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Cover picture: German East African Campaign. Kavirondo (BEA) porters of the 2nd Road Corps. Chikukwe Swamp, January 1918. Photo © Imperial War Museum, IWM (Q15625)

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EDITORIAL*

Much like the first decades of the twentieth century (an era which witnessed what the historian Thomas Otte has called a veritable 'cult of commemoration'), it seems that ours is also the age of the anniversary. A decade ago, the centennial of the First World War drew widespread international attention, whilst 'major' D-Day anniversaries (such as the 80th last year) have likewise garnered significant popular and political interest. For military historians, 2025 similarly has been marked by several important milestones, perhaps most notably the 250th anniversary (in June) of the establishment of the United States Army, and the 80th anniversary (in May and August) of the end of the Second World War. It is eminently fitting, then, that this issue of the *British Journal for Military History* includes articles shedding new light on various aspects of the 1939-45 conflict as well as one which revisits the British 'Southern Strategy' during the American Revolution.

In addition to a number of book reviews (covering scholarship on subjects as diverse as the Thirty Years War, to nineteenth century naval history, to the Korean War) the issue is rounded out by a Research Note and an Article dealing with a connected subject – casualty statistics. The former focuses on the Italian Royal Army casualties between 1940 and 1943, and the latter engages directly with a subject which emerged in the aftermath of the 1914-18 centennial: what the authors refer to as 'historical inequalities' in the 'commemoration of the dead of the British Empire'.

Through painstaking attention to the available evidence, the article's authors thus offer a new estimate for 'the number of soldiers and carriers raised from across East Africa who died in British Imperial service during the East Africa campaign of the First World War'. To be sure, whilst detailed statistical information of this sort cannot on its own make right prior commemorative neglect, it can, nonetheless, help to 'return some dignity and individual recognition to every one of the 88,285 East Africans who lost their lives in British military service' during the First World War. Indeed, as the article explains, it is hoped that the existence of an 'accurate and meaningful figure' will better enable the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) to 'find ways to recognise and fittingly commemorate' those whose service has to date often been overlooked, marginalised, or diminished.

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The British Southern Strategy in the American Revolution, 1775-1782

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ABSTRACT
The British southern strategy was not a side-show or afterthought in the world war that began as the American Revolution (1775-1783), but a part of the planning efforts from the earliest days of the war. Implementation of this strategy continued for more than two years after Cornwallis' famous surrender at Yorktown, which resulted from the failure of the southern strategy. This article argues for a new assessment of the war within this context, while examining the importance and ultimate failure of these campaigns.

'A great empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges.'

Benjamin Franklin.[1]

Introduction

The dark and bloody events of a British southern strategy were not a side-show to the better-remembered campaigns of the American Revolution. This persistent idea to defeat, or at least salvage something from, the rebellion began in the early months of the war. These campaigns continued for more than two years after they resulted in the famous Franco-American victory at Yorktown on 19 October 1781. General Nathanael Greene's subsequent campaign in the South led to Great Britain's withdrawal from Georgia and the Carolinas.[2]

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[1]William B. Willcox, ed., 'Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One, 11 September 1773,' *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,* vol. 20, *January 1 through 31 December 1773,* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 389–399.

[2]For how the Southern Strategy was carried out, see Richard Sears Dukes, Jr., 'Anatomy of a Failure: British Military Policy in the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution, 1775-1781 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1993); Alan

This southern strategy, part of America's part of a still unnamed world war, would have significant consequences as that rebellion metamorphosed into a global conflict.[3] The British Empire was severely challenged by relying on a southern strategy and continuing the American war after 1777. French armies fought beside American ones at Savannah and Yorktown.

The Spanish conquest of West Florida, today's Alabama, Mississippi, and western Florida, brought about Spain acquiring East and West Florida, expanding the Spanish Empire to its greatest extent, with the Louisiana Territory that it had previously acquired from France after the end of the Seven Years War in America, and after suppressing a two-year revolt by the residents. The Dutch and French captured valuable British possessions in the Caribbean and threatened to take others. Historian Piers Mackesy even argues that 'The American War had been largely fought and decided in the West Indies.'[4]

The British government, however, did not believe the war was lost but envisioned, at the least, retaining the southern colonies with popular local support. This would allow the Empire to contain the new United States from Canada, the Caribbean, and the

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Pell Crawford, *The Fierce People: The Untold Story of America's Revolutionary War in the South,* (New York: Knopf, 2024); Brian W. Neil, *The Southern Campaign of the American Revolution: The American Insurgency from 1780 to 1782,* (Coppell, TX: Createspace, 2015); John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas 1780-1782,* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985); J. Pearson, *The Failure of the British Southern Strategy During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution,* (Coppell, TX: Createspace, 2014); Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, and Michael T. McMaster, eds., *Strategy in the American Revolution: A Global Approach,* (New York: Routledge, 2010), and David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina, and Georgia, 1775-1780,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2005).

[3]See Walter Russell Mead, *God and Gold, Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World,* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007).

[4]Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783,* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 144, pp. 159-160, p. 166, p. 209, p. 397, p. 400, p. 416, pp. 436-439, pp. 444-518. See, among other works, Lorrie D. Ferreiro, *Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the Men of France and Spain who Saved It,* (New York: Knopf, 2016); Andrew O'Shaughnessy, *European Friends of the American Revolution,* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2023); Gabriel Paquette and Gonzalo M. Quintero Sarava, *Spain and the American Revolution: New Approaches and Perspective,* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2022); and James W. Rabb, *Spain, Britain and the American Revolution in Florida, 1763-1783,* (Jeffersonville, NC: McFarland, 2007).

southwest American provinces. They continued this southern strategy when they came to see defeat as the only alternative.[5] Later attempts worldwide at thwarting populist insurrections reflected this failure in the American Revolution.

The coming two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of this colonial war for independence is an appropriate time to review the realities of that conflict's composition, creation, and identity. British leaders believed that loyal subjects on the Carolina frontier could overcome the American Revolution by deciding for the King's cause.[6] As late as 1780, Georgia's colonial Chief Justice James Simpson, in reviewing the Loyalist situation in Georgia and South Carolina, still argued that the majority of those living in the southern backcountry would oppose rebels from the coastal interests, who did not represent and often ignored the western settlements.[7]

Americans' opposition to coastal-oriented governments was real. On the eve of the Revolution, this dissent raged in the backcountry from Vermont to Georgia. During the North Carolina Regulator Rebellion of 1764 to 1771, as many as six thousand frontiersmen, three-quarters of the adult males on that frontier, revolted against corrupt local governments with connections to the coastal elite. The parallel South Carolina Regulator Rebellion organised vigilante action against frontier banditry, successfully forcing the province's government to establish the rule of law through courts and jails created outside of Charleston.[8] Virginia had similar problems.

[5]John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence,* (New York: Oxford, 1976), pp. 163-192; Michael A. McDonnell, 'The American War for Independence as a Revolutionary War,' American History: Oxford Research Encyclopaedias (7 July 2016), 2, 11-12, online: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.1. Accessed 2 February 2024. For a defence of British failure in the American Revolution, see Anne Midgley, 'First Empire Unravelled: Why the British Lost in the War of American Independence,' *Saber and Scroll Journal* 2 (Fall 2013): pp. 139-153.

[6]Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South 1775-1782,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), pp. 14-25, p. 36, pp. 37-40; 'Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina,' *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 11 (July 1910): p. 153.

[7]Gordon B. Smith, *Morningstars of Liberty: The Revolutionary War in Georgia, 1775-1783,* (Milledgeville, GA: Boyd Publishing, 2006), pp. 183-184.

[8]See Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia,* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and Robert S. Davis, William Bartram, Wrightsborough, and the Prospects for the Georgia Backcountry, 1765-1774, in Kathryn E. Holland Braund and Charlotte M. Potter, eds. *Fields of Vision: Essays on the Travels of William Bartram,* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), pp. 15-32.

Georgia's royal governor, Sir James Wright, had no use for regulators, but he avoided those troubles by giving the settlers on his frontier courts and other concessions.[9]

Frontiersmen, however, did not see these conflicts as reasons to rebel against their protector, Great Britain. In 1774, hundreds of backcountry Georgians signed petitions in support of royal rule. Royal Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina arranged a similar successful petition drive in his colony. In South Carolina, thousands of frontiersmen who opposed the Revolution refused to sign the Continental Association.[10]

Aware of the situation, American rebels offered the frontier political power and self-determination, which the colonial system had denied them. British promises of restoring an old order would not influence people who had received little benefit from it. The rebels united the individual settlements through shared interests, such as land, security, and political power, using persecution, promotion, and propaganda. America's new currency often carried the image of a frontier rifleman.[11]

The rebels could also make a case against British imperial policies. Having won its war against the French and their Indigenous allies in America, the King's government blocked western settlement across the Appalachian Mountains to avoid the expense of conflict with the Indigenous people and to encourage Anglo-American settlement

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[9]Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America,* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 108-109; E. W. Caruthers, *Revolutionary Incidents and Sketches of Characters Chiefly of the Old North State,* (Philadelphia, PA: Hayes & Zell, 1854), p. 19, p. 37. See Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia,* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) and Robert S. Davis, 'William Bartram, Wrightsborough, and the Prospects for the Georgia Backcountry, 1765-1774, in Kathryn E. Holland Braund and Charlotte M. Potter, eds. *Fields of Vision: Essays on the Travels of William Bartram,* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), pp. 15-32, and for the history of the North Carolina Regulators, see Marjoleine Kars, *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina,* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and for the South Carolina Regulators, see Richard M. Brown, *The South Carolina Regulators: The Story of the First American Vigilante Movement,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).

[10]Carole Waterson Troxler, *The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974), pp. 8-17.

[11]See Philip L. Mossman, *Money of the American Colonies and Confederation,* (New York: American Numismatic Society, 2012).

in the newly acquired Canada and Florida. The King's Privy Council's order of 7 April 1773 ended the practice of granting free headright land in America, which became an American grievance listed in the Declaration of Independence. On the eve of the Revolution, a London court case initiated the process that would ultimately lead to the abolition of slavery in the Empire. The British government worked to discourage migration to America.

The British southern strategy to try to take advantage of this situation began in the rebellion's earliest days when North Carolina's Royal Governor Josiah Martin, driven by the rebellion to take refuge aboard a Royal Navy vessel, wrote to the British commander in America, General Thomas Gage, in the summer of 1775 about retaking his colony using loyal Americans. Gage promised gunpowder for this effort.[12]

Martin believed he could muster two to three thousand men, half of them well-armed, but Georgia Loyalist Thomas Brown in East Florida thought Martin could embody ten thousand men if they had sufficient weapons. By the end of 1775, Alexander Shaw, a friend of the governor, wrote to William Legge, the 2nd Earl of Dartmouth and the Secretary for the Colonies, that a successful uprising in North Carolina would embolden the Loyal Americans in neighboring South Carolina to guarantee the success of a British campaign to capture Charleston, South Carolina's and the South's all-important port.

Dartmouth ordered ten thousand stands of arms and six light field pieces for the effort. Further, in December 1775, General Sir William Howe, Gage's successor, planned to dispatch a fleet with two thousand British soldiers to North Carolina to implement Martin's plan and then move against Charleston.[13]

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[12]Josiah Martin to Earl of Dartmouth, 28 August 1775, in K. G. Davies, ed., *Documents of The American Revolution, 1770-1783*, 19 vols., (Dublin, IE: Valentine Mitchell, 1973-1983), 11: pp. 88-92; Duane Meyer, *The Highland Scots of North Carolina,* (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Archives, 1963), pp. 53-60; Edward A. Bator, *South Carolina 1775: A Crucible Year,* (Franklin, TN: American History Imprints/American History Press, 2009), p. 12, p. 35; Mackesy, *The War for America*, pp. 43-44. Also see Michael Cecere, *March to Independence: The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies, 1775-1776,* (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2021).

[13]Thomas Brown to Governor Lord William Campbell, 18 October 1775; Martin to Lord George Germain, 21 March 1776; and 'Narrative of Proceedings of Loyalists in North Carolina,' 25 April 1776, in Davies, *Documents of The American Revolution,* 11: p. 149 & 12: pp. 85-90, pp. 112-117; Gerald Krieger, 'British Miscalculation and Loyalist support in the American Revolution,' March 19, 2024, *Journal of the American Revolution*, online https://allthingsliberty.com/2024/03/british-miscalculation-of-loyalist-support-in-the-american-south-round-one/. Accessed 21 March 2024; David K. Wilson, *The*

As Martin promoted his plan, a prosperous Virginia planter and captain in the Royal Militia, Moses Kirkland, arrived in St. Augustine, the capital of British East Florida, in late September 1775. He sought military support for the six thousand South Carolina backcountry Loyalist Americans he claimed to represent. He presented his request to Royal Governor Patrick Tonyn before setting sail to advocate to General Gage in Boston.[14]

Kirkland first arrived in Virginia, where he assisted colonial Governor John Murray, Lord Dunmore, in the capture of Norfolk. His Lordship had plans for his colony, like those of Martin in North Carolina. On 7 November 1775, he issued a proclamation encouraging enslaved men to escape from the plantations of Virginia, when the owners had supported the rebellion. Martin would enlist these Black Americans as soldiers, an idea that sparked fears of violence among the white population, regardless of politics. (Of the fifteen hundred enslaved who came forward, eventually one thousand died from disease and other conditions of their service.) From there Kirkland set out for Boston in late November, only for his ship to be captured by an American privateer.[15]

Through these events, a written copy of Kirkland's plans came into the hands of the revolutionary leadership, including proposals to arm Cherokee and Creek warriors, as well as the enslaved, which became of great propaganda value for the rebellion. In Charleston, on 18 August 1775, African American Thomas Jeremiah, likely the wealthiest person of his race in the colonies and a slave owner, died on the gallows on the charge that he intended to start a slave rebellion for the King's cause. At Lindley's Fort, South Carolina, on 15 July 1776, Loyalist white Americans fought beside

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Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 1-2; Ricardo A. Herrera, 'The King's Friends: Loyalists in British Strategy', in David Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, and Michael T. McMaster, eds., *Strategy in the American War of Independence,* (London: Routledge Cass Military Studies, 2010), p. 102.

[14]Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 40-41.

[15]Wayne Lynch, 'Moses Kirkland and the Southern Strategy, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution 10' (2-3) (April 2015): pp. 1-13; Thomas B. Allen, *Tories: Fighting for the King in America's Civil War,* (New York: Harper, 2011), pp. 154-155; Alan Gilbert, *Black Patriots and Loyalists: Fighting for Emancipation in the War for Independence,* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 9-10; Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia,* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 156-161.

Cherokees in an attack that newly arrived rebel militia repulsed, further igniting the fears of the frontier population of British-sponsored raids and uprisings.[16]

With violent revolutions, what often began as partisan political guerrillas frequently degenerate into apolitical bandits or worse. Patriots could be such terrorists, but the notoriety of the kind of men who followed John Bacon, Thomas Brown, William 'Bloody Bill' Cunningham, the Harpe brothers, Francis Hopkins, Daniel McGirt, the Doan Outlaws, and Joseph Coffel/Scophol gave Loyalists a negative reputation in general, even to the present. Those Americans were often foreign-born or connected with Indigenous people, further causing them to be viewed with disdain by the far greater native-born American population.[17]

In 1775-1776, Sir Henry Clinton led a mismanaged effort to reach both the Loyalists on the frontier and capture Charleston. The two thousand South Carolina backcountry men who came forward suffered defeat and dispersal at the Great Cane Brake on 22 December 1775, and North Carolina's Revolutionary militia defeated frontier Loyalists at the Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge on 27 February 1776, before Clinton's fleet could arrive. Far from a success, this uprising ultimately led to the North Carolina Provincial Congress agreeing to approve American independence.

Governor Martin assured Lord Dartmouth that twenty thousand Loyalists would mobilise in North Carolina, but only fourteen hundred men, largely former Regulators and Scottish immigrants, came forward. By the time of their defeat at Moore's Creek,

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[16]Bator, *South Carolina 1775*, p. 131; Piecuch, *Three Peoples One King*, pp. 76-82; Harry M. Ward, *Between the Lines: Banditti of the American Revolution,* (Westport, CT: Meckler, 2002), p. 194; J. William Harris, *The Hanging of Thomas Jeremiah: A Free Black Man's Encounter with Liberty,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 119-135; Nash, *Unknown American Revolution*, p. 37, p. 38, pp. 392-394; Cecere, *March to Independence*, p. 61.

[17]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) Patrick Tonyn to Sir William Howe, 1 May1778, British Headquarters Papers, no. 1142, and Thomas Brown to Lord Cornwallis, 16 July 1780, Cornwallis Papers, 30/11/2, pp. 307-311, Ward, *Between the Lines*, p. 200; Timothy Compeau, *Dishonoured Americans: The Political Death of Loyalists in Revolutionary America,* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2023), pp. 76-104; Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and The American Revolution on The Southern Frontier,* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989), pp. 73-74; 'An ADDRESS to any People that have been attacked, and may be attacked, that they may consider,' *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), 12 August 1779, p. 1 cc. 1-3; Leland J. Bellot, *William Knox: The Life and Thought of an Eighteenth-Century Imperialist,* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1977), p. 142, p. 144.

they numbered only eight hundred to a thousand men. They fought with broad swords and had only five hundred muskets.[18]

The King's cause suffered across the South as the Continental Congress prepared to declare Independence. Continental troops turned back Clinton's landing at Wilmington, North Carolina, in April and May and his fleet at Sullivan's Island near Charleston on 28 June 1776. A company from the Georgia frontier helped suppress Loyalist Americans in South Carolina, and frontier Georgians also helped to defend Savannah against a British fleet. At that same time, militias from the four rebelling Southern colonies destroyed the villages of the Cherokee in retaliation for raids on the frontier that were in response to white intrusions onto native lands.

America's revolutionaries, however, continued to fear that a successful uprising by Loyalists in the South could be fatal to the Revolution. Major General James Moore of North Carolina prepared to march from Wilmington, North Carolina, to defend Charleston, South Carolina, against a return of a British invasion force, and the new rebel provincial governments passed oppressive anti-Loyalist legislation.[19]

In the interim, Kirkland, having escaped from imprisonment in Philadelphia with the help of local Loyalists, finally presented his plans for a southern campaign to Howe in New York. In March 1777. The general sent him back to East Florida to work as a deputy superintendent for Indian affairs. In 1778, Kirkland wrote to Sir Henry Clinton and other British officials, continuing his call for the implementation of a southern strategy.[20]

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[18]Wilson, *The Southern Strategy*, pp. 2-3, pp. 26-34; Bobby Gilmer Moss, *The Snow Campaign, 1775: First Land Battle of the American Revolution in South Carolina,* (Blacksburg, SC: Scotia Hibernia Press, 2007), pp. 1-20; Ward, *Between the Lines*, pp. 191-193; Allen, *Tories: Fighting for the King*, pp. 141-153; Cecere, *March to Independence*, pp. 110-111; Herrera, The King's Friends, p. 110; James Kirby Martin, *Insurrection: The American Revolution and Its Meaning,* (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2019), p. 99; Baikia Harvey to Thomas Baikia, 30 December 1775, D2/385, Orkney County Library, Kirkwall, UK.

[19]C. L. Bragg, *Crescent Moon Over Carolina: William Moultrie and American Liberty,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2013), pp. 51-58; Piecuch, *Three Peoples One King*, pp. 52-57, pp. 59-60. Also see David Lee Russell, *Victory on Sullivan's Island: The British Cape Fear/Charles Town Expedition of 1776,* (Conshohocken, PA: Infantry Publishing, 2002) and Nadia Dean, *A Demand for Blood: The Cherokee War of 1776,* (Cherokee, NC: Valley River Press, 2012).

[20]Randal M. Miller, 'A Backcountry Loyalist Plan to Retake Georgia and the Carolinas', 1778, *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 75 (October 1975): pp. 207-214.

Efforts at Loyalist uprisings subsequently failed elsewhere. General Sir William Howe took command of the British forces in America and brought officer commissions for Loyalists willing to organize a counter-revolution. He supplemented his army with seven thousand Americans as provincial regiments in 1777-1778 from Philadelphia and the Middle Colonies, but only to use them as second-line garrison troops. A bloody civil war followed, with the Loyalists suppressed by their neighbors who had joined the rebellion.

Howe withdrew his various local garrisons from rebel attacks, an outcome the opposite of what was intended by creating the provincial troops. General Sir Henry Clinton, Howe's successor, withdrew the British army to New York to save it, and likely the British fleet, from destruction in the summer of 1778.[21] The tension over the overall strategy of trying to 'Americanise' the British war effort, southern or otherwise, can be seen by New Jersey and South Carolina vying for the most battles.

New York's highlands divided New England, the primary source of soldiers and supplies for George Washington's army, from the mid-Atlantic colonies; the local population was politically divided. This route was so critical that one of the reasons for the 1775 American invasion of Canada was to prevent a British invasion by that route. The new state militias crushed Loyalist uprisings there, contributing to General John Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in 1777. In 1780, John Connolly proposed a plan for rallying landless white squatters on the Ohio frontier for the King's army, but that went nowhere.[22] British planners did not learn from these mistakes and near

[21]T. Cole Jones, *Captives of Liberty: Prisoners of War and the Politics of Vengeance in the American Revolution,* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), p. 113; George W. Kyte, 'Some Plans for a Loyalist Stronghold in the Middle Colonies', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 6 (July 1949): pp. 179-180, p. 183; Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' pp. 107-108; Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, 'To Gain the Hearts and Subdue the Minds of America: General Sir Henry Clinton and the Conduct of the British War,' *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 158 (September 2014): pp. 199-208; Mackesy, *The War for America*, pp. 214-217; Julie Flavell, *The Howe Dynasty: The Untold Story of a Military Family and the Women Behind Britain's Wars for America*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2021), p. 243. Also see Liam Riordam, *Many Identities, One Nation: The Revolution and Its Legacy in the Mid-Atlantic,* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).

[23]Martin, *Insurrection*, p. 99; Michael E, Shay, *The Whites of Their Eyes: Revolutionary War Hero Israel Putnam from Roger's Rangers to Bunker Hill,* (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Stackpole Books, 2023), p. 217; Shy, *People Numerous and Armed*, pp. 186-190; Richard A. Ketchum, *Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War,* (New York: Holt 1997), pp. 70-71, pp. 80-81, pp. 108-109, p. 111, p. 239, pp. 252-254, pp. 315-316.

disasters, despite a history of failure with populist resistance, from the English Civil Wars in the 1640s to the occupation of Cuba and the Philippines in the 1760s.[23]

A whole new military effort had to be made for a sustained war in America. Ships were captured in the already inadequate and expensive trans-Atlantic supply line by American, French, and other privateers at sea and as wrecks on the coast.[24] European soldiers, unaccustomed to America, died of disease at an appalling rate.[25]

Most military and political leaders on either side never understood the Loyalists' limitations, motives, and potential.[26] Historian Ricardo A. Herrera wrote that American Loyalists had 'motives diverse and actions anything but united,' but generally only sought the protection of 'their liberties and individual freedoms' within the British Empire, not to fight and die as martyrs.[27]

Of these Americans, other than the bandits, former colonial officials, and terrorists, wrote historian Anne Midgley: 'Some were staunchly devoted to the Crown, while others shifted their alliance with the vagaries of war. Many were better termed as neutrals and wished to be left alone.'[28] For example, a few hundred Loyalists from the South Carolina frontier, named by their neighbors as Scopholites after a notorious chicken thief, marched across Georgia to St. Augustine in East Florida in the spring of

[23]For British failure in Cuba, see Elena A. Schneider, *The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade, and Slavery in the Atlantic World,* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), and for the Philippines, see Shirley Fish, *When Britain Ruled the Philippines, 1762-1764: The Story of the 18th Century British Invasion of the Philippines during the Seven Years War,* (n. p.: S. Fish, 2003). Also see James M. Johnson, Christopher Pryslopski, and Andrew Villani, eds. *Key to the Northern Country: The Hudson River Valley in the American Revolution*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2013).

[24]Sam Willis, *The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of the American Revolution,* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), pp. 93-95, pp. 99-100, p. 433, p. 434; Mackesy, *The War for America*, pp. 66-67, p. 68, pp. 118, pp. 223-224, pp. 367, p. 518. For privateers, see Eric Jay Dolin, *Rebels at Sea: Privateering in the American Revolution,* (New York: Liveright, 2022).

[25]Shay, *The Whites of Their Eyes,* pp. 71-82; Midgley, 'First Empire Unravelled,' p. 146.

[26]Leonard Woods Larabee, *Conservatism in Early American History,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1943), pp. 164-165.

[27]Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' pp. 100-101.

[28]Midgley, 'First Empire Unravelled,' p. 146; Leonard Woods Larabee, *Conservatism in Early American History,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1943), pp. 164-165.

1778. Many of their number, however, subsequently deserted and returned to South Carolina. Their units disappeared and were resurrected repeatedly.[29]

Despite the surge in activity in the North, the southern strategy survived because it had influential supporters. So many Loyalists and officials wanted to believe it could still succeed that recriminations for the plan's eventual failures would hardly exist beyond the later famous pamphlet war between Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Charles Cornwallis.[30]

Even after the British disaster at Saratoga in 1777, in places like Glasgow, Kingston, and occupied New York, Loyalists rallied to support the King's cause. Prominent New Yorker William Bayard, for example, wrote to Lord George Germain in the autumn of 1778 that half of America still supported the King's Cause and needed only to be encouraged by the arrival of British soldiers to carry muskets in overthrowing the American rebels.[31]

Excuses to justify continuing the southern strategy became desperate, such as answering the declining number of British troops by capturing enough American Continental soldiers to force an exchange for the King's soldiers surrendered at Saratoga, not abandoning the Loyalists, and thwarting French and Spanish ambitions to drive the British from the hugely financially important Caribbean. Among the King's subjects who were not ready to accept the Empire's defeat, it became an obsession, mainly because of what they saw as malicious American anarchy, even terrorism, in place of an orderly government.[32]

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[29]Robert S. Davis, '1778: Loyalism and the Failure of the British Military in the Southern Colonies,' *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (2018): pp. 67-68, p. 72.
[30]See Benjamin F. Stevens, ed. and comp., *The Campaign in Virginia, 1781: An Exact Reprint of Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy* 2 vols., (London: Malby and Sons, 1888-1889); Richard Middleton, 'The Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy and Responsibility for the British Surrender at Yorktown,' *History* (July 2013): pp. 370-389; and John E. Ferling, 'The Troubled Relationship Between Clinton and Cornwallis and Their "War" after the War,' *Journal of the American Revolution* (15 July 2021), online https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/07/the-troubled-relationship-between-clinton-and-cornwallis-and-their-war-after-the-war/. Accessed 1 July 2025.
[31]Brad A. Jones, *Resisting Independence: Popular Loyalism in the Revolutionary British Atlantic,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), pp. 159-160; William Bayard to Germain, [September 1778?], in Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution*, 13: p. 410.
[32]Jones, *Captives of Liberty*, pp. 158-159, pp. 191-192; Roberts, *The Last King of America*, pp. 340-341, pp. 358-359; Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 111; William B. Wilcox, 'British Strategy in America in 1778,' *Journal of Modern History* 19 (June 1947): p. 121.

The American people proved an insurmountable obstacle to British hopes for the southern strategy. A crucial lesson to be learned from the southern strategy is that even if the American army had been defeated and the Continental Congress bankrupt, Britain's army of thirty thousand men still had to conquer more than a million Americans, many of whom were armed and hostile. Further, a Loyalist, by definition, seeks to continue as before, which few Americans, even British supporters, wanted.[33]

Some observers saw the reality in America. Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a Maryland signer of the Declaration of Independence, correctly predicted at least as early as 29 March 1776 that the British army, however often victorious in formal battles, could only succeed in holding the ground where it stood, having not been defeated as much as rendered irrelevant by the hostility of the civilian population. He believed Great Britain must be 'an immense loser' in America because war fails as a lone weapon in subduing the human spirit.[34] Frederick Howard, the Fifth Earl of Carlisle, while heading an official peace commission sent by Parliament to the Americans, wrote similarly to his wife as early as 1778. He believed that Americans only gave the British army support when it was physically present and that the Loyalists, who consisted of refugees, were being protected at great government expense.[35]

Other voices continued to call for an invasion of the Southern colonies, however. Former Royal Governors Sir James Wright of Georgia and Governor Lord William Campbell of South Carolina presented a memorandum to Lord George Germain, Secretary for the Colonies, in 1778, arguing for the restoration of their colonies to provide food for the population of British East Florida and the enslaved labour who worked in the immensely profitable sugar islands in the Caribbean. Wright also presented his ideas to the King.[36] By the winter of 1777-1778, William Knox, undersecretary to Germain, presented the first plan to invade Georgia to reach the frontier Loyalists of the Carolinas. He had served as provost in Georgia and still owned plantations there.[37]

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[33]Ketchum, *Saratoga*, pp. 10-11.

[34]McDonnell, 'The American War,' pp. 3-11.

[35]Lord Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, 21 July 1778, in Historical Manuscripts Commission, comp., *The Manuscripts of The Earl of Carlisle Preserved at Castle Howard,* (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1897), pp. 356-357.

[36]Greg Brooking, *From Empire to Revolution: Sir James Wright and the Price of Loyalty in Georgia,* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2024), p. 159; Robert S. Davis, comp., *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers of the American Revolution,* (Easley, SC: Southern Historical Press, 1979), pp. 11-19; Lynch, 'Moses Kirkland and the Southern Strategy,' 6-7.

[37]Edward J. Cashin, *Governor Henry Ellis and the Transformation of British North America*

Germain made the final decisions in London regarding the British conduct of the war. He blamed the campaign's failure in the South in 1775-1776 on military incompetence, rather than on the flawed basic idea. Historian John Ferling wrote that the Secretary depended upon the advice of the most extreme Loyalists, men desperate to continue the war for various reasons, including self-interest.[38]

On 8 March 1778, Germain sent General Sir Henry Clinton detailed instructions on conducting the operations of what had become a world war. As usual, the Secretary called for bold offensives even as British military resources declined. On his list of what historian William B. Wilcox described as 'a collection of strategic fossils,' he ordered Knox's plan for an invasion of Georgia to be implemented as the beginning of what he envisioned would restore America to the Crown at least as far north as Maryland.[39]

Germain wanted much more, including an invasion of Honduras, which would have cut the Spanish Empire in half. Clinton was also ordered to send reinforcements to Jamaica and to dispatch five thousand men under Major General James Grant to invade the island of St. Lucia, and thirteen hundred reinforcements under Brigadier General John Campbell of Strachur to British Pensacola in West Florida in a scheme going back to at least 1771 to take Spanish New Orleans and the Lower Mississippi River. Spain provided the Americans with gunpowder and other significant support during the Revolution.[40]

(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994), pp. 217-219; Leland J. Bellot, *William Knox: The Life and Thought of an Eighteenth-Century Imperialist* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1977), pp. 39-40, pp. 143-144, pp. 155-157, pp. 163-165.

[38]John E. Ferling, *The Loyalist Mind: Joseph Galloway and the American Revolution,* (State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), pp. 47-54; Bellot, *William Knox*, p. 142; Mackesy, *The War for America*, pp. 47-60.

[39]Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, 8 March and 3 December 1778, in Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution*, 15: pp. 58-59, p. 279; Wilcox, 'British Strategy in America in 1778,' p. 121; Mackesy, *The War for America*, p. 225.

[40]Germain to Clinton, 8 March 1778, in K. G. Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution*, 15: pp. 58-59; Germain to Clinton, 25 June 25 1779, Colonial Office Papers 5/97. For British ambitions to seize Spanish Louisiana, see William S. Coker and Robert R. Rea, eds., *Anglo-Spanish Confrontation on the Gulf Coast during the American Revolution,* (Pensacola, FL: Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference, 1982); Michael J. Devine, 'Territorial Madness: Spain, Geopolitics, and the American Revolution', (Master's Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1994); J. Barton Stares, *Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in British West Florida,* (Gainesville, FL: University of

Not the first choice for his position, and the fourth in a series of generals who failed in America, Clinton again unsuccessfully tried to resign. By 1778, he likely had given up hope that the British would win the war. In a characteristically blunt statement, he protested to Germain:

> You have but one army. 'Tis a good one; it has never been affronted. You may want it. You ought to have kept it together, nursed it, cherished it. By the present arrangement, I wish one-half of it would not be underground by Christmas and the rest reduced to an ignominious fight to avoid still greater disgrace.[41]

A consistent sceptic of every idea, including his own, Clinton had opposed the southern strategy even before his campaign to the Carolinas failed in 1775-1776. He saw no value in encouraging Loyalist uprisings only to abandon these Americans, as had already happened at least three times. The general delayed carrying out the new southern effort, likely hoping it would be dropped. France's entry into the conflict postponed the start of the year's campaign until winter set in, as Clinton had to march to try to find and defeat Washington's army while defending his base in New York and returning six hundred marines to Halifax.[42]

The general finally selected Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, a Scottish engineer without command or field experience, to lead the new expedition south in the worst weather of the year. He thus appointed an officer he could afford to lose to command British English, Highlander, Hessian, and Loyalist troops, whom he could most spare for a campaign to a place of which Campbell knew nothing and had no maps. Clinton also chose a man named Boyd, reportedly an Irish immigrant to the North Carolina frontier, so little known that his past remains a mystery, to embody the frontier Loyalists.[43]

Florida Press, 1976); and J. Leitch Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America,* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1975).

[41]Sir Henry Clinton to H. F. C. Pelham-Clinton, Second Duke of Newcastle, 27 July 1778, Ne C 2648, Newcastle Collection, Manuscripts and Special Collections, University of Nottingham, UK.

[42]Undated memos of Henry Clinton, vol. 15, folios 16, p. 28, p. 29, Clinton to Lord George Germain, 3 April 1779, enclosing Augustin Prévost to Clinton, 6 March 1779, vol. 55, folios 35-36, and Clinton to William Eden, 21 & 22 August 1779, vol. 66, folio 12, Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library; O'Shaughnessy, 'To Gain the Hearts and Subdue the Minds of America,' p. 202.

[43]Robert S. Davis, 'The British Invasion of Georgia,' *Atlanta Historical Journal* 24 (winter 1980): pp. 1-8; Holgar Hoock, *Scars of Independence America's Violent Birth,* (New York:

Despite Clinton's misgivings, the military expedition to Georgia overcame many dangers and obstacles, including attacks by American privateers and winter storms on the dangerous coast of North Carolina. The invading army achieved a spectacular series of victories in formal battles in Georgia.[44]

Campbell's superiors in New York, however, had assured him of a reinforcement of six thousand Carolina Loyalists, as well as significant numbers of Indigenous native allies. By the time he and his British troops had penetrated the backcountry and captured Augusta on 31 January 1779, he had lowered his expectations to only a thousand Americans coming to his standard. He never saw an Indigenous Cherokee or Creek warrior.

Although reports arrived in Georgia that thousands of Loyalists had gathered on the Saluda River in South Carolina, Boyd's uprising numbered, on its best day, only six hundred men, and they were of little value to meeting the King's army's expanding need for soldiers or to fulfilling the aspirations for winning the war. In Great Britain, a report arrived that this uprising had consisted of only three hundred and fifty men.

Many of the Loyalists who answered Boyd's call were from emigrant families that had benefited from privileges under British colonial rule and sought only protection from their native-born American neighbors. Some of these 'Tories' came because of threats to their lives and property by their more adamant Loyalist neighbors.[45]

Crown, 2017), p. 58, p. 302, p. 309; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, p. 67; Archibald Campbell, *Journal of An Expedition against The Rebels of Georgia in North America*, ed. Colin Campbell, (Augusta, GA: Richmond County Historical Society, 1981), pp. x-xi, pp. 4-7, p. 103 Fn. 12.

[44]Davis, 'The British Invasion of Georgia in 1778,' pp. 5-26; Martha Condray Searcy, '1779: First Year of the British Occupation of Georgia,' *Georgia Historical Quarterly* (Summer 1983): pp. 168-188.

[45] Campbell, *Journal*, 6, pp. 61-65, p. 76; Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 100; Jack P. Greene, 'Independence, Improvement and Authority: Toward a Framework for Understanding the Histories of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the American Revolution,' in Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution,* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), pp. 17-20; 'Savannah Feb. 11,' *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), 11 February 1779, p. 4 c. 1; 'Case of the Loyalists,' *Political Magazine* 4 (April 1783): p. 266; Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, pp. 67-68, pp. 130 Fn. 196. For a general discussion of frontier social conflict in the colonial period, see Eric Hinderaker and Peter C. Mancall, *At the Edge of Empire: The Backcountry in British North America,* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2003) and William R. Nester,

Only two hundred and seventy to three hundred and fifty of Boyd's survivors eventually reached the British army, and only after being defeated by an inferior number of Georgia and South Carolina militiamen, in some instances their neighbours, at the Battle of Kettle Creek. Boyd fell mortally wounded in this battle; his Lieutenant Colonel John Moore of North Carolina was lynched later in the war, and his Major, John Spurgeon of South Carolina, died in a battle at the end of March 1779. State courts tried many of these Loyalists, at least seven of whom consequently went to the gallows. Some of the patriot militia at Kettle Creek were North Carolinians who traveled hundreds of miles in inclement weather in pursuit of Boyd's Loyalists.[46]

Brigadier General Augustin Prévost, the British commander in Georgia, did not consider Boyd's effort even large enough to be counted as an uprising and saw the southern strategy a failure. A British periodical summed up these men as 'being in a great measure composed of emigrants from North Britain' and only of military value when serving with the royal army.

