from what the book has provided: a vital, foundational overview of a crucial, and hitherto ignored, moment in Britain's military history. It completely and utterly dismantles any notion that England and Englishmen had no military education in the lead up to the Civil Wars or that the Thirty Years' War was a conflict which happened 'over there,' only to be ignored by those 'over here.' Adam Marks' *England and the Thirty Years' War* simply cannot be ignored by those working on Britain in the early modern world or on early modern military history. It will hopefully capture the imagination of a generation of historians to come.

JACK ABERNETHY
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Huw J. Davies, *The Wandering Army: The Campaigns that Transformed the British Way of War, 1750-1850*. London, Yale University Press, 2022. xix + 500 pp, 32 illustrations, 14 maps. ISBN 978-0300217162 (hardback). Price £25.00.

In the period between 1745 and 1815, which has been labelled the 'Seventy Years War', British troops saw service on all continents of the globe. Each campaign brought with it different challenges deriving from the terrain, environment and enemy faced. In his highly detailed and thought-provoking new book, Huw Davies tracks how British officers responded to these varied and unexpected challenges as they deployed new approaches to fighting war.

The Wandering Army opens with the losses at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 and at Monongahela in 1755, which subsequently inspired a 'military enlightenment' among British officers. From this point forward, Davies argues, British commanders gradually acquired a greater appreciation for meticulous planning, the avoidance of frontal assaults and the value of light infantry. As the British Army 'wandered' through North

America, India and Europe, the diverse experience of military personnel facilitated and perpetuated this 'military enlightenment'. The varied experience of army personnel led to the establishment of 'informal knowledge networks' where the lessons learned in previous wars led to experimentation and knowledge diffusion throughout the officer ranks. The transmission of these ideas fostered a process of gradual improvement in the British army. Through this interesting, highly original argument, Davies offers his perspective on the development of military tactics and technology throughout the eighteenth century – an area of considerable debate among British military historians over the last half century.

The Wandering Army is based on a wide range of archival research and provides a strikingly deep insight into the logistical and tactical considerations that British army commanders faced on campaign in this period. For example, Davies highlights how contrasting views on military theory underpinned the animosity between British commanders during the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence. This analysis of informal exchanges between officers is a highly interesting perspective to military historians and opens the door to future reappraisals of British commanders in this era.

Above all, Davies offers an excellent sense of just how well-travelled some of these officers were. Lord Cornwallis is a stand-out example. Born in Britain and trained in European fighting techniques, Cornwallis was introduced into combat in North America during the War of Independence and infamously forced to surrender at Yorktown in 1781. In 1786 Cornwallis was appointed Governor-General and commander-in-chief in India and led his Indian Sepoys against Mysore in 1790-2. Davies shows how Cornwallis actively utilised his rounded experience by pushing for tactical reforms of his Indian troops in innovative ways.

Davies' work is not without limitations, however. This is not an easily accessible book for a general audience. Readers without prior knowledge of Britain's wars in the eighteenth century may find themselves lost under the weight of detail. The structure of the book itself exacerbates this problem. The chapters stand either by themselves or in pairs rather than a part of a larger cumulative analysis. One suspects that Davies might have been forced to squeeze a large initial draft into a far smaller one for publishing, and that much of the connective tissue between the chapters has ended up on the cutting room floor.

Despite his many original insights, a harsh reviewer might argue that not all of Davies' conclusions strike home. At times, this reviewer feels that Davies might overestimate the adaptability and innovativeness of the British army commanders. For Davies, the period 1799-1801 is crucial as it witnessed the 'rebirth of the British army'. At this point, British commanders began to amalgamate European fighting techniques with the

light infantry tactics and formations that had been deployed in North America during the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence. Here, Davies' 'informal knowledge networks' play a central role. New generations of officers fighting in the French Revolutionary Wars, such as John Moore, were actively talking to and learning from the older generation who had served in North America. While it seems beyond doubt that such conversations about military tactics did occur, there is very little evidence that they took place. Frustratingly, it appears that few officers were compelled to record the nature and direction of conversations about military tactics with their peers in the 1790s.