Campbell, as military governor, restored Georgia's colonial militia before he left Georgia in March 1779; however, almost all of the fourteen hundred men who had taken his oath to the King disappeared or joined the enemy. The British army in Georgia became another isolated garrison that steadily declined due to malaria and smallpox.[47]

Clinton acknowledged Campbell's success in Georgia without comment. He wrote that he likely would have given up on his subsequent expedition to South Carolina in 1780 if the American and French armies had forced the surrender of the British army in Georgia in the autumn of 1779. Awaiting news of the outcome of that siege held back Clinton's already delayed fleet in New York until the harbor almost froze over. His new invasion of South Carolina might have been delayed for months if not canceled, making Savannah one of the most significant battles of the Revolution.

The Frontier War for American Independence, (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2004).

[46]Robert S. Davis, 'The Loyalist Trials at Ninety Six in 1779,' *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 80 (April 1979): pp. 172-181.

[47]*The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1780,* (London, 1781), pp. 179-180; Prévost to Germain, 5 March 1778, in Davies, *Documents of The American Revolution*, 17: pp. 76-78; William B. Willcox, *Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in The War of Independence,* (New York: Knopf, 1964), pp. 320-322; Allen, *Tories: Fighting for the King*, p. 280; R. Arthur Bowler, *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 245.

Because of the winter weather, Clinton's fleet, instead of taking the usual ten-day voyage from New York to Savannah, was at sea for three weeks, risking destruction in storms along the coast of North Carolina. Cavalry horses died, and the ordnance ship floundered. Clinton's army, however, forced the surrender of Charleston after a six-week siege on 12 May 1780.[48]

In 1780, the South Carolina campaign began as a great success but ultimately became a repetition of the failure in Georgia in 1779 on a larger scale, resulting in a deeper division and increased isolation of the British army in America. The King's forces overran South Carolina. Georgia became the only American state ever reduced to colony status. Many of the frontier militia surrendered but were allowed to live freely as prisoners of war on parole. They were required to take an oath of Loyalty to the King and were subject to conscription. [49]

Lord Charles Cornwallis established a chain of interlocking outposts across the South Carolina frontier and ordered the recruitment of Loyalists for provincial units. British Major Patrick Ferguson formed a corps of provincials and colonial militia. He believed that the militiamen held great promise, especially the five thousand former members of patriot Brigadier General Andrew Williamson's frontier Ninety-Six [District] Brigade.[50]

The British, however, again risked much at great expense, and ultimately gained less than nothing. Ferguson was killed, and his corps was destroyed at the Battle of King's Mountain on 7 October 1780, by a multi-state patriot militia that included men who had traveled hundreds of miles and had left their settlements vulnerable to attack by Cherokee and Creek warriors to fight in the campaign. After King's Mountain, support for the British cause steadily declined except amongst the most diehard Loyalists.[51]

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[48]For the British Siege of Charleston, see Carl P. Borick, *A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston 1780,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012).

[49]Kenneth Coleman, 'Restored Colonial Georgia, 1779-1782,' *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 40 (March 1956): pp. 1-20; Stephenson, Patriot Battles, pp. xviii-xxi, p. 19, pp. 298; Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' pp. 113-114.

[50]Scott Syfert, 'Ramsour's Mill, 20 Jume 1780: The End of Cornwallis' Loyalist Illusion,' *Journal of the American Revolution*, https://allthingsliberty.com/2024/08/ramsours-mill-june-20-1780-the-end-of-cornwallis-loyalist-illusion/. Accessed 2 July 2025; Robert S. Davis, 'Lord Montagu's Mission to Charleston in 1781: American POWs for the King's Cause in Jamaica', *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 84 (April 1983): pp. 89-109; Bobby Gilmer Moss, *Roster of the Loyalists in the Battle of King's Mountain,* (Blacksburg, SC: Scotia-Hibernia, 1998), pp. ix-xviii.

[51]Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 114; Midgley, 'First Empire Unravelled,' pp. 145-147. Among the works on King's Mountain, see Phillip Thomas Tucker, *King's Mountain:*

Guerrilla warfare killed British and Loyalist soldiers at Blackstock, Hammond's Store, Hanging Rock, Ramsour's Mill, and elsewhere while making legends of patriot partisans Elijah Clark, Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and others. A Loyalist wrote as early as 1780,

> Most of these actions would in other wars be considered as skirmishes of little account, and scarcely worthy of a detailed narrative. But these small actions are as capable as any of displaying conduct. The operations of war are being spread over the vast continent. It is by such skirmishes that the fate of America must be decided. They are therefore as important as battles in which a hundred thousand men are drawn up on each side.[52]

Americans did fight for and give their lives for the King's cause. Provincial units served with distinction as auxiliaries to the regulars but proved too few and improperly trained to succeed in a partisan war. Arguments about pay and leadership arose, and the officers of the Regulars often held these Americans in contempt as soldiers. Clinton ordered the exchange of British officers to have priority over Loyalists. The provincials declined in numbers due to battles, desertions, and disease.[53]

South Carolina, in particular, represented the significance of the southern strategy to the American Revolution, with one-fifth of all battle deaths and one-third of the wounded for the entire war in 1780-1781 alone, primarily among Americans fighting Americans. They accounted for one-third of the total war casualties. Forty of their

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Most Forgotten Battle That Changed the Course of the American Revolution, (New York: Skyhorse, 2024).

[52]Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 106, pp. 109-110; Compeau, *Dishonoured Americans*, pp. 55-56.

[52]Quotation from *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1781,* (London: James and Robert Dodsley, 1782): p. 83.

[53]Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 106, pp. 109-110; Compeau, *Dishonoured Americans*, pp. 55-56; Ward, *Between the Lines*, pp. 196-199; Robert W. Barnwell, 'Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785,' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1941), pp. 322-325; Gregory Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of The American Revolution,* (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1984), p. 564; Wilbur Henry Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785*, 2 vols., (Deland, FL: Florida Historical Society, 1929), 1: pp 54-55, p. 75, pp. 77-78, pp. 85-87 & 2: pp. 333-335, p. 373; Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, p. 99, p. 109. For histories of the individual Loyalist provincial units, see Thomas B. Allen and Todd W. Braisted, *The Loyalist Corps: Americans in the Service of the King* (Takoma Park, MD: Fox Acre Press, 2011) and The On-Line Institute for Advanced Loyalist Studies: http://www.royalprovincial.com/index.htm. Accessed 2 July 2025.

battles were fought in the frontier Ninety Six Court District, where a visitor after the war reported twelve hundred widows created by the fighting.[54]

Partisan murder became so common in the Deep South that cynics called killing unarmed prisoners the granting of a 'Georgia parole.'[55] Elsewhere, Americans called this crime 'lynching' from the executions of Loyalists by Colonel Charles Lynch of Virginia.[56] Ironically, men would return to the Revolution because of the British failure to protect them from their rebel neighbors. Clinton ordered no retribution against rebels for fear of retaliation against British officers being held as prisoners.[57]

A Continental Army under Generals Nathanael Greene and Daniel Morgan, and their militia and partisan allies, mauled the British army in the South at such battles as Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. Lord Cornwallis marched the remains of this field command from the Deep South to Virginia, the consequence of which would be surrendering his army at Yorktown.

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[54]Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, p. 308; Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America,* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 392-394; Ward, *Between the* Lines, p. 199; Midgley, 'First Empire Unravelled,' p. 146. For the guerilla war and civil violence in the South, see Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution,* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985); Dan L. Morrill, *Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution*, (Baltimore, MD: Aviation & Nautical Publishing, 1993); Patrick O'Kelley, '*Nothing but blood and slaughter': Military Operations and Order of Battle of the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas*, 4 vols. (Bangor, ME: Booklocker, 2004); and David Lee Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies,* (Jeffersonville, NC: McFarland, 2009).

[55]William Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution, So Far as It Related to the States of North and South Carolina and Georgia*, 2 vols., (New York: D. Longworth, 1802), 2: p. 336; Dr. Thomas Taylor to Rev. John Wesley, 28 February 1782, Shelbourne Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor; 'Savannah March 14,' *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), 14 March 1782, p. 3 column 1; E. W. Carruthers, *Revolutionary Incidents and Sketches of Characters Chiefly of the Old North State,* (Philadelphia, PA.: Hayes & Zell, 1854), p. 431.

[56]Babits and *Howard, Long Obstinate, and Bloody*, p. 62.

[57]Lawrence E. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens,* Revised Edition, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 3; Searcy, '1779: First Year of the British Occupation of Georgia,' p. 175, p. 187; Davis, *Georgians in the Revolution*, p. 215, p. 224, and *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers of the American Revolution*, pp. 176-178.

The 'King's friends' left behind found no protection beyond refuge in the overcrowded squalor of Charleston and Savannah garrison towns. Formerly enslaved Black people supplemented the garrison, partly to keep British and Hessian soldiers from deserting.[58]

The British evacuated Georgia and South Carolina in the second half of 1782, which led to further changes. Four hundred thousand Loyalists, despite the war, chose to remain in the United States and contributed to the building of the new nation. Some African Americans, including those serving as soldiers for the King, also remained and even founded communities in the wilderness that would be destroyed by post-war white militia.

Tens of thousands of other Americans, but not all supporters of the British cause, and often only 'country people,' decided to leave the new United States, although sometimes to neighboring Canada and the Spanish Empire; many of them would even return to America. Loyalists established new homes and futures on six continents and in the South Pacific. [59]

The evacuees included tens of thousands of enslaved and free African Americans. South Carolina had thirty thousand fewer enslaved people in 1783 than it had in 1775, and Georgia lost one-third of its number of chattel laborers. These evacuees included Reverend George Liele to Jamaica and Reverend David George and Henry Washington (formerly enslaved by George Washington) to Sierra Leone, carrying with

[58]Samuel Kelly, *Samuel Kelly, an Eighteenth Century Seaman*, ed. Crosbie Garstin, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1925), p. 51; David Ramsay, *The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina,* (Trenton, NJ: Isaac Collins, 1785), 1: p. 176; Sir James Wright to Sir Henry Clinton, 3 February 1780, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, vol. 84, item 9, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI; Robert Biddulph to Thomas Harley, 12 March 1782, in 'Letters of Robert Biddulph, 1779-1783,' *The American Historical Review* 29 (October 1923): p. 106. For Cornwallis' decision to abandon the Deep South, see Ian Saberton, *The American Revolution in the south: Further Reflection from a British perspective in light of the Cornwallis Papers volume 2,* Revised Edition, (Tolworth, UK: Grosvenor House, 2022).

[59]Kenneth Coleman, *The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763-1789,* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1958), p. 167; Maya Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World,* (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. xii, p. 47, p. 50, pp. 70-71, pp. 249-250, p. 256, pp. 266-272, p. 276, p. 277, p. 280, p. 305, p. 306, p. 358; Compeau, *Dishonoured Americans*, pp. 137-172; Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, p. 156. Also see Jonathan Israel, *The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017) and Wallace Brown, *Victorious in Defeat: The American Loyalists in Exile,* (New York: Facts on File, 1984).

them the spirit of revolution that their followers would use in the worldwide overthrow of slavery.[60]

The last battle of this world war was fought in India in June 1783, but the final fight in America, during the previous October, was also the concluding act of the southern strategy. Brigadier General Andrew Pickens and Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Clark, formerly patriot commanders at Kettle Creek, led their now veteran militia hundreds of miles through a wilderness to attack the Cherokee village of Long Swamp.

Pickens had played a significant role in the great American victory at Cowpens, South Carolina, and Clark is remembered as a great partisan leader across the South. This expedition principally sought English-born Colonel Thomas Waters, a Loyalist leader in Georgia and South Carolina from Kettle Creek to the war's end, who now led more than one thousand Cherokee against the Americans. Pickens subsequently defined, at Long Swamp, a new western boundary between Georgia and the lands occupied by the already refugee Cherokees. He sold the captured African Americans to pay Clark's soldiers.[61]

The southern strategy was doomed to fail. Even if three-fifths of Americans were neutral, that did not mean they could be persuaded to support a counter-revolution against their neighbors; not enough Americans were prepared to join the King's military to restore a colonial system recognised as needing reform, a revolution in itself. British policy changed, but the military and political leaders failed to adopt any practical means for winning the hearts and minds.[62]

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[60]Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves, and the American Revolution,* (New York: Ecco, 2006), pp. 97-100; John W. Pulis, 'Bridging the Troubled Waters: Moses Baker, George Liele, and the African American Diaspora to Jamaica,' in John W. Pulis, ed., *Moving On: Black Loyalists in the Afro-Atlantic World,* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1999), p. 183, pp. 189-192, pp. 199-203, p. Fn15. P. 35.

[61]Clyde R. Ferguson, 'General Andrew Pickens,' (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1960), pp. 271-277; Andrew Pickens to Henry Lee, 28 August 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1VV107, Lyman C. Draper Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; Mary Bondurant Warren, comp., *Revolutionary Memoirs and Muster Rolls,* (Athens, GA: Heritage Papers, 1994), p. 146; Elijah Clark to John Martin, 3 November 1782, Joseph Valance Bevan Papers, Mss 71, Box 1, folder 9, Georgia Historical Society, Savannah; Robert S. Davis, 'Fighting in the Shadowlands: Loyalist Colonel Thomas Waters and the Southern Strategy,' *Journal of the American Revolution,* 11 June 2024: https://allthingsliberty.com/2024/06/fighting-in-the-shadowlands-loyalist-colonel-thomas-waters-and-the-southern-strategy. Accessed 2 July 2025.

[62]McDonnell, 'The American War for Independence as a Revolutionary War,' 1.

The southern strategy had become an excuse for not facing the reality of inevitable defeat, rather than a realistic plan for victory. America became for the British what would come to be called, in modern times, a garrison nation, where a foreign nation occupies a hostile land until it inevitably gives up and leaves. Operations were daunting, from transporting British troops through dangerous waters to Loyalists passing through enemy territory to protecting the civilian population.

Supporters of the King's cause would argue that the British army was not defeated, giving a false impression that military success was possible. The fate of a country ultimately falls to its people, rather than the temporary occupiers.[63]

By 1778, even King George III could no longer see a path to military victory. The British Empire risked much by continuing the conflict. Generations of carefully crafted continental alliances were thrown away. Rich Caribbean sugar islands were at risk, arguing for an end to the war with the thirteen former mainland colonies to divert resources for taking French and Spanish possessions, possibly with American assistance. The capture of Gibraltar, Jamaica, or India would have threatened the British economy and its imperial military capabilities. France and Spain even attempted to mount an invasion of England.

Britain did suffer losses and near-disasters. Sugar Islands fell to France. The Spanish took Pensacola in May 1781 and the Bahamas in May 1782. A British naval victory at the Battle of the Saintes saved Jamaica from a joint invasion, but many ships were lost.[64] Clinton finally obtained an exchange for the Saratoga army, but only after Lord Charles Cornwallis' army left the Deep South, partially due to an unwillingness to fight the brutal partisan war in the Carolinas, and in the hope of finding Loyalists in Virginia.[65]

Much could have been learned from the southern strategy and the American Revolution. Scholars during the Bicentennial of the United States observed that, contrary to conventional public history, America's war for independence shared many

[63]Joseph J. Ellis, *The Cause: The American Revolution and Its Discontents, 1772-1783,* (New York: Liveright, 2021), pp. 237-238; Herrera, 'The King's Friends,' p. 100, p. 110.
[64]Stone, *Our French Allies*, pp. 126-128; Thomas Schatmen, *How the French Saved America,* (Baltimore, MD: St. Martin's Press, 2017), p. 308; Willis, *The Struggle for Sea Power*, pp. 256-267, pp. 284-292, pp. 304-311. For Spain's campaigns, see Thomas E. Chavez, *Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift,* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2003).
[65]See Stanley D. M. Carpenter, *Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown,* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019); and Richard Middleton, *Cornwallis: Soldier and Statesman in a Revolutionary World,* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022).

similarities with later revolutions. The experience of the conflict of 1775-1783 was repeated in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and elsewhere, and with similar results, argues for the American Revolution and its southern strategy as part of a greater human struggle for self-determination and independence, with all its consequences that continues to this day.[66]

[66]For comparisons of the American Revolution to Vietnam, see Michael Stephenson, *Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence was Fought,* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), pp. xviii-xxi, pp. 19, p. 298; and Robert M. Calhoon, *Revolutionary America: An Interpretive Overview,* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), p. 108. Several works also compare Vietnam to Iraq after the Second Gulf War, including Kenneth J. Campbell, *A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War,* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Lloyd G. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam,* (New York: The New Press, 2007); and John Dumbrell and David Ryan, eds., *Vietnam in Iraq,* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

African manpower statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914-18: a reassessment

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ABSTRACT
This article offers a new estimate for the number of soldiers and carriers raised from across East Africa who died in British imperial service during the East Africa campaign of the First World War. It does this by examining and challenging figures present in the historiography and returns to contemporary records to provide meaningful data on which to base new calculations.

Introduction

In April 2021, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) published a report examining historical inequalities in its commemoration of the dead of the British Empire following the First World War.[1] A significant acknowledgement in that report was that it could not provide comprehensive answers to all the questions raised, and perhaps the most significant of those unresolved questions concerned the number of dead still unaccounted for and not commemorated by name following the East Africa Campaign of the First World War.

In a theatre lacking all-weather roads and railways and plagued by insects that often made the use of pack animals impossible, the solution to the resulting transport problem was human porterage. Although drawing in fighting and labouring forces from across Africa and further afield, this mobile war with its stretched supply lines put particular pressure on the regional populations of East Africa, with over a million personnel likely to have been raised by the warring colonial powers. A sizeable portion of those men contributed to the fighting, but many more provided the backbone to the logistical effort, which in British service became colloquially known as the 'Carrier

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[1]George Hay and John Burke, *Report of the Special Committee to Review Historical Inequalities in Commemoration*, (Maidenhead: CWGC, 2021), p. 53.

Corps'. This force was raised largely through compulsion, with the authorities exploiting the power imbalances inherent in the British imperial system and often resorting to coercion and extortion.[2] These carriers were forced to work through wet seasons and unfamiliar climates, and for large parts of the war were generally overworked and poorly cared for. Understandably, these conditions and this treatment took an enormous toll, and the campaign is now infamous for the number of deaths suffered by these labour forces. Nonetheless, despite this infamy, our understanding of the true number who perished remains imprecise. To provisionally quantify these losses, the CWGC's 2021 report drew on broad and conflicting figures from the historiography to provide an estimate of between one hundred and three hundred thousand dead. Accepting that all their names are now unlikely to be recovered, a more accurate and meaningful figure is required to enable the CWGC to find ways to recognise and fittingly commemorate them. This article does that by returning to archival material and contemporary publications to provide a new estimate for the number of East African personnel who died in British service in this campaign.[3]

An initial estimate and issues in the historiography

The lower end of the estimate given in the 2021 CWGC report is double what many contemporary sources suggested and double the figure the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) believed it was commemorating namelessly in the 1920s.[4] The upper end reflects the decision of some scholars to utilise 'wastage' figures (which incorporate all reasons for leaving service, including death) to suggest the total number of deaths could reach, or even exceed, 300,000.[5] The imprecision of these figures

[2]See for example Geoffrey Hodges, *Kariakor: The Carrier Corps*, (Nairobi: Nairobi University Press, 1999), pp. 37-43; Melvin Page, 'The War of *Thangata*: Nyasaland and the East African Campaign, 1914–1918', *Journal of African History*, Vol. xix, No. 1 (1978), pp. 87-100.

[3]Unlike East African forces, those who died in the campaign who were raised in West Africa, South Africa, the Seychelles and India are commemorated by name either in the former theatre of war or in their country of origin. They are believed to be fully accounted for and are not included in this analysis.

[4]The organisation replaced 'Imperial' with 'Commonwealth' in March 1960.

[5]Works cited in the 2021 Report included Edward Paice, *Tip and Run – the Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2007), pp. 392–3; Richard Fogarty and David Killingray, 'Demobilisation in British and French Africa at the End of the First World War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2015), p. 105; G.W.T. Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa, 1914–1918', *Journal of African History*, Vol. xix, No. 1 (1978), pp. 101-116; Michael Pesek, 'The war of legs. Transport and infrastructure in the East African Campaign of the First World War', *Transfers*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2015), pp. 113–114; John

obviously invites further study, and this analysis will start by examining the figures present in existing scholarship.

What is immediately striking on studying the historiography is the limited number of cited documentary sources. While there is rightly an observation that contemporary record keeping was inadequate and inconsistent, and that the preservation of what was created is patchy, it is commonplace to see a figure given without evidence or drawn solely from the work of others.[6] This failure to re-engage with source material has seen the wider historiography repeat a figure of 100,000 dead without explanation, challenge or critical analysis. This issue is especially problematic because the most influential – and thus most referenced – historian of this field appears to have manipulated the raw data without explaining his logic or working.

In 1978, Geoffrey Hodges concluded that over 10,000 troops and 100,000 carriers died in East Africa. As Table 1 shows, he supported this by providing the first, and to date, only tabulated breakdown of deaths by country.[7] Though powerful and at first glance convincing, close scrutiny of the sources used to build these figures shows a potential issue with his method: rather than use the numbers as presented, he shifted 42,476 men into a 'missing presumed dead' category who were never described as such.[8] These numbers, drawn from the evidence of the Director of Military Labour in East Africa, Lieutenant-Colonel Oscar Watkins, were recorded in legislation from the Kenyan government connected to the distribution of unclaimed pay, and actually show

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Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 249–250; David Killingray and James Matthews, 'Beasts of Burden: British West African Carriers in the First World War', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1/1 (1979), pp. 18–19.

[6]For figures offered without citations, see for example David Olusoga, *The World's War: Forgotten Soldiers of Empire*, (London: Head of Zeus, 2014), p. 147; Paice, *Tip and Run*, pp. 392-393; M. Crowder, 'The First World War and its consequences', in A. Adu Boahen (ed.), *General History of Africa VII – Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935*, (California: Heinemann UNESCO, 1985), p. 283.

[7]Note these figures include a little over 2,000 dead raised outside East Africa who are excluded from this analysis – see footnote 3. This is also the only mention of 10,000 soldiers, with Hodges table stating 6,000+. Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics', p. 115; Hodges, *Kariakor*, pp. 19-21; Geoffrey Hodges, 'Military Labour in East Africa and its impact on Kenya', in Melvin Page (ed.), *Africa and the First World War*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 148.

[8]Hodges' carrier death figures for the territories listed as 1-8 in his Table 1 were drawn from the Watkins Report, Appendix 1, Tables 6-10. Statistics for missing presumed dead were drawn from the Kenya Secretariat Circular 104 of 18 December 1922. See footnote 7 in Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics', p. 102.

these men classified as 'reported dead, as having deserted, and as being missing'.[9] In the simplest terms, this means Hodges declared as dead all those who had deserted and gone missing, a proportion of whom the authorities asserted had fled the service and survived.[10]

Crudely reclassifying this entire grouping is erroneous and unduly skews the figures, as it was frequently recorded that desertion rates in carrier units were disproportionately high.[11] In fact, it was for this reason that the normal practice of issuing presumptions of death for those unaccounted for was not adopted for carriers in East Africa, with the Military Labour Corps (MLC) instead reclassifying the missing as deserted unless proof could be found to the contrary.[12] This inability to provide more meaningful information about the fate of these men led the War Office to conclude that the only reliable figure was Watkins' confirmed deaths. This, of course, created another flawed statistic given the other contemporary assertion that a proportion of the deserted and missing were, indeed, deceased.[13]

[9]UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 32/4136, No. XXXV 1918, An Ordinance to make provision for the Distribution of Pay and Personal Property belonging to Natives attached to the Military Labour Corps, 31/12/1918, Point 9 (1). The ordinance for Kenya was used as the model for Uganda, with their Ordinance passed on 16/06/1919.

[10] See for example comments under Appendix 1, Table 7 in TNA CO 533/216, Report by Lieut-Colonel O.F. Watkins, Director of Military Labour to the B.E.A. Expeditionary Force on the period from August 4th, 1914 to September 15th, 1919.

[11]TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Para. 29; TNA CO 95/5331/13, Despatch No.1 by Lt. Col. E.B.B. Hawkins, 14 November 1918, p. 28.

[12]With its origins in less formalised transport units, the Military Labour Bureau (MLB) was formed in February 1916. In March 1918 the name was changed to Military Labour Corps (MLC). For the sake of simplicity, MLC will be used, unless explicitly referencing an earlier period. In notes regarding draft ordinance to wind up the MLC on 27 January 1918 it was noted that the D.A.G. was informed that Ordinance 31/16 'which presumed the death of all missing men unless evidence to the contrary could be found was just the opposite of what we wanted. The only solution is presumption of desertion failing evidence to the contrary' (emphasis in original). TNA WO 95/5311/5, East Africa, GHQ, Director of Military Labour, Dec 1915-Dec 1918, pp. 85-86.

[13]TNA WO 32/4131, Note for the Finance Member on the suggested payment to the Native Tribes of East Africa of the Unclaimed Balances of the E.A. Military Labour Corps, August 1931. See comments under Appendix 1, Table 7 in TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report.

	DEATHS	**Troops other than KAR**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**1-3 Total Dead**
			A) Gun Porters & B) Medical Staff	C) Carriers	A-C Missing presumed dead	
1	EAP (Kenya)	64	2,022	23,869	13,748	39,639
2	Uganda	113+	136	3,734	780	4,650
3	GEA (Tanzania)	?	195	12,934	27,535	40,664
4	PEA (Mozambique)	-	-	450	?	450+
5	Zanzibar & Mafia	?	3	210	349	562
6	Sierra Leone	-	-	808	44	852
7	Nigeria	589	?	814	20	834
8	Seychelles	-	-	222	-	222
9	Gambia	38?	-	?	?	?
10	Gold Coast	400	25	50	?	75
11	Nyasaland (Malawi)	?	37+	4,440	?	c.4,480
12	Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)	200?	-	2,300	?	2,300
13	Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	250?	-	?	?	?
14	South Africa	163	-	?	?	?
	KAR	4,237				
	TOTAL	**6,000+**	**c.2,418**	**49,831**	**42,476**	**c.94,725**

Table 1: Figures extracted from Hodges's article on 'African Manpower Statistics'.[14]

Removing the men Hodges reclassified *en masse* as 'presumed dead' reduces his overall total to that ultimately accepted by the authorities at just over 50,000. While we know this figure is omitting a substantial proportion of missing personnel who did die, estimating that proportion requires careful calculation. Whether through error or deliberate manipulation, Hodges' total is not supported by documentary evidence and nor does his accompanying text explain how or why he reclassified all these men.[15]

[14]Hodges, 'African Manpower Statistics', p. 116.

[15]The work of Hodges has been cited by, amongst others, Fogarty & Killingray, 'Demobilization in British and French Africa', p. 104; Pesek, 'The war of legs', pp. 110-111, p. 113; Christian Koller, 'The recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and Asia and their deployment in Europe during the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol. 26, No. 1/2 (2008), p. 112; Michèle Barrett, 'Afterword Death and the afterlife:

Despite these issues, the influence of Hodges work is clear in the wider historiography, with many taking his figure as accepted to the point of not referencing it. Taking one example, Joe Harris Lunn has attempted to account for all African soldiers and labourers who died under British command across all theatres, reaching totals of 7,850 and respectively. However, the only contemporary source he cites is the 1922 Official Statistics of the War, while all the secondary literature he references is ultimately underpinned by Hodges.[16] Taking the most prominent examples for East Africa, Paice offers no citations for his figures (although they are clearly drawn from Hodges), while Strachan draws his estimates from the work of Page and another historian, Crowder, who provides no citations.[17] Page, in relation only to African deaths under British command, cites the IWGC's register for the East African memorials as the highest contemporary official estimate of 50,000, and Hodges' figure of 100,000 for East Africa as a whole.[18]

Given the absence of any detailed analysis and considering the work currently being undertaken by the CWGC across East Africa, it is clearly timely to return to the source material to reassess these figures. While we must accept that these records are incomplete, any new calculation for the known dead must be underpinned by contemporary data drawn from wartime records. Although we know these will not tell the full story, they will ultimately provide a base figure from which informed, evidence-based estimates can be made to account for those who were omitted.

Britain's colonies and dominions', in Santanu Das (ed.), *Race, Empire and First World War Writing,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 303; David Killingray, 'Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1989), p. 487 & p. 493; Andrew Roberts, 'East Africa', in A. D. Roberts (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 7. From 1905 to 1940*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 667; The figures were also repeated, but not directly cited, in Paice, *Tip and Run*, pp. 392-393.

[16]Joe Harris Lunn, 'War Losses (Africa)', in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2015-06-22, War Losses (Africa) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1) (1914-1918-online.net). Accessed 1 July 2024).

[17]See Paice, *Tip and Run*, pp. 392-393; Crowder states, in relation to Africa as a whole (all colonies), that 'over 150,000 soldiers and carriers lost their lives during the war', however no citation is provided. See Crowder, 'The First World War', p. 283; Hew Strachan, *The First World War in Africa,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 3.

[18]Melvin Page, 'Introduction: Black Men in a White Man's War', in Melvin Page (ed.), *Africa and the First World War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 14.

Quantifying The Known Non-combatant Dead

Figures recorded for non-combatant deaths varied in the immediate aftermath of the war, sometimes even within the same document, but they were all within a general range of 40-50,000. The official statistics of the war, published in 1922, quoted three separate figures based on different dates that ranged from just over 42,300 up to 48,000.[19] The lower of these figures was repeated in the official medical history of the War but is known to exclude labour units operating out of Nyasaland.[20] A middling figure provided no information on the territories included, while the highest gave an approximate number of 44,000 dead from Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar, and another 4,000 for Nyasaland. The most comprehensive contemporary source for these figures is the Watkins Report of 1919, although this, too, provides conflicting numbers and an admission that some manpower cohorts were not accounted for. Nonetheless, if the figures given by Watkins in Appendix 1, Table 6 (*General percentage of deaths to recruitments*) and Table 9 (*Maxim Gun Carriers, Stretcher Bearers and Ward Orderlies*) are combined, they give an overall total of 40,998 dead from 406,914 enlistments across East Africa up to 15 September 1919.[21]

Within his report, Watkins claimed to have no information for carriers raised in several formations. This included 8,624 men who served as part of the B.E.A. and Uganda Carrier Corps of 1914, the Uganda Transport and Belgian Carrier Corps, and those serving with NORFORCE (drawn largely from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia). He acknowledged he could not account for the casual labourers used in the latter stages of the campaign, but perhaps more importantly, he also noted that an unknown number of those classified in his statistics as 'deserted and missing' were very likely dead. Despite these limitations, Watkins still felt confident to conclude that a mortality rate of 10 per cent amongst all recruits was 'approximately right'.[22]

Two other units not explicitly referenced in Watkins' statistics were the Kikuyu Mission Volunteers (KMV) and the Bishop of Zanzibar's Carrier Corps. The former

[19]The figures were: 42,318 (up to 30/09/1918), 44,635 (up to 28/02/1919) and 48,000 (no date included). *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920* (London: HMSO, 1922), p. 240, p. 303, pp. 382-383, p. 753.

[20]W.G. Macpherson & T.J. Mitchell, *Official History of the War: Medical Services General History, Vol. IV*, (London: HMSO, 1924), p. 504; This figure was also adopted by the IWGC within their Annual Reports from 1928-9, having previously a range of 40-50,000 dead. See CWGC/2/1/ADD 6.2.1, *Annual Report No. 10*, (London: HMSO, 1929), p. 57.

[21]This figure excludes the 9,768 recruited and the 1,844 who died from Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Seychelles, as they are commemorated in their countries of origin. TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report.

[22]Ibid., Para. 48.

operated from April 1917 to January 1918, while the latter was raised in August 1916.[23] Of these, the KMV has been repeatedly singled out for its significantly lower casualty rate in comparison to the wider MLC average.[24] Nonetheless, although both maintained their independence while working within the wider body of carriers, surviving acquittance rolls demonstrate these men were formally registered with the MLC and issued with depot-specific service numbers.[25] For this reason their recruitment and casualty statistics are believed to be incorporated into Watkins' wider calculations.

In relation to the territories and corps not included within Watkins' report, for Nyasaland, the official statistics noted that 4,000 died out of 200,000 non-combatants raised. While there is no immediate reason to doubt the death figure – at least beyond its convenient rounding – the seemingly large number of recruits does throw up an anomaly: unlike Watkins' numbers, some of these figures do not represent individuals but the number of engagements they served.[26] This issue was explained in a January 1919 report on manpower in the colony where it was stated the total number of labourers recorded was made up of individuals who served multiple stints as carriers, most having served twice, but some upwards of three times.[27] Because of this, it was believed that the actual number of individuals raised was more likely around half the given total. A Nyasaland section of a separate post-war publication dedicated to the empire's contribution to the war provides a fuller breakdown. Listing figures for 1916-1918 for 'front-line carriers' with troops (43,809), 'transport on lines of communication' and 'labour on roads' (95,134), it provides a likely more accurate total of 138,943. This deliberately excludes short-term engagements under which 56,709 men, women and children were employed on 'wood-cutting and miscellaneous' tasks and for 'carrying foodstuffs locally', as this was considered standard civil employment

[23]For KMV see Edinburgh University, Col-207, Box 1, Folder 3, Annual Report 1918 by John W. Arthur; For Zanzibar see Charles Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War, Vol. 4*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 204.

[24]See for example John Iliffe, *East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 36-37.

[25]Edinburgh University, Col-207, Box 1, Folder 1, Acquittance Roll K.M.V. M.L.B, 22 June 1917.

[26]Mel Page has suggested this mortality rate was conservative on the grounds it did not include labourers within Nyasaland. No evidence is cited to support this statement. See Melvin Page, 'The War of *Thangata*', pp. 94 & 97; This is repeated in John McCracken, *A History of Malawi 1859-1966*, (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2012), pp. 151-5.

[27]TNA CO 525/82, Report on the manpower effort of Nyasaland by Acting Governor, 27 January 1919.

with the agreements lasting only days.[28] For the military labourers under analysis, the Nyasaland authorities recorded the deaths of 4,440 men, broken down as 3,487 front line carriers and 953 second line carriers.[29]

As in Nyasaland, the number of individual carriers raised in Northern Rhodesia is hard to accurately determine as most figures again refer to the number of engagements rather than individuals. To demonstrate this, statistics show 312,891 deployments for carrier work in Northern Rhodesia from 1914-17. However, the majority of these carriers were raised from North-Eastern Rhodesia, which at the time had a male population of 119,606 (a figure that included the old and infirm). Nonetheless, there was said to be between 15,000 and 40,000 Northern Rhodesian labourers in employment at any given time inside and outside the territory, at least until the end of 1917 when demand 'slackened considerably'. More useful to this analysis, however, is a reference stating that nearly 41,000 were enrolled as 'first line military porters' serving with troops in German and Portuguese East Africa.[30] Casualties amongst all these carriers appear to have been poorly recorded, with a figure of 1,467 ultimately provided to the IWGC by the Commandant of the Northern Rhodesia Police in 1928.[31] However, in 1924 the colonial administration had estimated that 'rather more' than 2,300 of the 41,000 serving outside the country had died or were missing, whilst a further 300 men were estimated to have died 'within the borders' of the territory.[32] Given the small numbers involved, the missing here will be presumed dead. In recognition of the administration's admission that its estimate was insufficient, these figures will be reconsidered in the final section of this paper, but it can be accepted that Northern Rhodesian casualties included at least 2,600 dead.

In relation to Ugandan carriers raised separately from the MLC, a report from September 1918 noted that the Uganda Transport Corps (38,310) and the Congo Carrier Corps (8,429), which both disbanded in December 1916, suffered a combined

[28]These short-term engagements account for the large numbers, as the count refers to each engagement rather than individuals engaged. See Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War,* p. 270.

[29]TNA CO 626/6, Summary of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, Twenty-first Session, 15-16 July 1919. The note for these figures added that it included deserters who had not returned.

[30]Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, pp. 281-314; *Statistics of the Military Effort*, p. 383; Edmund Yorke, 'War, Mobilisation and Colonial Crisis in Northern Rhodesia, 1914-16', *British Journal of Military History*, Vol. 2, Issue 2, (2016), pp. 130-131, pp. 156-157.

[31] CWGC/1/1/7/E/76, Letter: Major E.G. Dickinson, Acting Commandant Northern Rhodesia Police, to, The Chief Secretary, 17 May 1928; Letter: C.R. & M.M. Branch to Director of Records, 6 February 1928; *Statistics of the Military Effort*, pp. 382-3.

[32]Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War,* p. 309.

2,056 dead and 836 missing out of 46,739 recruited.[33] For the purposes of this calculation, those declared missing from these units will be considered dead as the number is relatively low and there is no suggestion these figures incorporate deserters. Combining the dead and missing figures above, it can be said that at least an additional 2,892 Ugandan labourers died with these units.

Of the 3,576 Ugandans who served in the B.E.A. and Uganda Carrier Corps of 1914, the Ugandan authorities recorded 1,526 as dead or invalided, although there is no evidence to suggest how many fell into each category.[34] Similarly, no mortality figures were provided for the 1,000 men who served with the Uganda Pioneers (500) and Belgian Military Telegraph Construction (500), nor 1,741 auxiliary labourers attached to the Uganda Transport Corps.[35] The final section of this report will offer an estimated figure for deaths within these units, as well as for the Kenyans who served in the B.E.A. and Uganda Carrier Corps.

By adding to Watkins' death figures those he acknowledged were missing at the time – a portion of those raised in Uganda and the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian carriers – we reach a figure of 48,038; a number so close to the round figure given in the official statistics that this must be its origin. As demonstrated, there are also other cohorts of manpower absent from Watkins' numbers. Overall, it can be shown there were at least 9,932 recorded deaths outside the MLC's jurisdiction. With the various caveats accepted, Table 2 shows a new total for the number of confirmed labour force deaths at 50,930.

[33]The Uganda Transport Corps suffered 1,267 dead and 434 missing carriers. The Congo Carrier Corps suffered 789 dead and 402 missing. See TNA CO 536/90/60006, The Handbook of Uganda (II Edition), 24 September 1918.
[34]TNA CO 536/90/60006, The Handbook of Uganda.
[35]Totals here exclude 5,763 recruitments and 402 deaths listed within The Handbook of Uganda who were raised for operations in German East Africa in 1917. These men were under MLC command and are included in those statistics. See Ibid and TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, para 7-25, 53; Auxiliary roles within the Uganda Transport Corps included 844 stretcher bearers, 149 medical details, 161 headmen, 152 Ox transport (Belgian), 149 Ox Transport (UTC), 114 maxim gun porters, 49 syces, 38 veterinary details, 38 telegraphs, 25 supply, 22 pioneers. TNA CO 536/90/60006, The Handbook of Uganda.

	Recruitments	Deaths
British East Africa (Kenya)	186,689	25,891
Uganda	64,922	4,207
German East Africa & Zanzibar (Tanzania)	204,858	13,342
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique)	10,931	450
Nyasaland (Malawi)	138,943	4,440
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)	41,000	2,600
TOTAL	**647,343**	**50,930**

Table 2: Combined registered frontline non-combatant deaths.[36]

Quantifying The Known Combatant Dead

The official statistics of the war give an approximate number of African combatants killed or died in the East Africa Campaign as between 4,300 to 4,500.[37] The King's African Rifles (KAR), which expanded from a base of 2,319 in 1914 to 30,658 in January 1918, was the largest locally raised combat force. Of these men, the battalions

[36]This is a baseline figure for officially recorded deaths and will be expanded upon within the text. The basis for each total, unless otherwise stated, is drawn from TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, appendix 1, Table 6 & 9; For British East Africa, recruitment total combines MLC (179,189) and BEA Carriers (7,500); For Uganda, recruitment total combines MLC (11,936), Uganda Transport Corps (40,051), Congo Carrier Corps (8,429), Uganda Carrier Corps (3,576), Uganda Pioneers (500) and Belgian Military Telegraph Construction (500). Does not include around 120,000 'job porters' known to have been raised on temporary arrangements within the western province by Belgian forces, something that falls outside the scope of this exercise. Death figures combine Watkins Report (1,315) with non-MLC Carrier dead (2,056) and missing (836). See TNA CO 536/90/60006, The Handbook of Uganda; For Nyasaland, recruitment figures include front-line (43,809) and second-line (95,134) carriers from Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War,* p. 270. Death figures from TNA CO 626/6, Summary of the Proceedings; For Northern Rhodesia, these totals are for front-line carriers only. Lucas (ed.), *Empire at War*, p. 309. Please note, re-calculations of this figure, as well as the inclusion of totals for internal porterage, will follow in the final section.

[37]*Statistics of the Military Effort*, pp. 302, 382-3.

recorded 4,237 dead up to 14 February 1919, with the vast majority dying from disease.[38]

	Killed	Died of Disease	Total
1st KAR	228	161	389
2nd KAR	434	369	803
3rd KAR	322	910	1,232
4th KAR	199	1150	1,349
5th KAR	9	111	120
6th KAR	3	251	254
7th KAR	3	87	90
TOTAL	**1,198**	**3,039**	**4,237**

Table 3. African rank and file deaths in the KAR by Battalion, 14/02/1919.[39]

Although these figures are so close they might be seen to corroborate one another, in September 1923 the Officer Commanding 6th KAR wrote to the Military Records Office in Nairobi saying the figures appeared low.[40] There are also complications elsewhere. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the KAR, which were based in Nyasaland, account for 1,192 of the 4,237 deaths given in Table 3. However, a colonial government report of July 1919 recorded 1,256 dead, while a memorial dedicated to these men at Zomba lists 1,285.[41] Although there is no additional information to question these figures any further, we can adjust the table to include the additional deaths from the 1st and 2nd KAR for a new total of at least 4,330.

[38]177 British officers and NCOs were also reported as dead. See TNA CO 534/30_07, KAR Strength and Casualties, 14/02/1919, p. 38.
[39]CWGC/1/1/7/E/14, Letter: Colonel H.S. Filsell, O/C 6th KAR, Dar es Salaam to O/C War Records, Nairobi, 13/09/1923
[40]Ibid.
[41]TNA CO 626/6, Summary of the Proceedings; Zomba Memorial statistics are: 1st KAR 474 deaths; 2nd KAR 811 deaths.

Territory	Regiment	Total
British East Africa	Arab Rifles	31
	East African Pioneers	5
	East African Remount Depot	4
	Jubaland Irregular Constabulary	39
Uganda	Baganda Rifles	8
	East African Army Medical Corps	31
	East African Medical Service	7
	East African Native Medical Corps	84
	Uganda Police Service Battalion	41
German East Africa & Zanzibar	East Lake Border Police	1
	Zanzibar African Rifles	2
Nyasaland	Nyasaland Field Force	3
Northern Rhodesia	Northern Rhodesia Police	128
	Northern Rhodesia Regiment	3
Southern Rhodesia	British South Africa Police	40
	Rhodesia Native Regiment	169
British Somaliland	Camel Corps	30
	Somaliland Camel Corps	23
Un-territorialised	Army Ordnance Corps	1
	East African Animal Transport	3
	East African Forces	23
	East African Intelligence Department	51
	East African Mechanical Transport Corps	20
	East African Scouts	12
	East African Veterinary Corps	1
	Royal Army Veterinary Corps	1
	Unidentified	1
	Overall	**762**

Table 4: Named East African combatants recovered from archival sources and added to the CWGC Casualty Database.[42]

The CWGC casualty database also contains the names of a further 762 military casualties from other locally raised units, as detailed in Table 4. To this can be added

[42]Dead as recorded in the CWGC casualty database and, as far as possible, excluding British Officers. Some of these casualties have always been present, but the majority were recovered through archival research connected to the CWGC's Non-Commemoration Programme. In some cases, like the Arab Rifles, figures reflect the name count not the total recorded as dead. Owing to ongoing research, it is possible these statistics will change. They are correct as of 1 April 2025.

another 12 Arab Rifles and 21 deaths within police units, as recorded by the Acting Governor of Kenya in December 1919.[43] This produces a total of 795. When combined with the KAR casualties, this results in a total confirmed figure of 5,125 dead. Taking the KAR statistics alone – the East African force that saw the bulk of frontline fighting – this equates to a 14.12 per cent mortality rate. As most fighting personnel served with the KAR, whose existing administration and casualty reporting processes were more robust than those of the carrier forces prior to the establishment of the MLC, we can assume any further omissions in this category would be small in scale and should not greatly affect the totals here.

A New Baseline for the Confirmed Dead

Adding the totals for combatant and non-combatant dead provides a new baseline figure of at least 56,055 deaths (Table 5). While this is a sizeable reduction of the estimate put forward by the CWGC in 2021, it does not include those believed to be completely unaccounted for at the end of the war.

Non-Combatants	50,930
Combatants	5,125
Total	**56,055**

Table 5. Total number of verified deaths

Accounting For the Unrecorded Dead

While we can provide a number for the officially recorded dead, it is universally accepted this does not incorporate all those lost amongst the carrier units. There are four issues of particular significance here:

1) potentially unreported MLC deaths due to influenza;
2) potentially unreported deaths amongst MLC casual labourers;
3) MLC carriers reported as deserted and missing who actually died; and
4) forces raised for which there are overall statistics but no death figures.

As much of the evidence informing the estimates for the first two issues is the same, they will be dealt with under a single heading.

[43]TNA CO 533/216/7624, Letter: Charles Bowring, Acting Governor British East Africa to Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 December 1919. These were for African casualties only.

1 & 2. Potentially unreported MLC deaths due to influenza and potentially unreported deaths amongst MLC casual labourers

An anomaly in the tabulated statistics of Watkins' report is the apparent absence of deaths caused by influenza in 1918. The reason to doubt their inclusion is an almost passing reference to the impact of the disease in an appended chart, which appears in isolation and clearly diverges from the statistics given elsewhere. The chart, entitled 'deaths per cent per annum of all porters in the field' (henceforth 'per cent per annum' chart), shows a single trace until November 1918, when it splits into deaths caused by influenza and deaths from other causes. Also unique to this chart is the apparent inclusion of casually employed labour, something that Watkins suggests is absent from the statistics elsewhere in the report.

Taking the chart at face value and as the title suggests and then attempting to extract and tabulate the figures therein, shows that the influenza line rises sharply to a peak of 58.45 per cent for the week ending 7 December 1918. When subtracting deaths from other causes, the suggestion is that 55.24 per cent of carriers in the field that week died from influenza.[44] This would obviously be a startling statistic, suggesting that during one week in December more than half the carriers still active with the MLC succumbed to the disease. While the number of active carriers was undoubtedly falling quickly during this period, this would still account for a significant number of men.

The largest issue with these figures is the fact they do not connect with the rest of Watkins' report. These details are neither referenced elsewhere nor directly linked to data showing strength in the field, something that prevents an immediate calculation of the number of deaths using the chart. Furthermore, the obvious and substantial spike in recorded deaths in December 1918 does not appear in any of Watkins' other statistics or his narrative, which seems unduly odd, especially as he singled out and explained the excessively high mortality rate seen in the middle of 1917.[45]

Death percentages for the entire period of this chart, from January 1917 to December 1918, also do not align with any other statistics produced for similar periods elsewhere in the report. For example, a separate chart that plots mortality against estimated strength (henceforth 'mortality and strength' chart) shows that, for the week ending 16 November 1918, estimated strength was around 55,000 and mortality around 150.[46] If the axes of the 'per cent per annum' chart are taken to be just that – the percentage of a given number of men in the field who died – and are applied to this

[44]TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix 2, Graph 5.
[45]Watkins attributed the mid-1917 spike in deaths to campaigning in the rainy season, a lack of doctors and stretched lines of communications. Ibid., paras. 28-30, 124.
[46]This was a considerable increase from the months preceding, which averaged less than 100. Ibid., Appendix 2, Graph 1.

55,000 strength figure, the total deaths for the same week would jump to 7,893 (6,380 from influenza and 1,513 from other causes). Given the virulence of the disease, these numbers are not necessarily impossible in isolation – especially in the context of the other hardships faced by carriers – but the tenfold increase in deaths from other causes is harder to explain. Additionally, a war diary entry from a few days later written by the Deputy Director of Medical Services, East African Expeditionary Force, noted that carrier influenza deaths from the previous week had been unusually high but that this had cost 205 lives.[47] The difference is simply too large to ignore.

Continuing this comparative exercise just causes further issues. Using the same method across the entirety of the month of November would yield a total death figure of 33,703: 25,914 due to influenza and 7,789 due to other causes. Though not expressly stated, it is not believed the 'mortality and strength' chart includes casual labourers, something the 'per cent per annum' chart does, which would mean the total death figure would be even higher. Given that Watkins' death figures provide a total for the entire war of nearly 41,000, a monthly toll like this that went unmentioned within the tabulated figures or narrative of the report begins to seem questionable.

Extending the analysis back before the influenza period is also revealing. While we might accept that a substantial increase in deaths due to this disease was deliberately excluded, it is harder to explain large anomalies elsewhere. Using the same method of calculation in pre-pandemic 1917 produces weekly mortality rates that would amount to a total annual loss of 944,462. Given the total wartime population of British East Africa was said to be around 2,596,000, and assuming that approximately half that population was female, such numbers would have been quickly unsustainable. Pushing this crude calculation further and continuing to ignore the existence of children and the infirm, you would get to an annual death figure that equated to 73 per cent of the entire male population of British East Africa. While recruitment was by this time drawing on the population of German East Africa and beyond, the total recruitment recorded for the entire war by Watkins – admittedly, again, not including casual labour or those raised in territories outside of the MLC's control – amounted to approximately 400,000. Even if we expand this to include those believed to have been raised elsewhere and compare this against a total of 690,072 known recruitments for the entire war, this still suggests an additional 300,000 deaths above that total. This, of course, is not possible and the chart cannot be made to compute before or after the influenza period.

The flaws in this chart, or at least the absence of raw data that might give it meaning, prevent its use in this analysis. Nonetheless, its existence and other references to

[47]See entry from 19 November 1918. TNA WO 95/5300/9, Deputy Director of Medical Services, East African Expeditionary Force, p. 32.

carrier influenza deaths elsewhere suggests there is still a need to account for them. The figures provided by Watkins come with several caveats, most of which he mentions and are already recorded here, however, the impact of influenza on carriers is conspicuous by its absence. His loss figures for the influenza period support this, where contrary to expectation, their general trend is gradual decline. Although the monthly death percentages shifted to longer periods towards the end of the war – a 4-month composite figure covering August 1917 to November 1917, and a 17-month composite figure for December 1917 to April 1919 – dividing this out to a monthly average shows a steep decline, with the final period – the one covering the pandemic – falling to just 0.33 per cent. Given what is known about the impact of the disease globally, this strongly suggests these deaths are absent from the totals. While it is known that the war was highly conducive to the spread of influenza, there was a general tendency towards underreporting across all theatres owing to censorship, non-registration, missing records and misdiagnosis. This has also been said to be especially prevalent in the colonial context.[48] Nonetheless, we can begin to account for these men by benchmarking against other statistics.

The US Army is said to have suffered nearly 46,000 influenza related deaths during the whole pandemic (c.30,000 in US training camps and 15,489 in France), with the highest week of fatalities ending 4 October 1918, where there was a peak of 6,160.[49] With an army totalling 1.2 million, this equates to a mortality rate of 38.3 deaths per 1,000 population.

Contemporary statistics from colonial settings are rare but do exist, although their accuracy is often doubtful. Within German East Africa, post-war statements from newly arrived British administrators show the war-ravaged country 'suffered severely'. A June 1919 report by the District Political Officer for Rungwe estimated that the total number of deaths across the Central Area 'must have reached' 15,000 to 20,000, out of a total population of c.180,000.[50] Although clearly given as an unscientific estimate, it translates to an average mortality rate of 83.33 to 111.11 per 1,000. A far more detailed and evidenced-based report from South Africa produced by the

[48]Raised in, amongst others, Niall Johnson & Juergen Mueller, 'Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918-1920 "Spanish" Influenza Pandemic', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 76, No. 1, (2002), pp. 105-115; Fred Andayi, Sandra Chaves & Marc-Alain Widdowson, 'Impact of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Coastal Kenya', *Tropical Medicine and Infectious Disease*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2019), pp. 1-14.

[49]Peter Wever & Leo van Bergen, 'Death from 1918 pandemic influenza during the First World War: a perspective from personal and anecdotal evidence', *Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses*, Vol. 8, No. 5, (2014), pp. 539-541.

[50]Tanzania National Archives, Tanganyika Territory reports, Rungwe District 1918, Report by District Political Officers, 22 June 1919.

Influenza Epidemic Commission in 1919 provides a firmer base for comparison. Here it was noted that between August and November 1918, the infection rate among non-Europeans was 27.19 per 1,000 population, with a total of 2,162,152 confirmed cases and 127,745 deaths.[51] This amounted to a mortality rate of 59.08 per 1,000 infected, and an overall mortality rate of 27.19 per 1,000 of the non-European population. When focused solely on the statistics of military hospitals within the Union, there were 1,288 recorded cases and 79 deaths among 'natives', with a mortality rate of 61.34 per 1,000 cases (which is to say per 1,000 people infected rather than per 1,000 population). Allowing for the small sample size, this is broadly comparable to the mortality rate within the wider population.[52] Similar findings were reported by the Principal Medical Officer of Nyasaland in February 1919, where a mortality rate of 63.8 per 1,000 military cases was reported.[53]

More recent regional calculations have explored these historical figures and applied various means for their adjustment, usually on the assumption that the recorded figures were underestimations. Looking specifically at the Coast Province of Kenya, Fred Andayi et al. calculated that, from September 1918 to March 1919, out of an estimated population of 181,199, there were 31,908 confirmed cases and 4,593 deaths. This produces a case rate of 176 per 1,000 people, and a mortality rate of 25.3 per 1000.[54] In a recent recalculation of the impact of influenza and its incidence and virulence within global populations, Niall Johnson and Juergen Mueller have calculated that out of a population of 2,596,000, Kenya colony as a whole suffered 150,000 deaths – a mortality rate of 57.8 per 1,000.[55]

This final figure of 57.8 per 1,000 is not only the most useful to this analysis given its regional focus, but by being the highest per-population rate amongst the more robust analyses, it also allows us to err on the side of overestimation – something that fits more comfortably with the wider carrier experience. Applying this figure to the 64,622 men known to still be in the field at the time of Armistice – coincidentally the moment

[51]These statistics were noted as being as reliable as possible, although it was accepted there would be gaps.
[52]TNA CO 633/112/14, Report of the Influenza Epidemic Commission, Union of South Africa, 8 February 1919.
[53]Figures in this report, which included totals for European and Indian deaths, were recognised as 'far from being an exhaustive record of the epidemic'. They also apply to those infected rather than total population. TNA CO 525/82 21731, Letter: The Principal Medical Officer & Assistant Director of Medical Services Nyasaland Protectorate, to, The Acting Chief Secretary Zomba, 14 February 1919.
[54]Infection figures only available for three out of five districts. Andayi et al., 'Impact of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic', pp. 6-11.
[55]Johnson & Mueller, 'Updating the Accounts', p. 110.

that influenza cases appeared to spike – suggests an additional 3,735 carriers could have died in MLC service. As recruitment is known to have stopped on 13 November, this is one of the rare occasions we can be confident about the total number of men likely to have been affected. Furthermore, we know that over the six months that followed Armistice, the depots repatriated 55,175 men; a figure that comfortably absorbs this additional death figure with a small excess. Most of those left over were said to be working with salvage units, with some others also possibly waiting for the provision of artificial limbs and pension arrangements.[56]

Attempting a comparable calculation for carriers raised in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia is more complicated due to a lack of statistics. For Nyasaland, it is known that 20,000 carriers were at least promised to NORFORCE in October 1918.[57] Although recruitment from Northern Rhodesia is said to have slackened considerably in that year and effectively ceased in September owing to unrest, it is likely some men were still in the field. Drawing on lower average strength statistics from preceding years is still likely to overestimate the number employed, but it is also the only figure available. Thus, adding 15,000 from Northern Rhodesia to the Nyasaland figure gives a combined total of 35,000, which closely aligns with NORFORCE's earlier carrier demand.[58] Using these figures, it is possible to estimate that 1,156 carriers from Nyasaland and 867 from Northern Rhodesia died from influenza while on active service.[59] Although far less robust than many other statistics included in this analysis, this allows us to account for influenza deaths in these cohorts while erring on the side of overestimation.

MLC casual labour presents a unique issue in this calculation given the difficulties found in applying a mortality rate to a cohort of personnel that was, by its very nature, temporary and constantly fluctuating. What we can say of this group is that they were largely used to undertake short-term sanitation work in Dar-es-Salaam and other towns, and that their maximum period of consecutive employment was 30 days. In emergencies they were used to supplement the MLC's regular labour force, but only

[56]TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, para. 129-30 & Appendix 1, Table 5.
[57]For Nyasaland see TNA WO 95/5298/3, East Africa GHQ, entry for 5 October 1918.
[58]For Northern Rhodesia see Yorke, 'War, Mobilisation', pp. 120-59. Although average is from 1916-17, and it is known that demand for carriers slackened in 1918, it is used here as the only estimate relating to carriers in the field during a given period. In late 1917, the total number of carriers engaged by NORFORCE was 30,000. See Lucas (ed.), *Empire at War*, p. 265.
[59]Infections within the civilian population averaged 10-30% with deaths at 3-12%. The highest mortality rate was amongst children. See M.C. Musambachime, 'African Reactions to the 1918/1919 Influenza Epidemic in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland', *Zambia Journal of History*, Vol. 6, No. 7 (1994), pp. 1–24.

while working on this 30-day card system rather than being registered on the books of the MLC. While this almost certainly meant some of these men fell ill and died in ways similar to enlisted MLC carriers, the method and nature of their employment suggests this number would have been comparatively low. Where we might assume a larger casualty rate, however, is in connection to the influenza pandemic, the deadliness of which had little direct connection to the campaign and the dates of which coincided with the peaks in casual labour employment. Following the method applied to the wider carrier population, and using the figures Watkins provided for casual labourers under 'contract' at given times during the pandemic period, we can add a further 3,863 deaths from influenza.[60] The extent and nature of the information available makes it impossible to distil more from these statistics and, in all likelihood, this is an overestimation, but it allows these men to be included in the analysis and any excess likely offsets those casual labourers who died in service outside the influenza period.

In sum, this estimate suggests a further 9,621 deaths due to influenza can be added to Watkins' total for carrier casualties.

3. MLC carriers reported as deserted and missing who actually died

The penultimate group unaccounted for in these statistics is the proportion of those who were recorded as deserted or missing who had in fact died. A particular frustration is the fact that MLC statistics do not disaggregate the deserted from the missing, something born out of the high desertion rate and dispersal of forces. As previously stated, it was this uncertainty that led the MLC to classify as deserted all the missing unless proof to the contrary could be obtained.[61] The two categories are treated as one in this analysis.

At the end of the war, over 130,000 carriers raised in British East Africa, German East Africa, Zanzibar, and Uganda fell into these categories. In setting out this figure, Watkins added that most early deserters (1914-15) 'must in the majority of cases have obtained work with European or Indian employers to avoid being again conscripted in the native reserves'. Likewise, later into the campaign, he noted that local impressment meant that many 'who did not like it simply went home' – a fact reflected in MLC statistics, where 77 per cent of those listed as deserted and missing came from German East Africa, where most of the fighting occurred. Watkins clearly believed that most of these individuals deserted rather than died in service, stating 'the majority

[60]The MLC made short-term contracts with local Chiefs and Headmen to complete specific tasks. They then found and provided the labour. TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, paras. 73, 84-6 & Appendix 1, Table 11.

[61]See TNA WO 95/5311/5, East Africa, Director of Military Labour, 27 January 1918, pp. 85-6.

of local natives undoubtedly reached their homes', although he added that those attempting to reach British East Africa were more likely to have perished.[62] In essence, the further from home a deserting carrier was, the less likely he was to survive.

Acknowledging that a proportion of the deserted and missing were actually dead is significant, but determining that proportion is difficult. This is complicated by the fact that many who were conscripted allegedly provided false names, meaning they could have served and deserted multiple times.[63] This is just one of several factors that introduces uncertainty to any calculation, but this is not the first time this exercise has been attempted. In December 1919, the acting Governor of Kenya, Sir Charles Bowring, wrote to the Colonial Office to state his belief that of the 27,936 from the territory who were listed as missing and deserted by Watkins, 'it may be assumed that 14,000 died'. While accepting that an exact total 'will never be known', he felt compelled to account for these men.[64] Although Bowring did not show his working, he almost certainly formulated his calculation from the statistics Watkins provided for Maxim Gun Carriers, which were the most detailed.

Whilst compelling, there are several issues with this calculation. Firstly, machine gun carriers operated as frontline porters, as opposed to transport carriers who operated on the lines of communications. Frontline porters were specially picked and trained, and attached permanently to formations, as their duties 'frequently took them under fire'.[65] Watkins, too, noted that the higher proportion of deaths amongst carriers raised in Kenya was attributable to the fact they served longer, furnished the majority of gun-carriers, stretcher bearers and front-line porters, and served further from their own country.[66] As such, whilst it is understandable that Bowring used the most complete statistics for this calculation, they also potentially skew the result given the fact these porters made up just 3% of the total manpower raised within the MLC.

[62]TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix 1, Table 7.
[63]Ibid. See also para. 29, where desertions were described as 'rampant' in German East Africa, especially when men were near home or 'some harbour of refuge'. Watkins believed many would have lost their lives in the attempt but declined to estimate numbers; For prevalence of desertion see also TNA CO 95/5331/13, Despatch No.1 by Lt. Col. E.B.B. Hawkins, 14 November 1918, p. 28.
[64]Bowring estimated deserted and missing at 27,936. Combining the figures in Appendix 1, Table 7 & 9 of the Watkins' Report equal 27,794. See TNA CO 533/216/7624, Letter: Charles Bowring.
[65]C.P. Fendall, *The East African Force 1915-1919*, (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1921), pp. 202-209.
[66]TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix 1, Table 6.

A more significant issue is found in the calculation itself. Within Watkins' statistics for Maxim Gun Carriers, there are three knowns (the number recruited, the number discharged and the number dead) and one unknown (the number of missing and deserted likely to be dead). Removing those known to have survived, which Bowring appears to have done, is an error, as their absence dramatically and incorrectly increases the mortality rate. Instead, Bowring should have removed the unknown from his calculation – the deserted and missing – so that the number of recruits with known outcomes could be identified as either discharged or deceased, thereby providing a percentage mortality rate that could be applied to the unknown (the missing and deserted).

While the wider MLC statistics do not include a figure for those discharged, this is of no significance as those not dead or within the missing or deserted groupings must have filled this category. Removing the deserted and missing from the total recruitments allows us to determine the percentage of those remaining who were known to have died. This mortality rate can then be applied to estimate unrecorded deaths (Table 6). This is done using the following calculation:

- Subtract the deserted and missing from the total recruited.
- Calculate the percentage of those left known to have died.
- Apply this percentage to the deserted and missing.

	Figures from Watkins Report			**Calculation**			
	A)	B)	C)	D)	E)	F)	
Territory	Recruitments	Deaths	Deserted & Missing	Total recruitments minus recorded deserted & missing (Col A minus Col C)	Percentage of recruitments (minus deserted & missing) recorded dead (based on Col B and D)	Potential dead amongst deserted & Missing (% in Col E applied to Col C)	**Combined total of recorded & presumed dead from all recorded MLC recruitments (Col B plus Col F)**
BEA	179,189	25,891	27,794	151,395	17.10%	4,753	30,644
Uganda	11,936	1,315	2,921	9,015	14.59%	426	1,741
GEA	201,343	13,129	103,719	97,624	13.45%	13,949	27,078
Zanzibar	3,515	213	1,628	1,887	11.29%	184	397
TOTAL	**395,983**	**40,548**	**136,062**	**259,921**		**19,312**	**59,860**

Table 6. Calculation based on Watkins Report for potential missing (presumed dead).[67]

[67]Figures are compiled from Appendix 1, Tables 6, 7 and 9 of the Watkins Report.

Using this methodology with MLC statistics for the deserted and missing from British East Africa, German East Africa, Uganda, and Zanzibar suggests an additional 19,312 men should be considered dead, with the remaining 116,750 being classified as deserted.

4. Forces raised outside of the MLC for which there are overall statistics but no death figures
For the B.E.A. and Uganda Carrier Corps whose deaths are not recorded elsewhere, it is possible to apply the death percentages from Column E, Table 6. For the Ugandans, who suffered a combined 1,526 dead or invalided from 3,576 total recruits, we can suggest that 522 died and 1,004 were invalided. For Kenya, by drawing on a figure of 7,500 pre-MLC carrier recruitments and applying the relevant percentage, the result is 1,283 deaths.[68] This suggests a further 1,805 carriers died outside of the MLC between August 1914 and March 1915. Of the 1,741 auxiliaries who served as part of the Uganda Transport Corps and for whom no mortality figures were provided, the same approach results in 254 deaths, while applying the same methodology to the 1,000 Ugandans who served in the Uganda Pioneers (500) and Belgian Military Telegraph Construction (500) results in 146 deaths. Overall, this adds a total of 2,205 deaths.

Finally, also absent from Watkins' figures are Northern Rhodesian carriers. Although the colonial government did provide casualty numbers for these men and women, in the same sentence it acknowledged they were likely too low for first-line carriers. Taking this group first, and accepting a total wartime strength of 41,000, more focused statistics based on discrete groups within this cohort provide a mortality rate that can be applied globally. Taking one contingent of Fort Jameson carriers loaned for operations alongside Nyasaland forces in 1916, evidence suggests a mortality rate of 7.91 per cent.[69] Applying this across all those who served outside the territory (41,000) provides an estimated total of 3,243 deaths. For those carriers operating internally within Northern Rhodesia, the colonial government believed casualty rates were comparable to peacetime and estimated 300 deaths. Using more detailed statistics from neighbouring Nyasaland, where the type of service and conditions were

[68]Watkins' Report referenced 8,624 Kenyans and Ugandans served in the B.E.A. and Uganda Carrier Corps. While we can disaggregate the Ugandans, subtracting them from this total (5,048) conflicts with a figure (7,500) provided in a separate report by the colonial government in Kenya for pre-MLC enlistments. This higher estimate will be used here. TNA CO 533/216/7624, Letter: Charles Bowring; TNA CO 533/216, Watkins Report, para 47.

[69]Of 12,427 personnel, 983 were said to be dead or missing. Mutale Mazimba, 'African Reactions to the First World War: The Case of the Mtenga-Tenga of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 4, (2023), p. 561; Comparable statistics are in Yorke, 'War, Mobilisation', pp. 144-145.

comparable, and accepting that second-line enlistments numbered approximately 44,889, we can suggest a more accurate estimate of 449 deaths.[70]

Although it is unlikely these calculations can be developed further, they provide the most comprehensive estimate attempted to account for the true human cost paid by locally raised forces in the East Africa campaign of the First World War.

Recorded deaths (non-combatants)	50,930
Recorded deaths (combatants)	5,125
Unreported MLC influenza deaths	3,735
Unreported NORFORCE influenza deaths	2,023
Unreported influenza deaths amongst MLC casuals	3,863
MLC missing presumed dead	19,312
Dead unaccounted for in other statistics	3,297
Total	**88,285**

Table 7. Total estimate for East African deaths.

Conclusion

Despite the enormous effort put into raising and administering carrier forces during the war in East Africa, there is little remanence of the paperwork that recorded their extraordinary endeavours and the awful price they paid in lives. Although soldiers seem to have been better served in this respect, both groups remain underrepresented in named commemoration by the CWGC. The absence of all this information has had a substantial impact on the way this campaign is remembered and how these casualties are commemorated.

Although attempts to quantify the losses experienced by East African communities mobilised in this war have been made in the past, these have been satisfied with sweeping figures based on the application of percentages to approximate overall numbers. While this has been effective in emphasising magnitude, looking at the issue in round figures has stripped the individual from this tragedy. By digging deeper into the available statistics and applying careful and informed calculations using information that has survived, this analysis provides a figure very likely to be closer to reality. Although it only differs by a little under 12,000 from the universally accepted 100,000 dead, these statistics are now disaggregated and territorialised. It is hoped this returns

[70] 44,889 figure comprised of 12,000 paddlers, 6,000 Barotse, 6,000 from Kasama, 17,134 from Fort Jameson, 3,755 from Mkusi. Lucas, *Empire at War*, p. 295; Mazimba, 'African Reactions', p. 556.

some dignity and individual recognition to every one of the 88,285 East Africans (Table 8) who lost their lives in British military service during this war, and that this helps the communities of today to better connect with those casualties.

Territory	Soldiers			Enlisted Carriers			Casual Engagements		
	Recruitments	Deaths	Percentage	Recruitments	Deaths	Percentage	Engagements	Deaths	Overall total deaths
British East Africa (Kenya)	c.9,643	1,464	15.18%	186,689	31,927	17.10%	13,096		**33,391**
Uganda	c.14,039	1,520	10.83%	64,992	5,555	8.55%	120,000		**7,075**
German East Africa & Zanzibar (Tanzania)	c.5,554	347	6.25%	204,858	27,475	13.41%	218,411		**27,822**
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique)	-	-	-	10,931	450	4.12%			**450**
Nyasaland (Malawi)	c.19,000	1,288	6.78%	138,943	5,596	4.03%	56,709		**6,884**
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)	c.3,437	131	3.81%	85,889	4,559	5.31%	-		**4,690**
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	c.2,752	209	7.59%	204	-	-	-		**209**
British Somaliland (Somalia)	c.1,500	53	3.53%	-	-	-	-		**53**
Un-territorialised		113		-	3,735	-	-	3,863	**7,711**
Total	**55,925**	**5,125**	**9.16%**	**692,506**	**79,297**	**11.45%**	**408,216**	**3,863**	**88,285**

Table 8. Combined Totals.[71]

[71]Note once more that, unlike Hodges, this table deals only with manpower raised in East Africa. For the section on soldiers, the figures provided here are primarily based on the territory in which a regiment was based, not on the number of recruitments and deaths from that territory. Citations for enlisted carriers are drawn from the tables above. For casual engagements, the figures here denote number of 'engagements', not total number of individuals who served. For British East Africa, soldier recruitment and casual engagement figures from TNA, CO 533/216/7624. Soldier deaths combined from Table 3 – 3rd and 5th KAR - and Table 4. For Uganda, soldier recruitment figures from TNA, CO 533/93/20072, War services of Uganda, 12 February 1919, soldier deaths combined from Table 3 – 4th KAR – and Table 4. For German East Africa and Zanzibar, recruitment figures combined 900 for Zanzibar with the total strength of 6th KAR and 7th KAR in Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, p. 204; TNA, CO 534/25_2, p. 47. Death figures from Table 3 – 5th and 6th KAR – and Table

This article has adopted a quantitative approach to a history that deserves a qualitative one. It does not attempt to document the experiences of Africans in this war, the horrors they endured on behalf of a colonial power, or the lasting impact of their service. Nor does it touch upon those who served and perished with German forces. Instead, it has very deliberately been written with a singular and specific purpose to quantify those lost in British service who should have been commemorated alongside their counterparts from across the British Empire. In making these calculations, it is acknowledged that the cost of this war did not end with the peace, and that many who survived their service returned home weakened, sick or injured. Others will have died after discharge before even reaching home. There is also no question that the movement of hundreds of thousands of people around the region helped the spread of disease, particularly influenza. The impact of these events and the voids left in these communities were long-lived, with many struggling to bounce back. These uncountable costs of war, as well as the lived experience of those involved, are clearly just as important to our understanding of the conflict and its legacies. However, it is hoped this paper not only enables the CWGC to renew efforts to commemorate those who lost their lives and never received the recognition they deserved, but also draws renewed focus on a largely forgotten history that merits further attention.

4. Casual engagements are combined as the majority were from these territories. See TNA, CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix 1, Table 11. For Nyasaland, soldier and carrier recruitment figures from Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, pp. 270 & 275. Soldier deaths from Table 3 – 1st and 2nd KAR – and Table 4. For Northern Rhodesia, recruitment figures drawn from Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, p. 309. Soldier deaths from Table 4. For Southern Rhodesia, recruitment figures drawn from Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, p. 344 (figure excludes 22 'Cape Boys'). Moreover, 169 Southern Rhodesians served with the BEA Transport Corps and 35 with the Union Labour Corps. Two deaths were recorded within these cohorts but they are incorporated into the wider MLC and South African statistics. The small number recruited for the territory is owing to the labour demands of civil mines. See National Archives of Zimbabwe, A3/11/25/5/2, List of Natives, exclusive of members of the Rhodesia Native Regiment, who left Southern Rhodesia to proceed on active service during The Great War, 1914-18. For British Somaliland, recruitment figures from Lucas (ed.), *The Empire at War*, p. 568. For unterritorialised casualties, the carrier total is from influenza deaths.

Last Ditch: The British Army in Southeast England, 1940

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ABSTRACT
This article examines the state of XII Corps, which occupied the most threatened corner of England during the invasion crisis of 1940. Drawing upon research in the UK National Archives and secondary sources, this article argues that early-war British commanders better understood the tactical challenges posed by the German Army than has previously been accepted, and in particular understood the need for dynamic training and a mission-specific doctrine.

Introduction

The role of the British Army in anti-invasion operations in 1940, and in particular the role of XII Corps, has received relatively scant attention. This is a serious omission, as the British Army would have had to confront and defeat the German Army if the RAF had been defeated, and the Royal Navy had failed to prevent a German invasion from taking place. This article aims to partially fill that gap by exploring the preparations made by a single corps, XII Corps. It will demonstrate that the British Army in southeastern England in September 1940 was relatively well-led, had a realistic operational and tactical doctrine, and took the issue of training more thoughtfully than has previously been recognised. This article relates to how British commanders adapted and developed their own mission-specific doctrines in order to deal with a scenario for which previous methods had proven insufficient. It confirms Jonathan Buckley's observation that the 'hands-off' training ethic of the British Army provided dividends by allowing commanders freedom to set their own training and doctrinal standards.[1] It focuses on how the units of XII Corps were deployed, what form their training took, and the tactical and operational doctrine to which that training was tailored.

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[1]Jonathan Buckley, *Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe,* (London: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 301.

Historians have recognised that the British Army of 1940 had many flaws. Sir David Fraser described a force that was unprepared for mobile warfare, and lacking in commanders who had high-command training.[2] This line of argument was followed by Edward Smalley, who characterised the British Expeditionary Force's (B.E.F.) campaign in France as being plagued by inept leadership, slow decision making, and poor morale.[3] The most recent contribution to this historiographical tradition has been by Richard Dannatt and Robert Lyman, who use the combat performance of the B.E.F in France as the centrepiece of their indictment of inter-war defence spending.[4] Even those looking to rehabilitate the British Army's reputation, such as Jonathan Buckley, have used training in the British army of 1940 as a negative example against which the later performance of the British Army can be positively assessed.[5]

Arrayed against this formidable body of opinion is the work of Charles More, who uses the example of the Battle of Ypres-Comines Canal to argue that the B.E.F. had strengths that have been neglected.[6] More's conclusion is that the B.E.F was capable of fighting defensive operations with skill and considerable tenacity, showed more flexibility and manoeuvrability than many have acknowledged, and remained remarkably well-motivated in the face of constant setbacks.