Without this evidence, this reviewer was unable to agree with Davies that the wars in North America had a profound effect on British tactics in the French Revolutionary War. Instead, it seems more plausible that the British army only saw the need to revaluate its order of battle after a string of repeated defeats in the 1790s at the hands of the French light infantry – the *tirailleurs*. It is strange that Davies does not highlight this as a possibility, even when he writes that 'the specific object of the light infantry and rifle units was to suppress the *tirailleurs*'. Combat between belligerents can be a powerful medium for the exchange of military knowledge and culture. Surely then, the British might have learnt these new tactics from their highly successful French opponent, rather than the older generation of commanders who served in America? Davies appears to concede this point in his conclusion, but this reviewer feels more could be done to highlight the limitations of the evidence over the course of the book.

While one may question some of Davies' arguments, overall, *The Wandering Army* remains a fascinating and thought-provoking work. It offers new and original perspectives on the British methods of fighting in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that will surely open opportunities for further study and academic debate.

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Ian F. W. Beckett, *British Military Panoramas: Battle in the Round, 1800-1914*. Warwick: Helion & Company, 2022. 210 pp + 87 Illustrations + Photos. ISBN: 978-1915113849 (hardback). Price £39.95.

Inspired by Beckett's longstanding personal interest in military panoramas (or 'cycloramas' in the United States), this book is a detailed summary of the development, popularity, and eventual fade into relative obscurity of this form of public spectacle over time. Having been invented by Irish miniaturist Robert Barker in 1787, military panoramas became a successful genre in nineteenth-century Britain, before being displaced in the twentieth century by the advent of cinema, plus a post-war distaste for their distinctive brand of emotive nationalism.

The book's main focus is on the production, materiality, and reception of these installations. Over six loosely chronological chapters, Beckett gives a useful overview of the domestic British side of this worldwide phenomenon, accompanied by a large number of colour illustrations. Designed to pull in wide popular audiences, Beckett argues, military panoramas often sacrificed scrupulous accuracy in favour of evoking emotion and national or imperial fervour. In general, they presented a 'sanitised' view of the experience of war, 'death often distant' and the brunt of the violence happening to the enemy (p. 26). At the same time, they may have followed a wider shift in art and literature towards beginning to include the experiences of junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted men, as well as towards conveying more openly to audiences some of the realities of wartime suffering and death. In terms of how the public responded, Beckett dashes through a range of responses from critics and visitors, noting that onlookers were often split over whether panoramas were vulgar or educational, or counted as 'art' at all: ultimately, he concludes, they were and still are 'a marriage of art, entertainment, and commercialism' (p. 180).

Beckett's work in highlighting where source material can be found and what kind of records survive will be particularly useful to anyone setting out to further study this topic, as panoramas were notoriously ephemeral: when not ruined by fire or damp, they were often discarded ('Many were simply cut up,' p. 26). However, this is largely a descriptive book, which does not delve very deeply into the analytical questions raised by other scholars of this form. Beckett responds only briefly to the now well-developed field of literature examining the relationship between nineteenth-century consumer culture and the spreading to the British public of an 'imperial message' celebrating empire, placing military panoramas as one of many formats through which this was attempted. When discussing Robert Ker Porter's 'The Great Historical Picture of the Storming of Seringapatam' (exhibited in London 1800-1801), Beckett mentions a stunning parallel in the murals commissioned by Tipu Sultan for his summer

palace to commemorate his father's defeat of East India Company forces at Pollilur, 'which the British subsequently characterised as grotesque and lacking in perspective compared to their own artistic celebrations of victory' (p. 39). Despite pointing out the clear irony here, Beckett does not go on to unpick the issues of perception and the imperial gaze at work in this comparison, nor justify why these murals – depicting battles in which British forces took part – are not considered at more length in the book. Perhaps, although it might have required a deliberately flexible definition of panorama, further similar examples could have been included in the book to great effect.

Another area which could be developed in future studies building on Beckett's work is the obvious class and gendered dimensions of popular reactions to the panoramas. The book is full of art critics' withering comments aimed at the 'middling sort', or the 'female of sensibility', or quotes that attest that 'more than one female was carried out swooning' from a supposedly particularly powerful scene (p. 41), which would be interesting to examine further. For the student of the classic and modern military panorama, however, this could be a helpful starting point – and for the traveller, a handy list of surviving panoramas around the world is included in the appendices.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v9i3.1744

Joanna Spear, *The Business of Armaments: Armstrongs, Vickers and the International Arms Trade, 1855–1955*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 388pp. ISBN: 978-1009297523 (hardback). Price £95.