Analysis by Joseph Moretz of British operational and tactical performance in Norway tells a similar story. The quality of officers at the command, brigade and battalion levels was high.[7] British fieldcraft was excellent, rearguard and defensive operations were well-executed, and march discipline was good, while morale remained solid.[8] Junior officers and non-commissioned officers, both Regular and Territorial, displayed consistent initiative, discipline and skill throughout the campaign.[9]

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[2]David Fraser, *And We Shall Shock Them* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983), p. 22-23.

[3]Brian Bond, 'Edward Smalley, The British Expeditionary Force 1939-40' *British Journal For Military History*, Vol. 2 No. 1 (2015), p. 132-133. https://journals.gold.ac.uk/index.php/bjmh//article/view/642/764. Accessed 21 February 2025.

[4]Richard Dannatt & Robert Lyman, *From Victory To Defeat,* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2023), p. 304.

[5]Buckley, *Monty's Men*, pp. 43-45.

[6]Charles More, *The Road To Dunkirk,* (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2013), p.305

[7]Joseph Moretz, *Towards A Wider War: British Strategic Decision-Making and Military Effectiveness in Scandinavia*, 1939-1940, (Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2017), pp. 436-437.

[8]Ibid., pp. 521-523.

[9]Ibid., pp. 525.

By far the most impactful work has been by Jonathan Fennell, who demonstrated that early-war British commanders were fully aware of the challenges posed by mobile warfare and were themselves perfectly capable of prosecuting it effectively. During 1940/41's Operation Compass, British commanders in North Africa successfully used dash, initiative and speed of movement to overwhelm and destroy a far larger Italian force wedded to positional warfare, and only lost that capability once their regular troops had been diluted with wartime replacements and their formations had grown in size and number beyond the scale their commanders had been trained to handle.[10]

These innate qualities had not, however, been enough to enable the British Army to avert a catastrophe in France in 1940. From early June onwards, Britain faced the prospect of invasion with an army that was disorganised and had lost much of its equipment. At the same time the army had to readjust its UK command structure to incorporate large numbers of new formations and develop a new and viable Order of Battle. The District Commands, previously purely administrative and training headquarters, now had to be converted into operational commands that included Regular Army and Territorial Army units. Amongst the new Corps formations created to tackle this task was XII Corps, formed in southeastern England in early June 1940 from a cadre of experienced staff officers and service troops. Given that German plans called for landings to be concentrated along beaches in Kent and East Sussex, it was XII Corps that would have been the first and main combat formation to come into contact with the enemy. The divisions that were immediately assigned to XII Corps reflected the ad-hoc nature of the wider British Army following the Fall of France.

In the beginning, the corps had under its control the regular 3 Infantry Division, which had distinguished itself in France. This division, however, had been removed by the end of July.[11] For most of the invasion period, the bulk of the corps' fighting power was provided by two Territorial Army (TA) formations: 45 (Wessex) Infantry Division had been formed in the West Country as a duplicate of 43 Wessex Division and had spent the Phoney War dispersed across Southern Command before being transferred to Eastern Command after the Fall of France. Large scale training had been significantly impeded by this dispersal, and the division spent much of the summer rectifying this issue.[12] The other TA division, 1 London Motor Division, had a more colourful history. Formed from London-based TA units, the division was organised as a two-brigade 'motor division' until June 1940, when it was converted to an infantry division and

[10]Jonathan Fennell, *Fighting the People's War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 121-123.
[11]David John Newbold, *British Planning And Preparations To Resist Invasion on Land, September 1939 - September 1940* (PhD Thesis, King's College London, 1988), p. 343
[12]Ibid., pp. 60-61.

given the 198 and 35 Infantry Brigades.[13] The latter had originally been part of 12 Division in France, and was the only brigade-level formation in the area that had seen active service on the continent, where it had been badly mauled, although the stubborn defence it put up around Abbeville earned it accolades in the German XXXXI Corps War Diary.[14]

In addition to these two divisions, XII Corps also had several brigade-sized units. 29 Independent Infantry Brigade which was composed of regulars recalled from India had spent much of its time absorbing lessons from France and Norway.[15] A mobile formation was available in the form of Brocforce, based around 1 Motor Machinegun Brigade and reinforced by several artillery, engineer and infantry units. In addition to these formations, the corps also had operational command of garrisons at Shorncliffe, Dover Castle, Chatham and Deal, and Sheerness, composed largely of Royal Engineers, Royal Marines and training units.[16]

The quality of generalship in the Second World War British Army has been a subject of controversy since the 1960s; the conventional view is best summarised by Brian Farrell, who attributes Commonwealth defeats in Malaya to British field commanders' excessive caution at the tactical level, combined with the failure of senior officers to adapt doctrine to local circumstances.[17] Robert Forczyk contends that had Operation Sea Lion taken place, this same inflexibility would have left XII Corps' commanders incapable of adapting to the speed at which the German Army and Air Force moved and fought.[18]

While it must be accepted that there were limitations in the training which senior British officers received during the 1930s, this narrative stands at tension with the available evidence. As has been seen, British commanders in North Africa in 1940/41 were perfectly capable of conducting high-tempo combined operations if they were given time to train the troops under their command.[19] The successful extraction of troops from Norway and France required commanders to improvise combat formations and plans on the spot and then commit them to battle quickly enough to delay the enemy's advance before breaking contact. Such operations place great demands on the tactical judgement of the officer responsible, and yet British

[13]Ibid., p. 260.
[14]L. F. Ellis, *The War in France and Flanders 1939-1940* (London: HMSO, 1954), p. 81
[15]Rowland Ryder, *Oliver Leese,* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), pp. 86-87.
[16]Newbold, *British Planning And Preparations To Resist Invasion*, p. 260.
[17]Brian Farrell, *Defence and Fall of Singapore* (Singapore: Monsoon Books, 2015), p. 393
[18]Robert Forczyk, *We March Against England: Operation Sealion, 1940-41,* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016), pp. 233-235.
[19]Fennell, *Fighting the People's War,* p. 122.

commanders had performed them with consistent success in Norway and France in 1940 and would do so later in Greece in 1941.

Figure 1: General Sir Andrew "Bulgy" Thorne in Norway in 1945.[20]

XII Corp's objective was to perform those same duties – to delay the enemy advance and inflict casualties, in preparation for a counter-attack by mobile forces. The combat record of XII Corps' General Officer Commanding (GOC), Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew "Bulgy" Thorne, suggests that he was well qualified to carry out this task. Thorne was commissioned into the Grenadier Guards in 1904, finishing the First World War as a temporary Brigadier aged just thirty-three.[21] Diarist Sir Duff Cooper, who served in his battalion, remembered Thorne as a hard-driving professional even by the standards of other officers.[22] Having distinguished himself as a combat officer, Thorne spent the interwar period in attaché and staff positions, the most significant of which was his service as Military Attache in Berlin between 1933 and 1935, where he was able to witness to German rearmament.[23]

[20]Imperial War Museum (hereinafter IWM) Image BU 6334.
[21]Donald Lindsay, *Forgotten General: A Life of Andrew Thorne,* (Salisbury: Michael Russell Ltd, 1987) p. 73.
[22]Duff Cooper, *Old Men Forget,* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), p. 88.
[23]Lindsay, *Forgotten General: A Life of Andrew Thorne*, p.104.

Appointed GOC of 48 Infantry Division in 1939, he instituted a policy of aggressive patrolling during the Phoney War period in northern France that resulted in gallantry awards for multiple officers and men in his division.[24] Thorne's actions in the subsequent Battle of France further suggest a determined and capable officer. In order to counter penetration towards Dunkirk by 8 Panzer Division, Thorne dispatched two of his brigades to occupy the towns of Cassel and Hazebrouck.[25] By shuttling reserves back and forth between these positions, Thorne and the neighbouring 44 Division held a 20 mile front for three days against combined infantry and armour assaults. It was likely that this performance led to Thorne being made GOC of XII Corps a week after his return to England. His four subordinates were Major-General Sir Claude Liardet of 1 London Division, Major General Edmond 'Teddy' Schreiber of 45 Division, Major-General Montagu Brocas Burrows of Brocforce, and Brigadier Sir Oliver Leese of 29 Brigade.

Historians of the invasion crisis have not been kind to Liardet, with Forczyk in particular casting him as a bookish, out-of-touch Territorial artilleryman.[26] Correspondence between Liardet and Basil Liddell-Hart suggests otherwise. Liardet was appointed to form the RAF Regiment in 1941, and used Liddell-Hart as a sounding board for his ideas on how the unit should be trained and organised.[27] The RAF Regiment that Liardet created pioneered the concepts of force protection and tactical air control that are cornerstones of modern doctrine, with Liardet remaining in command until 1945 and awarded a knighthood.[28] His grasp of the three-dimensional nature of modern warfare is further demonstrated by his insistence on officers being flown over their positions to ensure they were camouflaged against aerial

[24]Supplement to *The London Gazette* of Friday, 31 of May 1940, Issue 34863. p. 3343; Supplement to *The London Gazette* of Tuesday, 5 of March 1940, Issue 34804. p. 1305

[25]Stephen Ashley Hart, "The Forgotten Liberator: The 1939-1945 Military Career of General Sir Andrew Thorne." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 79, no. 319 (2001): pp. 233–49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44232609. Accessed 22 February 2025.

[26]Forczyk, *We March Against England: Operation Sealion, 1940-41*, p. 229.

[27]The Basil Liddell Hart Archives (hereinafter LH) 1/445, "*A Letter To Basil Liddell Hart, by Maj-Gen Sir Claude Liardet."*

[28]Shannon W. Caudill, *Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency,* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2014), pp. 8-9; Kingsley M. Oliver, *The RAF Regiment At War: 1942-1944,* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2022) p. 13.

observation.[29] While Liardet had not served in France or Norway, the accusation that he was out-of-touch is dubious.

Figure 2: Major General Liardet inspecting RAF Regiment airmen. [30]

Command of 45 Infantry Division in East Sussex fell to Major-General Edmond 'Teddy' Schreiber, also an artilleryman. Much like Thorne, Schreiber's service in the First World War had been distinguished, winning the D.S.O and ending the war as a brevet Major before attending the Camberley Staff College as student and later instructor.[31] By 1940, Schreiber was a well-regarded officer. His transfer back to Britain from the B.E.F. was seen as a bitter blow by Lieutenant-General Alan Brooke, who held a high opinion of his abilities.[32] Brooke's assessment was echoed by Field Marshal John Dill,

[29]The UK National Archives (hereinafter TNA) WO 166/709 I London Division Intelligence Summary No. 79 and 17 June; WO 166/709 I London Division Ops Instr No: 23, 30 June 1940.
[30]IWM Image CH 5916.
[31]Nick Smart, *Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of the Second World War,* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2005), pp. 477-478.
[32]Alex Danchev & Daniel Todman, *Field Marshal Alanbrooke: War Diaries 1939-1945,* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 2001), p. 55.

who regarded Schreiber as the best potential commander after Montgomery.[33] Alas it was not to be, for Schreiber developed renal disease in 1942 and was confined to home commands thereafter.[34]

Major-General Montagu Brocas Burrows, commander of Brocforce, was a Dragoon by training. His service in Murmansk in 1919 had been distinguished with the award of a Military Cross and a DSO, he was promoted to command 9 Armoured Division in November 1940, then 11 Armoured Division in 1942.[35] Popular with colleagues and subordinates alike, Burrows was a zealous troop trainer who placed great stock in individual proficiency.[36] A latecomer to XII Corps was Major-General Bernard Freyberg of the New Zealand Division, he had won the Victoria Cross in 1916 as a battalion commander. Freyberg's conduct of the Battle of Crete in 1941 was undermined by poor communications and incomplete intelligence, but his later command in North Africa and Italy was highly successful.[37]

At the brigade and battalion level, commanders were of a similar calibre. Some, like Brigadier Sir Oliver Leese of 29 Brigade or Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Gough 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers, had already distinguished themselves in France or Norway. Most had not, but these often had excellent records from the First World War and interwar periods. Brigadier Arthur Newth, of 45 Division's 135 Brigade, had been the youngest battalion commander in the British Army in 1918 aged just twenty-one.[38] Most had not received the latest training in mobile warfare, but in that respect they were no different to those who had fought successful delaying actions at Ypres-Comines, Cassel, and in Central Norway. Unlike those men, the officers of XII Corps had a battle-proven commander with intimate experience of the German military, and time to prepare.

The immediate issue facing these commanders was a lack of resources. 45 Division's assigned area was estimated by its HQ to cover around a thousand square miles of ground, necessitating the commitment of all three brigades.[39] Thorne would only receive reinforcements in late August and September, in the form of a New Zealand

[33]Smart, *Biographical Dictionary of British Generals of the Second World War*, pp. 478-479.
[34]Ibid., p. 479.
[35]Second Supplement to The London Gazette of Tuesday, 20 January 1920, Issue 31745, p. 919-921.
[36]Brian Horrocks, *A Full Life*, (Glasgow: Collins, 1960), p. 89.
[37]James C. Bliss, *The Fall of Crete 1941: Was Freyberg Culpable?* (MA Thesis, Army Command & General Staff College, 2006), p. 135-136.
[38]Peter Eric Hodgkinson, *British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War,* (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013), p. 156.
[39]TNA WO 166/536, 45 Infantry Division Defence Scheme Part 4.

Division and 31 Infantry Brigade. The former was emplaced around Canterbury as the corps reserve, while the latter was deployed to defend the Royal Military Canal.[40]

1 London Division was expected to cover a similarly large stretching from Sheerness to Folkestone, and its deployment provides an example of the challenges that faced divisional commanders in 1940. Liardet had to ensure that Dover and Deal were protected, which required 1 and 2 London Brigades to be oriented eastwards. 198 and 35 Brigades however were positioned to protect the north Kentish coast, as successful landings there would threaten the division's line of communication with London.[41]

The strongest deployments were at the western end of XII Corps' sector, around Brighton and the approaches to Lewes. This sector was held by Brocforce.[42] 29 Infantry Brigade, arriving in July, was in reserve in the vicinity of Staplefield.[43] Both formations were expected to act in close concert with each other, and conducted joint exercises throughout the summer.[44]

XII Corps saw 29 Brigade as its main reserve, with 12 Corps Instruction No. 4 stating that the brigade was to either assist 45 Division in retaking Newhaven if that port fell, or recapture Shoreham under the command of Brocforce.[45] However, the brigade was also warned that it might be expected to operate in any part of 45 Division's area, especially in containing penetrations around Pevensey and the Royal Military Canal, or even holding a sector of the River Rother. This latter instruction suggests that Thorne intended to compensate for his numerical weakness by mounting a mobile defence, but the lack of motor transport left the majority of the TA infantry on foot.

This posed the obvious risk of infantry units being outflanked and isolated by armoured units, as had happened on multiple occasions in France and would later occur in North Africa, Malaya and Burma. This was a particularly acute fear within XII Corps, as the Germans were expected to press inland using the same system of scattered armoured columns as used in France, undeterred by concerns about their flanks or supporting units.[46]
The War Diary for XII Corps includes a document, simply titled 'Defence in Depth,' that provides insight into the doctrine that the corps adopted in light of this anxiety.

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[40]Newbold, *British Planning And Preparations To Resist Invasion,* p. 391.
[41]Ibid., p. 260.
[42]TNA WO 166/1113, 1 Motor Machinegun Brigade, Ops Order No 1, 13 July 1940.
[43]TNA WO 166/934, 29th Infantry Brigade War Diary, July 1940.
[44]TNA WO 166/344, XII Corps General Staff War Diary, 16 August.
[45]TNA WO 166/344, XII Corps, Instruction No. 4.
[46]TNA WO 166/949, 35th Infantry Brigade Defence Scheme, 5 July 1940.

In its opening paragraph, the document argued that German success in the Battle of France was enabled by the failure to have previously developed adequate defences behind the French and Belgian frontiers, and by the failure to conduct effective reconnaissance or coordinate between positions.[47] Building on these conclusions, the document argued that the enclosed terrain of Kent and Sussex offered good opportunities for checking armoured thrusts and confining them to areas where they could be isolated and destroyed. Indeed, the Brocforce War Diary remarks on the difficulty of moving mechanised forces through the Sussex and Kent countryside, made up as it was of sunken lanes, hedgerows, woodland and hills.[48]

This scheme was drafted against a changing background of national defence schemes. In the early summer, national strategy was dominated by General Sir Edmund Ironside's Stop Line scheme, in which southeastern England featured heavily. The fortified area at Barcombe Mills in East Sussex for example, was a key crossing point on the Stop Line that ran through XII Corps' area.[49] While it intended to provide a degree of depth against armoured penetration, the key weakness of the Stop Line was that it took no account of the vulnerability of linear defences to being flanked from the air, or being penetrated at a single point and then rolled up from either side.

The available evidence suggests that Thorne was aware of this and took steps to alleviate it. Instead of positioning units along a single Stop Line, XII Corps instead divided its area using a system of 'fences' overlayed over each other to form a 'grid.' Crossings over each fence – such as roads and bridges – were to be roadblocked, fortified, and held primarily by Home Guard forces. At intervals within this grid would be fortified nodal points, each centred around a key built up area or river crossing and held by Regular Army or TA troops. The outer perimeter was to be lightly held with all round defence, and carefully concealed and sited along likely approaches reinforced with traps and mines. Behind this lay the 'keep', a densely fortified building or area surrounded by a continuous anti-tank obstacle. The objective behind this system was: to delay German forces from penetrating inland; inflict losses on them; and so constrict their advance. By doing so, XII Corps would buy time for GHQ Home Forces to deploy further reserves to the battlefield and then launch a counter-attack. The Stop Line, rather than being the focus of the entire defensive effort, instead became a fall-back position to which units could withdraw if that became necessary.

At the divisional level, 45 Division incorporated this doctrine into its own Defence Scheme. Reiterating the conclusions of XII Corps GHQ with regards to terrain, the

[47]TNA WO 166/344, XII Corps Defence Scheme.
[48]TNA WO 166/1113, 1st Motor Machinegun Brigade War Diary, 15 June.
[49]William Foot, *Fields, Streets, and Hills: The Anti-Invasion Landscapes of England, 1940, (*York: CBA, 2006), p.373.

division assumed that it would face an initial onslaught of two divisions accompanied by an aerial landing of up to 15,000 airborne troops. As the divisional area covered over one thousand square miles, the divisional policy was for nodal points to be concentrated in villages, crossroads and at natural obstacles.[50] While the whole coastline would have to be held, platoons were nevertheless to be concentrated to allow their commanders to exercise control.

It was accepted that this would result in gaps within the line, it being deemed more important that units be able to concentrate their fighting power and avoid being rolled up piecemeal. Commanders from battalion down to sections were to counterattack whenever possible, and to rehearse doing so. The reasoning behind this was simple; the Germans could not be allowed to secure a bridgehead in the same manner as they had done after crossing the Meuse in June 1940, and the best way to prevent this was to keep them off balance. The Defence Scheme also, notably, contained provisions for commanders to request air support from the RAF.

This combination of static strongpoints and aggressive counterattack was mirrored by 1 London Division, which further indicates the degree to which experience in France had been disseminated. The commander of 1 London Infantry Brigade emphasised to his battalion commanders that any attack, whether aerial or landwards, was to be met with aggressive counter-action.[51] The importance of retaining mobility was emphasised, while commanders were explicitly encouraged to act on their own initiative in the absence of orders, and this was extended down to section commanders. Brigade HQ couched that attitude in language lifted from naval traditions, passing on Nelson's recommendation that '*In the height of the battle, the signals from the flagship may not be visible because of the smoke, but no Captain will be wrong who lays his ship alongside an enemy's ship and engages them*.'

The mainstay of XII Corps' destructive power lay with the Royal Artillery. Here, a lack of equipment imposed limitations. After critical equipment shortages in May and June, by August both divisions had received their full complement of artillery in the form of American-supplied 75mm field guns, 13 and 18 Pounder field guns, 4.5 Inch howitzers, and even 3.7 Inch mountain guns.[52] All could be used as stop-gap anti-tank weapons, but their high physical profile and limited lateral traverse imposed limitations in this role, and their ammunition supply was limited and inconsistent. The usefulness of these pieces was in their being able to engage targets in open ground and at close-to-medium range. The modern 25 Pounder was available, but only in limited quantities. 1 London

[50]TNA WO 166/536, 45th Division Defence Scheme, Parts 1, 4 and 5.
[51]TNA WO 166/1040, 1st London Infantry Brigade Operation Instruction No 4.
[52]TNA WO 166/716, 1st London Division Commander Royal Artillery War Diary, 12th and 13th of June 1940.

Division also had a medium regiment assigned to it, with 60 Pounder guns and 6 Inch howitzers.[53] These heavy pieces were again elderly but could provide powerful concentrated barrages, but their ammunition stocks were finite, and they had no anti-tank capability.

In addition to divisional artillery, commanders also had access to corps level medium, heavy, and super-heavy assets. XII Corps Artillery Group was equipped with a large quantity of modernised 60 Pounders and 6 Inch guns, in addition to several batteries of super-heavy guns, including 8 Inch, 9.2 Inch, and 12 Inch howitzers. The super-heavy pieces had very limited mobility but could hit targets at up to twenty two thousand yards. In order to accommodate this collection of antiquated but nevertheless functional equipment, British commanders developed a series of fire plans optimised to make maximum use of local conditions. In Brocforce for example, 60 Field Regiment was to firstly prioritise sinking enemy transports, secondly to prevent enemy penetration inland by shelling beaches, and thirdly to engage enemy forces inland, though it had not been permitted to conduct a practice shoot due to a shortage of ammunition.[54] For their own support, the infantry battalions of Brocforce had been provided with twelve 6 Inch mortars.[55] This scheme was mirrored in 45 and 1 London divisions, both of which tasked their artillery assets with sinking or damaging as many incoming transports as possible, and then shifting their fire to beaches and beach exits.

Divisional fires were to be reinforced by XII Corps Artillery, which was tasked with using its heavy guns to target beach exits, port wharfs, river crossings, and important roads.[56] The intention was to use artillery to complement the aforementioned 'grid" doctrine by shelling areas which the Germans would have no choice but pass through in order to reach their own objectives. An example of this can be found in Figure 3 at Rottingdean Beach, which *Oberkommando West* had selected as the landing area for 28 *Infanterie-Division*.[57] In order to move inland, troops and vehicles belonging to this formation would have had to travel up a single road built through a narrow cleft in the surrounding cliffs, while under fire from multiple artillery batteries. Similar bottlenecks were used to negate the lack of anti-tank weapons, with 1 Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers at Rye positioning its few available guns to cover each of the seven beach checkpoints in its area.[58] Forward sections were issued with one anti-tank rifle per section instead

[53]TNA WO 166/347, XII Corps Artillery M. A. 12 Corps Operation Order No. 1, 11 July 1940.
[54]TNA WO 166/1113, 1 Motor Machinegun Brigade Ops Order No 1, 13 July 1940.
[55]Ibid.
[56]TNA WO 166/347, XII Corps Artillery Task Table, 17 September.
[57]Peter Schenk, *Operation Sea Lion,* (Barnsley: Greenhill Books, 2019), pp. 262-263
[58]TNA WO 166/4553, 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers, Rye Sector Defence Scheme.

of per platoon, and troops were instructed in manufacturing petrol bombs and were taught to use them aggressively.[59]

Figure 3: Rottingdean Beach showing seawall and narrow cleft.[60]

The modernity and flexibility of this corps doctrine is in contrast with what has been claimed by previous historians of the British Army in the early years of the Second World War. In his studies of the Malaya Campaign, Farrell attributes Commonwealth defeat to the reluctance of commanders to adapt doctrine to local circumstances.[61] Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millett similarly characterise British commanders as overly slow to adapt to battlefield realities, pointing to what they view as marginal changes taking place in the desert prior to Montgomery taking command.[62]

[59]TNA WO 166/709, 1 Lon Div Ops Instr No: 4, 3 June 1940; WO 166/990 35 Infantry Brigade Ops Memoranda, 22 July.
[60]© *Historic England,* Image from 1933.
[61]Farrell, *Defence and Fall of Singapore*, p. 374
[62]Alan R. Millett & Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness: Volume 3 – The Second World War,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 124-125.

It appears that these arguments cannot be applied to the British Army in southeastern England. Building on experience in France, XII Corps developed a defensive doctrine that empowered junior leadership, encouraged aggression, and prepared troops for mounting an active, all-round defence in depth in order to delay and attrit a mobile, numerically superior opponent. It is worth noting that on the Eastern Front, German commanders only came to understand the effectiveness of strongpoints wedded to a mobile defence when frontline units began to improvise them out of necessity.[63] Thorne, on the other hand, both foresaw the necessity and developed a coherent, locally adapted doctrine to accommodate it.

In order to function under the test of combat, this doctrine would require trained soldiers and officers who could hold positions and conduct local counterattacks. Building on conclusions by David French, Forczyk maintains that the training of the British Army during this period was plagued by a lack of clear doctrine, a didactic approach to training, and inattention to combined arms warfare, which left British troops at a disadvantage compared to their German and Japanese counterparts.[64] As before, the available evidence paints a more complex picture. At the Ypres- Comines Canal, 5 Infantry Division was able to hold off an entire corps for two days before mounting two successful counter-attacks.[65] Whatever may be said of the wider conduct of the B.E.F., the tactical training that 5 Division had received was clearly adequate for the task it was asked to perform. The performance of British forces in Malaya, by contrast, was miserable. The key variable between the two was the different capabilities of officers as troop trainers.

In this area, the available records show that XII Corps was well served at senior levels. On 30 May, Liardet's 1 London Division HQ outlined basic training orders for all fighting and administrative units in the division.[66] Each unit was to carry out a practice of its allocated Home Defence role twice per week and keep a logbook of comments and necessary improvements. This regime was enforced by log-book inspections and practice attendance, both by brigade commanders and by Liardet himself. While basic, this system would have encouraged troops to become familiar with their local area, ensured that they understood what was being asked of them, and allowed commanders to spot deficiencies before they became an issue.

[63]Timothy A. Ray, *Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine On The Eastern Front in WWII,* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), p. 68-75.
[64]Forczyk, *We March Against England: Operation Sealion, 1940*, p. 223.
[65]More, *The Road To Dunkirk*, pp. 292-293.
[66]TNA WO 166/1040, Practice in Operational Role and degree of readiness required, 30th May 1940.

One weakness which threatened to undermine training programmes was the relative inexperience of the available junior leadership. Throughout 1939-1940, the British Army suffered from a shortage of commissioned officers, so much so that it briefly experimented with appointing warrant officers to platoon command. To make matters worse, the commissioning of new officers from experienced NCOs came at the expense of robbing established battalions of their best men, leaving an inadequate cadre of experienced NCOs.[67] In 198 Brigade, officer shortages were reportedly so bad that many companies had only a single subaltern.[68]

An example of the problems this caused can be found the War Diary of 7 Devonshires, a machinegun battalion, which undertook an exercise on 13 June.[69] Liaison between company commanders and their infantry officers was found to be so bad that one subaltern lost his entire platoon, while B Company was found to be sluggish. On the 4 July, an inspection of the positions of C Company at Newhaven discovered that alternative positions had not been dug, and no sentry had been mounted. D Company was likewise found not to have mounted sentries and was living in very poor conditions. By 23 August, the battalion second-in-command was holding a Court of Inquiry within C Company to investigate conditions there; 7 Devonshires clearly had some way to go before they could be considered a fully effective unit.

Other units suffered from similar difficulties. In May 5 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry complained of having been used as labourers during an exercise, while in June 50 Royal West Kents were left with just one hundred and twenty trained men after having to provide three hundred to help form new battalions.[70] The officers of 5 Battalion The Somerset Light Infantry noted that many pillboxes had not been properly camouflaged, with too much emphasis on paint and foliage and not enough on disguising them as agricultural buildings.[71]

There is, however, evidence that XII Corps' commanders were aware of the problem and took steps to remedy it. Throughout July and August, the brigades of 1 London Division sent contingents of officers and men to train on sniping, section leadership,

[67]David Williams, The Black Cats At War: The Story of the 56 (London) Division TA, 1939-1945, (London: Imperial War Museum, 1995), p. 2-3
[68]TNA WO 166/1051, 198 Infantry Brigade, Minutes of a Brigade Conference Held at Sarre, 3 July 1940.
[69]TNA WO 166/4201, War Diary of 7 Devonshire Regiment.
[70]TNA WO 166/4646, War Diary of 50 Holding Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment; TNA WO 166/4216, War Diary of 5 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
[71]TNA WO166/4656, 5 Somerset Light Infantry, Operation Instruction No. 21, 28 June 1940.

and attend tactical courses at a Divisional School set up at Canterbury.[72] The existence of a Divisional Battle School in 1 London Division in mid-1940 is highly significant, as it predates Timothy Harrison Place's assertion that these institutions were not formally established across the British Army until late 1941 and early 1942.[73] The presence of at least one demonstrates that the leadership of 1 London Division were acutely aware of the need to improve the quality of individual and small-unit training and leadership, and were active in trying to resolving the problem. It also speaks well of Liardet and his staff, particularly in light of Liardet's later success with the RAF Regiment.[74]

This attention to training was complemented at the brigade and battalion levels by a programme of unit exercises. From 2 May to 25 June, the three battalions of 2 London Brigade conducted eight battalion sized exercises between them, alongside each other and supporting units.[75] The lack of combined arms training has been a popular source of criticism of the British Army during the early years of the Second World War, but available evidence shows that XII Corps tried to remedy this. The London Scottish and London Rifle Brigade, for example, conducted a simulated counterattack on Hawkinge Airfield on 24 June, alongside 64 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.[76] Another example can be found in 2 London Brigade, which participated in a divisional exercise alongside 90 Field Regiment.[77]

45 Division's 136 Brigade conducted an exercise on 26 June involving the entire brigade, which hypothesised it facing landings from the sea and from the air by paratroopers.[78] From the start of July to August, the brigade held no less than eight exercises of varying types and scopes, some immediately following on from others.[79] In August alone 135 Brigade held four major exercises, two of them in conjunction with neighbouring brigades.[80]

One of the key challenges the British Army faced in Norway and France was Luftwaffe bombing and its psychological impact on unprepared troops. Here, again, Thorne and

[72]TNA WO 166/949, 35 Brigade War Diary, July and August.
[73]Tim Harrison Place, "Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War." *War in History* 7, no. 4 (2000): pp. 442–62.
[74]Oliver, *The RAF Regiment At War: 1942-1946*, pp. 137-139.
[75]TNA WO 166/1042, 168 Brigade War Diary, May to July 1940.
[76]Ibid.
[77]TNA WO 166/1040, 1 London Infantry Brigade Home Defence instructions No 49, 23rd July 1940.
[78]TNA WO 166/992, 136 Infantry Brigade War Diary, 26th of June 1940.
[79]TNA WO 166/992, 136 Infantry Brigade War Diary, July to August.
[80]TNA WO 166/990, 135 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August.

his commanders made efforts to reduce the suppressing effect of divebombing. On 22 July 135 Brigade undertook a scheme with the RAF by having three Fairey Battle squadrons of the RAF conduct dive-bombing attacks in front of selections of men from each battalion, perhaps taking inspiration from similar schemes in 1 London Brigade.[81] That this practice was widespread in the corps is shown by a similar scheme in 9 Surreys that took place on 1 August.[82]

Figure 4: Lorry Mounted Mark VII 4 Inch near Dungeness - 29 July 1940.[83]

Similar energy can be found in the artillery units, which were the key destructive arm at XII Corp's disposal. The XII Corps Artillery HQ training regime emphasised the importance of mobility, and set down instructions that each battery was to practice relocation and to think and train in terms of how to get to the fighting as quickly as possible.[84] No officer was considered efficient unless he was capable of doing everything that his men were expected to, while units were to maintain classes for NCOs and to be watchful for likely NCO and officer candidates among the ranks. The intent behind this training was to create gunners who were self-reliant and tough.

[81]TNA WO 166/990, 135 Infantry Brigade Ops Memoranda, 22 July; 1 London Infantry Brigade Home Defence instructions No 50, 27 July 1940.
[82]TNA WO 166/4263, 9 Battalion East Surrey Regiment, War Diary 1 August 1940.
[83] IWM Image H 2570.
[84]TNA WO 166/347, XII Corps Royal Artillery, Subject: Training, 18 July 1940.

Practice shoots were carried out throughout the summer of 1940 and with positive results; 142 Regiment Royal Artillery for example carried out multiple practice shoots, and 69 Regiment Royal Artillery adapted to its assigned role of sinking invasion barges by training its crews to fire on floating targets towed by tugs.[85]

Even in units that were never originally intended for combat service, efforts were made to ensure that basic combat skills were present. No. 4 Docks Group, a Royal Engineers unit made up of stevedores, was one of the main formations available to the garrison at Shorncliffe. From May until at least July, cadres were taught tactical movement, musketry, field training, anti-gas precautions, and bayonet fighting, and under the instruction of a combat-decorated officer.[86] The use of the term 'cadre' implies that these groups were in turn expected to help train their comrades, building on the basic training that the men would have received upon joining up. While they could never be considered an offensive unit, the stevedores of No. 4 Docks Group were hardly helpless.

The primary issue with archival sources is that they do not allow us to understand what this training actually looked like for those taking part, and how realistic a preparation for combat it actually was. The British Army's early-war training regime has been characterised as having lacked realism and rigour, while being excessively focused on outmoded tactics. Timothy Harrison-Place in particular emphasised how the lack of qualified umpires negatively impacted the lessons that training could provide, and on how the value of exercises was undermined by the reluctance of troops to understand rules.[87] With all of that said, the available evidence does suggest that real progress was made.

Building on Fennell's work on developing a reliable means of measuring morale, the best indicator of commitment in XII Corps and available in the archives are the records of the Court Martial Charge Books; they contain individual cases from XII Corps' area, and the hospital admissions rate per thousand men in 1940 drawn from the chapter of the Medical History of the Second World War that dealt with troops stationed in the United Kingdom. It is acknowledged that this is an imperfect measure, as a division in training on home soil is not the same as a division in combat overseas. Charge books contain only what was alleged, while the hospital admission rates for 1940 cover the entire year, not just the period of the invasion crisis. Nevertheless, it is still possible to draw some conclusions from the available data.

[85]TNA WO 166/539, 45 Division Royal Artillery War Diary, 3 June.
[86]TNA WO 166/3463, No. 4 Works Group War Diary, May and June.
[87]Timothy Harrison-Place, *Military Training in The British Army 1940-1944,* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.19-22.

As has been addressed elsewhere in this article, leadership was vital to effective training. Here, the charge books suggest that there were isolated cases of officers who were patently unfit. In 45 Division, a major from 69 AT Regiment Royal Artillery was charged with public drunkenness and scandalous conduct after causing a disturbance in a hotel. In the same division, a captain was charged with dishonouring cheques and posing as a baronet.[88] What effect this had on the troops under their command can only be guessed at, but it is unlikely to have been positive. These two incidents, however, are outweighed by evidence that leadership in XII Corps was of a good standard. David Williams, a former officer in 1 London Division, described Liardet as an extremely popular officer who was appreciated by all ranks both for his efforts on the formation's behalf, and for the solidarity they felt with him as a fellow Territorial.[89] Thorne, likewise, was remembered by Sir David Fraser as a personable and adept communicator who could speak to the young without patronisation or simplification.[90] Hospital admission rates for troops stationed in the United Kingdom, another key measure of morale, were at their lowest during 1940, and increased only from 1942 onwards. The admission rate for mental illness in 1940 for example was 3.59 per 1,000 men, whilst in 1945 it was 8.05.[91] Skin disease rates in 1940 were 7.78, while in 1945 they were at 14.16. Even accounting for various factors which might have influenced this imbalance, such as the later intake of lower quality recruits and the accumulated stress of wartime, this suggests that the standard of physical and mental health in the British Army during this period was generally high.

When combined with the relatively low rates of disciplinary breaches – just thirteen cases in the charge books during the summer months – a picture emerges of an army that was well disciplined, fit enough to train, and actively engaged in doing so.