At the heart of this engaging study lie two central questions: how did Britain's most prominent arms manufacturers, Armstrongs and Vickers – amalgamated in 1927 as Vickers-Armstrongs – establish their businesses in the nineteenth century; and what kind of relationships did they foster and maintain both with the British government and with foreign states over the course of a hundred tumultuous years between 1855 and 1955? To address these questions, Joanna Spear draws upon the firms' archival records, regional archives, government documents, and newspaper coverage to examine the companies' business strategies and assess the extent to which those strategies exhibited signs of independence from – and influence over – the policies of

successive British governments. Her conclusion, that the arc of the relationship between the armament firms and the British state had evolved by 1955 from 'independence to interdependence' (p. 4) is convincingly argued throughout the book's pages.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, slightly longer section, provides a broadly chronological account of Armstrongs and Vickers attempts to sell arms in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century to the period following the end of the Second World War. Here, Spear provides readers with a firms'-eye view of the rapid progress in weapons technology that characterised the latter part of the century without slipping into unnecessary technical jargon. The book highlights the intense lobbying efforts both firms engaged in to try and bolster their position in their domestic market – and their attempts to exclude other firms from entering that market – and documents how periods of prolonged and intensive warfare presented both opportunities and crises for the firms. In 1899, for example, the outbreak of the South African War brought with it a huge increase in demand for the wares produced by Armstrongs and Vickers. However, both companies were unable to rapidly scale-up production to meet the voracious appetites of the British armed forces.

Unsurprisingly, the two world wars provided the catalysts for major changes in the relationship between arms manufacturers and the government. However, arguably the more interesting aspect of this half of the book revolves around the different approaches the two firms took in pursuit of success. Across each of the five chapters in this section, Spear deals with seven identified 'strategies' employed by the firms to both cultivate their relationships with the state and to insulate themselves from the worst effects of declining order books (notably in the aftermath of Britain's wars). Of particular interest to this reviewer were Spear's account in Chapter three of the manner in which fierce competition between the firms at the turn of the twentieth century gave way to cooperation and collusion, and of the following chapter's coverage of the 'dangerous position' (p. 126) inhabited by the firms after 1918. The collapse in demand for munitions and weapons of war was followed by a period of negotiations designed to control international arms sales, the Great Depression, and – as the 1930s slipped into view – a reluctance on the part of the British Government to seriously countenance the implications of further advances in weapons technology upon national security.

The final chapter in this section documents the difficulties with which Vickers-Armstrongs grappled during the period leading up to the Second World War. Spears records an almost complete absence of dialogue between the government and industry with regards to the anticipated requirements to be made on the latter in the event of war with Nazi Germany – a particularly surprising state of affairs given the number of characters within the book's pages who jumped from public service to employment

with the firms during the period. General Sir Noel Birch, who vacated the post of Master General of the Ordnance in 1927 before immediately joining the Board of Vickers-Armstrongs, is just one of a plethora of former army and navy officers to take prominent roles in the firms throughout the period covered in the text. This reviewer would have liked Spear to provide some more interrogation of the seeming 'revolving door' between the armed forces and the arms industry. Tantalising glimpses of the values such men possessed are to be had, but more could have been made as to the technical, organisational, or 'softer' skills former service personnel like Birch contributed to the firms' operations.

The second section of the book takes the form of three case studies into the firms' activities in three foreign markets: Latin America, Asia, and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. Against a backdrop of military coups, civil and interstate wars, and unpredictable economic environments – and for the most part with very little help from the British Government – Armstrongs and Vickers established remarkably enduring relations in all three regions. Given the scope of the three chapters in this section, it is perhaps understandable that the writing here lacks the precision and focus of the section on the domestic market. The narrative displays a tendency towards documenting various tenders and negotiations and the activities of key individuals. Consequently, the seven strategies outlined previously become largely eclipsed by minutiae and detail that was absent from the earlier section. The text is still rich in material – not least on the firms' attempts to navigate the declining relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire prior to the First World War – but the relative absence of structure across these three chapters means that readers seeking to extract information on particular themes are advised to take careful notes to assist them in retracing their steps.

That relatively minor issue aside, this is an intriguing and important contribution to the history of the arms industry, and one that sheds new light on the complexity of the relationships between the 'merchants of death' and their most prominent customers.

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Claire Andrieu, *When Men Fell from the Sky: Civilians and Downed Airmen in Second World War Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. xv & 355 pp. Appendix. ISBN 978-1009266680 (hardback). Price £29.99.

This is a fascinating piece of historical scholarship in which Claire Andrieu explores the differing reactions to downed airmen in France, Germany and the UK. It is a work set out in four separate parts and consists of an introduction, eleven substantive chapters a conclusion, appendix and bibliography. It sets out the argument that the reaction amongst civilians on a national scale to airmen who had either crashed or parachuted from their aircraft differed between nations. In order to support this argument, Andrieu brings together military, social, transnational and comparative historical approaches. Through these different approaches the argument that is being made is excellently supported through the interrogation of official archival files such as the court proceedings of trials held by Nazi authorities in occupied France, trials conducted by the Allied powers during the occupation of Germany and personal memoirs of the French Resistance, the airmen themselves and domestic German officials. Andrieu does, however, reflect on the general paucity of sources available as well as the inherent reliability of some, particularly the records that emerge from the trials conducted by German military authorities during the occupation of France.

The book begins by exploring the differences between the available documents and the history of the experiences of civilians who interacted with airmen and the cultural and national memories of these events that have developed since 1945. It is here that Andrieu begins to develop one of the most interesting findings that form the basis for later chapters. This is the extent to which the Nazi government directly established the lynching of downed enemy airmen or if these events can be explained more convincingly as a bottom-up reaction from the population at large, particularly in areas that had been subjected to heavy aerial bombardment. The conclusion reached is that whilst senior Nazi officials were perfectly willing to break international law surrounding the treatment of enemy prisoners, and airmen in particular, there was already a groundswell of activity that did not need to be cultivated from above. Strong evidence is provided to demonstrate that the lynching of airmen after aircraft crashes or parachuting was largely confined to Germany with a few instances of airmen being attacked during the German invasion of France in 1940.

The approach of the British government, as well as the wider population, is largely explored by focusing on the humour employed and demonstrates that the public reaction to downed Luftwaffe personnel was largely one of benevolence, although this was not reflected in London during the height of the Blitz, where airmen were subjected to violence, but not lynching. Relying on local newspaper headlines, Andrieu

argues that the British differentiated between Germany as a nation and the political ideology of Nazism, and that acted as a restraint on how the British public reacted in these situations.

The majority of the book looks at the French experience both during and in the aftermath of the invasion and during the bombing raids conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom. Through exploring these two disparate points of both French and Second World War history some interesting trends develop. There was widespread rejoicing amongst much of the French civilian population to the bombing actions conducted against French targets, despite the deaths and damage that was caused throughout a large swathe of metropolitan France. Andrieu suggests that despite the raids, there was little diminution of the support provided to fallen Allied airmen in their attempts to evade capture by German forces, and eventually cross the French border into Spain and to Gibraltar to be repatriated to the UK.

The social character of those who assisted Allied airmen in their escape and evasion from German authorities is explored through two distinct themes. The first is the gender of those who put their lives at risk, often several times, to house, feed and generally support the airmen as they navigated their way through the resistance networks that transported Allied personnel across France. Andrieu highlights that the majority of those who were involved in the initial support were women, often mothers, and that this role fulfilled a maternal or nursing role for those involved. 'The women were there in their traditional role as nurses and mothers. Though their action was politically meaningful, it was … an extension of their gender role.' The second theme is one of how a society reacts to being under the occupation of either a hostile military and political power or governed by a de facto puppet government. It is argued that despite the harsh penalties in place for aiding Allied personnel, including death or imprisonment in concentration camps, this had little deterrence on the wider population and did little to either stir up animosity against downed enemy airmen, or see a reduction in the activities of the Resistance groups who were supported by British intelligence organisations and personnel on the ground.

Whilst not a traditional military history book, this is an important piece of scholarship that widens our understanding of how societies react or can be made to react through radicalisation, and the agency that individuals or groups have in wartime to conduct hostile actions against enemy personnel who have been unarmed and have surrendered. This work would appeal to those who have an interest in the social aspects of the Second World War, the politicisation of civilians in wartime, and those

with an interest in the social and gender aspects of the Resistance in France, particularly surrounding the support of Allied personnel.

MATTHEW POWELL
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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v9i3.1746

Ben Wheatley, *The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler's Greatest Armoured Defeat*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2023. 229pp + 14 maps + 126 photographs + 67 tables. ISBN: 978-1472859082 (hardback). Price £25.00.