Evidence of this is extant in multiple sources. All four battalion commanders of 198 Brigade were satisfied with their battalions' readiness by 3 July.[92] Sir Oliver Leese's training regime for 29 Brigade, also produced immediate results; while two of the brigade's four battalions were found to be in bad shape on 1 August, an exercise alongside Brocforce from the 11th to the 17th of the same month was judged satisfactory.[93] General Brooke, visiting on 20 September, judged the unit to be in good

[88]Ibid, pp. 506 & 573
[89]David Williams, *The Black Cats At War: The Story of the 56th (London) Division TA, 1939-1945,* (London: Imperial War Museum, 1995), p. 14.
[90]David Fraser, *Wars and Shadows: Memoirs of General Sir David Fraser,* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 70-71.
[91]TNA WO 222/2151 Medical History of the Second World War; Army Medical Services, p. 17.
[92]TNA WO 166/1051, Minutes of a Brigade Conference Held at Sarre, 3 July 1940.
[93]TNA WO 166/934, 29 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1940.

form.[94] The War Diary of 142 Regiment Royal Artillery noted during an exercise that the gunners had shown a high degree of initiative and ability in selecting their positions, and subsequent practice shoots were judged successful.[95]

One key aspect of Thorne's training programme was preparing troops for the psychological impact of air attack, which remained a constant threat. Here, again, there is plentiful evidence that troops took this training to heart. 198 Brigade lost four men killed and two wounded in August alone during exercises.[96] Despite this, the Brigade continued with its training programme, and the War Diary mentions that troops returned fire against German aircraft attacking Ramsgate on 16 September. Throughout the summer and into the autumn, 1 London Irish Rifles recorded multiple instances of defensive positions returning fire at German aircraft.[97] 67 AT Regiment, having lost 4 gunners killed on 13 August, engaged enemy bombers with machine gun fire on 2 September.[98]

A further example of the impact that anti-invasion training had can be seen in 45 Division's performance during Exercise Bulldog which was held in June 1941, the following year. While it took place nearly a year later, the division was still under the same commanders it had in 1940. In offensive operations, the division was judged to have performed fairly; march discipline was good, but radio silence was overly strict; and there was disagreement between battalion and brigade commanders, perhaps reflecting the division's 1940 emphasis against relying on a functioning communication system, and the emphasis on the need for command autonomy.[99] Its defensive operations however were judged to be extremely effective.

While it is impossible to say how a German ground campaign would have played out, it is clear from the available material that the British Army in south-east England understood the nature of the challenge and had adopted practical measures to meet it. British forces in the threatened area were led by energetic, innovative officers who developed a modern defensive doctrine that aimed to minimise the effectiveness of German manoeuvre warfare by taking maximum advantage of available terrain, employing some measure of defence in depth at choke points, and the use of existing although often obsolete artillery. Doctrine was married to a progressive, and occasionally radical, training scheme that sought to prepare soldiers for the specific

[94]Danchev & Todman, *Field Marshal Alanbrooke: War Diaries 1939-1945* p. 109.
[95]TNA WO 166/539, 142 Regiment War Diary, 17 June 1940.
[96]TNA WO 166/1051, 198 Brigade War Diary, August 18 & 24.
[97]TNA WO 166/4435, 1 Battalion London Irish Rifles War Diary, July, August & September.
[98]TNA WO 166 /1639, 67 AT Regiment War Diary, August 13 & September 2.
[99]TNA WO 199/2461, Moves of Formations Taking Part in Exercise Bulldog.

task of anti-invasion defence. The ability of commanders to maximise their defensive advantage was limited by available equipment, but commanders met this challenge by adopting a dispersed, forward deployment of artillery assets to maximise the support being given to troops fighting in the immediate landing zones. While this study has been limited to the activities of XII Corps, the evidence uncovered suggests that a wider reassessment of the British Army's activities during this period is overdue.

Cawthorn, Auchinleck and British Counter-measures against the Indian National Army

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ABSTRACT
This article challenges the depiction of the Indian National Army (INA) as either having played a direct and central military role in India's independence struggle, or as an irrelevance in the fighting in Asia after 1942. It argues that British fears about the INA's psychological threat to the Indian Army's loyalty persuaded the Commander in Chief India (C-in-CI), General Claude Auchinleck, to sponsor a series of countermeasures named JOSH (pronounced JOASH), and the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major General W. J. Cawthorn, to champion a policy that would have profound implications in 1945 and arguably accelerated the end of British Rule in India, the Raj.

Following Britain's defeats in Asia in1942, the INA was raised from Indian Prisoners of War (PoWs) to fight alongside Japan with the aim of expelling the British from India. It was the Indian Army's largest mutiny since 1857.[1] Despite the INA's negligible tangible success during the war, in late 1945 the decision to prosecute three INA officers, a Hindu, Sikh and a Muslim, and in public at the Red Fort in Delhi, a resonant symbol of the 1857 uprising, provoked public and political outrage that seemingly took the British by surprise and arguably hastened the end of the Raj.[2]

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[1]Chandar S. Sundaram, 'The Indian National Army: Towards a Balanced and Critical Appraisal', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 1, 30, (July 2015), pp. 21-24.

[2]Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, *Forgotten Armies,* (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 402; Daniel Marston, *The Indian Army and the End of the Raj,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 117-118; John Connell, *A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,* (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 797–819; Nirad C. Chaudhuri, 'Subhas Chandra Bose: His Legacy and Legend', *Pacific Affairs*, 4/26 (1953), pp. 349-357; Sundaram, 'Appraisal', p. 23; Hugh Toye, *Subhas Chandra Bose: The Springing Tiger,*

The historiography of these events can be loosely divided into three camps. Earlier works describing the INA's heroic contribution to independence are dominated by the role of Subhas Chandra Bose, one of India's leading nationalists.[3] Facing prosecution for promoting the overthrow of the Raj, Bose fled to Germany in 1941 to enlist Axis support for India's independence.[4] He returned to Asia in mid-1943 to lead the INA before dying in an airplane crash in August 1945. The uproar at the trials is seen as vindication of his and the INA's efforts which had been thwarted by Japanese duplicity during the war. The INA's effectiveness has since been challenged, with some volunteers depicted as being motivated less by nationalism or admiration for Bose as by the shock of defeat, lack of trust in British officers, grievances over service conditions, fear of their captors, and the slow pace of the Indianisation which was believed to reflect British racism and insincerity.[5] More recent works, focussing on the Indian Army's revival in Asia after 1943, consequently make little reference to the INA.[6] The British authorities, the Indian Army's leadership and the Government of India (GoI), appear dismissive of the INA, an impression vividly reinforced by Field Marshal Sir William Slim's description of an INA surrender in early 1945 as its single

(Bombay: Jaico, 1959), pp. 249-256; Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker, *While Memory Serves,* (London: Cassell, 1950), pp. 60-72.

[3]S. A. Ayer, *Unto Him A Witness,* (Bombay: Thicker, 1951), pp. ix–x, pp. 1-4 & pp. 295-297; Major-General Mohammad Zaman Kiani, *India's Freedom Struggle and The Great INA,* (New Delhi: Reliance, 1994), pp. xv-xvi, pp.xx; Chaudhuri, 'Bose', pp. 349-357; Toye, *Tiger,* pp. 256-257; Leonard Gordon, *Brothers Against the Raj,* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2012), pp. 613-618; K.K. Ghosh, *The Indian National Army,* (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), pp. v-vi, pp. 258-267; Peter Ward Fay, *The Forgotten Army* (New Delhi: RUPA, 1997), pp. 8-10.

[4]Toye, *Bose*, pp. 83–86; Gordon, *Brothers*, pp. 412, pp. 417–21.

[5]Tarak Barkawi, 'Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 41/12, (2006), pp. 325-355; Joyce Chapman Lebra, *The Indian National Army and Japan*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 20, p. 217; Tan Kia Lih, 'The Indian National Army: A Force for Nationalism?' (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, National University of Singapore, 2011), pp. 3-4, pp. 40-82; Chandar S. Sundaram, 'A Paper Tiger: The Indian National Army In Battle, 1944-5', *War & Society,* 13/1, (1995), pp. 35-59; Note: Indian officers trained at Sandhurst received King's Commissions before the Indian Military Academy opened in 1932 for Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs). Indianisation here means the process for increasing the number of ICOs.

[6]T. R. Moreman, *The Jungle, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-45,* (Oxford: Frank Cass, 2005); Daniel P. Marston, *Phoenix from the Ashes* (Westport: Praeger, 2003); Raymond Callahan, *Burma 1942-1945,* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1978); Alan Jeffreys and Patrick Rose (eds), *The Indian Army 1939-47: Experience and Development*, (London: Ashgate, 2012).

biggest contribution to either side during the war.[7] A common theme of all three camps is that the British were taken completely unawares by the uproar surrounding the Red Fort trials.

It is indisputable that the INA's direct military or espionage impact was negligible. However, this article will show that by 1942 the British were acutely concerned about any perceived threat to the Indian Army's loyalty and consequently felt compelled to implement numerous countermeasures against the INA's threat between 1942-1945. It will be demonstrated that the British authorities had actively considered how maintaining one of these countermeasures in 1945, a news blackout, would impact post-war India and, by dismissing concerns about its possible consequences they directly contributed to public anger in 1945.

British concern in part reflected a growing appreciation of India's importance to the war effort for manpower, supplies, geographic proximity to the battle zones and India's apparent security from attack.[8] Britain's reliance on India is typically characterised in terms of India's undoubtedly huge manpower contribution, with the often quoted statistic that the Indian Army was the largest volunteer force in the world by 1945.[9] In 1939 the Indian Army was larger than the combined forces of the four dominions and by mid-1940 the Chiefs of Staff concluded they required 'all the troops which India can provide'.[10] The army's rapid expansion from 1941 created problems, including a shortage of ICOs, inadequate training, poor equipment and grievances concerning ICOs' powers of punishment of white troops, promotion, pay, rations and family

[7]Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Pan, 2009), p. 492.
[8]The National Archives (hereinafter TNA) AVIA 22/3271, *Expansion of Munitions Production in India,* Meeting at India Office 25 June 1940, Amery Letter 19 June 1940 & Viceroy's Telegram 7 June 1940; British Library, London (hereinafter BL) IOR/L/MIL/17/5/4261, *India's Part in the War*, pp. 10-12; BL IOR/L/E/8/3477, *War Trade Supply: Eastern Group Conference Recommendations Leading to the Establishment of a Supply Council, Central and Local Provision Officers*, Memorandum on the organisation of Provision Production and Distribution of Supply within the Eastern Group.
[9]Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour,* (New York: Nolt, Rinehart and Winston, 1994), pp. 13; Yasmin Khan, *The Raj at War* (London: Vintage, 2015), p. xii; Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation,* (California: University of California Press, 1971), p 143; Ashley Jackson, 'The Evolution and Use of British Imperial Military Formations', in Jeffreys and Rose (eds) *Indian Army,* pp. 24–25.
[10]TNA CAB 66/10/22, *Preparation of More Troops in India for Service Overseas*; BL IOR/L/MIL/17/5/4262, *India's War Effort*, p. 2; Elizabeth Mariko Leake, 'British India British India versus the British Empire: The Indian Army and an impasse in Imperial Defence, circa 1919-39', *Modern Asian Studies,* 48/1, (2013), pp. pp. 301-329).

support, that encouraged some Indian PoWs to join the INA.[11] In fact British concern about the reliability of Indian troops pre-dated the defeats in Asia in 1942, as shown by the response to four mutinies involving the Indian Army in Egypt, Malaya, Bombay and Hong Kong between 1939-41. The limited historiography concerning these mutinies examines them purely in the context of why PoWs joined the INA.[12] While the mutinies cannot be covered here, the official investigations appeared to reveal links between the mutinies and a wider plot to suborn the Indian Army by Sikh revolutionaries, stoking British concerns about the Indian Army's reliability.[13] The resonance of these events on the British authorities should not be underestimated, especially given Cawthorn, India's future DMI, was involved in the investigations and later played a central role in shaping the Raj's response to the INA. While recognising the importance of addressing the grievances previously mentioned when considering the army's revival from 1942, it is also necessary to recognise that those steps were taken alongside, not instead of, measures deemed necessary to tackle what was perceived at that time to be a credible threat of subversion.[14]

It is also important to emphasise that Britain's reliance on India was not restricted to manpower.[15] From 1941 India was the base for, and fulfilled over half the requirement

[11]BL IOR/L/MIL/17/5/4262, *War Effort*, p. 5; F.W. Perry, *The Commonwealth Armies,* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. pp. 103-107, pp. 114-117; Major-General J.G. Elliott, *A Roll of Honour*, (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 132; Mason, *A Matter of Honour*, p. 465; Kaushik Roy, 'Expansion and Deployment of the Indian Army During World War II: 1939-45', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 88/355, (2010), pp. 248–268); Lih, 'Indian National Army', pp. 53-54; Kaushik Roy, *Sepoys against the Rising Sun,* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p.8.

[12]Chandar S. Sundaram, 'Seditious Letters and Steel Helmets', in Kaushik Roy (ed.), *War and Society in Colonial India, 1807-1945,* (New Delhi: OUP, 2010), pp. 126–60; Mason, *Matter of Honour*, pp. 513-514.

[13]BL IOR/L/WS/1/303, *War Staff `WS' Series Files: File WS 3306*, Disaffection of Sikh Troops; Indian National Archive, Abhilekh Patal, New Delhi (hereinafter AP), Identifier PR_000003010554, *Indiscipline among RIASC Personnel in Egypt, 1940*, p. 71; AP PR_000003010730, *Interrogation of Sadhu Singh of the RIASC and Bharat Singh alias Sultan Singh with a view to determining the part played by the Group of Communists who controlled the publication of the 'Kirti Lehr' in subverting the army, 1940*, p. 3; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/641, *Unrest among Sikhs in Hong Kong, October 1940-October 1941*.

[14]Roy, *Sepoys*, p.8.

[15]Kaushik Roy, *India and World War II - War, Armed Forces and Society, 1939-45,* (New Delhi: OUP, 2016), pp. 66–75; Srinath Raghavan, *India's War: The Making of Modern South Asia, 1939-194,5* (London: Allen Lane, 2016), pp. 214, pp. 320--326.

for troops east of Suez, a quarter of the entire imperial strength.[16] The War Cabinet was informed that India was unique in its ability to bring both 'man-power and material to bear upon the war effort'.[17] Humiliating defeats in Asia led to fears that an invasion would disrupt India's industrial heartland and hamper the wider war effort, a concern aggravated by growing defeatism amongst India's population.[18] Recognising Britain's growing reliance on India by 1942 sheds light on why the perceived threat of the INA would be taken so seriously.

The British sense of vulnerability in Asia was also driven by concerns about Japanese espionage. Aldrich's challenge to the view that Japanese espionage at this time was ineffective is borne out by intelligence reports describing extensive Japanese espionage in India as war approached.[19] In 1938, these reports identified Japanese links with Indian nationalists, and the threat was taken increasingly seriously as India's role in the war expanded such that, by 1941, every Japanese was assumed to be 'a potential spy'.[20] Harrowing stories from Indian refugees fleeing Burma then aroused nationalist fury, causing anxiety that India's population would not resist an invasion.[21] The GoI described the Quit India violence in August 1942 as the most serious challenge since 1857 and, importantly, as 'a mine laid directly under enemy influence', although no

[16]TNA AVIA 22/3271, *Expansion*, Memo on ToR Rogers Mission; TNA WP (42) 54, *India's War Effort*, p. 4.
[17]TNA WP (42) 54, *India's War Effort*, p. 6.
[18]BL IOR/L/PO/10/17, *Private telegrams between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy*, 19 February, 16 March 1942; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/509, *DIB Reports on activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India 1941-42*, Surveys 47, 48 & 49; BL IOR/L/WS/1/1433, *`WS' Series Files, File 6637*, Current Feeling in India 13 & 27 March 1942; BL IOR, L/WS/1/317, *War Staff "WS" Series Files: WS 3475: 1940-43*, General and Air Headquarters India No. 619/DMI 8 February 1942; Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies,* pp. 123, pp. 193-197.
[19]Richard J. Aldrich, *Intelligence and the War against Japan,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 41-43; Douglas Ford, *Britain's Secret War Against Japan, 1937-45,* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 176; Douglas Ford, 'Strategic Culture, Intelligence Assessment and the Conduct of the Pacific War', *War in History*, 14/1, (2007), pp. 63-96; Duff Hart-Davis, *Peter Fleming* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 283.
[20]TNA KV/3/251, *Japanese Espionage in the East Indian Archipelago and Straits Settlement and India, 1934-1938*; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/507, F*ile 1080/A/36 - DIB Reports on activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India 1940*, Surveys 1, 2, 4 & 5; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/508, *File 1080/A/36 - DIB Reports on activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India November 1940-November 1941*, Surveys 1, 2, 4 & 18.
[21]Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies*, pp. 181-190.

evidence was ever unearthed of Axis complicity.[22] The conclusion was that that 'for the duration of the war…. India must be considered as an occupied and hostile country'.[23] Indeed, even before learning of the INA's existence, the British instituted a news blackout of reports of the German sponsored Indian Legion in Europe, a small force formed by Bose from Indian PoWs captured in North Africa.[24] This desire to prevent the Indian Army and India's population from learning that Indian troops had joined the Axis powers provided a template for events in Asia.

It was against this backdrop of the growing appreciation of India's importance to the war effort, concerns about the loyalty of segments of the Indian army and population and Japan's espionage threat that the INA was formed in Malaya in late 1941 following the capture of Captain Mohan Singh of the 1/14 Punjab Regiment.[25] Sponsored by Major Iwaichi Fujiwara, a Japanese army intelligence officer, Mohan Singh announced his intention to create an army from Indian PoWs. The historiography of the INA at this stage focusses on its integration with expatriate Indian nationalists and a subsequent rupture with the Japanese that led to Mohan Singh's imprisonment in December 1942.[26] The British were largely unaware of these events. Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Mains, who worked in Military Intelligence in India at the time, wrote that knowledge from Japanese-held territories in mid-1942 was negligible.[27] Intelligence reports in early 1943 stated that detailed information about the INA was 'still on the meagre side', challenging Fujiwara's assertion that British intelligence was very concerned about his activities.[28] Given Japan's startling military successes in early

[22]BL IOR/L/P&J/8/628, *Coll 117/C27/Q Pt 2; Gandhi, 'Quit India' Movement and Disturbances, Calendars of Events, Narratives, Reports and Other Information Compiled in India to Assist Secretary of State in Replying to Parliamentary Questions,* Home Department History of the Congress Rebellion p. 1, p. 72.

[23]Milan Hauner, *India in Axis Strateg,y* (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1981), p. 542.

[24]Hauner, *Strategy,* pp. 583-592; Aldrich, *Intelligence*, pp. 150-151; Rudolf Hartog, *The Sign of the Tiger,* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2001).

[25]TNA WO 208/833, *Captain Mohan Singh Indian National Army Report, 'S' Section CSDIC Report 15 November 1945*, pp. 1-14; Iwaichi Fujiwara, *F. Kikan: Japanese Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia during World War II,* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1983); Fay, *Forgotten Army*, pp. 74-75; Hugh Toye, 'The First Indian National Army, 1941–42', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15/2, (1984), pp. 365–381.

[26]Toye, *Tiger*, pp. 10–20; Gordon, *Brothers*, pp. 467-472; Bayly and Harper, *Forgotten Armies,* pp. 255-258; Lebra, *Japan,* pp. 75-101.

[27]Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Mains, 'Indian Intelligence, 1930-1947', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research,* 79/317, (2001), pp. 63-82.

[28]BL IORL/P&J/12/511, *File 1080/A/36 – DIB Reports on Activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India, January–July 1943*, Survey 4; Fujiwara, *Kikan*, p. 138.

1942, however, the British feared that fifth columnists were operating with 'enormous efficiency, scope and danger', while security against such activity was deemed ineffective.[29] This fifth columnist threat was gradually linked to concerns that the Japanese had created an underground force in India similar to the Burma Freedom Army which they had sponsored to help the invasion of Burma.[30]

Escaped soldiers and Axis radio broadcasts provided patchy information about 'traitor troops' supporting the Japanese and, by July 1942. it was concluded that Japan was 'fostering a movement of dangerous potentialities among Indians in the Far East'.[31] Not until mid-August did the INA merit its own section in the weekly intelligence reports which revealed that apparently significant numbers of enemy agents had successfully entered India in an escalating espionage campaign.[32] These assessments compelled the Indian Army to begin addressing some of the previously mentioned grievances and to acknowledge that the majority of new ICOs were likely to be nationalists.[33] Late September brought reports of INA agents landing by submarine near Madras and on India's west coast.[34] These landings had a powerful impact on the British authorities, yet they are either ignored by historians or depicted as unimportant given the focus on the INA's espionage activities.[35] In fact initially believing that many of these agents had evaded capture, the British rapidly implemented measures to improve coastal

[29]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/509, *1941-42*, Survey 6; BL IOR/L/WS/1/1433. *File 6637*, Summary No. 19, 13 March 1942.
[30]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/510, *File 1080/A/36 - DIB Reports on Activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India, May-December 1942*, Survey 19; Andrew Selth, 'Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945', *Modern Asian Studies,* 20/3, (1986), pp. 483-507. Note: This refers to the Burma Independence Army, later re-named the Burma National Army.
[31]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/510, *1942*, Surveys 23, 28 & 29; AP Identifier PR_000003013856, *Interrogation of Mohan Chand Thakuria suspected of being an enemy agent and possessing technical knowledge of enemy espionage methods, 1945*, pp. 64-70;
[32]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/510, *1942*, Surveys 30, 35.
[33]BL IOR/L/MIL/7/19158, *Collection 430/118 Powers of Command of Indian Officers Holding the New Form of Commission; Grant to Indian Officers of Powers of Punishment over British Personnel, 1942-1948*, War Cabinet Conclusions 31 August 1942; BL IOR/L/WS/1/1433, *File 6637*, Summary No. 27 8 May 1942.
[34]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/510, *1942*, Summary 35.
[35]Azharudin Mohamed Dali, 'The Fifth Column in British India: Japan and the INA's Secret War, 1941-45' (Unpublished PH.D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2007), pp, 213-215; Hauner, *Strategy*, p. 594; Michael Howard, *British Intelligence in the 2nd World War*, (London: HMSO, 1990), Vol. 5, pp. 206–207; Toye, 'Indian National Army', p. 376.

defences and publicise rewards for the apprehension of enemy agents.[36] Cawthorn, by now DMI, led the debate about the fate of captured agents, the need to prevent sensitive information leaking during trials and how to avoid any public backlash against death sentences.[37] The result was The Enemy Agents Ordinance (No 1, 1943) permitting trials *in camera*. This facilitated the turning of agents to go back and gather intelligence, which was regarded as essential since, as Cawthorn wrote, 'we do NOT at present know the full Japanese plan for the use of these agents'.[38] This early evidence of security concerns and rapidly implemented countermeasures highlights the importance of expanding any assessment of the INA beyond its direct military or espionage effectiveness to its impact on the British authorities actions. This becomes ever clearer with the reaction of those authorities following the capture and interrogation of Major M. S. Dhillon.

Dhillon, a senior member of the INA's espionage wing, defected in October 1942 when leading an espionage group into India. The INA's then Chief of Staff wrote that Dhillon had taken with him 'a complete set of INA establishments, to be made a present to the British'.[39] Historians have focussed on how Dhillon's defection led to a rupture in INA-Japanese relations and a hiatus in INA activity before Bose's arrival in mid-1943.[40]it is illuminating to demonstrate how his disclosures influenced British policy for the rest of the war . For the first time, the British understood the INA's scope, its senior personnel, details of its strategy and how Quit India had stimulated INA recruitment. The INA was now understood to represent a 'lurking danger…. [for which] a little real or imaginary grouse, a little subversive propaganda, and a reverse to the allies have their possibilities', prompting immediate countermeasures focussed

[36]AP Identifier PR_000003015754, *Steps against the Infiltration of Enemy Agents from the Coast – Question of Paying Rewards to the Local Inhabitants of the Seaboard for the Reporting the Presence of Enemy agents, 1943,* pp. 6-16; AP Identifier PR_000003014063, *Announcement of Rewards for Apprehension of Enemy Agents, 1942,* pp. 7-10.
[37]AP Identifier PR_000003014009, *The Enemy Agents ordinance (No 1 of 1943) and the Enemy Agent (Amendment) ordinances (No XV of 1943 and No XI of 1944), 1944*, pp. 5-11; BL IOR/L/P&J/7/5689, *The Enemy Agents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944,* Memo to Chief Secretaries of the Provinces 2 February 1943.
[38]AP Identifier PR_000003014009, *Enemy Agents*, pp. 6, 16
[39]Kiani, *INA*, p. 67.
[40]Toye, 'Indian National Army', pp. 378-379; Dali, 'Fifth Column', pp. 255-259; Gajendra Singh, 'Between Self & Soldier - Indian Sepoys and Their Testimony During The Two World Wars', (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009), pp. 130–32.

on the Eastern Army that was then planning the first offensive campaign since the Burma retreat in the Arakan.[41]

Early the following month, on 4 November, GHQ India (GHQI) circulated the memo 'Indian National Army – Counter Measures' to alert the army commands of the INA.[42] This revealed the formation of a new combined police and security section to develop, recommend and execute policies against the INA. Comprehensive countermeasures were being formulated. In the interim front line troops were to be instructed to guard against Japanese Fifth Columnist tactics, without mentioning the INA itself, to use passwords at night and in the jungle, to wear recognition devices and to treat anyone on the front line with suspicion. This was followed, on 6 November, by a memo examining the reliability of Sikh troops given Sikh dominance in the INA's leadership and fears of Japan exploiting Sikh concerns about the possible creation of a post Indian independence Pakistan.[43] That same day the Weekly Intelligence Summary provided a comprehensive overview of the INA's apparent links with Indian nationalists and its goal of expelling Britain from India through a combination of military force, subversion of Indian troops, and the activity of fifth columnists already in India and preparing for a Japanese invasion.[44] To prevent INA agents infiltrating the army disguised as genuine PoW escapers, Forward Interrogation Centres were established on the border to screen returnees. On 12 November, responding to the Eastern Army's request for urgent countermeasures against the risks of sepoys encountering the INA on the front line, Cawthorn circulated further countermeasures given the 'grave potentialities as regards the loyalty and fighting efficiency of the Indian Army'.[45] Cawthorn outlined a serious psychological threat to the army, compounded by ineffective British counter-propaganda, with agents posing as escaped PoWs successfully returning to their units and forming subversive cells. Enemy agents were believed to be entering India disguised as refugees while segments of India's population were assessed as being profoundly anti-British. Cawthorn described how the INA provided Japan with both a political screen, garnering nationalist support, and a tactical screen by suborning Indian PoWs and troops. He questioned whether the 'new type' of ICO, recruited during

[41]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *`WS' Series Files, File 13104*, Appendix 'B' to CSDIC (I) No. 2 Section Report No. 19 Dated 6-11-42.
[42]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1433, *File 6637,* Indian National Army - Counter Measures 4 November 1942.
[43]BL IOR/L/WS/2/44, *Other War Staff Files, Notes on Sikhs dated* 6 November 1942; AP Identifier PR_000003013919, *Report on the Situation in Akyab and other Places in Burma, Deputation of Mr Shah, ICS, For Purposes of organising Resistance to Japanese in Arakan, 1942*, p. 53-56.
[44]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1433, *File 6637*, Summary No. 53.
[45]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, General Staff Branch (M.I. Directorate The Problem of the Indian National Army.

the Indian Army's rapid expansion, would fight against INA forces which contained family, friends or former comrades. Mohan Singh's brother-in-law served in the Indian Army at this time, while the brother of Major K. S. Thimayya, the first Indian officer to lead an Indian Infantry Brigade in battle, had joined the INA.[46]

Cawthorn recommended maintaining rewards for escapers but limiting any publicity to facilitate ongoing surveillance of returning agents and maximise the chances of turning those agents, a strategy that only became effective from late 1944.[47] He also wanted to prevent questions concerning the loyalty of the wider Indian Army, a recurring concern. Recognising that manpower needs made the rapid redeployment of returnees inevitable, despite the risk they might include INA agents, Cawthorn proposed increased surveillance of all returnees, especially ICOs. Payments to known INA members should cease, although allotments for dependents in India should continue to avoid domestic unrest. For the same reason, he opposed the death penalty for captured agents. Addressing counter-propaganda, the 'essential corollary' to the defensive measures already proposed, Cawthorn excoriated the failure to counter Japanese propaganda which was demoralising Indian soldiers and civilians. He recommended that the General Staff take over this responsibility, establish a broadcasting station focused on the INA and systematise leaflet dropping in Burma. Cawthorn also outlined the imminent deployment of units on the border equipped with loudspeakers able to broadcast propaganda over a range of 600 yards. Notably, he also advocated seeking, and acting on, the advice of Indian officers like Dhillon. Failure to do so, Cawthorn wrote, risked prolonging India's suffering 'long after the war is ended'. As will be seen, he signally failed to heed his own advice. By 6 December the C-in-CI had approved Cawthorn's proposals and promoted him from Brigadier to Major General, reflecting the increasing importance of his role.[48] The GoI had similar concerns and took parallel steps to reinforce domestic security and ensure the loyalty of police and railway workers.[49] The rapid adoption of these countermeasures demonstrates the acute British concern at Dhillon's disclosures, a concern that endured and led to further countermeasures in 1943 and beyond. This challenges the characterisation of the INA's threat as diminishing by late 1942 given that it had

[46]Humphrey Evans, *Thimayya of India* (New York: Harcourt, Bruce, 1960), p. 226; BL IOR/L/WS/2/44, *War Staff Files*, Appendix A.
[47]Howard, *British Intelligence*, p. 207.
[48]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, The Indian National Army Problem Memo dated 6 December 1942.
[49]AP Identifier PR_000003014195, *The Hon'Ble Home Members Statement on the Internal Situation at the Meeting of the National Defence Council Held In Nov 1942*, pp. 12-16; AP Identifier PR_000003015819, *Statement on Congress and the Internal Situation made by the Hon'ble Member in the April 1943 Session of the National Defence Council*, p. 3.

seemingly missed the opportunity to take advantage when the British in India were most vulnerable.[50]

Throughout 1943 intelligence reports warned of INA efforts to subvert the Indian Army and foment civil unrest.[51] Fears about collapsing army morale following 'perhaps the worst managed British military effort of the war', the first Arakan campaign, led to questions about how to protect. the sepoys' fighting spirit given that 'patriotism is clearly a less vital source of [their] offensive spirit than it is with the average Britisher' and to the General Staff making 'urgent representations for special measures to deal with the potential menace'.[52] However, the INA's historiography for 1943 is dominated by its internal difficulties, Bose's arrival in Asia and his efforts to position the INA as an ally, rather than a supplicant of Japan.[53] Yet the British were, in fact, deeply concerned about a Japanese Intelligence or 'I' Offensive gathering strategic intelligence and undermining the morale of the Indian Army and population. While Howard is correct that the INA was closely watched from 1943, his assertion that it was heavily infiltrated is questionable given the enduring debate about the scale of the INA threat between 1943-45.[54] British intelligence concerning the INA remained heavily dependent on captured agents and Axis radio broadcasts.[55] Between May and September 1943 intelligence reports spoke of 'justifiable grounds for anxiety' given the difficulty of finding information about Indians being trained by the Japanese as spies, while referring also to Mohan Singh's 'alleged' arrest the previous December, and revealing that it remained impossible to confirm rumours of trouble between the INA

[50]Aldrich, *Intelligence*, p. 151; Hauner, *Strategy*, pp. 543–549, pp. 595-596.

[51] BL IOR/L/P&J/12/511, *1943*, Survey Nos 1, 4, 7 & 15; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/512, *File 1080/A/36 - DIB Reports on Activities of Germans, Italians and Japanese in India, July-December 1943*, Survey Nos. 26, 39, 41, 45 & 49.

[52]Callahan, *Burma*, p. 59; TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Indian Traitors,* Memorandum on the work done by the P.R. Central Group and its future; BL IOR/L/MIL/17/5/4271, *Other War Staff Files, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia 1943-46, Rear Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten of Burma Vol 2*, p. 24; BL IOR/L/WS/1/317, *WS 3475*, General and Air Headquarters India 5 January 1943.

[53]Cohen, *Indian Army*, pp. 148-152; Fay, *Forgotten Army*, pp, 201-215; Lebra, *Japan*, pp. 97-101, pp. 114-136; Hauner, *Strategy*, pp. 599-607; Toye, *Tiger*, pp. 130-149; Ghosh, *Second Front*, pp. 122-197.

[54]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, File 13104, Memo to All Commanding Officers of Indian Army Units, May 1944; TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors,* WIS Summary No. 153 6 October 1944; Howard, *British Intelligence*, p. 207.

[55]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/511, 1943, Surveys 9, 11-13, 17, 20 & 22; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/512, File 1080/A/36, Surveys 26-28, 31-33 & 36.

and Japan.[56] This enduring concern prompted further countermeasures, and, importantly, began a debate that had profound implications in 1945 regarding a news blackout of the INA for both the Indian public and military. Cawthorn was central to this debate.

In early March 1943, Cawthorn received a proposal to replace an existing news blackout for the wider army and public with a publicity campaign to discredit Japan and the INA given that failing to warn Indian troops about the INA would create huge risks if they met in battle.[57]. A publicity campaign would stop dangerous rumours, hamper INA recruitment and sow doubts in INA ranks by stressing that those aligning with Japan faced disgrace. Loyal soldiers needed to be convinced that those joining the INA had done so from expediency, not patriotism, and that its leadership faced extreme penalties when caught. While Cawthorn considered the proposal, GHQI issued the memo 'Subversive Activities Directed Against the Indian Army' on 18 March which outlined further countermeasures against INA agents.[58] This described threats to the morale and loyalty of Indian troops from both the INA and Congress, although links between the two remained unproven. It was believed troops were being politicised by a 'considerable number' of agents already in India; and warned that the army's stability had already been undermined by rapid expansion and the lack of experienced British officers and it was essential therefore to convince Indian soldiers that a Japanese victory would be calamitous for India. It also highlighted that an unanticipated consequence of the existing news blackout was that many British officers did not recognise the INA threat. To combat this complacency, limited information about the INA would now be shared with British and trusted Indian officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Himmatsinghi of GHQI would act as liaison officer to improve co-ordination of anti-INA measures, while Army commanders were ordered to appoint officers to assist him given the task's importance.

On 31 March, Cawthorn then circulated further countermeasures supplementing those already extant which had failed to deal adequately with the threat.[59] Regardless of the risk of miscarriages of justice, Cawthorn recommended the immediate demotion or dismissal of any suspect individuals. He also proposed using Gurkhas against the Japanese given that they were less prone to subversion. Cawthorn then stated that the imperative of understanding more about INA activities inside India from captured agents overrode the Eastern Army's request for their rapid trial and

[56]BL IOR/L/P&J/12/511, 1943, Surveys 18. 21; BL IOR/L/P&J/12/512, File 1080/A/36, Survey 37.
[57]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Publicity and Propaganda in India re I.N.A 31/3/43.
[58]Ibid., Subversive Activities Directed Against the Indian Army March 18, 1943.
[59]Ibid., Measures to Counter the Japanese Sponsored Attack on the Loyalty of the Indian Army, DMI/4746 31/3/43.

punishment. He then rejected the notion of the deterrent value of publicity about any punishments which instead risked antagonising nationalists and creating distrust between British and Indian troops. While supporting GHQI's proposals for sharing information regarding the INA with select officers, he rejected the earlier proposal for a broader lifting of the news blackout given that it was 'not likely to increase confidence either…in the value of the Indian Army or of the Indian Army in itself'.

On 7 April Cawthorn then circulated a letter he had received from an unnamed Indian officer who claimed that ICOs were either strongly nationalist (60%) or dissatisfied with Britain (40%), and were unlikely to wholeheartedly support fighting simply to perpetuate British rule.[60] This officer recommended: equalising the pay of British and Indian officers; improving that of VCOs and sepoys; and broadcasting to Japanese-occupied territories that the allotments and property of INA volunteers would be confiscated. On 3 May, Cawthorn's recommendations were all approved, as was the proposal to publicise the confiscation of property of those joining the INA. It was agreed that the public news blackout should remain in place, although it was decided to inform all Indian troops about the INA, while the terms 'INA' or 'Indian National Army' were only to be used in a derogatory manner.[61] Furthermore, any Indian Army soldier captured by the Japanese was asked to join the INA as an expedient to gather intelligence while planning to escape. On the same day, in a vivid demonstration of how seriously the INA's threat was taken, the Department of Public Relations (DPR) then proposed a campaign to build the Indian soldiers' fighting spirit and increase their hostility towards both Japan and the INA.[62]

This campaign, jointly run by DPR and DMI, became known as JOSH, the Urdu for spirit or enthusiasm.[63] Initially approved on 15 May for six months under the joint control of DPR and Cawthorn as DMI, JOSH then remained in place until the war's end. JOSH was a critical tool for building the resistance of Indian troops to subversion and for generating confidence that they would fight effectively in 1944-45, essential given that Indian troops comprised 70% of Slim's Fourteenth Army.[64] The army's recovery from 1943 has largely been explained by factors including its learning culture, training improvements and improved doctrine, overshadowing the importance of JOSH. Little or no mention is made of JOSH when describing Slim's undoubted brilliance in building morale, which focusses typically on his work with British, rather

[60]Ibid., Note by an Indian ECO.
[61]Ibid., Subversive Activities Against The Indian Army 3 May 1943.
[62]Ibid., Memorandum re publicity and propaganda against the INA.
[63]Ibid., Statement of Case for the Provision of a Counter-Propaganda Staff 14 May 1943.
[64]Perry, *Commonwealth Armies*, pp. 71-73; Roy, *Sepoys*, p. 1.

than Indian, troops.[65] While biographies of Auchinleck describe his empathy for Indian troops, they omit any mention of JOSH, despite Auchinleck himself describing it as 'a matter of the first importance'.[66]

The papers of Lieutenant Colonel J. A. E. Heard highlight the essential role played by JOSH.[67] Heard ran JOSH from mid-1943, and expressed delight on learning from the memoirs of one of the Red Fort defendants, that, in 1945, Indians knew little about the INA because of the effective propaganda 'that had been my responsibility to the Army of India'.[68] Reflecting concerns that Bose's arrival in Asia would galvanise the Indian diaspora and increase the tempo of subversive activities, Heard was personally briefed by Cawthorn and then interviewed by Auchinleck, who he described as always 'the most encouraging force' in promoting JOSH.[69] They convinced Heard of the importance of JOSH because '…. suddenly into the field of war came the realisation of the propaganda value [for the INA] of Independence…Thus was born JOSH, an Indian word meaning spirit – enthusiasm – zeal, difficult to translate by one word, but well known as the quality possessed by every Hero'.[70] Heard confirmed that desertions during the Arakan campaign had caused a vivid realisation of the INA's danger and the need to convince Indian soldiers to 'think of the [INA] as the Japanese Indian Fifth Column (JIFC or JIF) and its leaders …. as Traitors'.[71]

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[65]Mason, *Matter of Honour*, pp. 498-499; Patrick Rose, 'Indian Army Command Culture and the North-West Frontier 1919-39', in Jeffreys and Rise (eds), *The Indian Army 1939-47*, (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 31, pp. 54-55; Graham Dunlop, 'The Re-Capture of Rangoon, 1945: The Last and Greatest Victory of the British Indian Army' in Jeffreys and Rose (eds.), *Indian Army*, pp. 137-156; William Franklin, 'The Genius of Leadership: Why Did the 14th Army Fight For 'Uncle Bill'? (Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Buckingham, 2015); John Masters, *The Road Past Mandalay,* (New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 43–45; Robert Lyman, *Slim, Master of War - Burma and the Birth of Modern Warfare,* (London: Constable & Robinson, 2004), pp. 63-67.