Nowadays, visitors approaching the town of Prokhorovka on the main road from Belgorod cannot miss the fifty-two-metre-high Victory Memorial Tower which dominates the fields to the south of the town. A little further on, lies the extensive Prokhorovka Museum complex which is 'announced' by a particularly dramatic sculpture of two Soviet T34 tanks crushing a couple of German Tigers. The tower, the museum complex and the sculptures were constructed in the 1990s at a time when direct memories of the Battle of Kursk were beginning to fade. The Great Patriotic War was (and is) a source of great pride for the Russian people, and in the post-Soviet era it has served the authorities well to reinforce this through the memorialisation of key sites, and the propagation of associated nationalistic sentiments through school curriculums and state-controlled media.

The Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was, without doubt, an iconic victory for the Red Army - ranking alongside the Battles of Moscow, Stalingrad and the crossing of the Dnieper in terms of scale and importance. Indeed, the distinguished American historian David M. Glantz, suggests that Kursk and the ensuing Soviet Kutuzov counter-offensive constitute the point at which the strategic initiative was irretrievably lost by the German Wehrmacht. However, elements of the established narrative have, in recent years, been subject to vigorous challenge. One such element is the idea that on the 12 July 1943 Hausser's German II SS Panzer Korps suffered a catastrophic loss of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) when counter attacked by Rotmistrov's Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka.

The 'myth of Prokhorovka' began to unravel with the publication of the II SS Panzer Corps War Diary in 1980. A report from 5th Guards Tank Army issued on 17 July

1943 claimed 353 German AFVs had been destroyed on the fields around Prokhorovka in just one day, and yet the former document gave a figure of only 33 for the entire Kursk offensive! In recent years, the German historians Ernst Klink and Karl-Heinz Frieser have done much to develop a counter-narrative, and, from a Russian perspective, the research undertaken by Valerie Zamulin has also served to challenge the 'official' view.

In this fascinating new study Ben Wheatley has built on these foundations to produce a definitive enumeration of AFV losses. In doing so he has developed a number of thought-provoking arguments concerning the significance of the battle. The approach the author has taken is the epitome of empirical study in that every piece of available data from both Russian and German sources has been analysed and cross-referenced. The use of aerial reconnaissance photographic evidence to verify documented claims is novel and serves to build confidence in the conclusions reached. The revised picture is a revelation. Far from being 'destroyed' at Prokhorovka the three Division strong German II SS Panzer Korps (*Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf*) left the field of battle undefeated and in good order, having lost only 16 AFVs - a figure which included just one Tiger. On the other hand, the author, in applying the same analytical tools, concludes that the four Soviet tank corps that participated in the Battle of Prokhorovka lost between 212 and 265 AFVs.

Aside from giving the definitive position on AFV losses at Prokhorovka, the author explores a number of related questions. In particular it is clear that on the German side, the recovery of 'knocked-out' armour was, up until late 1943, extremely effective. Damaged vehicles were classified on the basis of severity before being allocated for repair to in-theatre workshops or specialist facilities back in Germany. Where they were written-off, then this was marked in contemporary records. Because the ground at Prokhorovka was not conceded until a few days after the battle, then it was possible for specialist Wehrmacht units to retrieve and repair a high proportion of damaged vehicles. Later in the war, as spare parts become scarce, transportation more difficult and where the Axis forces were in retreat, recovery and repair became more difficult and the rate of AFV losses increased exponentially.

Notwithstanding the over-statement of German losses, the author readily concedes that the Soviets prevailed at Prokhorovka and that in holding the Wehrmacht on both the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient, they were able to successfully execute Operation Kutuzov which set the conditions for a drive to the Dnieper and beyond. In acknowledging the Soviet victory, he cites a massive superiority in artillery, the deployment of a seemingly impregnable anti-tank screen and the sheer number of tanks as the elements that tipped the balance. Indeed, even after the battle, 5th Guards Tank Army were able to deploy over 400 operational AFVs.

This reviewer is not a fan of counter-factual history but nevertheless the author makes some interesting points when ruminating over what might have happened had the II SS Panzer Korps not been split up and its' effectiveness diluted after the 17th of July - particularly in bolstering the defence of Kharkov or prosecuting an effective counterattack to pre-empt such a threat. As he says, 'a fully operational and complete II SS Panzer Korps (including the *Liebstandarte*) in the hands of Manstein would have been a fearsome prospect'.