[66]Philip Warner, *Auchinleck,* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006), pp. 176-186; Connell, *Auchinleck,* pp. 752- 764; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London (hereinafter LH), GB0099 KCLMA, *Heard, Lt. Col. J.A.E., 11,* Auchinleck Letter 8 July 1943.

[67]LH GB0099 KCLMA, The Heard Collection; Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India,* (London: Little, Brown, 1997), pp. 576-578.

[68]LH Heard, 12, *Notes on Books re INA Activities*.

[69]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Recent Activities of Subhas Chandra Bose 14 July 1943; LH Heard, 20, *Heroes or Traitors*, pp. 33, 48.

[70]LH Heard, 20, *Traitors*, pp. 33, 41.

[71]LH Heard, 20, *Traitors*, pp. 33, 37.

In designing the JOSH campaign, Heard stressed the need to deploy carefully selected and well trained officers in order to engage effectively with Indian officers and men. British officers involved were instructed to 'shed the Kipling attitude'.[72] By December 1943 the instruction was given to prioritise the use of Indian officers of the rank of Captain or Major, with a sound knowledge of Urdu or the vernacular of the relevant unit, to ensure the widest possible coverage by JOSH.[73] JOSH courses addressed how factors including poor leadership, low pay, postal delays and health grievances had contributed to the vulnerability to subversion.[74] To build fighting spirit, copious material was provided on Japan's broken promises and mistreatment of Indian PoWs and civilians. Information rooms, described by Heard as recreation rooms rather than classrooms, displayed the latest war news in a way that was accessible and would interest the men, including the use of pictures and maps.[75]. By May 1944 GHQI described JOSH as 'the strongest and most effective counter-propaganda model yet evolved to combat the "I" Offensive against the morale and loyalty of Indian troops'.[76] Weekly Talking Points were also produced to build camaraderie between British and Indian troops; and visual images depicted Japan as a rat nibbling at India 'because [the Rat] reminds us of our enemy', with the INA depicted as Japan's dishonourable ally.[77] The 15 February 1944 issue included:

> We know how you feel about the JIFs. To you it is inconceivable that a soldier who holds the honour of his country and his ancestors in trust should sell this valuable trust to the enemy…[who] is your own personal enemy and anyone who helps him is equally your own enemy…for those who deliberately help the enemy there can be neither forgiveness nor pity.[78]

By 1945, sepoys were said to 'despise JIFs …. when they see any JIF at work, they consider it their duty to give the 'Namakharam' (untrue to his salt) his due – the bullet'.[79] Indian troops were reported as regarding JIFs with 'genuine contempt'.[80] Dick Romyn, while serving with Deception Division in Burma, recalled how his troops

[72]LH Heard, 1, *Ledger of JOSH Courses,* Visits, General Contacts.
[73]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Revised Instructions for Anti-Jap Verbal Propaganda.
[74]LH Heard, 1, *Ledger of JOSH Courses,* Visits, General Contacts.
[75]Ibid., *Why Are We Fighting Japan?*.
[76]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Memo to All Commanding Officers of Indian Army Units May 1944.
[77]LH Heard, 2, *JOSH Weekly News sheets*, February1944.
[78]LH Heard, 2, *JOSH*, 22 February 1945.
[79]LH Heard, 2, *JOSH*, 16 April 1945.
[80]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Cipher Telegram from C-in-C India 19 February 1944.

almost murdered a surrendering INA officer who began to make excuses for his treachery.[81] Lieutenant General Sir Reginald Savory tells a similar story of JIF 'hunts' in February 1944 and the execution of a JIF captive.[82]

The perceived severity of the INA's threat prompted further measures in parallel with JOSH. New unit security instructions required the reporting of possible subversive activities, placing suspects under observation, censoring mail while preventing access to confidential information, overseas postings or forward areas.[83] Concerns about a climate of suspicion developing in the army, though, demanded discretion in accusing soldiers, and it was emphasised that the army was not concerned with political views unless they undermined loyalty, discipline or morale.[84] In October 1943 the Subversive Activities Ordinance (no. XXXIV) 1943 was promulgated, providing for the death penalty or up to twenty years transportation for the attempted subversion of army personnel, a measure strongly supported by Cawthorn.[85] That same month a further Ordinance conferred new powers on commanders to prevent activities which risked disrupting offensive action in forward areas, a measure described by the C-in-CI as 'essential for the successful conduct of operations'.[86] Underlining the ongoing threat, in February 1944 the GoI reaffirmed that the public news blackout would continue, a stance the C-in-CI and Cawthorn supported given reports of the 'I' Offensive growing to 'enormous proportions', with enemy agents at large in India and reports of sepoys being captured by the INA at the front and then quickly released to suborn their colleagues.[87]

In July1944, GHQI issued the directive 'Psychological Warfare against the INA and JIFs in Enemy Occupied Territories', designed to run in parallel with a GoI propaganda campaign directed at Indian civilians in Japanese occupied territories..[88] Leaflets would

[81]National Army Museum, London (hereinafter NAM) 2005 04 09, *Romyn Oral History Transcript*, p. 31.
[82]NAM 7603-93-70, *Papers of Lt. Gen. Sir Reginald Savory*, 17 February 1944.
[83]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1576, *File 13104*, Document No. B-3256 Unit Security Instructions.
[84]Ibid.
[85]AP Identifier PR_000003052121, *Subversive Activities Ordinance (xxxjv) of 1943 Extension to Excluded Areas*, p. 10.
[86]BL IOR/L/P&J/8/566, *Coll 117/A27 Military Operational Area (Special Powers) Ordinance 1943*, GoI to Secretary of State 18 September 1943, Viceroy to Governor of Bengal 13 October 1943, Ordinance No. [blank] of 1943.
[87]AP Identifier PR_000003015943, *Use by Provincial Government of Rule 38 A Prohibiting the Publication of Matter Derived from Enemy Sources, 1943*, pp. 16-17; TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors*, 27 April, 3 May1944.
[88]TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors,* Directive on Psychological Warfare against the So-Called Indian National Army and JIFs 15 July 1944.

be dispersed by air, by artillery and by agents, alongside transmissions by Field Broadcasting Units and radio to undermine INA morale and portray its followers as dupes betrayed by their leaders and on the losing side. Deserters were reassured that they would not be shot, with Auchinleck signing the leaflets 'THIS IS MY PROMISE'. The British believed that JOSH's effectiveness meant that Indian troops wanted to fight JIFs and consequently avoided offering a general pardon to prevent any impression of leniency. Japanese trust in the INA would simultaneously be undermined by suggestions of its widespread infiltration by British agents. The extensive countermeasures taken from late-1942 show how seriously the British authorities took the need to counter the INA's threat to the loyalty of the Indian Army, notwithstanding the reality that the INA was ill-equipped in every sense to threaten India militarily. Finally, it will now be shown that while these measures had helped prepare the army for the fighting of 1944-45, one critical element, the news blackout, would leave India's public woefully unprepared for what they were told about the INA in late 1945.

In late 1945, the British decided to court-martial the INA's senior officers.[89] The first trial was held at the Red Fort in Delhi, the former palace of the Mughal emperors. The first three INA defendants, all former Indian Army officers who had been captured by the Japanese early in the war, represented India's three largest religious communities. The location and the choice of defendants served as a potent rallying cry for Indian nationalists,

While the British may have been astonished by the vehemence of the public reaction to the Red Fort trials, it is inaccurate to say that they had not entertained the possibility that this would happen.[90] Suggestions that lifting the news blackout was first considered in 1945 fail to recognise that between 1943-45 the British authorities periodically debated its merits. In 1943, a senior official had written presciently against focussing counter-propaganda on the army because 'the army comes from the people. It is the people as well as the army that must be convinced …'.[91] However, as already shown, Cawthorn was adamant about the need to maintain the public news blackout. In August 1944 he circulated a further memo 'Publicity About JIFs and INA' in which he revealed that the question of publicity about the INA had been exhaustively discussed between November 1943 and March 1944.[92] Cawthorn continued to

[89]Chaudhuri, 'Bose', pp. 349-352; Rafe McGregor, 'Enemy of My Enemy', *Military History*, (May 2016), p. 71.
[90]Mason, *Matter of Honour,* pp. 520-522.
[91]BL IOR/L/WS/1/1711, *War Staff 'WS' Series Files: File WS 29299*, Most Secret letter 1 January 1943.
[92]TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors,* DMI View Publicity about JIFs and INA 21 August 1944.

support the news blackout for India's public, stating that it was still 'too early to be certain that Bose and the INA are a busted flush', and that maintaining secrecy about JIF captives also supported ongoing operations and counter-espionage. For Cawthorn there was no half-way house between no publicity and full publicity. For him there was absolutely no merit in changing a successful policy at a critical stage in the war when Japan's plans for the INA remained unclear and anti-British sentiment amongst the Indian public remained high. Cawthorn argued that any publicity meant losing control of the topic to a hostile vernacular press, raising awkward questions about the fate of INA captives and risking 'a sensation throughout the country' that would reflect badly on the Indian Army while boosting the INA. He urged that 'we do nothing to stir up interest'.[93]

In August 1944 a DPR memo written by its Brigadier Ivor Jehu, argued unsuccessfully against Cawthorn for a controlled lifting of the news blackout to show the Indian public that the INA, as Japan's allies, were India's enemies.[94] Any sympathy subsequently shown towards the INA by the press meant they would be regarded as helping the enemy. The DPR memo emphasised that the news blackout would be unsustainable in peacetime when, in India, 'the political pot' would inevitably begin to boil again. Failure to commit India's press or politicians to at least tacit hostility towards the INA would allow it to play a 'distasteful' part in post-war events.[95] The uncontrolled emergence of news about the INA would drown out the truth as 'facts' about its supposed military exploits would generate sympathy and support from segments of India's population The DPR argued that acting now would avoid 'very undesirable results when control has to go…If left too late I anticipate very unwelcome repercussions the future'. Cawthorn won the debate and the public news blackout continued. In 1945 the DPR's fears were realised.

This article has shown that the INA's influence on the British authorities has been understated and in fact prompted a series of countermeasures to diminish the perceived threat to both the Indian Army and the Indian public, most notably JOSH and the news blackout. In championing the news blackout, Cawthorn had considered, but completely underestimated, the consequences which contributed directly to the furore surrounding the Red Fort trials. This lacuna in the historiography has possibly been caused by several factors; they include the focus on steps taken to revive the Indian Army in 1943, the negligible direct impact of INA operations and Bose's presence which acquired 'the magic of a sorcerer's spell' both at the time and subsequently.[96] It is also possible that the exclusion of many INA volunteers from the

[93]TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors*, 21 August 1944.
[94]TNA WO 208/804 (A), *Traitors,* 28 August 1944.
[95]Ibid.
[96]Chaudhuri, 'Bose', p. 356.

post-independence Indian and Pakistani armies has played a role.[97] Finally, Slim's dismissive writing on the INA may have inadvertently discouraged a fuller exploration of this topic. What is evident, though, is that by taking the action they did, the British authorities were complicit in creating a mythology concerning the INA that was not merited by its actual operational capability or results, yet which nonetheless had profound consequences for Britain by contributing to an accelerated timeline for Indian independence.

[97]Singh, 'Soldier and Self', p. 150; Kiani, *INA*, p. 204.

The SAS and Tactical Intelligence: Normandy 1944 – Operation Haft 702

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ABSTRACT
After more than eighty years it is time to re-evaluate the role of the Special Air Service (SAS) and intelligence gathering during the Normandy campaign of 1944. This study examines Operation Haft 702 which ran between the Allied breakout in July and the closing of the Falaise pocket in August. The article combines original syntheses of archival research and landscape analysis to reveal a rich historical record which contributes to an understanding of how SAS human intelligence influenced the use of tactical airpower.

Introduction

The Normandy Campaign of 1944, formed the beginning of the Allied liberation of Western Europe where the use of intelligence was a key part of the success of the operation.[1] An important, if rather overlooked, element contributing widely to success between June and August 1944 was the role played from behind the German lines by Special Forces and the French Resistance in support of Allied Tactical Air Power's disruption of German supplies. While much has been written regarding the French Resistance and operations of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the

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[1]F.H Hinsley with E.E Thomas, C.A.G Simkins and C.F.G Ransom, *British Intelligence in the Second World War. Its influence on Strategy and Operations. Volume Three Part II Overlord,* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988), pp 3-277. Also David Abrutat, *Vanguard. The True Stories of the Reconnaissance and Intelligence Missions Behind D-Day,* (London: Uniform, 2019).

Special Air Service (SAS); interest in the activities of the SAS brigade in France has tended to concentrate upon high profile 'hit-and-run' actions conducted deep behind the German lines to delay troops and supplies reaching the battlefront such as operations Bulbasket and Gain.[2] Memorialisation of these events can be seen today in the French countryside through memorials and plaques marking sites of interest.[3] However, an overlooked aspect of SAS activity was its role in providing tactical and targeting intelligence for the Allied Air Force from behind the lines. This article seeks to address that issue by focusing on Operation Haft 702, which was dedicated principally to that role. Described as a minor operation and one that avoided combat activity, it rarely features in the SAS narrative.[4] The only known account for Haft 702 was published in 2014 by Randall and Trow.[5] Randall was the radio operator for Haft 702 and the account uses his diary in conjunction with Haft reports from the UK National Archive (TNA).

This article will evaluate the value of the intelligence supplied by Haft 702 for influencing Allied air operations during the SAS team's deployment between 8 July and 11 August 1944. To do this a detailed and systematic study of intelligence gathered and reported by Haft 702 has been conducted for that period. The article then determines whether Allied tactical air operations were executed specifically in response to this intelligence by assessing primary sources. The foundation for this paper are: documents obtained from TNA; documents held at the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama; and documents kindly supplied by the Special Air Service Association, and specifically Captain Blackman's summary report of German troop movements, petrol and ammunition targets and aerodromes.[6] Adding to a better understanding of the

[2]Olivier Wieviorka. *The French Resistance*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in France. An Account of the Work of the Special Operation Executive in France 1940-1944,* (London Portland Or: Whitehall History Publishing in Association with Frank Cass, 2006); Roger Ford, *Fire from the Forest: the SAS Brigade in France, 1944,* (London: Cassel, 2003); Ben Macintyre, *SAS Rogue Heroes the Authorized Wartime History,* (New York: Penguin, 2016), pp. 213-225 & pp. 242-248; Ford, *Fire from the Forest,* pp 105-116.

[3]Gavin Mortimer. *The SAS in Occupied France: 1 SAS Operations, June to October 1944*, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2020).

[4]Ford, *Fire from the Forest,* p. 117.

[5]John Randall and Martin Trow, *The Last Gentleman of the SAS: A Moving Testimony from the First Allied Officer to Enter Belsen at the End of the Second World War,* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2014).

[6]All tables and maps are primarily structured on information from the UK National Archive (hereinafter TNA) TNA WO 219/2343a SAS Daily Situation Reports, TNA WO 219/2414 SAS Suggested Targets for Attack (WO 219/2414); these appear to be

effectiveness of the intelligence supplied by Haft 702, surviving features in the landscape have provided evidence of a number of these attacks (Tables 2 and 3), and two sites where there is a remarkable level of archaeological survival have been selected to illustrate the findings.

Classified tactical intelligence has been divided into two categories: firstly, that intended to inform general tactical analysis; and secondly, the subsequent targets recommended by the SAS. The latter must be considered conservative in the findings as much that was provided was integrated into larger aerial operations such as Armed Reconnaissance (AR), and railway disruption operations; an area the subject of wider and ongoing research.

Background To Events.

In addition to information being supplied by the French Resistance, by April 1944 there were additional sources of information arriving from Europe, and these were many and varied, such as aerial photographs, agent reports, annual reviews, ground photography, guidebooks, libraries, German prisoners of war, signals intelligence, and intelligence from men who had escaped and evaded the enemy. After the invasion, up-to-date intelligence on German troop movements, dispositions and logistics patterns became increasingly important in interpreting enemy intentions.

In the planning for the campaign, the Allies realised that once ashore, the option of inserting uniformed troops behind the lines to conduct offensive operations and gather intelligence would become a viable and supportable reality. The commander responsible for ground forces, General Bernard Law Montgomery, envisaged that the SAS deployment would be on a large scale with paratroopers dropped in small groups close behind the lines, attacking specific targets to delay enemy reinforcements.[7] The SAS fiercely resisted this method of employment as it went against the operational doctrine of the regiment which was essentially for it to be used as a mobile force multiplier and strategic weapon deployed well behind enemy lines. By May 1944 this disagreement had erupted into a fierce argument between 21st Army Group Command and the commanding officer of No. 1 SAS, Bill Stirling, and which resulted

incomplete and are supplemented with data in 21st Army Group Headquarters Teletype/Signals in the TNA WO 171 series, Royal Air Force files in TNA Air 20,37, 40 operational reports and correspondence. In addition the Records of the Special Operations Executive (hereinafter SOE) HS series. In America US Ninth Airforce records held at the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA) Alabama which include mission reports. At the US National Archives College Park, Washington Captured German records in Records Group 242.

[7]Andrew L. Hargreaves, *Special Operations in World War 11 British and American Irregular Warfare,* (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, *2013), p. 78*

in his resignation.[8] It was subsequently agreed that the SAS would be used in a strategic role, rather than a tactical role, by operating deep behind the enemy lines alongside the SOE and the Resistance, a role much more in keeping with the unit's original operational concept. The SAS brigade came under the command of the British 1 Airborne Corps, a part of 21st Army Group.[9] The brigade was granted much latitude in its own command and control, working closely with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Operations Section (G-3).[10] However, after the initial deployment of the SAS, its operations were constrained by Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ). One reason was that certain elements within SFHQ considered that parties of uniformed troops could compromise the established operations of the SOE and the French Resistance and that their actions could also present a threat to the local population in the form of reprisals while also being a drain on existing resources.[11] Even with these concerns, SFHQ instructed its own Jedburgh teams to, where practicable, work alongside the SAS when on the ground, but not to the extent where they would fall under SAS control. By 13 August 1 and 2 SAS had 12 teams on the ground in France.[12]

Evolution and Deployment of Haft 702.

In early July, German resistance in Normandy impeded Allied progress towards a breakout. By 8 July, the Americans were fighting to the west, their primary objective being the important road network hub of St Lo. To the east, the British and Canadians were engaged around Caen, where German resistance was also stubborn. It is against this backdrop that Operation Haft was conceived (Figure 1).

The original Operating Instruction No. 25 called for the dropping of ten to twelve small SAS parties behind the enemy lines north of the Loire River to attack infrastructure targets which would hamper German operations and resupply.[13] The

[8]Mortimer, *The SAS in Occupied France*, p. 5.

[9]TNA HS 6/604, 'SAS operations under SHAEF control'. Letter from SF HQ to G3 SHAEF dated 18 May 1944.

[10]Hargreaves, *Special Operations, p.169.*

[11]Roger Ford, *Fire from the Forest,* p, 22.

[12]National Archives and Records Administration, (hereinafter NARA) Washington, D.C RG 226. M1623-R8 V.4. Jedburgh was the codename of a combined British and American covert operation in Europe. It aimed to assist Resistance operations and relay back military information. Teams usually consisted of three members: one British, one American, and a National from the country in which they were operating. Records of the Office of Strategic Services.

[13]TNA WO 218/114, 'H.Q. S.A.S. Tps, War Office: Special Services War Diaries, Second World War. Special Services Units H.Q. S.A.S. Tps'. Operating Instruction 25. No date.

targets consisted of airfields and aircraft emergency landing grounds, soft transport targets on main roads, telecommunications, bulk petrol, and any operation which would embarrass and delay the movement of reserves to the battlefront. Operation Haft was redefined as an intelligence-gathering operation because it was considered too close to the front line, circa eighty kilometres, to be offensive.

There was a clearly implied frustration within the SAS regarding the planning process. The final Operating Instruction No. 27 notes that the operation 'has now finally been approved by all concerned'.[14] The inference of delay here likely emanates from friction between the SAS and SFHQ.[15] The primary objective now was to conduct reconnaissance around Mayenne, Laval and Le Mans, paying attention to troop concentrations, strategic targets (not defined), petrol and ammunition stores, and possible parachute operations in the region (Figure 2). This main party was led by Captain Blackman and named Haft 702 A (Figure 1), with his adjutant Lieutenant Kidner and radio operator Lieutenant Randall. They were assisted by a French parachutist by the name of Maison and three other SAS ranks, Corporal Brown and Troopers Baker and Harrison. The second part of the operation, known as Haft 702 B, was led by Lieutenant Anderson with Trooper Hull and a French member, Lemée, and an unnamed fourth member.[16] Their job on arrival in the area between Argentan and L'Aigle was to conduct reconnaissance of enemy landing grounds in the Alençon area (Figure 2) near Barville, Essay, and Lonrai. At least one of these sites, Lonrai, was being used by Focke Wolf 190 fighter aircraft of 2 Gruppe and by 13 July, both Lonrai and Essay had been bombed. The SAS were also granted permission to conduct hostile action provided it did not compromise the local Resistance. This included an attack on a railway tunnel and train outside Paris carrying wounded troops from the front.[17]

[14]TNA WO 218/114, 'H.Q. S.A.S. Tps, War Office: Special Services War Diaries, Second World War. Special Services Units H.Q. S.A.S. Tps', Operating Instruction No 27 Ref HQ/SAS Tps/TSB/5G.H.Q. S.A.S. Tps. No date.

[15]Foot, *SOE in France,* p. 355 observes that 'About a dozen different authorities had to consent to every new SAS venture**.'**

[16]Jean Planchais. *La Résistance à Coulonges-sur -Sarthe,* (Cahiers Percherons : Fédération des amis du Perche, 1998**).** No4 pp. 29-32.

[17]Martin Dillon and Roy Bradford. *Rogue Warrior of the SAS the Blair Mayne Legend,* (Edinburgh: Mainstream publishing, 1987), p,158. The location of the attack is unknown. This part of the operation is subject to further research. It is likely that this supplemental requirement was approved too late for incorporation into the Operating instruction.

Figure 1: Captain Blackman courtesy of the Peter Forbes collection.

Within days of 702 A and B landing, there was discussion between 21st Army Group and HQ Airborne Troops on inserting a further three parties consisting of men from the Belgian Independent parachute company with a brief much closer to the original Haft Operating Instruction which was to harass the retreating enemy but not to destroy infrastructure targets.[18] On 31 July, and 2 and 8 August, they were dropped to the east of Haft 702. Originally codenamed Haft C 105, D 205, and E 305, they were renamed Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Bunyan, respectively. (Figure 2).

[18]TNA WO 205/652A. 'Reports on Special Air Services and special forces' War Office: 21 Army Group : Military Headquarters Papers, Second World War. G. Plans. Reports on Special Air Services and special forces.' Signal Date Time Group, (DTG) 180105 between HQ Airborne Troops and EXFOR Main copying in SHAEF,SFHQ and Command SAS Troops.



Figure 2: Haft Positions.[19]

The insertion by air of the party led by Anderson (Haft B) on the night of 7/8 July had to be cancelled as the drop zone, nine kilometres NNE of Gacé, was in an area covered by flak. Blackman's party, however, was successfully dropped in the vicinity of Lassay les Chateaux in the Mayenne department, an area garrisoned by one hundred and fifty Germans and members of the Gestapo.[20] They were met by an SOE Agent Major Claude de Baissac, codenamed Scientist, and by members of the Resistance. The party stayed in the near vicinity of the drop zone until 14 July. Within two days of landing, Haft 702 was embedded eighty kilometres behind the lines and was transmitting intelligence and targets back to Headquarters airborne troops by radio. Anderson's Haft B party arrived in the field with his two-man team on the night of 11/12 July at a position sixty five kilometres east of Blackman, close to Courtomer in the Orne department where they were housed with members of the local Resistance.

[19]Map created by the authors using ArcGIS Pro by ESRI. Basemap sources: IGN,ESRI,HERE,USGS.

[20]Special Air Service Regimental Association Archive. Haft 702 report on German troop movements. No date.

Blackman and his party were installed in isolated farm buildings three kilometres to the South of Le Ham (Figure 3). Surprisingly they transmitted their exact position over the airwaves to HQ by two-way radio, even though it must have been obvious to Blackman and his team that the Germans were trying to intercept such radio transmissions.[21] During this time Blackman and Kidner reconnoitred the area on several occasions to gather information. Major de Baissac also ensured that Haft 702 was well supplied with intelligence from networks in the wider Normandy area, appointing George Rabaud to function as the party's liaison link with the various Resistance organisations.[22] De Baissac was, on occasion, using Haft 702 to duplicate intelligence that was being sent back by his wireless operator, Phyliss Latour. Anderson joined them on 8 August, and by 10 August, with little useful intelligence being gathered, they decided to end the operation.

Figure 3: Farm building used as the main base for Haft 702 south of Le Ham in the Mayenne Department.[23]

[21]NARA 'Records of German Field Commands', RG 42 T311-R1, '*Oberbefehldshaber* West'. Radio Networks of SAS known in France. p. 7000976. dated 27 July 1944.
[22]TNA HS 9/76, 'Personnel file of Claude Marie Marc de Baissac C, aka BOUCHERVILLE, aka CLAUDE, aka DENIS, aka MICHEL, aka JACQUES, aka Clement BASTABLE, aka SCIENTIST, aka David - born 28.02.1907. Volume 2'.
[23]Author's image.

Haft 702 continued to operate at the Le Ham site until 2 August when German activity in the immediate area became intense, and it was decided to relocate to a hay barn near Loupfougers.

In parallel with Haft 702, two three-man Jedburgh teams, codenamed Gavin and Guy, were also parachuted into the same area fifteen kilometres to the southeast of Haft 702 on 7 July. This drop zone placed them seventy five kilometres to the east of their designated operating areas. The initial aims of these two groups were to assist the local French Resistance to the north and south of Rennes and to supply intelligence in the path of the anticipated American advance. This insertion of the two teams was conducted by two aircraft using the same drop point and timed to be within minutes of each other. Their subsequent reports mention their being told of an SAS party working nearby and they were also in contact with Haft 702.[24] Guy and Gavin observed that of the 'supposed' four thousand Maquis Resistants in the department where they landed there appeared to be only thirty active members. Their post-operation report also noted the friction between de Baissac and the local Resistance leadership. This appeared to be the cause of the loss of eleven days in deploying toward their designated operating area.[25]

There was ill feeling between elements of the command of the Resistance in the area and de Baissac due to French interpretation of the lines of command and control.[26] Major de Baissac had an extremely high opinion of the Resistance but observed that weapons supplied by air-drop to certain members of the Resistance went unused, and on 8 June, he reported 'that the French Secret Army were so secret, nobody could find them'.[27] Subsequently, he distributed weapons to units where he felt they could be better employed, such as active Resistance units and the Communists. No doubt de Baissac was an outstanding and talented operative, but he upset elements of the Resistance establishment. A subsequent letter written in the aftermath by his Commanding Officer, Colonel Maurice Buckmaster, on 19 September observed that

[24]TNA WO 171/110, '21 Army Group. G. (Ops.) with Apps. B-D'. Signal from HQ Airborne troops to EXFOR Main DTG 181830.
[25]Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives. Kings College. London. OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries. Frederick, Md. University Publications of America, c1985. Great Britain. Special Operations Executives.
[26]TNA HS 9/76, 'Personnel file of Claude Marie Marc de Baissac', Vol 2.
[27]TNA HS 9/76, 'Personnel file of Claude Marie Marc de Baissac', Volume 2. *' L Armee secret est tellement secret qu'on ne peut pas la trouver*!' Report of Interrogation, of de Baissac dated 25 August 1944.

'His relations with the French have at times been strained, and he is not persona grata with the present French staff in London'.[28]

Haft 702 operated in this difficult climate with success, working alongside the Resistance and de Baissac, although nowhere in Blackman's Haft official report did he mention the strained relationship between de Baissac and the Resistance. He did observe that 'Everybody encountered in this operation were 100% loyal and trustworthy', although noting inactivity in some areas.[29]

The American forces in Normandy began moving south after Operation Cobra, and by 6 August they had captured Laval and were driving south toward Le Mans. On 7 August, the Germans mounted their last counter-offensive at Mortain in an attempt to cut the American advance by driving west towards Avranches. This ground to a halt and effectively ended any German chance of turning the tide against the Allied advance. In the eastern sector, on 7 August, the British, Canadian, and Polish forces launched Operation Totalise, pushing south of Caen towards Falaise. By 11 August, the Germans were retreating by night, but by 13 August, the retreat was being conducted in the open and in daylight; with many German troops subsequently surrounded in what became known as the Falaise pocket. On the night of 10/11 August Haft 702 assessed that it was providing little useful tactical intelligence and decided to end the mission. Making their way through the enemy lines the next morning, escorted by Rabaud, they met the Americans and were initially de-briefed at the American 20 Army Corps HQ on the road between Laval and Le Mans. They then proceeded to British 21st Army Group. From there Blackman flew back to debrief his commanding officer Brigadier McLeod. The rest of the party returned to the UK by ship. For his part in leading Haft 702, Blackman was awarded a bar to his Military Cross.

Intelligence Supplied by Haft 702: 8 July - 5 August.

Between 8 July and 5 August Haft 702 provided 44 intelligence reports. These are listed in Table 1 and, where given, the locations are shown in Figure 4. The intelligence provided by Haft 702 has been synthesised into three categories: Movements; Special Interest Reports (SIR); and General Observations. The first two are likely to have been turned into targets, while General Observations would have most likely been used to augment the overall intelligence picture.

[28]TNA HS 9/76, 'Personnel file of Claude Marie Marc de Baissac', Volume 2.

[29]TNA WO 218/114,'HQ/SAS Tps Report on Operation Haft 702', by Capt. M.J.D.A Blackman. Not dated.

Date submitted	Location or Comment	Detailed amplification	Intelligence Illustrated Fig. 4	Fig 4 ID
8/7/1944	Lassay les Chateaux.	150 Germans garrisoned in the area.	Intelligence Movements (IM)	1
8/7/1944		Germans using minor roads.	General Observation GO)	
9/7/1944	Pre en Pail forest, and most large forest areas.	Germans present.	IM	2
9/7/1944		Comments on the Resistances method of operation; and strong local support.	GO	
10/7/1944		Road signs booby-trapped.	GO	
10/7/1944	St Pierre sur Dives.	Described as 'Transport centre SW Caen' (In reality SE Caen).	IM	3
11/7/1944	Ambulances go north from Alençon.	Carrying ammunition.	IM	4
11/7/1944		Troops from Russia on this front.	GO	
11/7/1944	Caen area, Putot SW Dozule.	Large HQ.	IM (HQ)	5
12/7/1944	Gonneville and Dozule.	German troop concentrations.	IM	6
12/7/1944		Stress Germans using minor roads and nearly all forest areas.	GO	
12/7/1944	Charchigne.	German troops bombed, heavy casualties returning to Le Mans.	IM	7
12/7/1944	Varaville, 1 Km W in farm. .	Allied Para doctor Colthorp? with 20 men. Request rescue or food (TNA WO 219/2343A).	Special Interest Report (SIR)	A
16/7/1944	Bernay-Dreux-Louviers-Mantes-Vernon.	German troop concentrations.	IM	8 - 12
16/7/1944	Bagnoles de l'Orne.	Rommel tactical HQ located.	SIR	B
17/7/1944	Mont du Saules.	Suggested good Drop Zone for British parachutists .	SIR	C
18/7/1944		Suggest RAF bomb road points not rail.	General Observation	
18/7/1944	Bagnoles de l'Orne.	Rommel not now in Bagnoles de l'Orne.	SIR (Rommel Continued)	B
22/7/1944	Lonrai	2 Airfields under construction.	SIR Aviation	D
22/7/1944	5 Km S of Laval in area Parne-Bignon-Mortigne.	3 Airfields under construction.	SIR Aviation	E - G
22/7/1944	Route Vitre-Laval-Le Mans–Fougeres.	Engineers improving route for heavy traffic.	IM	13
22/7/1944	Ecouves and Gouffern forests.	Approx 8 SS Divisions around the forests Then no more troops until Evreux and Dreux	IM	14 -15

		and Chartres where possible defensive line being prepared.		
23/7/1944		Personal comments on German morale and equipment.	GO	
24/7/1944	Homet wood and Bourgon forest.	Tanks, troops and ammunition believed left from front a week ago.	IM	16 - 17
24/7/1944	Bagnoles de l'Orne.	Huge hospital 10000 - 6500 pass through in week.	IM	18
26/7/1944	Beaumont sur Sarthe.	12 Flying bomb ramps.	SIR Aviation	H
26/7/1944	Woods surrounding Chartres.	Fighter bombers based.	SIR Aviation	I
26/7/1944	S of Caen.	3 SS Divisions present Das Reich, Adolf Hitler and Gross Deutschland.	IM	19
26/7/1944	Commer bridge.	'Not hit after 6 attacks worth another go.'	GO Not Haft target.	
26/7/1944	Mayenne.	American aircraft (B17) attack caused many civilian casualties.	GO	
26/7/1944		Good work by American P38s.	GO	
26/7/1944		Report on Resistance in Brittany that groups are active in major towns.	GO	
27/7/1944	St Quentin les Chardonets.	Admin HQ for front.	IM (HQ)	20
28/7/1944	La Ferté Macé and Falaise.	SS Gross Deutschland Division seen.	IM	21 - 22
28/7/1944	15 Km SW Caen.	SS Adolf Hitler Division seen.	IM	23
28/7/1944	Laval-Le Mans.	Supply rail line operational.	IM	24
29/7/1944	Domfront-Avranches.	Supply rail line operational.	IM	25
29/7/1944	Villaines. No record found of this being a HAFT 702 target.	Ammunition dump hit by RAF with good results.	GO	
1/8/1944		German troops bombed, heavy casualties returning to Le Mans.	GO	
1/8/1944	0,5 Mile from current position. Note Haft 702 transmitted its own position to HQSAS (VY 991775) 16 July. (TNA WO 219/2343A).	German troops.	IM	26
2/8/1944	Area NE Mayenne.	German mass withdrawal.	IM	
2/8/1944	Via Laval-Ernee.	SS advance to front.	IM	
2/8/1944	Area NE Mayenne.	5000 Germans in Area of La Baroche. Das Reich withdrawing.	IM	

4/8/1944		Report on battle, enemy strengths, and suggestion that the Americans could break-through in area between near Sille le Guillaume-Le Mans.	GO	

Table 1: Intelligence gathered by Haft 702 8 July – 5 August.[30]



Figure 4: Haft 702 Intelligence supplied: Movements and Reports to end of 4 August.[31]

The intelligence supplied from 8 July until their move to a hay barn on 2 August was a period of relative stability for Haft 702. They were securely ensconced at an operating

[30]Source TNA WO 219/2414 and WO 219/2343 and WO 171 110.
[31]See Table 2 for locations. Map created using ArcGIS Pro by ESRI. Basemap sources: IGN,ESRI,HERE,USGS. https://services.arcgisonline.com/ArcGIS/rest/services/Canvas/World_Light_Grey_Reference/Mapserver.

base away from the prying eyes of the enemy while their immediate neighbours brought them food.[32] This fixed base enabled intelligence to be fed to them by members of the Resistance and de Baissac. During July Haft 702 targets and intelligence were mainly coming from the centre rear German supply areas, and a hundred kilometres to the north of their position to the British front line; but one report came from as far away as Paris, more than two hundred kilometres to the east The scale and nature of their intelligence gathering partly reflects the geographic position of Haft 702 and the fact that de Baissac's operations were concentrated to the south and east of the front.

Troop & Vehicle Movements

Twenty-two of the reports dealt with movements across the area. Three examples are highlighted here. Firstly, the use of ambulances travelling north carrying ammunition illustrates the German dual use of what was a most valuable motorised resource. Secondly, the entire town of Bagnoles de l'Orne was reported by Haft 702 as being a large hospital holding ten thousand wounded and that six thousand five hundred men had passed through it in one week. The accuracy of these figures is not known, but the town was spared the fate of many others, escaping heavy bombardment and fighting. A debriefing document from January 1945 details the action of the Resistance in the area and noted that Blackman's efforts were the reason the town was saved from destruction.[33] Finally, towards the end of July, it was reported that rail lines were still operating between Avranches and Domfront, and later it was reported that a railway gun was located at Mortain, the site of which was attacked, but no gun was found, and to the south supplies were moving on an east to west axis by rail between Laval and Le Mans.