It is perhaps indicative of the range of sources used and the depth of research, that 132 pages are given over to the bibliography, appendices and notes. Aside from increasing the veracity of the authors' conclusions, this additional material is a rich reference source for anyone with an appetite to investigate this topic further. The large number of high-quality aerial photographs which are included, along with contemporary images sourced from Google Earth, bring another dimension to the analysis - and they also serve to remind the reader that many brave tank crews paid the ultimate price during this epic battle. It is often said that history is a matter of interpretation. However, this is one instance where the facts speak for themselves, and the author of this study should be commended on answering a contentious question in such a thorough, objective and authoritative way.

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Andrew Fine, *The Price of Truth: The Journalist who Defied Military Censors to Report the Fall of Nazi Germany*. New York: Cornell University Press, 2023. xv + 290 pp. ISBN 978-1501765940 (hardback). £27.99.

Andrew Fine's latest book is a study of a man and an incident. As a reporter based in Europe during the bloody denouement of the largest war in history, Ed Kennedy was a journalist at the peak of his career. Kennedy was not only covering news stories of interest to an enormous rapt audience but was also shaping up to become the chief of his bureau, the Associated Press, in Paris. In a single day all this would be lost.

As one of the journalists chosen to witness and report the surrender of all German forces in Europe, Kennedy also had the opportunity to secure one of the greatest

scoops of the war. However, in the rush to be the first to file the biggest story of the war so far, Kennedy infuriated the military and media establishments alike by appearing to break two promises. The first was the strict military order that forbade a reporter giving military information to the media before it was officially released. For Kennedy the second was perhaps the bitterest. Fellow journalists who had also been present at the surrender ceremony swore to each other that they would wait and file together once the military gave permission. As Andrew Fine demonstrates, the timeline for Kennedy's decision was marred by confused orders and misunderstandings.

In addition to the very interesting story of Ed Kennedy, Fine also examines the nature of US wartime reporting. Whilst at times tangential to Kennedy's story those sections of this book help to enrich our knowledge of the Second World War further. Of interest to those studying journalism and historians of the Second World War requiring basic knowledge of wartime-reporting, Fine's examination is useful.

However, military reporting, like great moments of civil achievement gain great audiences. A reporter in wartime can make a name for themselves and the American public desperately sought news. So, a triangle existed between the media, the military and the public. Fine is excellent at keeping each of these actors in the story. In order to keep the relationship between each on good terms a Bureau of Public Relations was introduced early in the war. Such measures help to explain how the American nation could be motivated for a foreign war without the authoritarianism which drove Axis nations. However, the three actors Fine focuses on had to tread a fine line. In a crucial early paragraph, Fine details the three elements of wartime reporting which needed to be kept in balance. Firstly, the press had to report to the public without damaging the military's war effort. Secondly, the press had to keep the military happy whilst also competing with each other to deliver the news fastest. And lastly, the public were suspicious of the media for manipulating or supressing war news.

Unlike other examinations of various figures from the military-media complex, Fine's preparatory analysis of the three actors is directly connected to the story of Ed Kennedy. The three way tug of war certainly explains how Kennedy's leaking of the German surrender might have come about. Media outlets wanted their reporters to file the big story first to make more money, the public were desperate to know that a long war was over but the military wanted all information suppressed. Kennedy appears not to have been able to wait. Nor, as Fine writes was London. After Kennedy's story broke but before any official statement, London was lit up by raucous celebrations. The city was brighter too because floodlights on the buildings were turned on for the first time since 1939. It is perhaps a pity that Fine does not show any of the consequences of Kennedy's pre-emptive report. Certainly, it seems absurd that Kennedy was punished when the war was so nearly over and everyone was ready to celebrate. But for all the discussion of the need for military secrecy, did Kennedy's

report actually jeopardise the lives of any people serving at the front? Fine quotes from General Eisenhower's missive in which potential loss of American lives is explicit. However, organised German resistance had ended by this point in the war and Berlin was occupied by the Soviets. Whilst especially tragic, deaths this close to the war's end were to be expected when German resistance in the final months of the war was fanatical and bizarre. In this mix of horror and confusion, the military's decision to blame Kennedy is preposterous.

For all Fine's diligent study there is no opinion on Kennedy's actions. Did Kennedy deliberately betray his fellow journalists in order to file his scoop, only to then see his career destroyed because the United States Army had not released the information? Or was Kennedy operating under the delusion that the news had been released and that it was now a race to file? Fine prefers to lay out the information and then step away. Kennedy, Fine argues, was not a bad man. But was a man who certainly lost his reputation and the chance to lead the Paris office. A situation which could not exist in 2023 when instant access to an audience on the internet has ended the newspaper scoop.