Special Interest Reports

Eight reports of special interest were made by Haft 702 and Haft B. Two such reports were made on 16 July; the first stated that Rommel, the operational commanding officer of German forces in Normandy, was using the spa town of Bagnoles de l'Orne as a tactical HQ. The Jedburgh team (codenamed Gavin) reported the same thing a day earlier on 15 July. SHAEF immediately required verification as the SAS Brigade was planning to kidnap/assassinate Rommel at a different location, a chateau at Roche Guyon on the banks of the Seine more than one hundred and fifty kilometres to the east. Blackman was tasked to reconnoitre Rommel's location in Bagnoles, and by 18 July, it was clear that Rommel was not present. Meanwhile, in the Theatre Intelligence Section, which dealt with compiling information related to the enemy order of battle,

[32]Perso comment M. L Leloup of Bel Air, Le Ham in the Mayenne Department who as a child remembers taking food from his nearby farm to Allied soldiers with red berets
[33]NARA Record Group 498. ID 193 'Helpers files' Box 974. Report of M. A Rave .13 January 1945.

it was declared that Bagnoles was a highly unlikely location for Rommel. They did observe, however, that the site was known to be an important logistics hub 'bristling with Ammunition and fuel depots', and they noted it was possible that Rommel could well have visited the site.[34] Independently of these events Rommel was injured by air attack on 17 July and subsequently relieved of command. The second report was a request made by Haft 702 to assist British paratroopers cut off behind the lines close to the front. This request was originally passed to SOE in London in June by de Baissacs team and then passed on to the 6 Airborne Division. Whether any assistance was provided to these troops is not known, but it is most likely that by the time this report was made by Haft 702, this intelligence was out of date.

A further aim of Haft 702 had been to locate landing areas for airborne assault. One location appears to have been submitted, close to their operating base at Mont du Saules. Of the reports made, four covered air intelligence subjects. Anderson's original brief had been to reconnoitre the advanced aircraft landing grounds to the east of the Orne at Essay, Barville and Lonrai. The 8th Air Force had already attacked Lonrai on 17 June, and subsequent aerial reconnaissance on 6 July noted craters to the north and south of the site and two single-engine aircraft parked near a clump of trees.[35] On 25 July, Haft 702 reported Lonrai to be hosting 50 Messerschmitt 110 aircraft. How many of these became targets and attacked is unknown.

General Observations

Fourteen General Observations were made. A number specifically criticised the precision of Allied bombing while others were, however, more constructive, suggesting air attacks would be better served on road points rather than rail lines. German morale and strength were also reported, noting that the enemy was using forests and minor roads, and warning that road signs were booby trapped. Two reports commented on the makeup and the operation of local Resistance.

Targets

These have been divided into three time periods 8 – 21 July, 22 July – 5 August and 5 August to the end of the operation on 11 August. The first-time period represents a period of relative stability for the location of the frontline as the Allies worked to expand their bridgehead, culminating in Operation Goodwood, 18-20 July, where British and Canadian forces completed the capture of Caen and attempted to secure the high ground beyond the town. The second period covers the time after the launch

[34]British Online Archives. Documents discussing Rommel by those close to him. Letter from H.Q Airborne Troops to SHAEF 3 Special Operations dated 18 July 1944 referring to Team Gavins signal C.6513 or 65/3 DTG 151200 15 July.

[35] TNA Air 34/258, 'Interpretation reports: K2561-K2670'. Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 2664 dated 8 July 1944.

of the American Operation Cobra on 25 July that led to the breakout of American forces to the south and then eastward to envelop the Germans within the Falaise pocket as the British, Canadian, and Polish forces drove down from the north. The third period covers the closing days of Operation Haft as the Allied force came closer to the team's location.

The system for allocating a priority for all targets by the Tactical SAS HQ was formally adopted on 21 July. The priorities were defined from A to C as:

'A' – 'demands' for an air strike from deployed SAS troops for operational reasons;
'B' – targets of fleeting opportunity such as road convoys, trains etc.;
'C' – fixed targets for example bridges and depots.[36]

Targets were sent directly to 21st Army Group for action and its representatives working alongside the advanced elements of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in Uxbridge. Not all targets submitted by the SAS were accepted for action. Before 21 July records show that these target priorities were already being applied.

Between 8 July and 21 July of the sixteen bombing targets allocated by SAS HQ at least five were attacked in direct response to Haft 702's intelligence (see Table 2, and Figure 5). The majority of these were fuel and ammunition targets. Seven consisted of a column of guns, bridges, an HQ and the location of an SS division. Most of these targets were localised within the area of the Haft 702 operation. Targets coming from further afield such as Caen (FD Cinglais), (Belleville Viellet) were no doubt passed from de Baissac.

Date Supplied	Location	Type	Target Number	Aircraft despatched For attack. Y / N/ ?	Military landscape trace
10/07/1944	Andaines forest 1.	Fuel.	C ?	Y	Logistics storage earthworks Bomb cratering. Depot related artefacts (Remnants of fuel drums).
11/07/1944	NE 2 Km Lassay les Châteaux.	10 large guns on road.	B ?	?	Unconfirmed.
12/07/1944	Cinglais forest.	Ammunition.	C50	Y	Bomb cratering.

[36] SAS Suggested targets for bombing . Letter HQ Airborne Troops - Commander SAS Troops dated 21 July 1944. TNA WO 219/2414.

12/07/1944	Varaville.	Divisional HQ.	C ?	?	Not assessed.
12/07/1944	Javron 1	Bridge No 1 & 2.	C ?	?	Unconfirmed.
12/07/1944	Javron 2	Bridge No 3	C ?	?	Unconfirmed.
12/07/1944	1 km E Lassay les Châteaux.	Ammunition with Flak	B ?	?	Unconfirmed.
12/07/1944	Ferriere Aux Etangs.	Fuel. In tanks 30 ft high.	C ?	Y	Bomb cratering.
12/07/1944	Andaines forest 2.	Fuel. 110 and 200 litre drums along road.	C ?	Y	Bomb cratering. Depot-related artefacts and logistics storage earthworks.
16/07/1944	La Ferté Macé.	Movements SS troops (Adolf Hitler division).	Not listed in target file although SHAEF aware.	?	Unconfirmed.
16/07/1944	Vingt Hanaps.	Railhead and Ammunition.	C ?	?	Unconfirmed.
16/07/1944	La Ferté Macé Forest	Ammunition	Not listed in target file although SHAEF aware.	N	Depot related artefacts and logistics storage earthworks.
18/07/1944	Gouffern forest.	Fuel and Tanks.	B ?	Y	Bomb cratering.
19/07/1944	Belleville Viellet.	Fuel.	C69	?	Not assessed.
19/07/1944	Chateau de la Lucaziere.	Ammunition and fuel in Chateaux.	C83	?	Unconfirmed.
19/07/1944	Sille Le Guillaume forest.	Ammunition dump (With FLAK).	C84	N	Unconfirmed.

Table 2: 8 -21 July Allocated target numbers by SAS HQ.[37]

[37]Source TNA WO 219/2414, WO 219/2343, and WO 171/114 .



Figure 5: Haft 702 Targets 8 - 21 July.[38]

From 22 July to the 5 August SAS HQ allocated at least a further fifteen targets (Table 3 and Figure 6). A further target number B136 was also allocated, but as to whether this can be attributed to Blackman remains unknown. The temporary airfield at Lonrai was confirmed to be hosting aircraft. Nine of the targets supplied focused on fuel and ammunition, The remainder consisted of two related to administration installations and a repair facility and two to movements, which included a railway gun at Mortain. Blackman's report included a further three targets but these were made by the three Belgium parties. They have been included in Tables 3 and 4 for completeness (shaded rows).

[38]Locations supplied by Haft 702. Target identified by SAS HQ and allocated by HQ Airborne Troops. Map created using ArcGIS Pro by ESRI. Basemap sources: IGN,ESRI,HERE,USGS. https://services.arcgisonline.com/ArcGIS/rest/services/Canvas/World_Light_Grey_Reference/Mapserver .

Date Supplied	Location	Type	Target Number:	Aircraft despatched For attack. Y / ?	Military landscape trace
22/07/1944	Le Teilleul.	Fuel. 50000 litres in drums.	C78	?	Unconfirmed by landscape.
22/07/1944	Andaines forests No 2.	Fuel. Much fuel in the Drums S side of track.	C79	Y	Logistics storage earthworks: Bomb cratering. Depot related artefacts, (Remnants of fuel drums).
22/07/1944	SE Mayenne Chateau/Farm.	Fuel, Ammunition, and troops.	B81	Y	Unconfirmed by landscape.
25/7/1944	Lonrai.	50 Messerschmitt type 110 aircraft at airfield.	B105	Y	Unconfirmed by landscape.
25/7/1944	Butte Chaumont wood.	Fuel (Aviation?).	C106	Y	Logistics storage earthworks Depot related artefacts, (Remnants of fuel drums).
28/7/1944	St Paul Gautier.	70 lorries and repair depot.(Moving in 1 week).	B111 amended to B113 by signal.	Y	Unconfirmed by landscape.
29/7/1944	St Honorine Wood.	Fuel (SS).	B117	Y	Bomb cratering.
29/7/1944 Still occupied 4/8 with 200 men.	Malhouse NW end of village on river 4 Miles NW Lassay Les Chateaux.	Engineering technical HQ.	C118	?	Unconfirmed by landscape.
29/7/1944	1,5 Miles W of Frenes on river.	Administration HQ.	C119	?	Unconfirmed by landscape.
29/7/1944	St Berthevan.	Fuel.	C120	Y	Unconfirmed by landscape but full report made by RAF evaluation team of depot attack. 27 Nov 44 TNA WO291/1366.[2]

[2]	Mortain Railway Station.	Railway gun.	B121	Y	Unconfirmed by landscape.
29/7/1944	Ferté forest. Part of Andaines forest.	Ammunition.	B123	Y	Logistics related earthworks. Bomb cratering.
31/7/1944	Vibraye forest.	Ammunition.	B124	?	Not assessed.
1/8/1944. Still occupied 4/8	Woods c.1.5 miles NW Javron.	Fuel, Ammunition and 300 SS troops.	B126	?	Unconfirmed by landscape.
1/8/1944	Chateau. VY797543–-Y794530.	Fuel c 9000 Gallons. Ammunition20 tons on both sides of road running past Chateau.	C128	?	Unconfirmed by landscape.
4/8/1944	Direction Le Mans-Paris.	Movements retreat.	B132	?	Not examined;

Table 3 22 July – 5 August Allocated target numbers by SAS HQ.[39]

[39]Source TNA WO 219/2414 and WO 219/2343.



Figure 6: Haft 702 targets 22 July – 5 August. Locations allocated target numbers by SAS HQ.[40]

Intelligence gathered by Haft 702 5 – 11 August

From 5 August with the front fast approaching, enemy activity in the Haft 702 operating area intensified and most of their reports highlighted troop concentrations (Table 4 and Figure 7). Targets not specifically allocated are known to have been

[40]Map created using ArcGIS Pro by ESRI. Basemap sources: IGN,ESRI,HERE,USGS. https://services.arcgisonline.com/ArcGIS/rest/services/Canvas/World_Light_Grey_Reference/Mapserver.

incorporated into wider Armed Reconnaissance sorties and form part of further research.

Date submitted	Location or Comment	Detail	Intelligence Illustrated (Fig7)
05/08/1944	VP476992-444976	2 Tankers loaded with Nitro Glycerine.	B133
?	?		B136
7/8/1944	Château.	German Occupation.	B139
5/8/1944	La Baroche VY 9489 and VY 9977.	3000 Troops S all night from 0320 including Das Reich at 1000 on 4/8.	Intelligence Movements (IM)
7/8/1944	Domfront–Mayenne.	Reports say 5 German Divisions in area but no troops seen by Haft on road situation confused.	IM
8/8/1944	VZ 040750.	Road mined.	Intelligence Report
8/8/1944	Villaines.	German tanks S.	IM
8/8/1944	VY 960772.	German.	IM (HQ)
8/8/1944	Mortagne–Sees	Petrol supplies moving between nightly 0200?	IM
8/8/1944	St Pierre des Nids.	Large troop concentration.	IM
9/8/1944	In area between Mamers–Belleme–St Cosmev. V59	Reports 500 tanks night of 9/8.	IM
9/8/1944	VZ 195895.	Tank concentration.	IM
9/8/1944	SE Alençon	Tiger tanks part of Corps at chateau.	IM

Table 4. 5 – 11 August Intelligence supplied by Haft 702 (Source TNA WO 219/2414 and WO 219/2343a).



Figure 7: Locations of tactical Intelligence supplied in the closing days of the operation by Haft 702.[41]

Landscape Evidence – the influence of Haft 702 intelligence on Allied air strikes?

Tables 2 and 3 include a provisional assessment of whether a target area identified by Haft 702 intelligence reporting still contains any evidence of air attack in the modern landscape. This is an emerging area of research interest that draws on the archaeological study of forested landscapes in Normandy. Previous work has documented exceptionally well-preserved evidence of German military installations, especially logistics depots, and the bomb craters testifying to Allied attempts to

[41]Map created using ArcGIS Pro by ESRI. Basemap sources: IGN,ESRI,HERE,USGS. https://services.
arcgisonline.com/ArcGIS/rest/services/Canvas/World_Light_Grey_Reference/Mapserver.

destroy them.[42] A particular challenge in this field of research is the attempt to link bomb craters to specific raids, including discriminating between separate flights or boxes of aircraft (in the case of medium bomber attacks) or discrete squadrons (in the case of fighter-bombers). This can be impossible for areas hit by multiple bombing attacks, but crater attribution has been successful in cases where craters are marginal to heavily bombed areas and for targets struck by single raids. [43]

Two forest sites identified in this study serve to illustrate not only the challenge of crater attribution but also permit an evaluation of the influence of Haft 702 intelligence on target identification and the deployment of tactical air assets. The first is the Forêt Domaniale des Andaines, near Bagnoles de l'Orne, which at the beginning of the Normandy campaign was a key German Seventh Army logistics hub holding fuel, munitions and rations depots. The location of a major fuel depot had been identified and designated as a potential target in the January 1944 Tactical Target Dossier.[44] The area was repeatedly bombed by US Ninth Air Force medium and fighter-bombers during June 1944. However, Haft 702 reports fuel storage in this area on the 10, 12, 22 and 29 July (Tables 2 and 3), including a description of the target as 'well worth attacking again.' [45] It is likely this influenced the decision to conduct further raids on the 11, 12 and 24 July and 8 August. Today, the area formerly occupied by the northern part of the depot illustrates the extensive cratering as a result of multiple bombings (Figure 8). Further sites survive in this forest and are the subject of further work.

[42]Capps Tunwell, D., Passmore, D. G., & Harrison, S, 'Second World War bomb craters and the archaeology of Allied air attacks in the forests of the Normandie-Maine National Park, NW France'. *Journal of Field Archaeology*, *41*(3), 2016, 312–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/00934690.2016.1184930. Accessed 12 July 2025. Please note that this lies behind a paywall.

[43]Capps Tunwell, D., Passmore, D. G., & Harrison, S., 'A witness in the landscape: The bombing of the Forêt Domaniale des Andaines and the Normandy Campaign, NW France, 1944', *War in History*,*25*(1) 2017, 69-102.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344516650228. Accessed 12 July 2025 and also behind a paywall.

[44]TNA Air 40/1284,'Tactical Targets Laval Area'. Issued January 1944.

[45]TNA WO 219/2414, 'SAS Suggested targets for bombing', Signal Ref 00561, dated 10 July..



Figure 8. Cratering today in the Andaines forests.[46]

Figure 8 shows the cratering resulting from the bombing of the German fuel depot and aerial imaging coverage using LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging) of the same area showing extensive cratering and rectangular fuel earthwork bunkers for fuel storage.

The second forest site described here is in the Forêt de Grande Gouffern, Figure 9, which lies forty three kilometres to the northeast of Bagnoles de l'Orne. Reports of roadside fuel storage and tanks in the forest had been forwarded by Haft 702 on 18 July, and quick to act on this report, 2 Group (RAF Second Tactical Air Force) medium bombers were directed to attack on the night of 19/20 July. The raid appears to have struck the forest some two kilometres short of the target area. A second attack early on the 25 July by Typhoon fighter-bombers of 439 and 440 Squadrons. 143 Wing succeeded in dropping thirty eight one thousand pound GP bombs in the general area of the aiming point. Some thirty six impact craters in this area can be identified on an aerial photograph taken in June 1947.[47]

[46]Courtesy of the Office National des Fôrets, France.

[47]Full details of these raids and an exploratory archaeological survey in Passmore and Capps-Tunwell, '143 Wing (RCAF) Typhoons Over Normandy', *Journal of Canadian Military History*, 33;1,5 pp. 25 – 31. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2171&context=cmh. Accessed 12 July 2025.



Figure 9: Aerial photograph of the Fôret de Grande Gouffern taken in 1947.[48] The inset image shows example of a surviving bomb crater.

No indication of petrol fires or explosions was observed during the second raid. It is possible that any fuel stocks present at the time were sufficiently well dispersed to avoid impacts. It is more likely that the observed fuel had been moved in the seven

[48]IGNF_C1714-0021_1947_F1714-1815_0222 showing interpretation of bomb craters for 2 Group raid of 19/20 July and 143 Wing raid of 25 July, 1944, and craters located by archaeological survey.

days between the SAS intelligence reports and 25 July. If so, then this would emphasise the short shelf-life of intelligence reports of targets sited outside of fixed installations.

Clearly, while analysis of the landscape evidence has much to contribute to the history of SAS operations, it also adds to the inventory of sites that link to and commemorate SAS activities in the Normandy campaign.

Discussion

The mechanics of the employment of the intelligence supplied by Haft 702 is a complex subject. The time between intelligence and targets arriving at SHAEF from 21st Army Group and it being acted upon depended on several factors. Procedures that were agreed by command prior to the invasion proved to be too slow and cumbersome to work effectively. For example, the initial plan had been to pass the intelligence gathered back to the Theatre Intelligence Section to evaluate the targets before priorities were allocated for attack.[49]



Figure 10: Theoretical Procedure for Handling SAS suggested targets post 21 July 1944.

As the campaign progressed handling procedures developed so that by 21 July it was agreed that HQ SAS were to pass potential targets direct to 21st Army Group and its two representatives in Uxbridge, as opposed to sending its request first to HQ Airborne troops who would then in turn forward to 21st Army Group and then to

[49]TNA Air 20/8941,'SAS and SOE Targets and Operations'. Note: This file is incomplete, with minute pages and entries retained by the Ministry of Defence.

the advanced element of the Allied Expeditionary Airforce (AEAF; Figure 10).[50] This sped up the time between a target's submission and its attack. It was not until 18 August that AEAF 'Advanced' at Uxbridge were advised by the 'Main' element of the AEAF that the SAS were to send their urgent requests directly into AEAF 'Main' so that they could be 'filtered' and sent to the relevant tactical Air Force (Figure 10). [51]

A significant point to be made here is that Command at SHAEF recognised that away from the immediate battlefront area there was a gap in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) being supplied notwithstanding the data being supplied by sources such as the Sussex teams.[52] To the south and east of the front intelligence was being supplied by de Baissac, Haft 702 and various units of the Resistance such as the Indou group.[53] The Americans on the western side of the battlefront needed to augment their existing HUMINT on enemy troop movements.[54] To provide this intelligence a British SOE operation codenamed Helmsman under Major Jack Beresford Hayes was parachuted into France on 10 July and was met by de Baissac. Helmsman recruited 'trusted' members of the French population to make their way to the front, gathering information as they went to provide tactical intelligence to the American forces. No less than thirty one locally recruited agents made the journey and sixteen static agents were positioned to give intelligence to the Americans as they were liberated.[55]

Between 8 July and 11 August Haft 702 relayed around one hundred and twenty four messages, thirty-two were earmarked as targets by the SAS and thirty one can be attributed to specific points on the map; of these fourteen were attacked. The majority of these were fuel and ammunition sites (Tables 1 and 3), although this figure is likely to be conservative. A further fifty four reports on wider tactical intelligence were provided. As to how accurate some of the reports were must be questioned, such as the claim that some eight SS Divisions were present in the two forests, see Table 1; perhaps this was a typo or an exaggeration by local sources gathering information.

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[50]TNA WO 219/2414, 'SAS Suggested targets for bombing' Letter from HQ Airborne Troops - Commander SAS Troops dated 21 July 1944.

[51]TNA Air 20/8941, 'SAS and SOE Targets and Operations'.

[52]Sussex teams were two man British and American teams dropped into France to gather tactical information and relay it back to London by radio. Winslow, D. R. (2016). Operation Sussex: your worst enemy is your ally. *Intelligence and National Security*, *32*(2), 208–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2016.1248588.

[53]TNA Air 20/894,1'France and Low Countries CODE 55/2/3: SOE and SAS targets and operations'. & Fondation de la France Libre. https://www.france-libre.net/

[54]Foot. *SOE IN FRANCE,* p.359.

[55]TNA HS9/681/1,'Personnel file of J.B. Hayes'.

Initially, radio reports to SAS HQ were objective in content; however, by July 25 and 27, questions were being raised regarding bombing accuracy, observing 'extremely bad bombing on many targets'. In one report, after witnessing a lacklustre attack, Blackman went as far as to voice a view as to the 'lack of care and determination' of aircrew attacking.[56] The resulting exchanges between Allied Expeditionary Air Force Headquarters and HQ Airborne troops were handled with delicacy, not wishing to criticise the efforts of either the operation on the ground or the aircrew attacking targets.[57] Even now after eighty years have passed some residents still recall occasions when the Allies missed the target, for example the inaccurate bombing of Mayenne where 'Haft' reported between three and five hundred civilian fatalities.[58] A recurring theme during the operation was that when calling in targets, Blackman insisted on making the positions clear to avoid civilian casualties.

Overall, Haft 702 was operational at a key period of the Normandy campaign. By 5 August, the Americans were in the Avranches area (Figure 6, and Table 4). Between 5 August to the termination of the operation on 11 August as the front became more fluid, the nature of Haft 702 Tactical intelligence changed drastically. Before Cobra most targets concentrated on logistics targets with fewer being related to movements, with the battlefront becoming fluid this trend reversed.

The use of Haft 702 party to gather intelligence and assist with the 'instruction and advise to the local Resistance' forces without engaging the enemy appears unique in the Normandy campaign. However, the role played by Anderson with Haft 702 did allow the potential for some offensive activity.[59] When considered against other operations behind the enemy front line such as 1 SAS Operations' Bulbasket and Gain, which were attacking and harassing targets between one hundred and thirty and three hundred kilometres southwest of Paris, the role played by the main party of Haft 702 had more similarities to a Jedburgh operation than that of a contemporary SAS deployment.

The other SAS operation in lower Normandy at this time was Defoe which took place between 19 July – 23 August. Defoe's aim was similar to that of Haft 702, but its

[56]TNA Air 20/8946, 'Operation, France the Low Countries: SAS operations: progress reports and returns'.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Perso comment M. Gallienne L. 2nd Generation Mayenne resident.
[59]TNA WO 218/114, 'H.Q. S.A.S. Tps, War Office: Special Services War Diaries, Second World War. Special Services Units H.Q. S.A.S. Tps', Operating Instruction No 27 Ref HQ/SAS Tps/TSB/5G.H.Q. S.A.S. Tps. No date. And TNA WO/373/50/475 'Recommendation for Award for Blackman, Michael D'Arcy Rank Temporary Captain'. Blackman. Author comment. Blackman appears to have been using his initiative here.

success depended upon its ability to infiltrate through the front line in jeeps to establish itself in positions to transmit target information. It proved to be ill-conceived in its planning and its implementation. On arrival at its operating base, British Second Army HQ, they discovered the officer who had requested their presence had left. Subsequent operations attempted to penetrate the German lines facing the British and Americans to supply tactical intelligence but the results were mixed due to 'minefields, the confined countryside, and the concentrated presence of German troops.'[60] The SAS war diary for July judged such operations were 'not sufficiently practicable to justify the employment of SAS specialist troops.'[61] A Defoe unit did contact de Baissac and was told that no useful intelligence could be gathered . The likely reason for this assessment is that a roaming unit in jeeps would likely have attracted unwelcome attention from German forces and compromised both his work and that of Haft 702.

Clearly Haft 702 operations fitted into the space nearer to the frontline and not so far back in the enemy rear where jeep operations were not suited.

Shortly after the Normandy campaign, Browning, the Commanding Officer of British Airborne Forces, wrote to 21st Army Group observing that that the collation between SAS targets submitted in relation to those that had been attacked had not been done.[62] Available resources at the time likely contributed to the reasons why this was never undertaken. Future research will focus on the impact of the SAS on the employment of tactical airpower during the Normandy Campaign. and will seek to answer this question.

Conclusions

Haft 702 played a significant role in augmenting tactical target intelligence from behind the enemy lines during a key period of the Normandy campaign. The emerging picture here is enhancing our wider understanding of the use of intelligence in tactical bombing during the period.[63]

[60]TNA WO 218/114,'War Office: Special Services War Diaries, Second World War. Special Services Units H.Q. S.A.S. Tps'.

[61]Ibid.

[62]OPERATIONS, France and Low Countries CODE 55/2/3. SAS operations: progress reports and returns. Letter to 21st Army Group, 8 September 1944 TNA AIR 20/8946.

[63]Capps-Tunwell et al, 'An Evaluation of Allied Intelligence in the Tactical Bombing of German supply during the Normandy Campaign. 1944', *Journal of Military History*, Vol 84, No 3 2020; Passmore and Capps-Tunwell, '143 Wing (RCAF) Typhoons Over Normandy: Some Operational, Geographical and Archaeological Perspectives', *Canadian Military History*, Vol 33, No 1 2024.

The operation was no doubt cost effective, fourteen targets highlighted by Haft 702 were attacked and the actual total was likely to have been much higher. In addition, valuable intelligence was supplied on German troop movements, morale, and locations of road improvement, the operation of railway lines and the construction of airfields. When taken as part of the wider context of intelligence gathering during the Normandy campaign, its contribution needs to be considered as a valuable tile in the overall intelligence gathering mosaic. There can be no doubt that the information being fed into the intelligence picture contributed to the general planning of aerial Armed Reconnaissance operations behind the lines but it was not the sole source of intelligence being fed back. Further study is ongoing to better understand the use of SAS intelligence during the campaign. Haft 702 clearly does not fit into the generally accepted narrative of the wartime SAS which highlighted fast hit-and-run tactics to undermine the enemy's ability to operate and damage morale.

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The Regio Esercito's Fatalities, 1940-1943

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ABSTRACT
The Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) fought no less than seven conventional campaigns against five opponents on two continents between 10 June 1940 and 8 September 1943, and in which around 133,667 servicemen died or went missing. Compared to the death toll of Italy's First World War, from May 1915 to November 1918, this is a surprisingly low figure. It is also a misleading and superficial figure as each campaign had its own lethal dynamic. Based on the few Italian sources available, this note compares the fatality rates for the campaigns and highlights downplayed facts and unknowns; and advocates for further and innovative research in the Albo d'Oro della Seconda Guerra Mondiale.

Few armies experienced the Second World War as did the Italian Royal Army, the *Regio Esercito*. From 10 June 1940 to 8 September 1943, in a period of almost thirty-nine months, it fought no less than seven conventional campaigns against five opponents on two continents.[1] These were non-sequential military efforts with different objectives, scopes, magnitudes, and endings. The *Regio Esercito* fought Mussolini's 'parallel war' before defeats forced the organisation to join Hitler's war in a subsidiary role. The ordeal ended in the army's quasi-disintegration after Italy's unconditional surrender on 8 September 1943, forty-five days after the fall of Mussolini; the man the army (and the other services) had served obediently since his rise to power in 1922.[2]

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[1]Against France in the Alps from 21 to 24 June 1940, Great Britain in East and North Africa respectively from June 1940 to November 1941, and June 1940 to May 1943), Greece and Yugoslavia from October 1940 to April 1941), and the Soviet Union from August 1941 to March 1943), and finally, the Allied forces in Sicily from July to August 1943. That list does not mention occupation duties in France from June 1940 to October 1943, in the Balkans, and the Aegean from April 1941 to September 1943.

[2]The *Regio Esercito* became a co-belligerent force with the Allied armies. See Richard Carrier, 'The Regio Esercito in Co-Belligerency, October 1943-April 1945', in

Over the last decade or so, our understanding of Mussolini's campaigns has notably improved, especially for the English readership. Insightful articles on the North African campaign brought new perspectives.[3] Two recent collections of essays explored neglected aspects of the Fascist wars.[4] In 2019, Scianna published the first comprehensive monograph on the army's involvement on the Eastern Front.[5] A study of the *Regio Esercito*'s performance in the war against Greece came two years later.[6] In the meantime, Gooch's monograph on the dictator's wars, a well-documented work, was published in 2020.[7] Finally, an accurate handbook on the Italian army based on primary sources is now available.[8]

However, one aspect of these campaigns is often neglected and underplayed – the human cost. Most Italian and non-Italian scholars have not undertaken the hard and unappealing work of compiling data, comparing losses, and putting the casualty numbers into perspective. Yet, the demographic cost of a war, or a campaign, is often revealing of its nature and intensity. Thanks to Giorgio Rochat and Antonio Rossi, the human cost of the *Duce*'s ambitions is no longer an enigma. Both have dissected the 1957 official survey as no other scholars have and their knowledge of the relevant sources is indispensable.[9] Therefore, despite some limitations and inaccuracies, their

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Emanuele Sica and Richard Carrier (eds.), *Italy and the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives,* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2018), pp. 95-125.

[3]Richard Carrier, 'Some Reflections on the Fighting Power of the Italian Army in North Africa, 1940-1943', *War in History*, 22, 4 (2015), pp. 503-528; Bastian Matteo Scianna, 'Rommel Almighty? Italian Assessments of the 'Desert Fox' During and After the Second World War', *The Journal of Military History*, 82, 1 (2018), pp. 125-146.

[4]Sica and Carrier (eds.), *Italy and the Second World War*; Mario Maria Aterrano and Karine Varley (eds.), *A Fascist Decade of War: 1935-1945 in International Perspective,* (London: Routledge, 2020).

[5]Bastian Matteo Scianna, *The Italian War on the Eastern Front*, *1941-1943: Operations, Myths and Memories,* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). In Italian, see Maria Teresa Giusti, *La campagna di Russia, 1941-1943,* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016).

[6]Richard Carrier, *Mussolini's Army against Greece, October 1940-April 1941,* (London: Routledge, 2021); also Pier Paolo Battistelli, *The Balkans 1940-41: Mussolini's Fatal Blunder in the Greco-Italian War* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2021).

[7]John Gooch, *Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy from Triumph to Collapse, 1935-1943* (London: Allen Lane, 2020).

[8]Pier Paolo Battistelli, *Mussolini's Army at War: Regio Esercito, Commands and Divisions,* (Milan: Agrafe Books, 2021). This note was prepared before the publication of James J. Sadkovich, *Fascist Italy at War: Men and Materiel,* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2025).

[9]Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Morti e dispersi per cause belliche negli anni 1940-45,* (Rome: Repubblica Italiana, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, 1957). Rochat noted that the

work remains the most reliable and accessible analysis with their work the starting point for further research.[10]

This research note briefly presents and compares the *Regio Esercito*'s fatalities, dead and missing in action, in the seven conventional campaigns fought between June 1940 and August 1943.[11] The author's analysis is based on: the referenced works; the 1957 survey; and Italian secondary sources including the campaign official histories published by the *Ufficio storico, Stato Maggiore Esercito* (USSME). Over the years the author has learned that the army archives provide partial figures, while the journals of army divisions (*diari storici*) often contain fragmentary information. As those sources are incomplete and contradictory, this research note provides estimates that are seen to be reasonable, but nevertheless debatable. Margins of error in both the numbers and the percentages are inevitable.

By way of introduction, it is important to expose Italy's losses during the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1945, almost 450,000 Italians, military and civilians, lost their lives – see Table 1.[12] Considering that the *Albo d'Oro della Seconda Guerra Mondiale* contains the names of 319,207 military, it can be assumed that roughly 130,000 civilians also died during the war.[13]

abundance of data makes the work difficult to use. Moreover, if the figures on civilian deaths are dependable, those on military fatalities are not and caution is necessary.

[10]Giorgio Rochat, 'Una ricerca impossibile: Le perdite italiane nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale', *Italia Contemporanea*, no. 201, December 1995, pp. 687-700; also Rochat, *Le guerre italiane 1935-1943. Dall'impero d'Etiopia alla disfatta,* (Turin: Einaudi, 2008), pp. 439-444; and Antonio Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945, gli Italiani caduti: breve storia del conflitto in cifre', *Quaderno Autonomi*, no. 19, 1996, pp. 5-48. Rossi's analysis rests upon the careful use of many different sources, including the *Albo d'Oro della Seconda Guerra Mondiale*.

[11]In some cases, aviators and sailors are included in the figures. The body counts of Italian occupations and counterinsurgency operations prior to September 1943 are not included in the author's analysis.

[12]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 440 and Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945,' p. 11.

[13]See Massimo Multari, https://www.campagnadirussia.info/i-caduti-del-fronte-orientale/. Accessed 11 Aug 2025. p. 4. The *Albo d'Oro* is the national register of the names of the military who died in the Second World War. It includes the service members of the armed forces, the partisans, but also those who fought for the *Republicca Sociale Italiana*. In 2019 the Italian Ministry of Defence made the *Albo d'Oro* as a database available to the public.

	10 June 1940 to 8 September 1943	9 September 1943 to 31 December 1945	Total
From Rochat	226,532	210,149	444,523 (including 7,842 deaths of undetermined date)
From Rossi	225,274	218,963	444,242

Table 1: Italy's Death Toll: 1940 to 1945, (military and civilian, men and women, all locations, all causes of death).[14]

Italian military personnel died from combat related actions in different locations, although mostly in Europe and in Africa, and from their injuries and disease in hospitals abroad or in Italy, and in prison camps. In contrast, the human cost of the First World War was somewhere around the commonly held figure of 650,000 service members.[15] Most men died in the bloody campaign against Austria-Hungary that was fought between May 1915 and October 1918.[16] The figures speak for themselves: and that less Italians died in the Second World War than in the First World War is a blessing. However, the context was very different, and it is possible to talk about two different wars in succession: the first from 1940 to 1943; and the second from 1943 to 1945. The first period coincided with Mussolini's campaigns where most deaths were combat related. The second period transformed the Italian peninsula into a battlefield where there was a clash between the Allied and German forces; Allied bombing, German atrocities, and a civil war between Italians partisans and those loyal to Mussolini also contributed to the death toll.[17]

[14]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 440 and Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945,' p. 11.
[15]Mario Isnenghi and Giorgio Rochat, *La Grande Guerra, 1914-1918,* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 470-471. For a new perspective based on an innovative approach, Alessio Fornasin, 'The Italian Army's Losses in the First World War', *Population*, vol. 72, no. 1, 2017, pp. 39-62. Using the *Albo d'Oro* of the First World War, Fornasin arrived at 558,000 military deaths.
[16]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 440. War related deaths after 1918 and 1945 are not included.
[17]For the details, see Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 443.

Between June 1940 and September 1943, the Fascist regime mobilised 4,500,000 men. According to Rossi, the total of military fatalities is 197,066 of whom 160,466 served in the army, 11,940 in the air force, and 24,660 in the navy.[18] Using Rossi's data, the author estimates that 133,667 of these deaths occurred in the seven conventional campaigns studied here, and this is a low figure in the context of a war waged over three years – see Table 2. Yet each campaign had its own lethal dynamic, an expression the author uses to describe the multiple variations in which fatalities occurred. It refers to geography, duration, intensity of fighting, and the causes of death among other things.

Location and date	Number of fatalities	Percentage of total death count
France *(June 1940)*	1,251	0,9%
East Africa *(June 1940-November 1941)*	5,511	4,0%
North Africa *(June 1940-May 1943)*	19,882	14,8%
Greece/Albania *(October 1940-April 1941)*	23,684	17,7%
Soviet Union *(August 1941-March 1943)*	79,789	59,6%
Sicily *(July-August 1943)*	3,550	2,6%

Table 2: The Regio Esercito's Fatalities: 10 June 1940 to 8 September 1943.[19]

The four-day Alpine campaign against France from 21 to 24 June 1940 took 1,251 Italian lives and represents a mere 0.9% of the aggregate Italian figure of 133,667; but this was still a fatality rate of 313 deaths per day.[20] This fighting took place in very difficult terrain, against a skilled enemy having the advantage of sound defensive positions. The French request for an armistice saved many Italian soldiers. The unwinnable campaign in Ethiopia and Somalia cost 5,511 men, Italian nationals, or 4.1%

[18]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', pp. 7-8. For slightly different figures, see Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, pp. 441-442. Both authors included in their figures the civilians mobilized by the three services (*civili militarizzati*).

[19]Source Rossi.

[20]The author calculates the percentages and the ratios using the data of either Rochat or Rossi, and has excluded the injured and prisoners of war.

of the total.[21] Except for some episodes, such as Battle of Keren in early February 1941, the campaign was characterised by low intensity fighting over a prolonged period of time from June 1940 to November 1941; the date the last Italian stronghold surrendered. Unsurprisingly, the campaigns in North Africa, in Greece/Albania, and in the Soviet Union belong to a different category.

The North African campaign from 10 June 1940 to 13 May 1943 took the lives of 19,882 men, Italian nationals, or 14,8% of the total.[22] Rossi calculated that 4,845 men died in Egypt, 11,310 in Libya, and 3,727 in Tunisia. These figures roughly coincide with the sequential unfolding of operations between the summer of 1940 and the spring of 1943. In Libya, the many violent encounters of 1941-1942 took their toll, during Operations Compass and Crusader for example, while the battles of El Alamein in Egypt, and the Mareth line and Enfidaville in Tunisia probably account for the majority of the deaths in each country. However, as exact body counts for the battles in North Africa are unknown, estimates prevail.[23] *Africa settentrionale* was the *Regio Esercito*'s longest and most important campaign at thirty-five months, but was not its deadliest as the monthly ratio amounted to some 570 dead or missing. Besides losses in battle captivity in North Africa *did not result in the high fatality rates faced by the men of the Armata italiana* in Russia (ARMIR).

The death toll of the campaign against the Greek army, 28 October 1940 to 23 April 1941 has for a long time been a source of confusion and discrepancies. In his seminal work, Mario Montanari reported 13,755 dead and 25,067 missing in action, and 'most of them dead on the battlefield.'[24] For years, respected scholars have repeated these figures with confidence.[25] Actually, we now know from the *Archivio of the Ufficio storico* that most *dispersi* were indeed prisoners, some 21,153, who were released after the armistice while probably 3,914 died on the battlefield.[26] Considering that Montanari had unlimited access to the army archives, his assumption about the *dispersi* is surprising. Moreover, the fact that he did not use at all, or even mention, the 1957 official survey is puzzling. Statisticians of the *Istituto* arrived at a death toll of 16,584.[27]

[21]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 12.
[22]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 12; Rochat gave 20,000 as an indicative figure.
[23]For instance on El Alamein, Pier Paolo Battistelli, *La guerra dell'Asse: Strategie e collaborazione militare di Italia e Germania, vol. 2, 1942-1943*, (Milan : Agrafe, 2020), p. 394.
[24]Montanari, *L'esercito italiano nella campagna di Grecia,* (Rome: SMEUS, 1991), p. 805.
[25]For instance, see Gooch, *Mussolini's War*, p. 185.
[26]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, pp. 280-281. 1 The author has learned that teams of the field hospital in Berat found 3,395 bodies after the armistice. See Carrier, *Mussolini's Army*, p. 151.
[27]Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Morti e dispersi*, p. 12, 14.

In his 1995 article, Rochat estimated that the fatality total in Greece for the three services could be as high as 30,000.[28] In *Le guerre italiane*, Rochat gave 'well over 20,000,' while Rossi came to the precise figure of 23,684.[29] It is likely that both Rochat and Rossi assumed that thousands of the 50,874 injured men died in hospitals in Albania and Italy after April 1941. Rossi's 23,684 dead represented 17,7% of the total, but the monthly ratio of 3,947 fatalities during a period of 176 days, indicates the intensity of the fighting. The forgotten campaign against Greece was a short, but painful and bloody experience that only ended when Germany invaded Greece.

Mussolini's desire to join the Nazi crusade in the East stands alone in terms of fatalities. In Ukraine and in Russia, the *Regio Esercito* faced its deadliest enemy. The death toll, 79,789 men, meant that 59,6% of all Italian army combatants died in the Soviet Union, and at a monthly ratio of 4,693 deaths.[30] However, this last figure is misleading as the soldiers of the *Corpo di spedizione italiano in Russia* (CSIR) and the ARMIR experienced different destinies. The CSIR's operations started in August 1941 and coincided with the German victories of 1941-1942, when General Messe's 62,000 men supported Italy's Axis ally in small-scale engagements. Accordingly, from August 1941 to July 1942, fatalities were fewer at 1,792 dead, a rate of about 150 men dead per month.[31] Conversely, the ARMIR experienced costly fighting from the beginning. Between 20 August and 1 September 1942, the First Defensive Battle on the Don, no less than 2,704 men died.[32] Then, a disaster happened: between 11 December and 20 March 1943, in just over three months, the ARMIR lost 74,800 men.[33] Men died in combat, in retreats, in marches, on trains in transit to captivity, and in camps.[34] Rochat argued that most prisoners died in the summer of 1943, while Rossi underlined that only

[28]Rochat, 'Una ricerca impossibile', p. 689.

[29]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 280, 442; Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 12. In both cases, the figures included men of the three services, and those who died in the operations against Yugoslavia. Rossi also included army personnel who died at sea. For a detailed analysis, see Carrier, *Mussolini's Army*, pp. 149-152.

[30] Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 12. Rochat agreed that 80,000 dead is a 'reliable' figure, although not a definitive one. Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 442. In an article posted in August 2023 on the website *Progetto storia e memoria della campagna di Russia 1941-1954*, Colonel Massimo Multari gave 88,548 as the total body count of the Eastern front. See Multari, 'I caduti del fronte orientale', p. 4.

[31]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 14. In addition, the *3rd Celere* lost 251 men between 30 July to 13 August during the battle of Serafimovich. See Scianna, *The Italian War on the Eastern Front*, pp. 132-133.

[32]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 14. Then the Soviet paused and only 242 Italians died between 2 September and 10 December.

[33]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 14.

[34]An unknown number of men died in field hospitals to the rear of the ARMIR.

10,030 of them ever came back to Italy.[35] The *Regio Esercito*'s fatalities fighting the Soviet Union were roughly four times that incurred in the longer North African campaign. It should not therefore be a surprise that the campaign in the east figures so highly in the collective memory of Italians after 1945.

Finally, the Sicilian campaign from 10 July to 17 August 1943 offers figures with great discrepancies. Rossi estimated that 3,550 men died in the fighting, while Santoni wrote that 4,678 men had proper burials on the island.[36] The men of the *Livorno* and *Napoli* divisions probably accounted for a good part of these deaths as both infantry divisions were involved in failed counterattacks in the days immediately after the Allied landings. Furthermore, Santoni added that 36,072 men went missing, that an unknown amount of them ended up in mass graves, and others were left on the battlefield.[37] For the sake of consistency, the author has used, even if it might be too low, Rossi's figure for the death toll of the five-week Sicilian campaign against the Allies, 2,6% of the total of the period. For many soldiers, dying in a lost cause and for a hated dictator was not an option; hence many chose captivity or deserted en masse.[38]

In conclusion, the author reiterates that all of the above figures are, at best, plausible estimates with inherent margins of error. They indicate how each campaign took its toll and how context mattered. The fact that the French Army gave up fighting in June 1940 resulted in a low total casualty rate; and there can be no doubt that the German intervention against Greece in April 1941 also saved many Italian lives. By comparison the long North African campaign, which was characterised by intense but relatively short battles, killed a limited number of Italian, German, and Allied soldiers, a fact rarely noticed in the historiography. Furthermore, only 7,077 Italian prisoners died in British and American prisoner of war camps.[39] In contrast, the *Regio Esercito*'s operations against the Red Army were part of the deadliest campaign of the European war. Only the withdrawal of the ARMIR from the Don and its repatriation could have saved tens of thousands of men. That decision never came. Finally, the Sicilian campaign

[35]Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, p. 442; Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 14.
[36]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 14; also Santoni, *Le operazioni in Sicilia e in Calabria, luglio-settembre 1943,* (Rome: SMEUS, 1989) p. 401.
[37]Santoni, *Le operazioni in Sicilia e in Calabria*, p. 401. Santoni did not give any sources to back up these figures.
[38]The author believes that most *dispersi* deserted, while 116,681 became prisoners. See Santoni, *Le operazioni in Sicilia e in Calabria*, p. 401.
[39]Rossi, 'Guerra 1940-1945', p. 15. However, a number of prisoners ended up in French hands in North Africa and experienced particularly harsh conditions of detention, 3,000 died. See Anna Maria Isastia (ed.), *I prigionieri di guerra nella storia d'Italia* (Rome: Edizioni ANRP, 2003), pp. 109-151; on the fate of Italian prisoners, see Rochat, *Le guerre italiane*, pp. 445-451.

marked the end of the army as the *Duce*'s fighting force and offered it the opportunity and its thousands of men to exit the war alive.

The late Giorgio Rochat once wrote that any attempt to analyse the Italian losses in the Second Word War is an impossible task, *una ricerca impossibile*.[40] That was thirty years ago, and things might change. For instance, by using the *Albo d'Oro della Seconda Guerra Mondiale,* Massimo Multari has shed new light on the fatalities of the campaign against the Soviet Union (see Fn 30). He systematically compared the data in the *Albo d'Oro* with that campaign's official history. The archives of the *Albo d'Oro* are located in Rome, and according to Multari, are open for research by appointment.[41] Unfortunately, Multari did not explain how he used the archives, and how they are organised. Yet, his work proved that a determined scholar, willing to overcome the usual red tape, could achieve similar results for Italy's other campaigns. If so, our understanding of the fate of the *caduti* who lost their lives between June 1940 and September 1943 could be improved.

[40]Rochat, 'Una ricerca impossibile', p. 700.

[41]The author believes that there is more to learn from the Italian military archives. While the army archives are currently closed (with no known date for reopening), the air force and navy *archivi* are open to the public by appointment.

Lucian Staiano-Daniels, *The War People: A Social History of Common Soldiers during the Era of the Thirty Years War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. 228 pp. ISBN 978-1009428415 (hardback). Price £85.

Luciano Staiano-Daniels' first book is not just a well-researched volume, but one of the first to merge the perspectives of military history and microhistory. The latter may be better seen as a perspective rather than a field and is particularly close to the different levels through which warfare can be studied, also for technical reasons. The author therefore uses the microscope to look at a specific regiment at the beginning of the seventeenth century and within a specific timespan and place. As thoroughly explained in the doctoral thesis at the origin of this first monograph, and in the different aspects explored in recent years, the investigations consider the regiment mobilised by Wolf von Mansfeld in service of Spain and the transnational life of its members. Staiano-Daniels also reflects in this way on some of the elements considered central to the warfare of these years, investigating the processes of transformation, particularly the much-debated Military Revolution and the theory of the Fiscal-Military State, and whether these had relevance to the actual life of the soldiers, or if other aspects were more influential.

One of the elements behind this research is the thesis that the experience of the soldiers who composed this regiment (*Das Kriegsvolk*) was, first of all, a collective human experience, with some specificities but fundamentally normed and subject to formal and informal rules, as in every other collectivity of the time. The methodological insight is that, for the author, these aggregation dynamics must be studied from a closer perspective, because it is there that we understand them. This view emerges from the 'history from below' tradition and its ties to the *War and Society* studies. This is also visible in the predilection for the type of sources available and used: the judiciary and criminal documents and the administrative ones. In essence, often not ego-documents, but testimonies written by others that tell us about ordinary soldiers or report their voices. In this case, this has been made possible by the extraordinary archival documentation found, organized, and studied systematically by Lucian Staiano-Daniels for the first time. These sources—though not the only ones used—were produced by the regiment's bureaucracy and employed for the first time from an internal point of view, rather than an external one as in the past, such as in the extraordinary works of David Parrott. This allows us to understand how the soldiers described and perceived themselves as righteous, not in the act of working but in service of a duty (which implied a code of honor), therefore in contrast with the historical myth of a bunch of rootless mercenaries, for which the author also seeks an explanation.

Across nine chapters, the author follows the formation of the regiment in Dresden and its descent into Italy in 1625, a mobilisation intended to intervene during the Valtelline War for the defense of Milan and its roads to Tirol. Particular attention is devoted to how the soldiers actually lived and moved. The regiment was divided into smaller groups for marching and quartering in different areas to sustain themselves or be resupplied by the regimental logistics. These environments are framed by the author to analyze how the soldiers lived, particularly how the mechanisms of cohesion (exploring the social dynamics of primary groups, which the author reformulates as small group cohesion) worked during daily life and not in combat, discussing theses used for the seventeenth century by Geoffrey Parker, Gregory Hanlon and others, and expanding them to include women's roles, as integral parts of the military community.

The author also includes a gender perspective in the different aspects of masculinity in this society, reflecting on how it influenced the experience of living together. In different chapters, the focus is also on how these behaviors, for different reasons, led to homicides or violent internal actions, and on how it is possible to follow them through the criminal processes of the regiment, that had its own jurisdiction and was therefore more ordered than often assumed. Particular attention is also given to the status of soldiers, how mobility and recruiting functioned, the importance of veterans, and other essential elements for which the author presents important quantitative and well-analyzed data. Among these, the serious study of the pay system is especially important and how this was part of the economy of the time, clarifying new elements of how warfare was conducted in the early seventeenth century. Furthermore, another problem assessed is the importance of the spatial element and the relation between civilians, who weren't always disarmed victims, and the military world, highlighting how this link was highly conflictual, partly due to the lack of quarters and forced cohabitation, but was central to warfare, as recently also demonstrated from the operational point of view by Peter Wilson, Katerina Tkacova, and Thomas Pert. In the end, the last chapter focuses on the reasons that contributed to the disbandment of the regiment and on how and why it dissolved in 1627.

As is often affirmed in microhistory studies, this book explores the normal exceptionality of a case study, reflecting on the extraordinary elements of something that was common for the period, and could therefore be used, hopefully, for future comparisons. Certainly, this book adds a new and essential study to the field of early modern military history, but also to the social and economic history of the same period, researching new documents with a fresh perspective. Those interested in operational warfighting will not find many elements for their studies (actual fighting is analyzed in the case of a raid), but this cannot be considered a negative element of the book, as is also specified in the subtitle: 'A Social History of Common Soldiers…'. Furthermore, the book is also important for every military historian and researcher

interested in War Studies from a wide perspective. Indeed, to put it briefly, the book reflects on the kind of efforts that in warfare go 'wasted' from a strategic point of view, and the efforts to sustain war. Reflecting on these aspects is always useful to remember the degree of uncertainty in the decisions that define a certain strategy of certain historical actors, and that these choices are taken in a dynamic sequence, not following a certain plan: the Mansfeld regiment went to Italy too late to take part in the war, but disbanded too early for the following war in Italy (just one year after the collapse). From another perspective, reflecting on how the reality of military transformations is not linear, but full of different possibilities engaged, the investment of efforts that sometimes go wasted, and the coexistence of contrasting mechanisms, is always central. To look at how these processes developed in the first half of the seventeenth century offers food for thought for military historians of any period.

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Graeme J. Milne. *Making Men in the Age of Sail: Masculinity, Memoir, and the British Merchant Seafarer, 1860-1914*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2024. 270 pp. ISBN: 978-0228021308 (paperback). Price £31

In this most interesting and informative book Graeme Milne examines the society and culture of sailors on British merchant sailing ships during the late nineteenth and very early twentieth centuries. Although merchant sailing ships were being replaced by steamships during this period, they were still significant in number until after the Great War. They were publicly portrayed in a large body of literature, especially in fictional literature that tended to romanticise seafaring. Milne's major sources are not fictional, however. He has used forty-one memoirs published from 1883 to 1971 by former seamen, most of whom had come to enjoy middle-class status. Milne tells his readers how these memoir writers sought to represent merchant seafarers in this period, but he also uses the memoirs to provide his readers with a wealth of information about merchant sailing, while recognizing the biases of these authors.

As indicated in his title, a major interest of both Milne and his memoir writers is in masculinity. Milne observes that during the nineteenth century traditional gender roles were challenged ideologically and by changes in the nature of work, but that gender divisions of labour hardly declined and that masculinity continued to be celebrated in

British culture. Sailing provided a relatively extreme case of both the gender division of labour and the celebration of masculinity. Ironically, the exclusion of women from ship work meant that men sometimes had to perform such tasks as sewing that would normally be carried out by women. For the most part, however, the sailor's job was perceived as highly masculine. Indeed for sailors a unique masculinity was recognized that required exceptional strength, endurance, skill, and courage.

Yet Milne joins with writers who reject the notion that there is one monolithic masculinity. At the risk of oversimplification we can say the memoirs give us two opposite masculinities: firstly, sailors were, in varying degrees, rough, crude, violent, and even degenerate; and secondly, they were practical and responsible in their work and in private life. Milne points out that many sailors were married, with families whom they supported; or they aspired to eventually taking on marriage as a manly responsibility.

In addition to masculinity, the other major concern of this book is with status and status competition. Milne analyses formal status structures on the ships, the ranking of sailors from Ordinary Seamen to Officers and Captains. In addition, among new recruits higher status was enjoyed by those who were destined to become officers. These 'apprentices' as they were called were increasingly drawn from the middle class and were more educated than other sailors.

This formal status structure was confounded by an informal structure that accorded higher status to sailors who were more experienced and knowledgeable, and more skilled and risk-taking. The co-presence of these formal and informal hierarchies sometimes resulted in more knowledgeable sailors having to take orders from less experienced officers, in the backbiting of more educated sailors, and even in the humiliation and marginalisation of apprentices, especially those who came from wealthy families. Yet the co-presence of the two status hierarchies could also lead to voluntary status reversals in teaching as well as beneficial friendships and mentorships between sailors of different formal status. Complicating matters further was the informal status hierarchy that was based on nationality and race. Racial prejudices were ingrained in British society and were by no means absent on sailing ships, but they were restrained by the dependence of sailors on one another, by the skill and knowledge of many non-British sailors, and by friendships formed between sailors of different nationality or race. As other research has shown, crews on sailing ships were anomalous in British society and its empire as a result of their necessarily more cosmopolitan composition.

Another tension in the sailing-ship culture can be found in the opposition between individualism and corporatism. Most of a sailor's self-esteem lay in his individual status and abilities. It is also true that sailors worked for a considerable time on their own;

indeed, seafarers were not supposed to talk with one another while on watch, except to answer questions from their officers. On the other hand, they did interact a great deal with one another; most crew members recognised their mutual dependence on one another; they thought that the faithful performance of duty was an indicator of manliness; and they were highly aware of the need for discipline on sailing ships. Citing Irving Goffman, Milne plays with the idea that these sailing ships were 'total institutions': most of a seafarer's life was spent interacting with other sailors on ships; their entire day was regulated by the imperatives of their work; according to memoir writers sailors assumed a somewhat different language on board ship; and they were reportedly reluctant to tell their yarns on shore. Yet in important respects Milne's sailing ships were different from the strict definition of 'total institutions'. There was frequent turnover in personal relations; sailors had significant connections with people on shore; and they were interested in the way the public perceived them.

Milne's book reveals certain similarities between his merchant sailors and those on sailing ships in the Royal Navy. Both were a symbol of Britishness even though they were drawn from only certain districts in the British Isles. Both occupations were risky. Both were a symbol of manhood, positively, but also negatively; they had similar reputations for sexual immorality, especially in foreign ports. Yet there were also significant differences between Royal Navy and Merchant Navy seafarers. Royal Navy sailors were obviously under more government control. Merchant sailors could even abandon or switch ships in British or foreign ports. And the Royal Navy was a symbol of Britishness and was used by government officials for political and cultural purposes.

Although Milne's memoir writers were certainly willing to acknowledge negative traits of merchant sailors, what is perhaps remarkable is that for the most part their portraits of these sailors do not seem to have been negatively shaped by their own middle-class status. Rather, especially after 1920, they generally sought to provide a patriotic memorialisation of seafarers on merchant sailing ships and to portray them positively in the imagery of British rule of the seas and imperial domination. In some ways, however, the story of sailing ships only contributed to the decline of this imagery. Eventually many people saw their disappearance as symptomatic of the overall decline in British standing in the world.

Making Men in the Age of Sail is highly recommended, not only to those who have an interest in maritime history, but also to anyone just looking for a good read.

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John Nichol, *The Unknown Warrior: A Personal Journey of Discovery and Remembrance*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2024. 400 pp. ISBN: 978-1398509443 (hardback). Price £22.

The First World War was an unparalleled and unprecedented conflict; it left millions of dead and over 300,000 British men missing. Equally tragic was that many British families wondered what had happened to their loved ones and could not bury them, leaving many families without a sense of closure. In *The Unknown Warrior: A Personal Journey of Discovery and Remembrance*, historian John Nichol traces the journey of the Unknown Warrior from the battlefields of France to his final resting place at Westminster Abbey for the 11 November 1920 Armistice Day commemoration. The idea for the Unknown Warrior was conceived by David Railton, a padre who served with the British and witnessed and experienced the suffering of his comrades, and who believed that many families could not say goodbye to their missing loved ones and needed to unburden themselves of emotional pain. Railton advocated that the Unknown Warrior could serve as a symbol for millions of mourning families and bring together a nation to heal.

Nichol explores the symbolic significance of the Unknown Warrior. The mystery behind the identification of the Unknown Warrior was that he could have been a soldier or officer from any branch of the British military, who could have been killed at any point during the war. The Unknown Warrior's class status, ethnicity, and religion would not have mattered to the mourning families. The shrouded mystery of the Unknown Warrior, as Railton anticipated, was that he could give hope to grieving British families that he could be any family's deceased loved one.

Nichol relies on primary sources to tell the narrative of the Unknown Warrior, including newspapers, primary sources within secondary sources, and letters. The author's analysis of Prime Minister David Lloyd George's 29 November 1920, letter to Dean Herbert Ryle of Westminster Abbey reveals that the Unknown Warrior brought Britain together to mourn: 'It was a striking tribute to the memory of those gallant men who were so foully murdered in the performance of their duties and a true expression of grief felt by all classes in the country' (p.185-186). The funeral of the Unknown Warrior united all British people to come together for a single day and collectively mourn for their deceased loved ones. The outpouring of collective grief allowed families to find solace in one another as they were not alone in expressing their personal pain.

As difficult as it was for families to picture the Unknown Warrior as their loved ones, Nichol demonstrates that the Unknown Warrior's funeral allowed families to begin to heal: 'For many thousands of families, the funeral of the Unknown Warrior had, at last,

brought some of the equilibrium they had so desperately sought' (p.188). The burial of the Unknown Warrior permitted families the opportunity to say goodbye to their loved ones, especially after years of anticipating their unknown fate. While the funeral brought relief to some families, many more remained in mourning for the rest of their lives. Their loved ones were still missing on the Western Front with no known graves, waiting to be found, collected, and buried. In many cases, the bodies of the missing were never found.

Nichol's *The Unknown Warrior* is a heart-wrenching narrative that captures the emotional distress of the First World War. It is a riveting story that depicts the raw violence and destruction of the war, as well as the countless casualties of an entire destruction of young British men. Nichol's text is recommended for general historians, including history undergraduates, and does not specialise in a specific area of the history of the First World War. *The Unknown Warrior* is also a reminder that grief is unparalleled. Even in the twentieth century, as Nichol recounts, the families of those military personnel who served in Afghanistan are still impacted by the losses of war and the need to somehow rebuild their lives without the presence of their loved ones. While the nature and technological impact of warfare has changed over the last 100 years, 'the ceremony of death and remembrance goes on' as grief can be a unifying presence across multiple generations (p.148).

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Lavinia Greacen (Ed.), *Military Maverick: Selected Letters and War Diary of 'Chink' Dorman-Smith*. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2024. xii + 316 pp., 8 maps & 8 b/w photos. ISBN: 978-1036102272 (hardback). Price £29.95.

Eric Dorman-Smith has been described as his own worst enemy but many of his contemporaries would also have been happy to claim that honour. An intelligent, complex and difficult man it is no surprise that Dorman-Smith has strongly divided opinion amongst historians with Correlli Barnett (no fan of Montgomery, one of many senior officers who Dorman-Smith did not get on with) being his most vociferous supporter. Barnett wrote a typically trenchant foreword defending Dorman-Smith in Lavinia Greacen's *Chink: A Biography* (1989). In it she argued that while Dorman-Smith was his own worst enemy he was also a military genius. Thirty five years later, comes

Military Maverick, her edited collection of his private papers and letters which formed an important source for her while writing *Chink*. While her biography was sympathetic it was not a hagiography and in this volume takes the same approach of being a critical friend. The inclusion of 'maverick' in the volume's title forewarns us that the military genius argument is no longer propounded by her.

The book covers the period from the outbreak of the First World War to Dorman-Smith's death in 1969 (by which time he had changed his name to Dorman-O'Gowan – a mark of his change from defending the British presence in Ireland to believing Dublin should govern all 32 counties of Ireland. The letters from the First World War are to his parents, are personal in nature, and describe army life; and from them there is no hint of how his experience affected his thinking in the Second World War, the letters and diaries between 1939 and 1944 discuss this in retrospect. From 1919 to 1939 there were two significant influences in his life. Firstly, his close friendship with Ernest Hemingway, his letters offer an insight into why Dorman-Smith did not fit in with his fellow officers. Secondly he started to make connections with what were considered by the War Office to be unorthodox military thinkers and treated with hostility by many. While at the Staff College he contacted Basil Liddel-Hart, which he was not permitted to do. The letters to Liddell Hart show the development of his military ideas and that he struggled to exercise patience with those who didn't share his views. Conflicts with men such as Montgomery and Ronald Penney at the Staff College would lead to his downfall.

By the outbreak of war in 1939 he was Director of Military Training in India where he continued to make enemies with his arrogant and impatient attitude. When the opportunity came, his superiors in India placed no obstacles to him taking up a new post in Haifa. He started to keep a diary and this together with his letters, from 1939 to 1944, form over half of the volume. They offer an insight to why he was never able to achieve the high rank his natural intelligence made him capable of. For much of the war he was underemployed, apart from the brief periods when he served he on the staff of Auchinleck before and during First El Alamein, and then at Anzio. When he was underemployed the entries are brooding, filled with exasperation and contempt for those he considered to be inferior to him. Wavell, Auchinleck and Major Rex Cohen, his Brigade Major in England and a successful businessman, who he respected, all warned him about the need to suffer fools gladly. It was advice he admitted in his diary he was incapable of taking. His ability to easily make enemies led to the end of his army career. When he arrived at Anzio, Penney who was his Divisional Commander made it clear he did not want Dorman-Smith. After Anzio, Penney engineered his dismissal from the army in a way which was unfair but most were happy to look the other way, such was his unpopularity. The final two chapters cover the period after his dismissal which is of less interest although it does include his attempts

to defend himself against post-war criticism of him, some in the deluge of memoirs by politicians and senior officers, and sometimes in the courts.

This edited volume is a welcome addition to the historiography of the Second World War as it draws on papers not available to the researcher, unlike the papers of other senior officers such as Alanbrooke. It's not unknown for an editor to select papers which show the subject in a favourable light but in this case the selection is one which shows both the strengths and weaknesses of Dorman-Smith. There are also numerous footnotes which provide extra information both about events and the individuals mentioned. Greacen does not claim to be a military expert and her commentary is supplemented by that of a military historian, John Lee, who provides explanations of the events before and during First El Alamein. The volume offers a valuable insight into why Dorman-Smith was a military maverick but certainly not a genius. It shows a picture of a complex and difficult man and as a result there was no shortage of candidates to be his worst enemy, one of whom was happy to end his army career.

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DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v11i2.1897

Richard Dannatt & Robert Lyman, *Korea: War Without End.* Oxford: Osprey, 2024. 328 pp., 7 maps, 31 photographs. ISBN 978-1472869753 (hardback). Price £25.00

The Korean War (1950-53) is often referred to in the West as having been 'forgotten'. Sandwiched between the unconditional surrender of Axis forces at the end of the Second World War and the failed intervention in Vietnam during the subsequent couple of decades, it is too often seen as an adjunct to the former or a precursor of the latter. Fought by Second World War commanders, using weapons that would not have been out of place on the battlefields of 1944 and 1945, it is perhaps far too easy to dismiss the conflict as 'more of the same'. However, the Korean War was an early manifestation of East-West tensions which would dominate the geo-political agenda through to the early 1990s and, so it seems, well into the twenty first century. In this ground-breaking book, the authors offer up a reassessment of the Korean War which will, no doubt, accentuate its' historical relevance. Additionally, elements of this this book can be viewed as a case study supporting conclusions reached by the authors in their 2024 collaboration, *Victory to Defeat.* Richard Dannatt and Robert Lyman, are, after all, particularly well qualified to address this topic. The former is a highly

decorated military commander and the latter, who attained the rank of Major in the British Army, a respected military historian.

The authors divide the Korean War into two distinct phases. The first was the United Nations (UN) led intervention following North Korea's unprovoked and illegal invasion of the Republic of South Korea (ROK) on 25 June 1950. Post 1945 military cutbacks left Western forces ill-prepared, and as a result the well-equipped and highly motivated Korean People's Army, the *In Mun Gun*, nearly achieved reunification, pushing the ROK forces, along with those of their UN sponsored allies, back into a pocket centred around the southern coastal city of Pusan. The book vividly describes the chaotic retreat. However, the allied lines eventually stabilised and Douglas MacArthur's masterful amphibious counter stroke at Inchon drove the North Koreans back to the original border. The authors argue that at this point, the UN's legitimacy was affirmed, and *jus ad bellum* (the right to wage war) had been achieved.

The second phase, the authors contend, was a catastrophic overreach. Despite President Truman's desire for de-escalation, UN forces invaded North Korea on 16 October 1950. This provoked a massive Chinese intervention, a threat MacArthur had dismissed. The controls which normally determine the parameters within which military commanders operate were lacking in that the US Government's policy of non-escalation was sidelined by a man who had accumulated an unprecedented amount of power and influence. The authors make a strong argument that whilst MacArthur excelled at the operational art, his appreciation of strategy was severely lacking. Indeed, MacArthur was replaced by Matthew Ridgway after the UN-led invasion of the North had failed to achieve the anticipated result – the reunification of Korea under the ROK president, Syngman Rhee.

Aside from strategic considerations, the authors offer up two further criticisms of the UNs prosecution of the war after the original 1950 line of delineation had been restored. The first concerns the legal justification for the UN led invasion of the North. Whilst the original intervention in June 1950 had legal legitimacy, the subsequent Allied counter stroke did not. The second criticism concerns the question of proportionality and the heavy toll paid by non-combatants. The number of civilian deaths was astronomical and outstrips in relative terms any previous war of recent memory. Indeed, North Korea lost over 16% of its' population and most cities north of the DMZ were reduced to rubble. However, while acknowledging the conflict could have ended earlier, the authors rightfully place overall responsibility for the war on Kim Il-sung.

Both phases of the war concluded at the 38th Parallel. Restoration of the status quo cost the Republic of China almost one million combatants. UN losses were of a much lower magnitude and many of them were incurred during the final year of the war,

when each side fought to consolidate their positions along the restored, albeit still fluid, border. Ridgway's leadership during this period is commended for holding the line and protecting South Korea. Whilst the final eighteen months of the war became a struggle to consolidate lines of control, the ferocity of the fighting should not be underestimated. To this point, a couple of chapters are devoted to the *Battle of Imjin River,* a heroic story of vastly outnumbered primarily British defenders achieving the seemingly impossible – akin to the defence of Kohima against the Japanese in 1944. The device of blending the comprehensive eye-witness account of a National Service Subaltern with a historians' view works well. The men of the British 29 Infantry Brigade had much to be proud, and no more so than the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment.

In summary, Dannett and Lyman offer a compelling critique of Allied conduct in the Korean War, drawing heavily on extensive primary and secondary resources, including the Truman Office Files (Harry S. Truman Library). The war ended in an armistice, not a peace deal and in the final two chapters the authors reflect on how it might have ended, and how it still might. By framing the conflict in two distinct phases, they have succeeded in elevating its' historical significance, hopefully raising awareness and promoting remembrance of the millions of lives lost in what was a particularly bloody conflict. A deeper understanding of what has gone before is crucial for future decisions, though reconciliation between North and South Korea remains elusive.

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES (July 2021)

General

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The editors are keen to encourage submissions from a variety of scholars and authors, regardless of their academic background. For those papers that demonstrate great promise and significant research but are offered by authors who have yet to publish, or who need further editorial support, the editors may be able to offer mentoring to ensure an article is successfully published within the Journal.

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The Journal's Editorial Team is responsible for commissioning book reviews and for approaching reviewers. From time to time a list of available books for review may be issued, together with an open call for potential reviewers to contact the Journal Editors. The policy of the BJMH is for reviews always to be solicited by the editors rather than for book authors to propose reviewers themselves. In all cases, once a reviewer has been matched with a book, the Editorial Team will arrange for them to be sent a review copy.

Book reviews should generally be of about 700 words and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

A review should summarise the main aims and arguments of the work, should evaluate its contribution and value to military history as broadly defined, and should identify to which readership(s) the work is most likely to appeal. The Journal does not encourage personal comment or attacks in the reviews it publishes, and the Editorial Team reserves the right to ask reviewers for revisions to their reviews. The final decision whether or not to publish a review remains with the Editorial Team.

The Editorial Team may seek the views of an author of a book that has been reviewed in the Journal. Any comment from the author may be published.

All submitted reviews should begin with the bibliographic information of the work under review, including the author(s) or editor(s), the title, the place and year of publication, the publisher, the number of pages, the ISBN for the format of the work that has been reviewed, and the price for this format if available. Prices should be given in the original currency, but if the book has been published in several territories including the UK then the price in pounds sterling should be supplied. The number of illustrations and maps should also be noted if present. An example of the heading of a review is as follows:

Ian F W Beckett, *A British Profession of Arms: The Politics of Command in the Late Victorian Army*. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 2018. Xviii + 350pp. 3 maps. ISBN 978-0806161716 (hardback). Price £32.95.

The reviewer's name, and an institutional affiliation if relevant, should be appended at the bottom of the review, name in Capitals and Institution in lower case with both to be right aligned.

Reviews of a single work should not contain any footnotes, but if the text refers to any other works then their author, title and year should be apparent in order for readers to be able to identify them. The Editorial Team and Editorial Board may on occasion seek to commission longer Review Articles of a group of works, and these may contain footnotes with the same formatting and standards used for articles in the Journal.

BJMH STYLE GUIDE (July 2021)

The BJMH Style Guide has been designed to encourage you to submit your work. It is based on, but is not identical to, the Chicago Manual of Style and more about this style can be found at:

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html

Specific Points to Note

Use Gill Sans MT 10 Point for all article and book review submissions, including footnotes.

Text should be justified.

Paragraphs do not require indenting.

Line spacing should be single and a single carriage return applied between paragraphs.

Spellings should be anglicised: i.e. –ise endings where appropriate, colour etc., 'got' not 'gotten'.

Verb past participles: -ed endings rather than –t endings are preferred for past participles of verbs i.e. learned, spoiled, burned. While is preferred to whilst.

Contractions should not be used i.e. 'did not' rather than 'didn't'.

Upon first reference the full name and title of an individual should be used as it was as the time of reference i.e. On 31 July 1917 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), launched the Third Battle of Ypres.

All acronyms should be spelled out in full upon first reference with the acronym in brackets, as shown in the example above.

Dates should be written in the form 20 June 2019.

When referring to an historical figure, e.g. King Charles, use that form, when referring to the king later in the text, use king in lower case.

Foreign words or phrases such as *weltanschauung* or *levée en masse* should be italicised.

Illustrations, Figures and Tables:

- Must be suitable for inclusion on an A5 portrait page.
- Text should not be smaller than 8 pt Gill Sans MT font.
- Should be numbered sequentially with the title below the illustration, figure or table.
- Included within the body of the text.

Footnoting:

- All references should be footnotes not endnotes.
- Footnote numeral should come at the end of the sentence and after the full stop.
- Multiple references in a single sentence or paragraph should be covered by a single footnote with the citations divided by semi-colons.
- If citation management software is used the footnotes in the submitted file must stand alone and be editable by the editorial team.

Quotations:

- Short (less than three lines of continuous quotation): placed in single quotation marks unless referring to direct speech and contained within that paragraph. Standard footnote at end of sentence.
- Long (more than three lines of continuous quotation): No quotation marks of any kind. One carriage space top and bottom, indented, no change in font size, standard footnote at end of passage.
- Punctuation leading into quotations is only necessary if the punctuation itself would have been required were the quotation not there. i.e. : ; and , should only be present if they were required to begin with.
- Full stops are acceptable inside or outside of quotation marks depending upon whether the quoted sentence ended in a full stop in the original work.

Citations:

- For books: Author, *Title in Italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year of publication), p. # or pp. #-#.
- For journals: Author, 'Title in quotation marks', *Journal Title in Italics*, Vol. #, Iss. # (or No.#), (Season/Month, Year) pp. #-# (p. #).
- For edited volumes: Chapter Author, 'Chapter title' in Volume Author/s (ed. or eds), *Volume title in italics*, (place of publication: publisher, year), p. # or pp. #-#.
- Primary sources: Archive name (Archive acronym), Catalogue number of equivalent, *'source name or description' in italics* if publicly published, p. #/date or equivalent. Subsequent references to the same archive do not require the Archive name.

- Internet sources: Author, 'title', URL Accessed date. The time accessed may also be included, but is not generally required, but, if used, then usage must be consistent throughout.
- *Op cit.* should be shunned in favour of shortened citations.
- Shortened citations should include Author surname, shortened title, p.# for books. As long as a similar practice is used for journals etc., and is done consistently, it will be acceptable.
- Ibid., with a full stop before the comma, should be used for consecutive citations.

Examples of Citations:

- Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21.
- Michael Collins, 'A fear of flying: diagnosing traumatic neurosis among British aviators of the Great War', *First World War Studies*, 6, 2 (2015), pp. 187-202 (p. 190).
- Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 510-526.
- The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917.
- Shilpa Ganatra, 'How Derry Girls Became an Instant Sitcom Classic', *The Guardian*, 13 February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2018/feb/13/derry-girls-instant-sitcom-classic-schoolgirls-northern-ireland Accessed 20 April 2019.

Note: Articles not using the citation style shown above will be returned to the author for correction prior to peer review.