In the final chapter Fine reconciles the example provided by Ed Kennedy within the wider apparatus of war time journalism. Press and military relations were constantly strained because of the opposite aims of the organisations. Kennedy's decision to completely ignore the rules of the relationship, Fine writes, is indicative of how little patience was left between the two sides. As journalists constantly seek to harry and question authority, the military might have wished for a time when war fighting could be kept far from the eyes of the public at home.

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (July 2021)

General

The British Journal of Military History (the BJMH or Journal) welcomes the submission of articles and research notes on military history in the broadest sense, and without restriction as to period or region. The BJMH particularly welcomes papers on subjects that might not ordinarily receive much attention but which clearly show the topic has been properly researched.

The editors are keen to encourage submissions from a variety of scholars and authors, regardless of their academic background. For those papers that demonstrate great promise and significant research but are offered by authors who have yet to publish, or who need further editorial support, the editors may be able to offer mentoring to ensure an article is successfully published within the Journal.

Papers submitted to the BJMH must not have been published elsewhere. The editors are happy to consider papers that are under consideration elsewhere on the condition that the author indicates to which other journals the article has been submitted.

Authors must provide appropriate contact details including your full mailing address.

Authors should submit their article or research note manuscript, including an abstract of no more than 100 words, as an MS Word file (.docx) attached to an e-mail addressed to the BJMH Co-editors at editor@bcmh.org.uk. All submissions should be in one file only, and include the author's name, email address, and academic affiliation (if relevant), with the abstract, followed by the main text, and with any illustrations, tables or figures included within the body of the text. Authors should keep in mind that the Journal is published in A5 portrait format and any illustrations, tables or figures must be legible on this size of page.

The BJMH is a 'double blind' peer-reviewed journal, that is, communication between reviewers and authors is anonymised and is managed by the Editorial Team. All papers that the editors consider appropriate for publication will be submitted to at least two suitably qualified reviewers, chosen by the editorial team, for comment. Subsequent publication is dependent on receiving satisfactory comments from reviewers. Authors will be sent copies of the peer reviewers' comments.

Following peer review and any necessary revision by the author, papers will be edited for publication in the Journal. The editors may propose further changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression, although such changes will not be made without

consultation with the author. The editors are the final arbiters of usage, grammar, and length.

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Also note that the Journal editors endorse the importance of thorough referencing in scholarly works. In cases where citations are incomplete or do not follow the format specified in the Style Guide throughout the submitted article, the paper **will** be returned to the author for correction before it is accepted for peer review. Note that if citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the Journal editorial team.

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Articles

The journal welcomes the submission of scholarly articles related to military history in the broadest sense. Articles should be a minimum of 6000 words and no more than 8000 words in length (including footnotes) and be set out according to the BJMH Style Guide.

Research Notes
The BJMH also welcomes the submission of shorter 'Research Notes'. These are pieces of research-based writing of between 1,000 and 3,000 words. These could be, for example: analysis of the significance a newly accessible document or documents; a reinterpretation of a document; or a discussion of an historical controversy drawing on new research. Note that all such pieces of work should follow the style guidelines for articles and will be peer reviewed. Note also that such pieces should not be letters, nor should they be opinion pieces which are not based on new research.

Book Reviews
The BJMH seeks to publish concise, accessible and well-informed reviews of books relevant to the topics covered by the Journal. Reviews are published as a service to the readership of the BJMH and should be of use to a potential reader in deciding whether or not to buy or read that book. The range of books reviewed by the BJMH reflects the field of military history, taken in the widest sense. Books published by academic publishers, general commercial publishers, and specialist military history imprints may all be considered for review in the Journal.

Reviews of other types of publication such as web resources may also be commissioned.

The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2021)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on, but is not identical to, the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Illustrations, Figures and Tables:

- Must be suitable for inclusion on an A5 portrait page.
- Text should not be smaller than 8 pt Gill Sans MT font.
- Should be numbered sequentially with the title below the illustration, figure or table.
- Included within the body of the text.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.
- If citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the editorial team.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
- For edited volumes: Chapter Author, 'Chapter title' in Volume Author/s (ed. or eds), *Volume title in italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year), p. # or pp. #-#.
- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.

- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL Accessed date. The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout.
- *Op cit.* should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.